Introduction

In Tescil Romalis Mason-Kimmons v. State of Minnesota, decided November 5, 2025, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the denial of postconviction relief and held that the defendant established prejudice under the Sixth Amendment where his trial counsel advised him to plead guilty because counsel was unprepared to go to trial. The Court emphasized that the prejudice inquiry in ineffective assistance of counsel claims arising from guilty pleas must focus on the defendant’s decision-making and may be proved by contemporaneous evidence demonstrating a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient advice, the defendant would have insisted on going to trial.

The case stems from a 2017 Minneapolis homicide. After a grand jury indicted Mason‑Kimmons for first-degree murder, his privately retained counsel repeatedly sought continuances, explicitly stating on the record that he was unprepared and that proceeding to trial would amount to ineffective assistance, deny a fair trial, and violate due process. Following the denial of a continuance—and against a backdrop of late discovery—the defendant pled guilty to second-degree intentional murder for a 366-month sentence. His subsequent postconviction petition argued, among other grounds, ineffective assistance during plea negotiations.

The key legal issue before the Supreme Court was narrow but consequential: whether the defendant suffered prejudice under Strickland v. Washington where counsel’s constitutionally deficient performance consisted of advising a plea due to counsel’s own lack of trial readiness. Applying Hill v. Lockhart and Lee v. United States, the Court held that a reasonable probability existed that the defendant would have gone to trial but for counsel’s deficient advice, warranting plea withdrawal.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that Mason-Kimmons satisfied the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. There was no dispute that counsel’s performance was deficient—counsel admitted he was unprepared and advised a guilty plea for that reason, and the court of appeals had already so held in an earlier phase of the case. The Supreme Court then examined whether a reasonable probability existed that the defendant would have insisted on going to trial but for the deficient advice. It concluded that such a probability exists, based on:

• Contemporaneous evidence at the plea hearing where the defendant tied his decision to the inability to interview newly identified witnesses.
• The plea timeline: the defendant declined to engage with the State’s same 366‑month offer until after counsel declared on the record that he was unprepared and would render ineffective assistance if forced to try the case.
• Unresolved suppression motions that could have excluded significant State evidence and, thus, affected the defense’s assessment.
• Evidence supporting a viable misidentification defense (witness descriptions and video suggesting the shooter’s physical characteristics differed from the defendant’s), as well as credibility issues with a key State witness (W.S.) whose statements shifted.

While acknowledging the State had substantial evidence, the Court reiterated that the prejudice inquiry may not turn solely on the likelihood of conviction. Because both Strickland prongs were satisfied, it reversed and remanded with instructions to allow plea withdrawal.

The Court did not reach two additional issues accepted for review: the defendant’s structural-error argument under United States v. Cronic, and whether the court of appeals engaged in improper factfinding. It did, however, note an error by the court of appeals in stating that the defendant bought a gun, a fact not supported by the record.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): Provides the two-prong test for ineffective assistance—deficient performance and prejudice. The Court applied Strickland’s framework and treated the question as a mixed issue of law and fact reviewed de novo.
• Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985): In the plea context, prejudice requires a reasonable probability that the defendant would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on trial but for counsel’s errors. The Minnesota Supreme Court used Hill to define the prejudice standard here.
• Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357 (2017): Reinforces that the prejudice inquiry focuses on the defendant’s decision-making and cannot hinge solely on the strength of the State’s case. It also authorizes reliance on contemporaneous evidence (rather than post hoc assertions) to substantiate a defendant’s claim about what he would have done. The Court leaned heavily on Lee to assess the plea timeline, the defendant’s statements at the plea hearing, and the broader context.
• Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590 (Minn. 2017); Petersen v. State, 937 N.W.2d 136 (Minn. 2019): Confirm standards of review for postconviction denials and embedded legal issues.
• Scruggs v. State, 484 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. 1992): Affirms Strickland’s applicability to requests for new trials and postconviction relief in Minnesota.
• Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984): These decisions underscore the centrality of counsel to a fair adversarial process and informed defendant decision-making. The Court invoked these to explain why counsel’s preparedness and advice are constitutionally pivotal during plea bargaining—a critical stage.
• Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162 (Minn. 2012): Defines clear-error review for factual findings.
• Dunn v. National Beverage Corp., 745 N.W.2d 549 (Minn. 2008); Lehman v. Hansord Pontiac Co., 74 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1955): Appellate courts cannot make findings of fact, though they may recognize facts conclusively established by the record. The Court flagged but did not resolve whether the court of appeals crossed that line.

