Precautionary Closed Hiring Interviews and Reputation Protection Under Iowa’s Open Meetings Act

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Iowa’s decision in Robert Teig v. Brad Hart, Tyler Olson, Ann Poe, Patrick Loeffler, Dale Todd, Scott Olson, and Ashley Vanorny (No. 24-0029, filed November 25, 2025) marks an important clarification of when governmental bodies in Iowa may lawfully conduct hiring interviews in closed session. The case centers on the interpretation of Iowa Code § 21.5(1)(i), which allows closed sessions “to evaluate the professional competency of an individual … when necessary to prevent needless and irreparable injury to that individual’s reputation and that individual requests a closed session.”

The dispute arose after the Cedar Rapids City Council interviewed an internal candidate for city clerk in a closed session. A citizen, retired attorney Robert Teig, contended this closure violated Iowa’s Open Meetings Act because the council had no specific, evidence-based reason to fear reputational harm. The city council members argued that hiring interviews are inherently unpredictable and that, when a candidate asks for closure, a precautionary decision to close the interview is “necessary” to protect reputation within the meaning of § 21.5(1)(i).

The district court sided with the council; the Iowa Court of Appeals reversed, insisting on an individualized, evidence-based finding of reputational risk. The Supreme Court granted further review, vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision, and affirmed the district court. In doing so, it adopted a “precautionary” interpretation of “necessary to prevent needless and irreparable injury to … reputation” in the context of hiring and other personnel evaluations.

This commentary explains the decision, the precedents it draws upon, the Court’s legal reasoning, and the likely impact on open government, hiring practices, and future litigation under Iowa’s Open Meetings and Open Records Acts.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The hiring interview and the closed session

On April 29, 2021, the Cedar Rapids City Council held a special meeting—conducted online due to COVID-19— to interview Alissa Van Sloten, an internal candidate then serving as interim city clerk. Present were council members Tyler Olson, Ann Poe, Patrick Loeffler, Dale Todd, Scott Olson, and Ashley Vanorny, along with Mayor Brad Hart.

The posted agenda listed a single item, “Interview of City Clerk candidate,” and stated that the meeting “may be closed pursuant to Iowa Code Section 21.5(1)(i) (2021).” Before the meeting, Van Sloten submitted a written request that the interview be held in closed session under § 21.5(1)(i).

At trial, she testified that she was concerned about the “unknown”:

Q: When you sent this request, were you concerned that there might be harm to your reputation if you were interviewed in public?
A: I never know what's going to happen … so, yes. … I don't know if something may have been asked. I don't know how council would have felt about anything that I would have done. It's similar to a performance appraisal, so. … It's the unknown. It's the unknown.

She further testified that she would not have applied if she believed the interview would be public, and that a public interview would have been livestreamed and archived indefinitely on the City’s social media.

The council had prepared standard, substantive interview questions, including prompts about dealing with angry customers, persuading skeptical colleagues, and reflecting on past mistakes and lessons learned—precisely the sort of inquiries that can elicit discussion of sensitive or potentially negative information about a candidate’s performance, judgment, and interpersonal relationships.

At the outset of the meeting, in open session, the mayor announced the purpose of the meeting and the intent to conduct the interview in closed session. He read into the record the statutory basis in § 21.5(1)(i). Council member Scott Olson moved to enter a closed session; the members present voted unanimously to do so (aside from one member who joined after the vote).

Council members later testified that they did not know of any specific negative information about Van Sloten, but believed that in any candid interview unanticipated reputationally damaging information might surface—the candidate might acknowledge past mistakes, other members might raise concerns, and so on. They also testified that they viewed closure as a way of respecting the candidate’s request and protecting her reputation in light of the unpredictable nature of an interview.

Once in closed session, the council discussed the hiring process and interviewed the candidate. No negative information ultimately emerged; the interview was positive, and the council later agreed to offer her the position, which was formally approved at a subsequent open meeting.

B. Teig’s complaint and the district court’s decision

Immediately after the closed session, Teig emailed the city attorney and council members asking for the factual basis supporting closure and questioning how a job interview could “result in injury to the applicant’s reputation.” Within a month, he filed suit under Iowa’s Open Meetings Act, seeking statutory damages and injunctive relief.

