Precedential Requirement for Adversarial Hearings on Excludable Time under CPL 30.30

Introduction

The case of The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Diane E. Clark, Defendant-Appellant (2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 1463) represents a significant development in the application of statutory speedy trial rights under CPL 30.30. The defendant, Diane E. Clark, challenged her conviction for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, contending that the County Court improperly calculated the chargeable delay by excluding certain periods without an adversarial hearing. Central to the dispute was the methodology used to exclude periods of delay – notably, the court’s propria decision to exclude time not argued for by the People – and whether adequate party participation had been provided in light of the statutory expectations. This commentary examines the background, key issues, legal reasoning, precedents, and future implications of this decision.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of New York, Fourth Department, on appeal from a Steuben County Court judgment, held that the lower court erred in its handling of defendant Diane E. Clark’s CPL 30.30 motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds. Although the defendant had provided a sworn allegation that an unexcused delay of 189 days exceeded the statutory maximum, the county court had excluded 41 days – determined sua sponte – without holding a hearing, relying on evidence not contained in the record. The appellate court reversed this exclusion by emphasizing that any determination of excludable time must be made following an adversarial proceeding when a factual dispute exists. The case is therefore remitted to the county court for a proper hearing on the disputed time periods (July 16, 2021 to August 31, 2021 and August 6, 2021 to August 31, 2021) as raised by the People in their opposition papers.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Judgment cites several critical precedents which collectively reinforce the necessity of conducting adversarial hearings in the determination of excludable delays:

People v. Barden, 27 N.Y.3d 550: This case reiterates that when an accusing instrument includes a felony, the People must be ready for trial within six months, after subtracting excludable time.
People v. Barnett, 158 A.D.3d 1279: The decision in Barnett provides clarity on the computation of the statutory period, emphasizing the need to subtract excludable delays and add any post-readiness delays attributable to the People.
PEOPLE v. CORTES, 80 N.Y.2d 201: Quoted by Barnett, Cortes offers a foundation for understanding the statutory framework governing exclusion periods.
PEOPLE v. SANTOS, 68 N.Y.2d 859: Santos establishes that once a defendant shows evidence of unexcused delay exceeding six months, the burden shifts to the People to demonstrate that portions of the delay should be excluded.
PEOPLE v. GRUDEN, 42 N.Y.2d 214: This case underscores that a hearing must occur when a factual dispute arises regarding the excludability of time, as demonstrated by the People’s opposition papers in the present case.
PEOPLE v. BERKOWITZ, 50 N.Y.2d 333: Berkowitz supports the principle that any determination of excludable time made absent an adversarial proceeding is procedurally improper.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s legal reasoning pivots on the statutory scheme of CPL 30.30 and the necessity for adversarial process in resolving factual disputes over excludable periods. The defendant demonstrated that an unexcused delay had occurred according to the statutory measure, thus shifting the burden to the People. In response, the People attempted two distinct arguments concerning the time periods when the case should not be chargeable to them:

The first argument posited that from July 16, 2021, when a plea offer was extended to the defendant until August 31, 2021, the delay should not be charged to the People due to the defendant’s consideration of the offer.
The alternative argument maintained that the subsequent period from August 6, 2021, following a missed pretrial appearance, should be excluded pursuant to CPL 30.30(4)(c)(i).

Crucially, the court found that because these contested periods were identified in the People’s opposition papers, it was imperative to hold a hearing to provide the defendant a fair chance to contest the exclusion of time. The county court’s sua sponte determination, supported by documents not filed in the record, violated the adversarial process guaranteed by precedent.

Impact

This Judgment is poised to have a significant impact on future speedy trial motions in New York. By mandating that adjustments to the computation of excludable time – when contested by the prosecutorial side – require a formal adversarial hearing, the ruling reinforces the importance of fairness and procedural due process. Future cases involving CPL 30.30 motions will likely see a stricter adherence to the procedure established in PEOPLE v. SANTOS and PEOPLE v. GRUDEN, ensuring that any exclusion of delay periods is subject to thorough judicial scrutiny and party participation. This approach prevents courts from unilaterally excluding time without affording defense counsel the opportunity to contest such findings.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Several legal terms and concepts featured in the Judgment merit further explanation:

Excludable Time: This refers to periods during which delay in the prosecution process can be subtracted from the total time elapsed between the filing of the first accusatory instrument and the People’s declaration of trial readiness. Not all delay is considered excusable under the law; only those periods explicitly recognized by statute or by mutual agreement are eligible for exclusion.
Sua Sponte Investigation: This occurs when a judge independently examines additional evidence or issues not raised by either party. In this case, the lower court’s decision to exclude time based on suo motu review, rather than relying solely on the parties’ arguments, was found to be improper because it bypassed the adversarial process.
Adversarial Hearing: This is a judicial proceeding in which both parties are given the opportunity to present competing evidence and arguments. Here, the absence of such a hearing prevented the proper examination of disputed facts regarding the excludable periods.

Conclusion

In summary, the Judgment in The People of the State of New York v. Diane E. Clark clarifies that when a defendant raises a CPL 30.30 motion predicated on alleged unexcused delays, any factual dispute regarding which periods should be excluded from the statutory computation must be resolved through an adversarial hearing. The Court’s repudiation of the county court’s sua sponte exclusions underscores a commitment to ensuring that both sides have a fair opportunity to contest disputed evidence. This resolution has far-reaching implications, as it reinforces the obligation of the People to specifically detail any periods of delay they seek to exclude and to justify those exclusions before the court. Ultimately, the case serves as an important precedent for maintaining the balance between prosecutorial efficiency and the defendant’s right to a fair review in the speedy trial context.