Precedent on Religious Discrimination in Educational Funding: A.H. v. French

Precedent on Religious Discrimination in Educational Funding: A.H. v. French

Introduction

In the landmark case of A.H., by and through her parents and natural guardians, James Hester and Darlene Hester, et al. vs. Daniel M. French, adjudicated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on January 15, 2021, the court addressed significant issues concerning the intersection of public educational funding and religious freedom. The plaintiffs, including A.H., a senior at Rice Memorial High School—a Roman Catholic institution—challenged the Vermont Agency of Education's (AOE) Dual Enrollment Program (DEP) eligibility criteria. The crux of the dispute revolved around the DEP's "publicly funded" requirement, which excluded students from religious schools from accessing dual-enrollment benefits unless their tuition was publicly funded. The district court had previously denied a preliminary injunction, a decision that the appellate court ultimately reversed.

Summary of the Judgment

The appellate court found that the district court had abused its discretion by denying the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The DEP's eligibility requirements, which effectively barred religious school students in "Sending Districts" from participating unless their tuition was publicly funded, were deemed unconstitutional under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. The court emphasized that denying DEP benefits solely based on the religious status of a school imposes an unconstitutional burden on the free exercise of religion. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the district court's decision, ordering the AOE to permit A.H. to participate in the DEP pending the final resolution of the case.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The court's decision heavily relied on two pivotal Supreme Court cases: Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer and Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue. In Trinity Lutheran, the Court held that a state's exclusion of a religious institution from a neutral, generally applicable public benefit program constitutes unconstitutional discrimination based on religious status. Similarly, Espinoza reinforced that states cannot disqualify religious schools from participating in generally available public benefit programs solely based on their religious character.

Additionally, the judgment referenced Chittenden Town School District v. Department of Education, where the Vermont Supreme Court interpreted the state's Compelled Support Clause, creating ambiguity around public funding for religious schools. This precedent highlighted the challenges and uncertainties in administering public funds in a manner that respects both educational needs and religious freedoms.

Legal Reasoning

The court applied strict scrutiny to evaluate whether the DEP's "publicly funded" requirement unjustly discriminated against religious school students. Under this standard, the state must demonstrate a compelling interest and that the law is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. The court determined that the AOE failed to present any compelling state interest that would justify the exclusion of religious schools from the DEP, especially in light of the Supreme Court's rulings in Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza.

Furthermore, the court scrutinized the AOE's arguments that the DEP was neutral and generally applicable. By focusing primarily on "Sending Districts" where religious schools are excluded unless publicly funded, the DEP was found to disproportionately impact religious institutions. The absence of "adequate safeguards" to prevent public funding from supporting religious activities further solidified the argument of status-based discrimination.

Impact

This judgment sets a significant precedent in the realm of educational funding and religious freedom. By affirming that exclusionary funding practices based solely on religious status violate the Free Exercise Clause, the decision compels educational agencies to reassess and potentially revise eligibility criteria to ensure they are free from religious discrimination. Future cases involving public funding and religious institutions will likely reference this decision, reinforcing the necessity for neutrality and equal access in public benefit programs.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Dual Enrollment Program (DEP)

The DEP allows high school students to enroll in college courses, with the state covering tuition costs. This program aims to enhance educational opportunities and prepare students for postsecondary education.

Sending vs. Non-Sending Districts

  • Sending Districts: These districts do not maintain their own public high schools and instead send students to other public or approved independent schools, sometimes using public funds to cover tuition.
  • Non-Sending Districts: These districts have their own public high schools and do not send students to other schools for public funding.

Compelled Support Clause of Vermont's Constitution

This clause prohibits the state from using public funds to support religious worship or maintain ministers, thereby restricting financial support to religious institutions unless adequate safeguards are in place.

Free Exercise Clause

Part of the First Amendment, it protects individuals' rights to practice their religion freely without government interference or discrimination.

Conclusion

The appellate court's reversal in A.H. v. French underscores the judiciary's role in upholding constitutional protections against religious discrimination in public funding programs. By invalidating the DEP's exclusionary criteria based on religious status, the court reinforces the principle that public programs must be administered in a manner that is neutral and inclusive, ensuring that religious institutions are not unfairly disadvantaged. This decision not only impacts the immediate parties involved but also serves as a guiding framework for future cases where the delicate balance between public funding and religious freedom is at stake.

Case Details

Year: 2021
Court: United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit

Judge(s)

John M. Walker, Jr., Circuit Judge

Attorney(S)

Jacob P. Warner, Alliance Defending Freedom, Scottsdale, AZ (Ryan J. Tucker, Alliance Defending Freedom, Scottsdale, AZ; David A. Cortman, Alliance Defending Freedom, Lawrenceville, GA; Kristen K. Waggoner, John J. Bursch, Alliance Defending Freedom, Washington, DC; Thomas E. McCormick, McCormick, Fitzpatrick, Kasper & Burchard, P.C., Burlington, VT, on the Brief), for Plaintiffs-Appellants. John T. Alexander, Assistant Attorney General (Benjamin D. Battles, Solicitor General; Rachel E. Smith, Assistant Attorney General, on the brief), Office of the Attorney General, Montpelier, VT, for Defendant-Appellee.

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