After a two-day bench trial, the district court held that the mayor and council members had not violated § 21.5. The court framed the “fighting issue” as whether the closed session was “necessary to prevent needless and irreparable injury” to the candidate’s reputation. It ruled that the statute did not require the council to possess specific negative information or to make an individualized evidence-based finding of reputational danger. It was enough that the candidate requested closure and that, given the nature of an interview, members reasonably feared unpredictable reputational harm—so long as the closed session was in fact limited to evaluating professional competency.

C. The Court of Appeals’ reversal

The Court of Appeals reversed, adopting a more demanding interpretation of “necessary.” It required:

“Evidence” that closure was necessary to prevent reputational harm; and
Further inquiry by the governmental body into the need for closure.

The Court of Appeals proposed a two-step process: the body could initially meet in a “limited closed session” to identify potential reputationally damaging topics, then open the interview to the public for non-sensitive matters, closing and reopening only as needed. This, it thought, would both satisfy the statutory standard and address concerns about “unrung bells”—once something damaging is said publicly, closure cannot undo the harm.

D. Supreme Court review

The Supreme Court granted further review. It received amicus briefing on both sides:

In support of Teig / openness: The Iowa Freedom of Information Council; the State of Iowa also participated as amicus.
In support of the council / flexibility for government bodies: The Iowa League of Cities, the Iowa State Association of Counties, and the Iowa Association of School Boards.

The Court ultimately vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision and affirmed the district court, upholding the legality of the closed hiring interview.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

Justice Mansfield, writing for a unanimous court, held:

Under Iowa Code § 21.5(1)(i), a governmental body may adopt a reasonable, precautionary assumption that closing a hiring or employment-related evaluation is “necessary to prevent needless and irreparable injury” to a candidate’s reputation when:
- (a) the individual is being evaluated for appointment, hiring, performance, or discharge; and
- (b) that individual expressly requests a closed session.
The body need not possess specific evidence of a particular reputational threat before closing the session.
The proper focus is ex ante: whether closing the session was a reasonable prophylactic measure to prevent possible reputational injury—not whether negative information actually emerged during the interview.
The Court rejected the Court of Appeals’ “segment-by-segment” approach (constantly opening and closing a meeting as topics shifted). That approach, it held, is strained, impractical, and inconsistent with both the statutory text (which refers to “a closed session” for evaluation) and the realities of interviews and performance reviews.
The Court emphasized that § 21.5(1)(i)’s reputational-protection language is not surplusage: it functions to ensure that closure is limited to protecting the individual’s reputation, not to conceal illegitimate dealings such as corrupt hiring arrangements. Bad-faith closures remain unlawful.
The decision harmonizes § 21.5(1)(i) (Open Meetings Act) with § 22.7(18) (Open Records Act), which allows governmental bodies to keep outside job applications confidential. It avoids an “inherently unworkable” regime where external candidates’ applications are confidential but their interviews would have to be public.
Regarding the closed-session minutes and recording, the Court held that they must remain sealed and are not public records, even though they were produced to Teig in discovery under § 21.5(5)(b)(1). Party access does not equate to public access.
The Court rejected Teig’s claim that the trial court “closed the courtroom.” No one was excluded; there simply were no other attendees besides the parties and counsel.

In short, the Supreme Court endorsed a pragmatic, prophylactic reading of § 21.5(1)(i) in the personnel context, while reaffirming that Iowa’s open meetings law is to be construed liberally in favor of openness subject to the exceptions the legislature has chosen to provide.

IV. Interpreting Iowa Code § 21.5(1)(i)

A. The statutory text and its elements

Iowa Code § 21.5(1) permits a governmental body to enter a closed session by a supermajority vote, but “only to the extent [it] is necessary” for listed purposes. Subsection (1)(i) provides one such purpose:

To evaluate the professional competency of an individual whose appointment, hiring, performance, or discharge is being considered when necessary to prevent needless and irreparable injury to that individual's reputation and that individual requests a closed session.

Thus, for a lawful closed session under § 21.5(1)(i), four conditions must coexist:

The subject is an “individual” whose appointment, hiring, performance, or discharge is under consideration.
The session’s purpose is to evaluate that individual’s professional competency.
Closure is “necessary to prevent needless and irreparable injury” to the individual’s reputation.
The individual requests a closed session.

This case concerned the third condition: what does it mean for closure to be “necessary” to prevent reputational injury?

