PPIA Preemption Requires a Food‑Safety Nexus: Fifth Circuit Preserves Workplace COVID‑19 Negligence Claims Against Tyson While Rejecting Individual Coworker Duty

Introduction

In Williams v. Wingrove, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed three important questions arising out of a COVID‑19 wrongful death suit brought by the family of a poultry plant worker: (1) whether two in‑state plant managers were improperly joined to defeat federal diversity jurisdiction; (2) whether the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA) preempts state common‑law negligence claims targeting workplace COVID‑19 safety at a federally inspected poultry facility; and (3) whether a coworker owes an individual duty under Texas law to prevent the spread of contagious disease. The panel affirmed the district court’s refusal to remand and the dismissal of claims against the coworker, but reversed the dismissal of claims against Tyson Foods on preemption grounds, clarifying for the first time in this circuit that the PPIA’s express preemption provision reaches only requirements tied to food safety (adulteration/misbranding) and not general workplace safety duties unrelated to product adulteration.

The plaintiffs—Lorie Williams (individually and as representative of the estate of her husband, David Williams, Sr.), and two adult children—alleged that Mr. Williams contracted COVID‑19 and died because of unsafe conditions at Tyson’s Carthage, Texas plant. They sued two Texas‑based managers, the coworker who allegedly transmitted the virus (a Louisiana citizen), and later added Tyson. The district court found improper joinder of the Texas managers, denied remand, then dismissed all claims: as to Tyson on PPIA preemption grounds and as to the coworker for lack of a legal duty. The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Summary of the Judgment

• Removal and Improper Joinder: Affirmed. The Fifth Circuit held the Texas plant manager and safety manager were improperly joined because, under Texas law, the duty to provide a safe workplace belongs to the employer and is not delegable to individual employees or officers absent breach of an independent duty. The Smallwood “common defense” doctrine did not require remand because the basis for dismissal of the in‑state managers did not equally and necessarily compel dismissal of the claims against the diverse coworker.
• PPIA Preemption: Reversed. The court held that the PPIA’s express preemption clause does not preempt state‑law claims premised on workplace safety protocols to prevent transmission of COVID‑19 unless those requirements have a food‑safety (product adulteration/misbranding) nexus. Tyson offered no adulteration connection, so preemption failed.
• Duty of Coworker: Affirmed. The court held that Texas law does not impose an individual duty on a coworker to prevent the spread of disease; the 1902 Texas case (Wood) is limited to its unique facts where an employer undertook to provide medical care and custodial control.
• Leave to Amend: Vacated the denial of leave and remanded, because the preemption ruling—on which futility rested—was reversed.
• Dissent: Judge Haynes would have remanded the case to state court, finding the Texas defendants properly joined (or at least warranting certification to the Texas Supreme Court on the scope of Wood).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Leitch v. Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. 1996) and I.M. Werner v. Colwell, 909 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1995): Central to the improper‑joinder analysis. These cases cement the Texas rule that the duty to provide a safe workplace is owed by the employer, not individual officers/employees, absent an independent duty. The Fifth Circuit relied on this to hold that the plant manager and safety manager were improperly joined.
• Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Wood, 66 S.W. 449 (Tex. 1902): Plaintiffs invoked Wood to argue that individuals with custody/control of a contagious patient owe duties to prevent spread. The majority distinguished Wood as an employer‑undertaking case (custody and negligent quarantine/treatment), limiting its reach and refusing to recognize a general individual coworker duty. The dissent viewed Wood as supporting at least colorable state‑law duties sufficient to defeat improper joinder.
• Smallwood v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568 (5th Cir. 2004): Governs improper joinder and the “common defense” doctrine. The court rejected plaintiffs’ Smallwood argument because the reason for dismissing the Texas managers (employer’s non‑delegable duty) did not “equally” and “necessarily” compel dismissal of the claims against the coworker, whose alleged conduct and duties were pleaded differently.
• Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981); White Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 420 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2005); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992): These authorities frame preemption, emphasizing congressional intent, narrow construction, and the “tie goes to the state” presumption. The panel used this framework to confine the PPIA’s express preemption clause to its food‑safety domain.
• Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) and De Buono v. NYSA–ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund, 520 U.S. 806 (1997): Cited to underscore federalism concerns—preemption should not lightly displace states’ traditional police powers over health and safety.
• Glenn v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 3d 858 (E.D. Tex. 2021): The Fifth Circuit endorsed Glenn’s reasoning that the PPIA’s core purpose is consumer food safety, not worker safety—and that workplace COVID claims lacking an adulteration nexus fall outside the statute’s preemptive scope.
• Boone v. Citigroup, Inc., 416 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 2005): Supports refusal to invoke Smallwood’s common‑defense doctrine where the rationale does not “equally and necessarily” eliminate claims against all defendants.
• Turner v. GoAuto Ins. Co., 33 F.4th 214 (5th Cir. 2022) and Bonin v. Sabine River Auth. of La., 961 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2020): Reinforce that removal jurisdiction is assessed as of the time of removal; later‑added parties (e.g., Tyson) do not alter the jurisdictional analysis.
• Standards and review cases: McDonal v. Abbott Labs., 408 F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 2005) (improper joinder review de novo); Kling Realty Co. v. Chevron USA, Inc., 575 F.3d 510 (5th Cir. 2009) (procedure for improper joinder reviewed for abuse of discretion); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 2007) (Rule 12(b)(6) de novo); Franks Inv. Co. LLC v. Union Pac. R. Co., 593 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2010) (preemption de novo); Jim S. Adler, P.C. v. McNeil Consultants, L.L.C., 10 F.4th 422 (5th Cir. 2021) (futility of amendment de novo).

