Poynter v. Bennett: Customary Failure to Classify Violent Inmates as a Basis for Fourteenth Amendment and Monell Liability

I. Introduction

In Luther Poynter v. Aaron Bennett, No. 25-5188 (6th Cir. Dec. 17, 2025), the Sixth Circuit (Judge Karen Nelson Moore writing for the panel) reversed summary judgment for Barren County, Kentucky, arising out of a brutal inmate-on-inmate assault at the Barren County Detention Center (BCDC).

The case is factually stark. Luther Poynter, jailed on a contempt order for failure to pay child support, was moved from COVID observation into a general-population cell on December 28, 2020. Within ninety seconds of entering the cell, he was violently beaten in the head by two inmates, Scotty Wix and Timothy Guess, both “frequent fliers” at BCDC with long histories of in-custody violence. Poynter suffered a traumatic brain injury, required emergency brain surgery and facial reconstruction, and now lives with permanent, severe disabilities.

The legal questions presented were:

• Whether Poynter’s complaint adequately supported a Monell theory based on a custom of failing to classify violent inmates, even though that theory was fleshed out primarily at summary judgment.
• Whether a municipality can face § 1983 liability in the absence of a proven constitutional violation by a specific individual officer or staff member.
• What mental-state standard governs a pretrial or civil detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment “failure-to-protect” claim after Brawner v. Scott County and Westmoreland v. Butler County, and how an earlier case, Buetenmiller v. Macomb County Jail, fits into that framework.
• Whether, on this record, there is sufficient evidence that BCDC’s practices placed Poynter at a substantial risk of serious harm, that County actors acted with reckless disregard, and that a County custom or policy was the “moving force” behind Poynter’s injuries.

The court holds that:

• The complaint’s factual allegations were broad enough to support the “classification custom” Monell theory advanced at summary judgment; there was no unfair expansion of claims.
• A municipality can be liable for constitutional harm under § 1983 “even in the absence of a showing of a constitutional violation by any one individual,” where the harm is inflicted through collective action and municipal custom.
• Fourteenth Amendment failure-to-protect claims are governed by the objective recklessness standard announced in Brawner, and any suggestion in Buetenmiller that subjective knowledge is required is rejected to that extent.
• Poynter has produced enough evidence for a jury to find: (1) intentional conduct; (2) that placed him at a substantial risk of serious harm; (3) in reckless disregard of that risk; (4) causing his catastrophic injuries.
• He has also produced sufficient evidence of a County “custom of inaction” regarding classification of violent inmates (particularly state prisoners), supported by a clear pattern of prior assaults, municipal notice, and tacit approval.

Because the opinion is “Recommended for Publication,” it is precedential in the Sixth Circuit and materially develops the law of Fourteenth Amendment failure-to-protect claims and Monell liability, especially in the context of inmate classification practices.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

BCDC houses both county detainees (pretrial and misdemeanor) and state inmates (felony convicts serving time in local jails). Kentucky regulations (cited as “KAR 501.3” in the opinion) require each jail to maintain a classification system, including separation of prisoners “with a tendency to harm others,” using factors such as “institutional behavioral history.” BCDC’s written policy tracks this language and requires ongoing classification and reclassification, with assignment to minimum, medium, maximum, or protective/administrative custody.

In practice, however, evidence supported a very different picture:

• For county detainees, classification focused on sex, age, sentencing status, and whether charges/arrest behavior were violent or nonviolent, with little or no consideration of institutional behavioral history.
• For state inmates, BCDC largely did not classify them at all, instead relying on Kentucky Department of Corrections classification that was geared to work duty, not housing.
• Institutional histories of violence recorded in the JailTracker system were not systematically used to change housing or classification, except sometimes via narrow “keep-apart” orders between specific pairs of inmates.

Wix and Guess, both state inmates, had decade-long documented histories of violence and disruption in BCDC, including at least eleven prior assaults on cellmates and numerous serious confrontations with staff. Yet they remained in general population. On December 28, 2020, after finishing COVID observation, Poynter was moved into a general-population “new intake” cell (524), where Wix and Guess were housed. In under ninety seconds, while Poynter remained seated, they attacked him, inflicting devastating injuries.

B. Procedural Posture

Poynter (through his guardian) brought a § 1983 action against the Barren County Jailer (in his official capacity) and Barren County, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his safety in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. He pursued Monell liability based on:

• A custom of failing to classify state inmates at all; and
• A custom of failing to consider institutional histories of violence for classification and housing.

After discovery, the County moved for summary judgment, arguing:

• No underlying constitutional violation (no substantial risk, no deliberate indifference); and
• No basis for Monell liability (no pattern, no notice, adequate written policy).

The district court granted summary judgment, holding that Poynter failed to show any Fourteenth Amendment violation and that, in any event, the County could not be liable without an individual constitutional violation by a specific staff member.