B. Competing interpretations: evidence-based vs precautionary

The Court of Appeals read “necessary” to require evidence of an actual reputational threat before the meeting is closed. In its view:

A mere request by the individual was insufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement.
The governmental body had to conduct a further inquiry into why closure was necessary.
The statute could be implemented by starting with a short closed session to identify sensitive topics and then opening and closing the meeting as needed.

The Supreme Court instead adopted a precautionary, contextual reading:

“Necessary” is a flexible term whose content depends on context.
In the context of employment evaluations and hiring interviews, where questions and answers are inherently unpredictable, it is not realistic to know in advance which topics might arise that could damage reputation.
When an individual requests closure for such an evaluation, it is reasonable and lawful for the governmental body to assume that closing the session is “necessary” to prevent reputational harm, because there is no practical, less intrusive way to guarantee protection while still allowing candid evaluation.

Accordingly, the council did not need to know of specific adverse information about Van Sloten or to conduct a mini-trial on reputational risk before voting to close the session.

C. The Court’s contextual reading of “necessary”

To support its contextual interpretation of “necessary,” the Court invoked both federal and Iowa precedents.

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413–14 (1819).
Chief Justice Marshall famously analyzed the “necessary and proper” clause, explaining that “necessary” “admits of all degrees of comparison” and is often used flexibly, closer to “appropriate” or “convenient” than to “absolutely indispensable.”
Nehring v. Smith, 49 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Iowa 1951) (quoting Getchell & Martin Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Des Moines Union Ry., 87 N.W. 670, 671 (Iowa 1901)).
Iowa cases have similarly recognized that “necessary” is often used as analogous to “expedient” or “appropriate.”

The Court also emphasized that what is “necessary” depends on what one is trying to prevent. Here the target is “needless and irreparable injury” to reputation. Reputation, as reflected in the Shakespeare epigraph from Othello, is fragile; once damaged publicly, it is difficult (often impossible) to restore. This fragility justifies a more precautionary standard:

The legislature’s choice of “irreparable” signals a concern with harms that cannot be undone.
Once a reputationally damaging statement is made publicly (especially in the age of livestreaming and permanent online archives), the harm is done.
A prophylactic approach—closing the session where unpredictable, reputationally sensitive exchanges are likely—is thus reasonable and fits the statutory language “necessary to prevent.”

The Court rejected Teig’s argument that because no negative information emerged during the interview, closure was never “necessary.” It analogized to a fire extinguisher:

A fire extinguisher doesn't become unnecessary just because it isn't used. Thus, the relevant inquiry should not be whether harmful information came up during the interview, but whether [the challenger] has an alternative, workable approach that would have ensured in advance that no harm would befall [the candidate’s] reputation.

V. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. McCulloch and Iowa’s “necessary” jurisprudence

The Court’s reliance on McCulloch v. Maryland and the Iowa cases Nehring and Getchell & Martin is not merely rhetorical. It grounds the reading of “necessary” in a long-standing interpretive tradition:

“Necessary” does not automatically impose a standard of absolute minimality or require immediate, concrete proof of need.
Instead, the term is compatible with a range of measures that are reasonably calculated to achieve the protective goal, especially where the stakes are irreparable harm.

This tradition allowed the Court to reject the Court of Appeals’ rigid insistence on pre-identified factual “evidence” of reputational harm as a prerequisite to closure.

B. Telephone Herald, Inc. v. City of Dubuque, 297 N.W.2d 529 (Iowa 1980) (en banc)

Telegraph Herald was a foundational Iowa case interpreting the Open Meetings Act. It held, among other things:

The Act should be interpreted to avoid “strained, impractical or absurd results.”
Interviews conducted with fewer than a majority of council members present were not “meetings” under the Act.

The Supreme Court here repeatedly cites Telegraph Herald to frame its approach:

It invokes the “avoid impractical or absurd results” canon to criticize the Court of Appeals’ stop-start-open-close approach as unwieldy and inconsistent with the structure of § 21.5(1)(i).
It warns that if interviews in closed session become too legally risky, councils might revert to Telegraph Herald-style workarounds (serial, less-than-quorum interviews) to evade the definition of “meeting,” thereby decreasing actual transparency.