Collectively, these authorities oriented the Court’s analysis: adhere to Strickland and Hill, apply Lee’s focus on the defendant’s choice and contemporaneous proof, and treat the question through the lens of the totality of the circumstances rather than the State’s perceived trial strength alone.

Legal Reasoning

The Supreme Court’s reasoning proceeded in three principal steps.

1. Deficiency was established. The State conceded, and the court of appeals had already held, that advising a guilty plea because counsel was unprepared for trial falls below an objective standard of reasonableness. Counsel’s own statements in court—pledging that going forward would be ineffective assistance and deny a fair trial—cemented the point.
2. The proper lens for prejudice is the defendant’s decision-making, supported by contemporaneous evidence. The Court emphasized that it would not rely solely on post hoc claims. It identified contemporaneous indicia showing the plea decision was driven by counsel’s unpreparedness:
   • The defendant’s plea-hearing statement: “you didn’t give us no time to speak to the other witnesses.”
   • The plea timeline: the State offered the same 366-month deal on August 1; the defendant did not engage until after August 9 when counsel declared unpreparedness on the record; he accepted the same term on August 13.
   • Unresolved suppression motions kept the admissibility of significant evidence uncertain, which could reasonably affect a decision to go to trial.
   • Credibility problems with W.S., a key State witness, whose accounts shifted after a probation arrest—providing fertile ground for impeachment.
   • A plausible misidentification defense from witness descriptions and video that arguably did not match the defendant’s height, build, and complexion.
3. The strength of the State’s case is relevant but not dispositive. While noting substantial inculpatory evidence (prior feud, threats on a recorded call, the use of a vehicle linked to the defendant’s then‑girlfriend, ammunition found at home), the Court stressed, consistent with Lee, that prejudice cannot be resolved simply by predicting trial outcomes. Even defendants who face long odds may rationally choose trial. Moreover, here, the State’s case had vulnerabilities at the time of the plea: material evidence potentially subject to suppression, and a key witness of questionable reliability.

The Court rejected the State’s suggestion that the district court had implicitly discredited defense testimony about the defendant’s intent to go to trial. The district court made no express credibility finding as to the defendant or his counsel on that point; it found only that the prosecutor credibly described the strength of the State’s evidence. The Supreme Court refused to infer broader credibility determinations from that narrow finding.

The Court also identified errors that had crept into earlier proceedings. The district court had relied on non-existent “negative pretrial rulings” in evaluating prejudice; the court of appeals rightly labeled that clearly erroneous. And the Supreme Court independently flagged a court-of-appeals misstatement that the defendant had purchased a gun—unsupported by the record.

Weighing all factors—the contemporaneous plea-hearing statement; the plea timeline and refusal to negotiate until after counsel’s on-the-record declaration of unpreparedness; unresolved evidentiary issues; the availability of an arguable defense; and, on the other side of the ledger, a meaningful benefit for a third party (leniency for E.R.D.)—the Court concluded this was a “close question” but that the totality of the circumstances created a reasonable probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the proposition that the defendant would have pled guilty absent counsel’s deficient advice. Relief was warranted.

