Precise Pleading of EEOC Charges Under the ADEA: Timing and Substance

Introduction

This commentary examines the Third Circuit’s decision in Glenda Dianne Brooks v. Harrisburg Area Community College, No. 24-1800 (3d Cir. May 12, 2025). Brooks, a faculty career counselor and adjunct professor at HACC, sued her employer under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), alleging discriminatory acts beginning in July 2019. The central procedural issue was whether Brooks satisfied the ADEA’s condition precedent—filing a “charge” with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 300 days of the discriminatory acts—by submitting an October 1, 2019 “inquiry form” and later cooperating in an EEOC interview. Harrisburg Area Community College moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), contending that Brooks had not properly pled a timely “charge.” The District Court agreed and dismissed her amended complaint with prejudice. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed, emphasizing (1) the strict pleading requirements for EEOC charges under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(c) and (2) the bar on curing pleading defects by argument in briefs.

Summary of the Judgment

The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of Brooks’s ADEA claim. Key holdings:

Brooks specifically alleged in her amended complaint that she filed a “claim” with the EEOC on October 1, 2019. She did not use the §1626 regulations’ term “charge,” creating ambiguity about whether she satisfied the 300-day filing prerequisite.
EEOC regulations and Supreme Court precedent (Holowecki) require a “charge” to be a written document naming the respondent and requesting remedial action. The October 1 inquiry form lacked any explicit or inferable request that the EEOC activate its remedial machinery.
Brooks later submitted interview notes and an agency activity log from January 2020 showing that an EEOC representative intended to prepare a charge for her signature. But because her amended complaint did not allege a January filing and she had not moved to amend her complaint, these materials could not cure the pleading defect under Rule 9(c) or alter the alleged date of filing.
The Court reiterated that “a complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss” (Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Mount Prospect Chiropractic Ctr., 98 F.4th 463 (3d Cir. 2024)), and affirmed dismissal with prejudice.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

28 U.S.C. § 1331; 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1) (ADEA jurisdiction & filing period)
Establish federal‐question jurisdiction and require a charge to the EEOC within 300 days of an alleged discriminatory act.
Hildebrand v. Allegheny County, 757 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2014)
Holds that timely EEOC filing is a “condition precedent” to suit under the ADEA and must be pled generally but with enough clarity to identify the date of filing.
Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F.3d 851 (3d Cir. 2000)
Confirms that Pennsylvania, as a “deferral state,” is subject to the ADEA’s 300-day charge-filing requirement.
Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 535 U.S. 106 (2002)
Clarifies that Title VII’s charge-filing requirement has technical prerequisites distinct from the ADEA, but serves as background for understanding “charge” in the EEOC context.
29 C.F.R. §§ 1626.6, 1626.8
Set forth technical requirements for an EEOC charge: it must be in writing, name the respondent, generally allege discriminatory acts, and request agency action.
Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389 (2008)
Imposes the “request‐to‐act” requirement: a filing must be “reasonably construed as a request for the agency to take remedial action” to qualify as a charge.
Michelson v. Exxon Rsch. & Eng’g Co., 808 F.2d 1005 (3d Cir. 1987); Bihler v. Singer Co., 710 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1983)
Articulate that a written EEOC filing must “manifest an intent to activate the Act’s machinery” to be valid.
Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Mount Prospect Chiropractic Ctr., 98 F.4th 463 (3d Cir. 2024)
Reinforces that a complaint cannot be amended by briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss; plaintiffs must allege the essentials in their pleadings.

Legal Reasoning

Pleading a Condition Precedent: Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(c), Brooks could plead the EEOC‐filing requirement generally, but she expressly alleged that the filing occurred on October 1, 2019. She never amended her complaint to allege a later date.
Definition of “Charge”: The court applied 29 C.F.R. § 1626.6 and Holowecki to hold that a “charge” must be a written filing naming the respondent and requesting the EEOC to investigate or otherwise protect the employee’s rights.
Inquiry Form Insufficient: The October 1, 2019 inquiry form—though identifying Brooks and HACC—did not request remedial action; it was merely a pre-charge document inviting EEOC follow-up, not an activation of the agency’s enforcement machinery.
No Pleading by Briefs: Brooks sought to rely on January 2020 interview notes and EEOC activity logs to demonstrate that a charge was in the works. The court held that these post-complaint materials could not amend her pleading or change the alleged charge date.
De Novo Review & Final Judgment Rule: The Third Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo, confirmed that the District Court properly considered only the complaint and attached documents, and affirmed the with-prejudice dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Impact

This decision reinforces several important practices in employment discrimination litigation under the ADEA:

Precision in Pleadings: Plaintiffs must specify the exact date and nature of their EEOC charge in their complaints. A generic allegation of “filing a claim” will not suffice.
Early Compliance with Charge Rules: Counsel should ensure that the EEOC submission is labeled a “charge,” names the respondent, and includes a request for agency action to avoid waiver of the exhaustion requirement.
Limited Role of Briefs: Plaintiffs cannot use briefs or later submissions to amend the date or substance of critical factual allegations about administrative exhaustion.
Guidance for Deferral States: Employers and employees in deferral states must remain vigilant about the 300-day ADEA deadline and the technical form of EEOC submissions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Charge vs. Inquiry: A “charge” is a formal EEOC filing that (1) is in writing, (2) names the employer, (3) generally alleges discrimination, and (4) requests the agency’s remedial action. An “inquiry form” is preliminary—used to gather information—but does not start the EEOC’s enforcement process.
Deferral State: A state with its own anti-discrimination agency. Filing with the state agency can satisfy the federal ADEA’s 300-day deadline.
Condition Precedent: A specific event that must occur before a legal claim can proceed. Under the ADEA, filing an EEOC charge within the statutory period is a condition precedent.
Rule 9(c): Federal rule allowing general pleading of conditions precedent unless the statute or regulations require greater detail.
Chevron, Auer, Skidmore Deference: Doctrines governing judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes and regulations. Here, the court applied Holowecki’s reading of EEOC regulations under these frameworks to define what constitutes a charge.

Conclusion

In Brooks v. HACC, the Third Circuit clarified that compliance with the ADEA’s administrative‐exhaustion requirements hinges on properly pleading a timely EEOC “charge.” This decision underscores that plaintiffs must use correct terminology, follow EEOC filing rules, and allege the date of filing precisely in their complaints. Attempts to cure pleading defects through briefs or extrinsic materials are insufficient. By holding strictly to these principles, the court promotes transparency, fairness, and predictability in age‐discrimination litigation, ensuring that claims advance on their merits only after clear satisfaction of statutory prerequisites.