C. Donahue v. State, 474 N.W.2d 537 (Iowa 1991) (en banc)

In Donahue, the Court declared that Iowa’s open meetings law “is to be liberally construed” and that ambiguities in its construction or application “should be resolved in favor of openness,” echoing Iowa Code § 21.1.

Justice Mansfield reaffirms that principle, but adds a crucial qualification:

“It was however for the legislature to set its parameters.” … We hold that the decision to close the [hiring] interview … at her request and to protect against harm to her reputation, complied with those legislative parameters.

Thus, the Court views the exceptions in § 21.5—especially one that expressly addresses reputational harm—as legislatively chosen limits on the default rule of openness. Liberal construction favors openness within those parameters; it does not authorize courts to override or narrow clear statutory exceptions based on their own policy preferences.

D. Open Records cases: City of Sioux City v. Greater Sioux City Press Club, 421 N.W.2d 895 (Iowa 1988); Clymer v. City of Cedar Rapids, 601 N.W.2d 42 (Iowa 1999); Teig v. Chavez, 8 N.W.3d 484 (Iowa 2024); and Diercks v. Scott County, 17 N.W.3d 364 (Iowa 2025)

The Court also situates its interpretation of § 21.5(1)(i) within the framework of the Open Records Act, especially Iowa Code § 22.7(18), which protects from disclosure certain communications made to government bodies by persons outside government.

City of Sioux City v. Greater Sioux City Press Club.
The Court held that job applications from external candidates are confidential under § 22.7(18) because disclosure would discourage people from applying, thereby depriving the public of qualified applicants. The Court described the legislature’s goal as protecting “a broad category of useful incoming communications” from disclosure.
Clymer v. City of Cedar Rapids.
The Court reiterated that the legislature “cloaked employment applications with privacy.”
Teig v. Chavez, 8 N.W.3d 484 (Iowa 2024).
In a case involving this same plaintiff, the Court held that external candidates’ job applications for the Cedar Rapids city clerk position were confidential under § 22.7(18) and could be categorically withheld (without individualized determinations), though internal candidates like Van Sloten were differently situated.
Diercks v. Scott County, 17 N.W.3d 364 (Iowa 2025).
The Court noted that a committee appointing a county supervisor discussed candidates in a public meeting but identified them by number, not by name, to protect the confidentiality of their applications.

These cases collectively underscore:

The legislature’s strong policy of protecting job applications from external candidates; and
The practical accommodations governmental bodies have made (e.g., using numbers instead of names) to preserve confidentiality while complying with open meetings requirements.

The Supreme Court here reasons that if § 21.5(1)(i) were interpreted as the Court of Appeals proposed, it would create acute tension—and practical absurdities—when applied to external candidates:

Applications (including candidate identities) could be concealed under § 22.7(18), yet interviews required by § 21 could be public.
Public questioning might be impossible without identifying or referencing the confidential application.
Workarounds (concealing identity during a public interview; serial private interviews; delegating hiring to staff) would undercut transparency and rational hiring practices.

By adopting a more flexible interpretation of § 21.5(1)(i), the Court avoids this conflict and maintains doctrinal coherence between the Open Records and Open Meetings Acts.

E. Hutchison v. Shull, 878 N.W.2d 221 (Iowa 2016)

Hutchison is cited for the standard of review:

Interpretation of chapter 21 is reviewed for correction of errors at law.
Factual findings of the trial court are binding if supported by substantial evidence, and are given similar deference as a jury’s special verdict.

This reminded the Court that while it could freely interpret § 21.5(1)(i), it would defer to the district court’s findings about what actually occurred in the meeting and why the council acted as it did, so long as there was substantial evidence—such as testimony about the unpredictability of interviews and the rationale for closure.

VI. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Practical realities of hiring interviews and performance evaluations

The Court repeatedly emphasizes the “unpredictable” nature of interviews and performance reviews:

Interviewers often do not know in advance what an applicant might reveal about past mistakes, conflicts, or weaknesses when questioned.
Interviewees may not know which episodes from their work history might be raised or how their answers will be perceived.
Performance reviews or discharge meetings for high-level employees (e.g., city managers, school superintendents) commonly involve sensitive critiques that can be reputationally devastating if public.

Given these realities, the Court found it unrealistic—and counterproductive—to require a governmental body to identify in advance the specific negative information that might surface before closing a session. The whole point of the statutory exception is to prevent irreparable reputational harm before it occurs.