Impact and Implications

This decision fortifies and operationalizes Lee’s defendant-centered prejudice analysis in Minnesota’s plea-bargaining context. The principal impacts include:

• Plea prejudice is not hostage to State-case strength. District courts must focus on “what this defendant would have done” and may not dispose of prejudice solely by deeming conviction likely at trial.
• Contemporaneous evidence matters. Statements at the plea hearing, the timing and content of plea negotiations, and the procedural posture (e.g., unresolved suppression issues, late discovery) are all weighty in proving or disproving prejudice.
• Counsel’s unpreparedness is uniquely dangerous. Where the record shows counsel advised a plea because of counsel’s own lack of readiness, courts will scrutinize prejudice closely; the client’s trust in counsel is constitutionally central. Advising a plea to cure counsel’s deficiency can establish both deficiency and prejudice.
• Explicit credibility findings are essential. District courts should make clear credibility determinations in postconviction proceedings, especially where the defendant and trial counsel testify to intent and causation regarding the plea decision.
• Discovery practices and continuances carry downstream constitutional risk. Late disclosures that constrain defense investigation, coupled with denied continuances, can bear on both performance and prejudice analyses—and potentially lead to plea withdrawals years later.
• Appellate caution on factfinding. Although not resolved here, the Court reiterated that appellate courts must avoid independent factfinding beyond what is conclusively established in the record.

Practically, defenders should document trial readiness, investigation efforts, and advice given during plea discussions; prosecutors should avoid late discovery disclosures that precipitate avoidable constitutional problems; and trial courts should be meticulous in ruling on continuances and suppression issues and in creating a clear record at plea hearings about the voluntariness of the plea and counsel’s preparedness.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC): A claim that trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness (deficiency) and that this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant (Strickland).
• Prejudice in plea cases (Hill standard): The defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would have rejected the plea and gone to trial.
• Reasonable probability: Less than “more likely than not.” It is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome—in this context, the outcome being the decision to plead guilty.
• Contemporaneous evidence: Evidence from the time of the plea decision (e.g., statements at the plea hearing, negotiation timeline) that corroborates what the defendant would have done absent counsel’s errors. Courts distrust purely post hoc assertions.
• Structural error (Cronic): Rare errors that affect the framework of the trial and warrant presumption of prejudice (e.g., complete denial of counsel). The Court did not decide whether counsel’s unpreparedness here rose to structural error, because it found actual prejudice under Strickland.
• Totality of the circumstances: A holistic assessment that includes the strength of the State’s case, potential defenses, procedural posture (e.g., pending motions), and the human dynamics of plea bargaining, not just predicted trial outcomes.

Key Facts and Procedural Timeline

• September 2017: John Lacy is shot in Minneapolis; surveillance shows a shooter in a blue hoodie; a green Subaru (owned by the defendant’s then‑girlfriend) is involved.
• Charges: Initially second-degree murder; later, a grand jury indicts for first-degree murder and ineligible person in possession of a firearm.
• Discovery and witness W.S.: Initially unhelpful to the State; later, after a probation arrest, W.S. implicates the defendant—raising credibility concerns.
• August 1, 2018: State offers a 366-month second-degree plea; the defendant does not respond.
• August 9, 2018: Counsel states on the record he is unprepared, proceeding would be ineffective assistance, and the defendant would not get a fair trial; continuance denied.
• August 10–13, 2018: First plea negotiations occur; on the scheduled trial date, the defendant accepts the same 366-month deal; the State also agrees to leniency for the co‑defendant (then‑girlfriend).
• Postconviction: Multiple remands. Court of appeals recognizes deficient performance; later remands for proper prejudice analysis; district court again denies relief; court of appeals affirms; Supreme Court reverses and orders plea withdrawal.

Conclusion

The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision establishes an important precedent: when counsel advises a guilty plea because counsel is unprepared to try the case, prejudice under Strickland can be proven through contemporaneous evidence demonstrating a reasonable probability the defendant would have gone to trial absent that deficient advice. The opinion confirms that the prejudice analysis centers on the defendant’s choice—not merely on the perceived strength of the State’s case—and that plea-stage dynamics, including late discovery, unresolved suppression issues, and the timing of negotiations, are crucial to that inquiry.

For Minnesota practice, the case underscores rigorous duties on defense counsel to prepare for trial before advising a plea, instructs district courts to make explicit credibility findings and avoid reliance on nonexistent rulings, and cautions appellate courts against independent factfinding. More broadly, it strengthens the constitutional guarantees that protect the integrity of plea bargaining, ensuring that guilty pleas reflect informed, autonomous decisions rather than the fallout of counsel’s unpreparedness.