Precision Controls Scope: Tenth Circuit Limits Arbitrator Authority to Precisely Submitted Issues in Labor Arbitration

Introduction

In HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC v. United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union Local 11-574, the Tenth Circuit clarified a consequential boundary in labor arbitration. When parties precisely cabin the issue they submit to arbitration, an arbitrator may not decide different or additional issues—even if the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) might otherwise permit arbitration of those subjects. The case arose from HollyFrontier’s conversion of its Cheyenne petroleum refinery into a renewable diesel facility, a change that shifted laboratory work from hourly Lab Testers (in the bargaining unit) to salaried Chemists (non-unit). The Union grieved the reassignment of work. After the arbitrator ruled that the CBA permitted the Chemist role and the reassignment, he went further—on his own initiative—directing the parties to address whether Chemists should be in the bargaining unit, and then later ordered that Chemists be included.

HollyFrontier petitioned to vacate the accretion-style remedy on the ground that the Union had never submitted bargaining unit composition to arbitration. The district court agreed. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit (Judge Eid, joined by Judge Moritz) affirmed, holding that the arbitrator exceeded his powers under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) by deciding an unsubmitted issue. Judge Phillips dissented, arguing that courts owe the same high deference to an arbitrator’s framing of the submitted issues as they owe to the arbitrator’s contract interpretation and merits rulings, and that the Union’s invocation of the recognition clause brought unit membership within the arbitrator’s remit.

Summary of the Opinion

The majority held that the parties’ submissions to the arbitrator precisely presented only one substantive question: whether HollyFrontier violated the CBA by reassigning laboratory work from bargaining unit Lab Testers to salaried Chemists. Because neither party submitted whether Chemists should be included in the bargaining unit, the arbitrator exceeded his authority when he directed and then decided that Chemists must be accreted into the unit.

The court emphasized two limiting principles:

Arbitration is a creature of contract. Judicial deference applies only to disputes the parties agreed to submit. When submissions are clear and precise, arbitrators must “stay within the areas marked out for [their] consideration.”
Parties can limit an arbitrator’s authority by (a) a precise statement of the issues submitted or (b) express limitations in the CBA. Where submissions are precise, courts look first and foremost to those submissions; only if they are vague do courts look beyond to the CBA to delineate the arbitrator’s power.

Applying these principles, the Tenth Circuit concluded the arbitrator’s November 2022 decision mandating inclusion of Chemists in the bargaining unit was ultra vires and properly vacated. The court distinguished decisions that defer to an arbitrator’s scope determinations where the submission is broad or ambiguous; here, the parties’ submissions were clear and narrow.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574: Establishes the foundational principle that a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute it has not agreed to arbitrate. The majority used Warrior & Gulf to anchor the threshold inquiry—did the parties agree to arbitrate the specific dispute the arbitrator decided?
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614: Reinforces that a reviewing court’s “first task” is to determine whether parties agreed to arbitrate the relevant dispute. The panel applied this to separate deference to merits from agreement on scope.
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593: Announces the “essence” test and admonition that arbitrators must not go beyond the submission. The majority invoked Enterprise Wheel’s “stay within the areas marked out” language to vacate the award beyond the submission.
Retail Store Employees Union Local 782 v. Sav-On Groceries, 508 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1975): A controlling Tenth Circuit case vacating an award that granted relief beyond a narrow, specific submission. The court analogized: as in Sav-On, a precise submission constrains arbitrator authority, and relief beyond it is void.
United Food & Commercial Workers, Local Union No. 7R v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 889 F.2d 940 (10th Cir. 1989): Confirms two ways parties limit arbitrator authority—by precise submission or express CBA limits; courts look to the CBA only if the submission is vague. The majority relied heavily on Safeway to focus the analysis on the text of the parties’ issue statements.
Dish Network L.L.C. v. Ray, 900 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 2018) and Foster v. Turley, 808 F.2d 38 (10th Cir. 1986): Reiterate narrow review and deference to arbitrators’ merits decisions—up to the boundary of issues the parties actually submitted.
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Public Service Co. of Oklahoma, 636 F.3d 562 (10th Cir. 2010): The dissent’s lodestar for deferring to an arbitrator’s scope determination. The majority distinguished it: in Burlington, the contested finding was “directly related” to issues the parties submitted; here, bargaining unit composition was never submitted.
Out-of-circuit authorities (e.g., El Dorado, Metromedia, Richmond Fredericksburg & Potomac, Pack Concrete, Verizon Florida, Madison Hotel, NFLPA v. NFL) were examined primarily via the dissent. The majority found them distinguishable or noted that even those courts defer only when submissions are broad or ambiguous and do not require “blind deference” where submissions are clear.
FAA 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4): Provides the vacatur vehicle—arbitrators who “exceed their powers” produce awards subject to vacatur. The majority placed the case squarely within § 10(a)(4).