Legal Reasoning

1) Removal and Improper Joinder

The Fifth Circuit performed a Rule 12(b)(6)‑type assessment to determine whether plaintiffs had any reasonable basis to recover against the non‑diverse plant manager and safety manager under Texas law. The court applied the Texas rule from Leitch and Colwell: a corporation owes the duty to provide a safe workplace, and corporate officers/employees are not individually liable unless they breach an independent duty of care. Plaintiffs’ allegations against the managers were classic workplace‑safety complaints (PPE, screening, training, allowing COVID‑positive employees to work)—duties attributable to Tyson as employer, not to individual employees absent a separate, independent undertaking.

Plaintiffs attempted to invoke Wood (1902) to posit an individual duty to prevent disease spread. The court limited Wood to its narrow facts: the employer had undertaken medical care and custody/quarantine of a sick employee, thereby assuming a duty to prevent the spread. The panel found no analogous undertaking or custodial control by the manager or safety manager. Because the complaint alleged no independent duty, there was “no possibility of recovery” against the in‑state defendants, rendering their joinder improper.

As to the Smallwood “common defense” doctrine, the court held it inapplicable. The allegations and legal theories against the managers (employer’s non‑delegable workplace‑safety duties) were qualitatively distinct from those against the coworker (individual conduct—reporting to work after a positive test, failure to distance). Thus, the rationale defeating claims against the in‑state managers did not “equally” and “necessarily” defeat the claims against the diverse coworker. Because diversity existed between plaintiffs and the remaining defendant(s) at the time of removal, the district court correctly denied remand.

2) PPIA Preemption of Workplace COVID‑19 Claims

This was a question of first impression in the Fifth Circuit and the opinion’s most significant doctrinal contribution. The PPIA’s express preemption clause disallows state “requirements” concerning the “premises, facilities and operations” of an official establishment that are “in addition to, or different than” federal requirements. The court began with the “ultimate touchstone” of congressional intent and the presumption against preemption, observing that the PPIA’s policy (21 U.S.C. § 452) and implementing FSIS regulations focus on food safety—particularly preventing “adulteration of product” and “insanitary conditions” (e.g., 9 C.F.R. § 416.5). On that foundation, the court “identified the domain” expressly preempted as consumer food safety, not generalized worker safety.

Tyson did not argue, and the record did not show, that plaintiffs’ workplace COVID protocols (masking, screening, distancing, etc.) bore any connection to product adulteration or food safety requirements. Without that nexus, the court concluded that state‑law negligence claims predicated on employee health and workplace safety fall outside the PPIA’s preemptive scope. The opinion aligns with Glenn v. Tyson Foods (E.D. Tex. 2021), which likewise held that PPIA preemption does not extend to worker‑safety claims lacking a food‑safety tie.

The court also invoked federalism principles: preemption is an “extraordinary power” in our federalist system, and states traditionally regulate public health and safety. Reading the PPIA to displace such core police powers—without a clear food‑safety link—would overextend congressional intent.

3) No Individual Coworker Duty to Prevent Disease

The panel affirmed the dismissal of claims against the coworker, holding that Texas law recognizes no free‑standing duty of a private individual to prevent the spread of disease in the circumstances alleged. Again, Wood was confined to cases where an entity undertakes medical care/custody, not simply where an individual goes to work after a positive test. The court noted the absence of any Texas authority in the 123 years since Wood establishing an individual duty of this kind and declined to expand Texas law.

4) Leave to Amend

Because the district court’s futility ruling was anchored in its PPIA preemption holding, the Fifth Circuit vacated the denial of leave to amend. On remand, the district court must reconsider whether and to what extent to allow amendment in light of the now‑viable state‑law negligence claims against Tyson.

5) The Dissent

Judge Haynes would have ordered remand, emphasizing that removal statutes are strictly construed, that the removing party bears a “heavy burden” to show improper joinder, and that Wood provides a sufficient legal foothold for individual‑duty claims against the Texas managers to defeat improper‑joinder arguments. Alternatively, she would certify to the Texas Supreme Court whether Wood supports an individual duty to prevent spread of disease in modern contexts. The dissent underscores that Texas duty law in the contagion context remains an area of debate, even as the majority limits Wood.

