PREP Act Immunity Does Not Preempt State-Law Negligence Claims in Assisted-Living Facility Cases

Introduction

The case of Laura Hudak, Executrix of the Estate of William P. Koballa, deceased, v. Elmcroft of Sagamore Hills et al. (58 F.4th 845) addresses critical questions about the interplay between federal immunity provisions under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) and state-law negligence claims. This commentary explores the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's decision, which affirmed the remand of Hudak's state-law negligence claims against Elmcroft, an assisted-living facility, back to state court. The key issue revolves around whether the PREP Act's immunity provisions preempt Hudak's state-law claims, thereby allowing Elmcroft to remove the case to federal court.

Summary of the Judgment

In this case, Laura Hudak filed a wrongful death lawsuit in Ohio state court after her father, William P. Koballa, died from COVID-19 while residing in an Elmcroft assisted-living facility. Elmcroft sought to remove the case to federal court, asserting immunity under the PREP Act. The district court denied removal, determining that Hudak's state-law claims were not preempted by the PREP Act. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the PREP Act does not provide a basis for removal under §1441(a) or the federal-officer removal statute §1442(a)(1) because Hudak's claims did not fall within the narrow exception of willful misconduct as defined by the PREP Act.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The court extensively referenced several key precedents to establish the boundaries of the PREP Act's immunity provisions:

• Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003): Established the "well-pleaded complaint rule" for determining federal question jurisdiction.
• CATERPILLAR INC. v. WILLIAMS, 482 U.S. 386 (1987): Differentiated between complete preemption and ordinary preemption under the Supremacy Clause.
• Mays v. City of Flint, 871 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2017): Outlined the de novo standard of review for subject-matter jurisdiction determinations.
• Davila v. Jacobson, 542 U.S. 200 (2004): Clarified that preemption is a defense, not a basis for removal, unless the claim arises under a completely preemptive statute.
• Maglioli v. All. HC Holdings LLC, 16 F.4th 393 (3d Cir. 2021); Mitchell v. AdvancedHCS, L.L.C., 28 F.4th 580 (5th Cir. 2022); and others: Addressed the scope of PREP Act immunities in similar contexts, leading to divergent interpretations across circuits.

These precedents collectively shaped the court's understanding of the PREP Act's reach, particularly distinguishing between immunity as a defense and immunity as a basis for preemption of state-law claims.

Legal Reasoning

The court applied a meticulous three-step analysis to determine whether Hudak's claims could be removed to federal court:

• General Removal Under §1441(a): The court evaluated whether Hudak's claims "arise under" federal law using the well-pleaded complaint rule. It concluded that the PREP Act’s general immunity provision constitutes ordinary preemption—a defensive measure—not a complete preemption that would convert state-law claims into federal ones. Since Hudak did not allege willful misconduct as defined by the PREP Act, her negligence claims remained within the state sphere.
• Federal-Officer Removal Under §1442(a)(1): The court assessed whether Elmcroft was "acting under" a federal officer, a requirement that entails a direct subjection, guidance, or control by the federal government. Elmcroft failed to demonstrate such a relationship, as its adherence to federal COVID-19 guidelines did not equate to performing tasks under federal supervision.

The court emphasized that the PREP Act’s exclusive federal cause of action is narrowly tailored to cases involving willful misconduct that directly relates to the administration or use of covered countermeasures. Hudak's claims, focused on negligence rather than willful misconduct, did not meet this criterion.

Impact

This judgment clarifies the limitations of the PREP Act's immunity provisions, particularly in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. By affirming that general negligence claims are not preempted, the decision ensures that individuals can pursue state-law remedies against entities like assisted-living facilities for lapses in care and safety. This has significant implications for future litigation, reinforcing that federal immunity under the PREP Act does not shield negligent conduct unless it falls within the specific exception of willful misconduct.

Furthermore, the decision underscores the importance of the well-pleaded complaint rule in determining federal jurisdiction, ensuring that state-law claims retain their place within the state judicial system unless explicitly preempted by federal law.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit's affirmation in Hudak v. Elmcroft serves as a pivotal interpretation of the PREP Act's scope concerning state-law negligence claims. By delineating the boundaries between defensive preemption and complete preemption, the court ensures that federal immunity provisions do not unduly limit access to state courts for genuine claims of negligence. This decision not only reinforces the autonomy of state judicial systems in handling such matters but also encourages entities like assisted-living facilities to maintain high standards of care without the overhang of broad federal immunity. As public health emergencies continue to pose unprecedented challenges, this judgment provides essential guidance on the balance between federal authority and state-level accountability.