Legal Reasoning

The Tenth Circuit’s reasoning proceeds in three steps.

Step 1: Identify the submission. The court examined the parties’ arbitration briefs. The Union’s submission asked whether HollyFrontier violated the CBA “when they replaced bargaining unit employees with salaried personnel to perform laboratory work” and sought cease-and-desist relief, return of work “to the bargaining unit,” reinstatement of Lab Testers, and a make-whole remedy. HollyFrontier framed the issue similarly—did it violate the CBA by determining work assignments, qualifications, and staffing?

The arbitrator himself characterized the “primary issue” as whether HollyFrontier violated the CBA when it created the Chemist position and reassigned work—and he answered that question in HollyFrontier’s favor.
Step 2: Apply the submission rule. Citing Safeway and Sav-On Groceries, the majority emphasized that when parties submit a “precise statement of the issues,” the arbitrator is confined to those issues. Courts consult the CBA only if the submission is vague. The “challenged provisions” clause in this CBA reinforced that the arbitrator’s “sole authority” was to interpret/apply the “challenged provision(s),” but the decisive constraint came from the parties’ precise submission itself.

The court rejected the Union’s argument that mere references to Article 1 (recognition) or broad catch-all prayers for relief implicitly submitted bargaining unit composition. It also rejected the Union’s assertion that alleging a violation of a “broad” CBA provision (Article 1, § 1.01) pulled all related issues—including unit membership—within the arbitrator’s power. Nothing in the Union’s framing asked to add Chemists to the unit; instead, the Union sought to stop use of Chemists and restore work to Lab Testers.
Step 3: Distinguish deference to arbitrators. The majority acknowledged the customary “great deference” to arbitral merits determinations but limited that deference to disputes the parties agreed to arbitrate. Because the parties never agreed to arbitrate bargaining unit composition, the arbitrator’s accretion-style ruling drew no deference and exceeded his powers under § 10(a)(4).

Burlington Northern did not change the analysis: there, the challenged determination was “directly related” to issues actually submitted; here, the arbitrator introduced a separate, unsubmitted question. Likewise, out-of-circuit cases that defer to an arbitrator’s scope determinations typically involve broad submissions or ambiguity—conditions not present here.

The dissent would apply extreme deference to the arbitrator’s understanding of what the parties submitted, arguing that the Union specifically invoked the recognition clause and that, under a broad arbitration clause and the presumption of arbitrability, the arbitrator permissibly resolved unit status as a contractual question, with concurrent jurisdiction vis-à-vis the NLRB. The majority responded implicitly: deference begins only after we confirm the parties agreed to arbitrate that particular dispute; here, the submissions were precise and did not include accretion or unit composition.