B. Avoiding strained, impractical, or absurd results

The Court views the Court of Appeals’ proposed approach—opening and closing segments of a single interview— as precisely the sort of “strained, impractical or absurd” result that Telegraph Herald and general interpretive canons counsel against:

The text of § 21.5(1)(i) refers to “a closed session” to evaluate professional competency, not to multiple micro-sessions toggling between open and closed status.
Segmenting interviews would be unwieldy in practice, disrupting the flow of questioning, complicating record-keeping, and inviting inadvertent disclosure of sensitive topics before the session is re-closed.
The same logic would apply to performance and discharge reviews, creating a chaotic patchwork of open and closed portions and undermining candid discussion.

Moreover, if a partial closure occurs, it implicitly signals—to the public and to media observers—that there is “specific, damaging information” being discussed off-camera, which itself can harm the individual’s reputation. That paradox further undermines the utility of the Court of Appeals’ approach.

C. Reconciling Open Meetings and Open Records Acts

As discussed in Section V.D, the Court is keenly aware that its interpretation of § 21.5(1)(i) must fit with § 22.7(18) and the long line of cases protecting external job applications.

If external applicants can shield their identities and applications but must submit to public interviews whenever they reach the interview stage, several problems arise:

Highly qualified applicants might be deterred from applying for governmental positions for fear that they will be publicly identified and questioned about their backgrounds.
Government bodies could be forced into contrived procedures (referring to candidates by number, delegating interviews to staff, serial “non-meeting” interviews) that are less transparent and less effective.

The Court’s adoption of a precautionary closure rule—activated by the candidate’s request and the evaluative nature of the meeting—offers a coherent solution: it supports robust recruitment and candid evaluation while preserving the possibility of open interviews when either the candidate or the body prefers openness.

D. Safeguards and judicial review of closed sessions

Some amici and Teig voiced concern that if a governmental body may close interviews without individualized findings, courts will lose any meaningful ability to review closure decisions. The Court rejected this pessimistic view, pointing to statutory safeguards.

1. Required minutes and recordings

Iowa Code § 21.5(5)(a) requires governmental bodies to:

Keep “detailed minutes” of all closed sessions, and
Make an audio recording of the closed session.

Under § 21.5(5)(b)(1), these materials:

“Shall be sealed and shall not be public records open to public inspection,” and
“Shall be available only to the court and to parties in an action to enforce” chapter 21, subject to in camera review and judicial orders balancing the probative value against prejudicial effects of disclosure.

In this case, the district court did exactly that:

It required production of the minutes and audio recording to Teig for use in litigation.
It kept those materials under seal in the court record.
The Supreme Court itself reviewed them in camera.

This process allows a court to determine whether a closed session truly concerned “evaluation of professional competency” and was not used as a pretext for discussing other matters, while still respecting the confidential status of the session vis-à-vis the general public.

2. Dual gatekeeping: the individual and the body

The Court also underscores that § 21.5(1)(i) requires two independent decisions:

The individual must request a closed session; and
The governmental body must vote (by supermajority or unanimity of those present) to go into closed session.

Thus, closure is not automatic. A candidate who wishes to be interviewed publicly can insist on an open session, and a governmental body that prefers transparency in hiring can decline to close even if the candidate requests it. Section 21.5(6) confirms that nothing in § 21.5 requires a governmental body to hold a closed session; closure is permissive, not mandatory.

E. Addressing claims of surplusage and lack of review

Teig argued that the district court’s (and now Supreme Court’s) reading of § 21.5(1)(i) effectively renders the phrase “when necessary to prevent needless and irreparable injury to that individual's reputation” meaningless: if closure is always deemed “necessary” whenever a candidate requests it, the phrase would add nothing.

The Court rejects this, explaining that the reputational clause still performs important functions:

It limits the permissible purpose of the closed session: it must truly be about evaluating professional competency in order to prevent reputational injury, not about concealing favoritism, political bargaining, or other improper considerations.
Because courts may review the minutes and recordings in camera, they can detect pretextual uses of § 21.5(1)(i) and deem such sessions unlawful, thereby enabling enforcement actions and potential remedies.

As to concerns about “no meaningful review,” the Court leans on the sealed-records and in camera review procedures in § 21.5(5). Those mechanisms are, in its view, sufficient to preserve judicial oversight without converting every closed session into a public proceeding.