Impact

• PPIA Preemption Narrowed: The Fifth Circuit’s holding is a significant precedent for Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi: workplace safety claims against USDA‑inspected poultry processors are not preempted by the PPIA unless the plaintiff’s theory would impose requirements tied to food safety (e.g., product adulteration/insanitary conditions). This will allow negligence and gross‑negligence claims based on COVID‑19 (and potentially other infectious‑disease) protocols to proceed, at least past a preemption challenge.
• Pleading Strategy for Plaintiffs: To avoid preemption, plead workplace‑safety duties that protect worker health, not product integrity. Conversely, where claims inherently implicate sanitation in a way that touches product adulteration, expect robust preemption arguments.
• Defense Strategy for Processors: Preemption remains viable if the alleged state requirements would alter FSIS‑mandated sanitary practices affecting product adulteration. Processors should develop a factual record tying compliance decisions to food‑safety regulations where appropriate.
• Improper Joinder in Workplace Cases: Suing in‑state managers to defeat diversity will often fail under Texas law unless the complaint plausibly alleges an independent duty (e.g., an undertaking creating custodial control analogous to Wood, direct personal participation in tortious conduct outside the employer’s non‑delegable duty, or other recognized independent duties). The decision gives defendants a clearer path to removal where only corporate non‑delegable duties are alleged against managers.
• No Individual Coworker Duty: Plaintiffs in Texas are unlikely to sustain claims against coworkers for disease transmission absent special circumstances (custody, undertaking, or specific statutory duties). Claims should focus on the employer’s duties and conduct.
• Room for State‑Law Development: The dissent invites the possibility of certification to the Texas Supreme Court on whether Wood supports broader contagion‑control duties. Future cases may test edge scenarios (e.g., employer‑run clinics, quarantine programs, or explicit undertakings) that could revive Wood‑type duties.
• Other Defenses Remain: The court expressly did not reach Texas’s Pandemic Liability Protection Act (PLPA). On remand, defendants may raise PLPA or other state‑law defenses, and the viability of claims may turn on those statutory shields and on causation and damages proof.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Improper Joinder: A removal doctrine. If a plaintiff sues an in‑state defendant against whom there is no reasonable possibility of recovery under state law, the court may disregard that party’s citizenship to preserve diversity jurisdiction.
• Smallwood “Common Defense” Doctrine: If the argument that defeats the in‑state defendant would equally and necessarily defeat the claim against all defendants, then the case is not about joinder; it is a merits defense and must be remanded. Here, the theories against the managers and coworker differed, so the doctrine did not apply.
• Express Preemption: When Congress explicitly states that federal law displaces certain state “requirements.” Courts then “identify the domain” Congress intended to occupy. Ambiguities are resolved in favor of state authority, especially in areas of traditional state police power (health and safety).
• PPIA’s Domain: The PPIA regulates to protect consumers by preventing adulterated or misbranded poultry products from entering commerce. FSIS regulations focus on sanitation measures to prevent product adulteration and insanitary conditions.
• Adulteration (conceptual): Contamination or conditions that render food unsafe or unfit for consumption. The PPIA’s sanitation rules aim to prevent this; preemption is triggered when state requirements intrude on this domain.
• Independent Duty (Texas): Corporate officers/employees may be individually liable only if they personally owe and breach a duty independent of the employer’s non‑delegable duty to provide a safe workplace.
• Rule 12(b)(6) Standard: A complaint must allege facts that make liability plausible under the governing substantive law. Pure legal conclusions or duties not recognized by law will not suffice.
• Time‑of‑Removal Rule: Jurisdiction is assessed based on the parties and claims as they existed when the case was removed to federal court; later additions or changes typically do not retroactively affect jurisdiction.

Conclusion

Williams v. Wingrove delivers three key takeaways. First, the Fifth Circuit narrows PPIA express preemption to its proper food‑safety domain: absent a nexus to product adulteration or misbranding, state‑law negligence claims challenging workplace COVID‑19 policies at poultry plants are not preempted. Second, under Texas law, individual coworkers—and, by extension, managers acting within the employer’s non‑delegable duty—owe no general duty to prevent disease spread without an independent undertaking or custodial control; thus, claims against such individuals are vulnerable to improper‑joinder challenges. Third, Smallwood’s common‑defense doctrine remains a potent but carefully cabined remand tool; it applies only where the same defense equally and necessarily defeats all claims against all defendants.

Doctrinally, this opinion provides the Fifth Circuit’s first clear articulation of the PPIA’s preemptive boundary, aligning with district‑court reasoning that prioritizes consumer food safety over worker safety in the statute’s design. Practically, it preserves a pathway for pandemic‑related negligence suits against processors while steering plaintiffs away from individual‑duty theories against coworkers and managers. The dissent signals ongoing uncertainty in Texas duty law as applied to contagion control, leaving the door open to certification in a future case with facts more closely resembling Wood’s custodial‑undertaking scenario. On remand, the district court will grapple with the merits of plaintiffs’ negligence theories against Tyson, including any state statutory shields such as the PLPA and issues of causation and damages.