Preservation of Judicial Immunity for Public Bodies Under the New Mexico Civil Rights Act

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court of New Mexico’s decision in Bolen v. New Mexico Racing Commission (2025) clarifies a critical question under the recently enacted New Mexico Civil Rights Act (“CRA”): whether a public body may assert judicial immunity in defending a claim brought under the CRA. Petitioner Brad Bolen, a licensed horse trainer, sued the New Mexico Racing Commission (“NMRC”) under the CRA, alleging that NMRC pursued an administratively “vindictive prosecution” in retaliation for his protected speech and prior litigation. NMRC moved for summary judgment, invoking quasi-judicial immunity for its disciplinary proceeding. The district court held that judicial immunity was unavailable to a public body under the CRA; the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding both that the CRA preserves judicial immunity and that NMRC was entitled to it under the facts. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether judicial immunity can be raised by a public body in a CRA suit, and to articulate the scope of that immunity when the adjudication occurs in the executive branch.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court unanimously held that:

Judicial immunity—an absolute, function-based immunity originally developed to preserve the independence of the judiciary—was expressly preserved by the CRA in § 41-4A-10 and extends to public bodies sued under that Act.
The policy rationales supporting judicial immunity—protecting independent, impartial decision-making and safeguarding an established adjudicatory process from harassment—apply equally to governmental entities performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
The Court adopted a two-pronged framework for quasi-judicial immunity in the executive branch: (a) determine whether the administrative proceeding sufficiently resembles a judicial process using six factors derived from Butz v. Economou (1988); and (b) determine whether the challenged conduct is a judicial function (an “arm of the court” inquiry, per Collins v. Tabet (1991)).
Because the record did not permit a complete application of that framework, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ holding that NMRC was entitled to immunity on the existing summary-judgment record, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its newly articulated test.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Bradley v. Fisher (1871): Established the common-law roots of judicial immunity to protect judges from harassment and preserve public confidence in judicial independence.
Imbler v. Pachtman (1976): Recognized absolute immunity for prosecutors performing prosecutorial functions, as part of the “cluster” of immunities extending to courtroom participants.
Butz v. Economou (1978): Held that federal administrative hearing examiners and agency officials performing “adjudicatory” functions in executive agencies enjoy judicial immunity if their proceedings bear sufficient characteristics of a judicial process.
Stump v. Sparkman (1978): Confirmed that judicial immunity protects any judicial act within a judge’s jurisdiction, but not acts taken in “the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”
Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982) and Owen v. City of Independence (1980): Contrasted qualified immunity (personal capacity defense under § 1983) with absolute immunity, and discussed sovereign and official-capacity immunity distinctions in federal civil-rights law.
New Mexico decisions—including Edwards v. Wiley (1962), Galindo v. Western States Collection Co. (1970), Collins ex rel. Collins v. Tabet (1991), and Kimbrell v. Kimbrell (2014)—have applied and confined judicial/quasi-judicial immunity to judges, guardians ad litem, and other court-appointed officers performing judicial functions.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

Textual Construction: The CRA’s § 41-4A-10 explicitly provides that the Act’s bar on qualified immunity and waiver of sovereign immunity “shall not abrogate judicial immunity, legislative immunity or any other [] immunity.” Reading § 41-4A-3(C) (that CRA claims “shall be brought exclusively against a public body”) together with § 41-4A-10, the Court held that the Legislature intended to preserve judicial immunity as a defense available to public bodies.

Function over Person: Judicial immunity protects the function—not the individual—of officers essential to an impartial adjudicatory process. Extending immunity only to individuals but not to the entities they serve would undermine the doctrine’s purpose by enabling collateral suits against agencies for the same protected functions.

Distinction from § 1983 Jurisprudence: Federal law distinguishes individual-capacity (qualified/absolute immunity) from official-capacity suits (where only sovereign immunity applies); the CRA has no such distinction. Its plain text and legislative history demonstrate an intent to allow public bodies to raise judicial immunity despite prohibiting qualified immunity and waiving sovereign immunity.

Framework for Executive-Branch Adjudication: To avoid immunizing all administrative actions, the Court adopted a two-step test:

Proceeding Analysis (per Butz v. Economou): Does the administrative adjudication share these six “judicial” characteristics?
- Insulation of decision-makers from harassment
- Procedural safeguards reducing need for private damages actions
- Independence from political control
- Use of precedent or consistency in decision‐making
- Adversarial presentation of evidence
- Error correction through review or appeal
Function Analysis (per Collins v. Tabet): Was the challenged conduct a “judicial” or “quasi-judicial” function integral to the proceeding, rather than a purely administrative or personal act?

The CRA defendant bears the burden to prove each element of immunity. Absent a sufficient record on these inquiries, summary judgment is premature.

3.3 Impact

This ruling will shape future CRA litigation and administrative practice in New Mexico:

Defensive Strategy for Public Bodies: Agencies can now raise judicial immunity when performing adjudicatory functions that satisfy the two-step test. This may bar certain claims for damages or delay proceedings until immunity is resolved.
Clarity for Courts: The Butz-Collins framework provides lower courts with a concrete roadmap for evaluating quasi-judicial immunity in executive-branch proceedings.
Preservation of Judicial Independence: By insulating adjudicators—individuals and agencies alike—from collateral liability, the decision protects the integrity of administrative processes that replicate judicial functions.
Balance of Remedies: While immunity may shield agencies in appropriate cases, the CRA’s broad waiver of sovereign immunity and elimination of qualified immunity ensures plaintiffs retain robust access to remedies against non-judicial and unconstitutional acts.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

New Mexico Civil Rights Act (CRA): A state law (2021) allowing suits for deprivation of rights under the New Mexico Constitution, exclusively against governmental entities (“public bodies”), with damages and injunctive relief.
Judicial Immunity: An absolute immunity that protects judges—and those performing core judicial/adjudicatory functions—from lawsuits over their official actions, even if allegedly wrong.
Qualified Immunity: A defense in federal civil-rights litigation (§ 1983) shielding government officials from damages unless they violated clearly established federal rights—which the CRA eliminated for state-law claims.
Sovereign Immunity: The doctrine that a government cannot be sued without its consent—the CRA waived this immunity for CRA claims but preserved other immunities (e.g., judicial, legislative) by § 41-4A-10.
Quasi-Judicial Function: A formal proceeding in which an administrative body investigates facts, hears evidence, and renders binding decisions much like a court (“an arm of the court”).

5. Conclusion

Bolen v. New Mexico Racing Commission establishes that judicial immunity—rooted in promoting independent, impartial adjudication—is preserved by the CRA and extends to public bodies performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The Court’s two-step Butz-Collins framework ensures immunity is confined to truly adjudicatory contexts, balancing the CRA’s remedial goals with the need to protect vital decision-making processes from harassment and collateral litigation. By affirming immunity’s availability, reversing the Court of Appeals on the immunity determination, and remanding for further fact-driven inquiry, the Supreme Court has provided lower tribunals and litigants with clear guidance on the scope of absolute immunity under New Mexico’s landmark civil rights law.