VII. Clarification of Related Issues in the Opinion

A. Public vs. party access to closed-session records

An important subsidiary holding concerns the status of closed-session minutes and recordings once they are used as evidence in enforcement litigation.

Teig argued that because the minutes and recording were introduced as trial exhibits, they should become public. The district court disagreed, ordering that they:

Be provided to Teig under § 21.5(5)(b)(1), and
Remain sealed and confidential in the court’s electronic document management system (EDMS).

The Supreme Court affirmed this approach, emphasizing the statutory distinction between:

“Public records open to public inspection” (which closed-session minutes and recordings are not), and
“Inspection and use” by the parties in an enforcement action, which the court may permit.

In other words, party access does not equate to public access. Even if a plaintiff receives and uses closed-session materials at trial, the underlying materials do not automatically become public records. This preserves the confidentiality promised by § 21.5 while enabling meaningful enforcement litigation.

B. Alleged closure of the courtroom

Teig also complained that the trial court improperly “closed the courtroom” during the enforcement trial by keeping the closed-session materials effectively confidential. The Supreme Court dismissed this claim, noting that:

The district court never barred members of the public from attending the trial;
In fact, no one other than the parties and counsel were present; and
The judge’s reference to whether the “courtroom” should be “closed” was a “semantic question” in the absence of actual spectators.

The Court thus declined to view the situation as implicating any broader public-trial or open-courtroom concerns.

VIII. Complex Concepts Simplified

This case invokes several technical legal concepts. The following brief explanations may assist non-specialists.

A. Open Meetings Act vs. Open Records Act

Open Meetings Act (Iowa Code ch. 21).
Governs when and how meetings of governmental bodies must be open to the public. It defines “meetings,” requires advance notice and agendas, and generally mandates openness, subject to enumerated exceptions—such as § 21.5(1)(i).
Open Records Act (Iowa Code ch. 22).
Governs public access to “public records” held by governmental bodies, again subject to exceptions. Section 22.7(18) is one such exception, protecting certain confidential communications, including many external job applications.

B. Closed session

A “closed session” is a portion of a meeting during which the public is excluded. Under Iowa Code § 21.5:

A governmental body may enter closed session only for specific, listed reasons (e.g., personnel evaluation, litigation strategy, real estate negotiations).
Entry into closed session requires an affirmative vote by two-thirds of the members of the body or all of the members present.
Minutes and an audio recording must be made and preserved, but kept confidential unless needed in enforcement proceedings.

C. Prophylactic (preventive) standard

A “prophylactic” rule is designed to prevent harm before it occurs, rather than merely to remedy it afterward. Here, the statutory standard—“necessary to prevent needless and irreparable injury”—is expressly preventative.

The Supreme Court understands this to mean that:

The legality of closing a session does not depend on whether actual harm occurred during the meeting.
Instead, it depends on whether closure was a reasonable safeguard against severe, irreparable harm that could not easily be reversed if it happened in public.

D. “Irreparable injury to reputation”

“Irreparable” means an injury that cannot be adequately corrected or compensated afterward. Reputation is a quintessential example: once damaging statements are made in a public governmental meeting—especially when livestreamed and archived—they are effectively permanent.

Hence the focus on preventing such injury before it occurs, rather than waiting to see what happens.

E. In camera review

“In camera” (Latin for “in chambers”) refers to a judge’s private review of materials, outside public view and often outside the presence of one party, for purposes such as:

Determining what evidence can be disclosed or used in open court;
Evaluating claims of privilege or confidentiality; or
Assessing whether statutory conditions for secrecy (such as § 21.5’s closed-session requirements) have been met.

Here, § 21.5(5)(b)(1) explicitly authorizes in camera review of closed-session minutes and recordings, enabling the court to verify that the session was properly confined to a permissible purpose without exposing its contents publicly.

IX. Likely Impact and Future Implications

A. For hiring practices of Iowa governmental bodies

The decision provides important guidance—and comfort—to Iowa cities, counties, school boards, and other governmental bodies:

They may reasonably treat a candidate’s written request for a closed interview as sufficient “necessity” under § 21.5(1)(i), so long as the meeting is indeed limited to evaluating professional competency and the subject matter reasonably implicates reputational concerns.
They do not need to undertake preliminary fact-finding or hold a preliminary mini-hearing to identify potential reputational harms before voting to close.
They retain discretion: governmental bodies may still choose to conduct all interviews in open session even if candidates request closure, and candidates may refuse to consent to closure.

