Preservation of Potentially Exculpatory Evidence: Bad-Faith Requirement and Procedural Exhaustion in Federal Habeas Review

Introduction

This case arises from Mark Johnson’s federal habeas corpus petition following his 2018 convictions in Indiana state court for felony rape, felony criminal confinement, and misdemeanor battery. Johnson challenged (1) the exclusion of DNA‐from‐others evidence at trial and (2) the State’s disposal of the sexual‐assault victim’s blood sample without toxicology testing. After the Indiana courts rejected these claims, Johnson filed a § 2254 petition in federal district court. The district court denied relief, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. This commentary analyzes the court’s rulings on procedural default, the bad‐faith standard for preservation of potentially exculpatory evidence under Arizona v. Youngblood, and the broader impact on criminal procedure and habeas practice.

Parties:

Petitioner‐Appellant: Mark Johnson, convicted in Indiana of rape, confinement, and battery.
Respondent‐Appellee: Mark R. Sevier, Warden of Indiana State Prison.

Summary of the Judgment

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Johnson’s habeas petition. Key holdings:

Procedural Default: Johnson’s challenge to the trial court’s exclusion of DNA evidence from three unidentified men was defaulted because he failed to present it in his petition for transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court.
Bad‐Faith Requirement: Evidence that a sexual‐assault victim’s blood sample was destroyed before toxicology testing was merely “potentially useful.” Under Youngblood, due process is violated only if the prosecution acted in bad faith. The Indiana courts’ finding of no bad faith—based on Detective Smith’s credible testimony about a policy change—was neither unreasonable nor contrary to clearly established federal law.

Analysis

a. Precedents Cited

Brady v. Maryland (373 U.S. 83, 1963): Suppression of materially exculpatory evidence, regardless of good faith, violates due process.
Arizona v. Youngblood (488 U.S. 51, 1988): When evidence is only “potentially useful,” due process requires a showing of bad faith by the police to establish a violation.
California v. Trombetta (467 U.S. 479, 1984): Unpreserved breath samples in DWI cases did not violate due process because they were not obviously exculpatory and comparable evidence was available.
28 U.S.C. § 2254: Governs federal habeas relief for state prisoners, including the exhaustion requirement and the standards of review under AEDPA.
Lewis v. Sternes (390 F.3d 1019, 2004): To avoid procedural default, a habeas petitioner must present claims at all levels of state review, including discretionary review.
Hinesley v. Knight (837 F.3d 721, 2016): A claim not included in a petition for discretionary transfer is considered defaulted even if it was mentioned elsewhere.

b. Legal Reasoning

Procedural Default: Under § 2254(b)(1)(A) and (c), Johnson had to “fairly present” his due process claim regarding DNA evidence to the Indiana Supreme Court. His petition for transfer mentioned the exclusion only cursorily and did not argue a constitutional violation. Following Lewis and Hinesley, the Seventh Circuit held that discretionary review counts, and failure to raise the issue at that level bars federal habeas review absent cause and prejudice.

Bad Faith and Potentially Exculpatory Evidence: The Seventh Circuit applied the two‐step framework from Trombetta and Youngblood:

Determine whether the destroyed evidence had an “exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed.”
If only “potentially useful,” require a showing of bad faith by the police.

Johnson conceded the blood sample was only potentially useful—aimed at impeaching the victim’s sobriety. The trial court credited Detective Smith’s testimony that she believed toxicology testing remained standard procedure but was unaware of a policy change. Absent any evidence that she intentionally prevented testing or acted maliciously, the appellate court reasonably concluded there was no bad faith. Under AEDPA’s deferential review, this factual finding was not “objectively unreasonable.”

c. Impact

This decision reinforces two important principles:

Strict Exhaustion Requirement: Habeas petitioners must press every constitutional claim through state discretionary proceedings. Merely mentioning an issue without a developed argument does not satisfy the “fair presentation” rule.
High Bar for Bad‐Faith Finding: When evidence is only “potentially useful,” due process violation requires clear proof of prosecutorial or police bad faith. Honest mistakes or policy shifts—without malicious intent—will not suffice.

Future criminal and appellate practitioners should note that:

All exculpatory‐evidence preservation claims must be firmly grounded in proof of intentionality or bad faith.
Habeas petitioners must develop and press every argument at each state review level, even when review is discretionary.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Procedural Default: A rule that prevents federal courts from hearing a claim if it was not fully argued in state court, including discretionary appeals.
Brady Material: Evidence favorable to the defense. If suppressed, it violates due process.
Potentially Useful vs. Materially Exculpatory: “Materially exculpatory” evidence directly undermines guilt; “potentially useful” evidence might help the defense (e.g., impeach a witness). Only the latter triggers a bad-faith requirement under Youngblood.
AEDPA Deference: Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, federal courts must defer to state court factual findings unless they are objectively unreasonable.

Conclusion

Mark Johnson v. Sevier clarifies that in federal habeas proceedings:

Claims not fully presented to the state’s highest court are procedurally defaulted.
The State’s failure to preserve potentially useful evidence violates due process only upon a showing of bad faith.

The Seventh Circuit’s application of Youngblood and AEDPA’s deferential standard underscores prosecutorial and police discretion in evidence handling—so long as no intentional misconduct occurred—and emphasizes the critical importance of exhausting every legal argument in state court before seeking federal relief.