Introduction

State of West Virginia v. Lawrence Davonn Foye, decided May 20, 2025 by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, addresses what burden of proof applies at a final parole‐revocation hearing under West Virginia law. Lawrence Foye, a parolee convicted of fleeing in a vehicle with reckless indifference, was accused of violating his parole conditions by using illegal drugs, associating with a “disreputable person,” and engaging in conduct leading to his indictment for first‐degree murder. The circuit court revoked his parole, applying what it termed a “reasonable cause” standard. Foye appealed, contending he was entitled to a higher burden of proof. The Supreme Court affirmed, held that the statute’s “reasonable cause” standard must be read in harmony with due‐process requirements and dictates proof by a preponderance of the evidence at the final hearing.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the Kanawha County circuit court’s revocation order. It resolved two threshold questions:

• Mootness: Although Foye completed his sentence and pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit murder during the appeal, the Court invoked the public‐interest exception and addressed the merits to provide guidance for future cases.
• Burden of Proof: The Court interpreted “reasonable cause” in W.Va. Code § 62-12-10(a)(1) to mean proof by a preponderance of the evidence, reconciling the statutory language with constitutional due‐process requirements articulated in Morrissey and Gagnon.

Applying that standard, the Court found undisputed evidence that Foye admitted to marijuana use and consorted with a disreputable co‐defendant, plus corroborated hearsay and cell‐phone data linking him to the murder‐indictment conduct. The record therefore supported revocation.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• State v. Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) – Established minimum due‐process safeguards for parole revocation, including a final hearing “based on more than probable cause.”
• Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) – Extended Morrissey’s due‐process requirements to probation revocation.
• Sigman v. Whyte, 165 W.Va. 356, 268 S.E.2d 603 (1980) – In absence of statutory guidance, held contested probation violations require proof by a clear preponderance of the evidence.
• Louk v. Haynes, 159 W.Va. 482, 223 S.E.2d 780 (1976) – Adopted Morrissey/Gagnon procedural safeguards under West Virginia law.
• State v. Duke, 200 W.Va. 356, 489 S.E.2d 738 (1997) and State v. Hosby, 220 W.Va. 560, 648 S.E.2d 66 (2007) – Defined appellate review standards for probation revocations.
• State ex rel. Lilly v. Carter, 63 W.Va. 684, 60 S.E. 873 (1908) and State ex rel. McCabe v. Seifert, 220 W.Va. 79, 640 S.E.2d 142 (2006) – Set forth the mootness rule.
• Israel by Israel v. W. Va. Secondary Schs. Activities Comm’n, 182 W.Va. 454, 388 S.E.2d 480 (1989) and State v. Merritt, 221 W.Va. 141, 650 S.E.2d 240 (2007) – Articulated exceptions to the mootness doctrine.
• State ex rel. Appalachian Power Co. v. Gainer, 149 W.Va. 740, 143 S.E.2d 351 (1965) and State v. Legg, 207 W.Va. 686, 536 S.E.2d 110 (2000) – Reminded that statutory construction must preserve constitutionality.

Legal Reasoning

1. Mootness and Public‐Interest Exception
• Under Lilly/McCabe, an appeal from a revoked‐parole order ordinarily becomes moot once the sentence is completed.
• The Court applied the Merritt/Israel factors and held that due‐process rules for parole revocation are of great public interest and warrant resolution despite factual mootness.

2. Burden of Proof for Final Revocation Hearings
• W.Va. Code § 62-12-10(a)(1) authorizes revocation when the court “finds reasonable cause to believe” the parolee violated conditions. The statute does not define “reasonable cause.”
• Morrissey requires that the final hearing be based on more than probable cause; Sigman had supplied a clear preponderance standard when the statute was silent.
• By 2013 amendment, the Legislature implicitly rejected Sigman’s “clear preponderance” phrasing yet intended compliance with due‐process minimums. The Court read “reasonable cause” to mean the ordinary civil standard of proof—preponderance of the evidence.
• This construction preserves the statute’s constitutionality and balances the State’s interest in community safety against a parolee’s conditional liberty interest.

3. Evidence Sufficiency on the Record
• Foye conceded two violations (marijuana use; contact with a disreputable person).
• The State’s third allegation rested on hearsay from a confidential source but was corroborated by cell‐phone location data, video footage, and the fact that a magistrate found probable cause for murder charges based on similar information.
• Hearing officers may consider reliable hearsay at revocation hearings; the record contained sufficient corroboration to satisfy preponderance of the evidence.

Impact

• Clarifies that West Virginia’s final parole/probation revocation hearings require proof by a preponderance of the evidence, aligning with many jurisdictions and federal practice.
• Provides a uniform standard of proof, reducing uncertainty and divergent lower‐court practice.
• Reinforces that due‐process protections (notice, disclosure of evidence, hearing, confrontation rights) remain mandatory, even under a “flexible” civil standard.
• Guides defense and prosecuting attorneys, parole officers, and trial courts on evidentiary and procedural requirements for revocation proceedings.
• Limits arguments premised on “reasonable cause” as akin to probable cause, insisting on a more rigorous civil burden.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Preponderance of the Evidence: More likely than not. If the court believes there is a greater than 50% chance the violation occurred, the standard is met.
• Probable Cause: A lower standard; sufficient facts to lead a prudent person to believe a violation occurred. Used for arrests, not final revocations.
• Mootness Doctrine: Courts generally will not decide cases where events have removed the practical effect of a ruling—unless important public‐interest exceptions apply.
• Due‐Process Safeguards: Even though revocation hearings are not criminal trials, parolees must receive notice of violations, disclosure of evidence, a hearing before a neutral decision‐maker, and a written statement of reasons.
• Hearsay with Corroboration: Out‐of‐court statements can be used if there are independent indicia of reliability—cell‐phone records, security video, official charging documents.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Foye establishes that West Virginia Code § 62-12-10(a)(1)’s requirement of “reasonable cause” for final parole or probation revocation hearings must be read to impose a preponderance‐of‐the‐evidence standard. This harmonizes the statute with Morrissey/Gagnon due‐process mandates and creates consistency for future revocation proceedings. The ruling underscores that parolees’ conditional liberty interests demand more rigorous proof than mere probable cause, yet remain subject to a civil‐style burden rather than the criminal “beyond a reasonable doubt” threshold. Practitioners and courts now have clear guidance on both the procedural protections and evidentiary standard required in West Virginia’s parole and probation revocation processes.