Best practices, however, may still include:

Obtaining clear, written requests for closed sessions from candidates or employees;
Formally stating on the record the statutory basis (§ 21.5(1)(i)) and the candidate’s request;
Ensuring that the content of the closed session stays within the permitted scope (evaluation of professional competency), with any other business handled separately in open session;
Keeping detailed minutes and a complete audio record, as required by statute.

B. For transparency and media access

From a transparency perspective, the decision undoubtedly makes it easier for governmental bodies to conduct closed hiring interviews, especially in high-profile positions where candidates will almost always request privacy.

Potential concerns include:

Less public insight into the deliberative processes that produce key appointments, such as city managers, superintendents, and other high-level officials.
Reduced ability of media and citizens to compare candidates’ performance in interviews or to question whether a particular hire was merit-based.

However, several factors mitigate these concerns:

Final hiring decisions remain subject to open-session approval, where votes and basic rationales can be stated.
The two-party consent requirement prevents unilateral closure by the governmental body.
Judicial review and potential remedies remain available where closure is used as a pretext to discuss matters beyond professional competency and reputational protection.

Ultimately, the Court signals that if greater openness in interviews is desired, the appropriate remedy lies in legislative amendment, not judicial reinterpretation of “necessary.”

C. For internal vs. external candidates

The decision subtly reinforces a distinction between internal and external candidates:

External candidates. Their applications are generally confidential under § 22.7(18) and Teig v. Chavez. This decision now confirms that, when they request closed sessions, their interviews may also reasonably be closed under § 21.5(1)(i).
Internal candidates. Their applications may be more accessible as public records, but this case confirms that their interviews may still be closed if they request it and the evaluation could reasonably implicate their reputations.

Thus, both internal and external candidates can obtain significant reputational protection in the evaluative phases of hiring, with the key difference being that external candidates’ applications are typically confidential whereas internal candidates’ existing employment records may not be.

D. Potential limits and unresolved questions

The Court’s opinion leaves some boundary questions for future cases:

Scope of “professional competency.”
What precisely falls within “evaluation of professional competency” remains a factual question. If a closed session veers into topics unrelated to the individual’s performance—e.g., broad policy debates, purely political considerations—that may exceed § 21.5(1)(i)’s scope.
Evidence of pretext or bad faith.
The Court hints that using § 21.5(1)(i) to “conceal a corrupt hiring arrangement” or similar illegitimate purposes would be unlawful. Future plaintiffs may attempt to prove such pretext using in camera review of minutes and recordings, emails, or testimony.
How much explanation is required on the record?
Here, the council read the statutory language and referenced the candidate’s request. The Court did not mandate any more detailed findings. It remains open whether, in a closer case, minimalist on-the-record explanations would suffice.
Application beyond hiring to performance and discharge.
The Court specifically notes that its reasoning applies equally to performance reviews and discharge deliberations for positions such as city manager or school superintendent. Future disputes may refine how broadly this rationale extends in different employment contexts.

X. Conclusion

The Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in Teig v. Hart establishes a significant and pragmatic precedent:

In the context of personnel evaluations—hiring, performance, and discharge—governmental bodies may treat an individual’s request for a closed session as sufficient basis to deem closure “necessary to prevent needless and irreparable injury” to reputation under § 21.5(1)(i), without first identifying concrete evidence of specific reputational threats.
The statute’s protections are viewed as prophylactic and contextual, accommodating the inherent unpredictability of candid interviews and evaluations, especially in an era of widespread, permanent online dissemination of public meetings.
At the same time, the Court preserves meaningful judicial oversight through required minutes, audio recordings, and in camera review, and it maintains that the exceptions must not be used as a cloak for bad faith or corruption.

By vacating the Court of Appeals’ more rigid interpretation and affirming the district court, the Court provides clear guidance for Iowa’s governmental bodies on how to balance open government values with individual reputational rights. The decision harmonizes the Open Meetings and Open Records Acts, respects the legislature’s chosen parameters, and underscores that reforms to increase openness further must come from the legislature rather than judicial redefinition of statutory terms like “necessary.”