Impact

The decision re-centers Tenth Circuit law on a clear, administrable rule: precise submissions constrain arbitral authority, and courts will not defer to arbitrators who expand the scope. Key practical implications include:

Submission discipline. Parties should expect courts in the Tenth Circuit to read the submission as written. If a party wants an arbitrator to decide recognition, accretion, or representation-related questions, it must clearly and expressly submit them. References to a broad CBA provision or catch-all remedies will not suffice.
Arbitrator restraint. Arbitrators should avoid directing parties to litigate new issues that neither side tendered. Retaining jurisdiction (post-award) does not create authority to decide unsubmitted subjects.
Drafting strategy. Counsel should consider a joint, written submission agreement that precisely lists each question for decision and, where appropriate, expressly includes (or excludes) recognition/accretion issues. Absent such clarity, the arbitrator risks vacatur if a court later finds the submission was narrow.
CBA architecture. “Challenged provisions” clauses that limit arbitrators to interpreting “challenged provision(s)” amplify the submission constraint. Unions should be deliberate: invoking a recognition clause in a grievance letter is not enough unless the submission asks the arbitrator to resolve unit composition.
NLRB and concurrency. The court did not hold that arbitrators may never decide recognition or accretion questions; it held only that they may not do so when the parties did not submit those questions. Parties wanting an arbitral resolution of representational matters should signal that clearly—or consider pursuing the issue at the NLRB.
Appellate alignment. The dissent flagged a potential circuit split, urging deference to arbitrators’ scope determinations. The majority countered with Tenth Circuit precedent (Sav-On Groceries, Safeway) and distinguishing Burlington. Practitioners should expect the Tenth Circuit to continue enforcing the “precise submission controls” rule unless and until altered en banc or by the Supreme Court.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Arbitrability vs. scope of submission:
- Arbitrability asks: Did the parties agree in the CBA to arbitrate this type of dispute at all? Courts decide this de novo unless clearly delegated.
- Scope of submission asks: What specific questions did the parties actually present to the arbitrator in this case? In the Tenth Circuit, when submissions are clear and precise, the arbitrator must not stray beyond them.
Accretion (representation) vs. recognition clause:
- Accretion is an NLRB concept describing addition of employees to an existing unit without an election when they share a community of interest.
- A CBA recognition clause identifies the unit the union represents. An arbitrator might interpret a recognition clause in a contractual dispute if the parties submit that issue, but cannot assume authority to decide unit composition absent submission.
“Challenged provisions” clause:
- A CBA term limiting an arbitrator’s “sole authority” to interpreting/applying those CBA provisions that are actually challenged in the grievance. It narrows remedial discretion to the issues the parties put in play.
FAA § 10(a)(4) (“exceeded powers”):
- A federal ground for vacating an award when an arbitrator acts outside the authority the parties conferred—such as deciding issues they did not submit.
Enterprise Wheel “essence” test:
- An award must draw its essence from the CBA and reflect the arbitrator’s interpretation of the contract—not the arbitrator’s own brand of justice. But even a well-reasoned award fails if it resolves an issue the parties did not submit.
Catch-all prayers for relief:
- Generic requests like “make the Union whole in all ways” do not expand the arbitrator’s authority beyond the specific issues submitted. Relief must be tethered to the submitted question.

Conclusion

HollyFrontier reinforces a clean contractual boundary in labor arbitration within the Tenth Circuit: when parties precisely define the issue submitted, that precision controls the arbitrator’s jurisdiction. Courts will not defer to an arbitrator’s expansion of scope to reach unsubmitted subjects—even if the arbitrator views those subjects as intertwined and even if the CBA contains broad arbitration language. The decision synthesizes and strengthens prior Tenth Circuit doctrine (Sav-On Groceries; Safeway) and distinguishes Burlington Northern by anchoring deference to the scope of what the parties actually submitted.

For practitioners, the lesson is straightforward: draft submissions—and relief requests—carefully. If you want the arbitrator to decide recognition or accretion, say so explicitly. Arbitrators, in turn, should resist the pull to decide logically related but unsubmitted issues. In the Tenth Circuit, precision at the submission stage is the key that unlocks arbitral authority; without it, even a thoughtful award risks vacatur under § 10(a)(4).