C. Holdings

The Sixth Circuit reverses and remands:

1. Pleading / “Expansion of Claims”
   The amended complaint sufficiently alleged facts supporting a Monell theory premised on the lack of an adequate classification system and the practice of keeping Wix and Guess in general population despite their histories. Raising the classification-custom theory at summary judgment did not introduce a new, unfairly surprising claim.
2. Individual Liability Not a Prerequisite to Monell
   The court rejects the district court’s premise that some specific individual officer must be found liable as a constitutional violator before the municipality can be liable. Citing Grote v. Kenton County, the panel reiterates that a municipality may be liable where a “constitutional harm” is inflicted by collective action under a policy or custom, even if no single actor’s conduct alone is adjudicated as a constitutional violation.
3. Fourteenth Amendment Standard for Failure-to-Protect
   Proceeding under the Fourteenth Amendment (as the parties had done, thus forfeiting any Eighth Amendment argument), the court applies the Brawner/Westmoreland standard:
   • Intentional (non-accidental) conduct;
   • That places the detainee at a substantial risk of serious harm;
   • Without reasonable steps to abate that risk, in reckless disregard of an unjustifiably high risk that is known or so obvious it should be known; and
   • That failure actually causes the injury.
   The court clarifies that to the extent Buetenmiller suggested a subjective-knowledge requirement for the first “intentional conduct” prong, it conflicts with Brawner and does not control.
4. Constitutional Violation
   Viewing the evidence in Poynter’s favor, a reasonable jury could find:
   • BCDC’s failure to classify Wix and Guess and its housing decisions were intentional policy-level choices, not accidents.
   • Given the extensive record of prior cellmate assaults and violent incidents by Wix and Guess, putting a new detainee like Poynter in a cell with them posed a substantial risk of serious harm.
   • BCDC acted with reckless disregard in ignoring that risk, especially in light of its own written policies and state regulations requiring consideration of institutional behavior.
   • Had Wix and Guess been properly classified and removed from general population, the attack on Poynter likely would not have occurred.
5. Monell Custom-of-Inaction Liability
   Because Poynter’s theory sounds in municipal inaction (failure to classify or reclassify), he must show:
   • A clear and persistent pattern of similar constitutional violations;
   • Actual or constructive notice to the County;
   • Tacit approval amounting to deliberate indifference; and
   • Causation.
   The court holds that:
   • Repeated assaults by Wix and Guess on their cellmates over roughly eighteen months (after BCDC was already on notice of their dangerousness) suffice to show a pattern of the same kind of violation.
   • Those assaults were documented, went up the chain of command, and were admittedly “investigated,” putting the County on notice.
   • BCDC’s failure to change classification practices or to remove Wix and Guess from general population, despite this record, permits a finding of tacit approval/deliberate indifference.
   • The custom of failing to consider institutional behavioral history in classification decisions could reasonably be found to be a moving force behind Poynter’s injuries.

III. Analysis of the Opinion

A. Precedents and Doctrinal Building Blocks

1. Municipal Liability Under Monell and Its Progeny

The court grounds its municipal-liability analysis in familiar doctrine:

• Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), establishes that municipalities are “persons” under § 1983 and may be liable where a constitutional violation results from an official policy or a longstanding custom.
• Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997), and Ford v. County of Grand Traverse, 535 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 2008), emphasize that a “custom” can be proven by a practice that is so widespread as to have the force of law, even without formal adoption.
• Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462 (6th Cir. 2013), and more recently Franklin v. Franklin County, 115 F.4th 461 (6th Cir. 2024), articulate the elements of municipal liability, distinguishing affirmative policies from customs of inaction (such as failure to train or supervise).

Under Franklin and Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2005), when a plaintiff alleges a “policy of inaction,” he must show:

1. A clear and persistent pattern of unconstitutional conduct;
2. Notice or constructive notice to the municipality;
3. Tacit approval (or at least a failure to respond) amounting to deliberate indifference; and
4. Causation between this municipal inaction and the injury.

Poynter rigorously applies this “inaction” framework to a jail’s inmate-classification practices, showing how repeated similar inmate-on-inmate assaults can be used to prove pattern, notice, and tacit approval.

2. Individual Violations vs. Municipal Liability – Clarifying Grote and Westmoreland

The district court relied on language from Westmoreland v. Butler County, 29 F.4th 721 (6th Cir. 2022), to conclude that “if no constitutional violation by the individual defendants is established, the municipal defendants cannot be held liable.” The panel rejects that reading in light of Grote v. Kenton County, 85 F.4th 397 (6th Cir. 2023).

Grote held that a municipality can be liable “even in the absence of a showing of a constitutional violation by any one individual” so long as a “constitutional harm” was inflicted through the collective actions of multiple employees acting under a policy or custom. Poynter adopts that approach and explicitly disavows the district court’s “no individual, no Monell” rationale.

Practically, this is significant: plaintiffs need not identify and prove that a particular officer, nurse, or jailer personally met all elements of a constitutional violation, so long as the record supports a finding that governmental action as an organized system inflicted the constitutional harm.

3. Fourteenth Amendment Standard After Brawner, Westmoreland, and Buetenmiller

Historically, the Sixth Circuit applied the same “deliberate indifference” standard to both Eighth Amendment prisoner claims and Fourteenth Amendment pretrial detainee claims. Brawner v. Scott County, 14 F.4th 585 (6th Cir. 2021), changed that, relying on Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015).

Brawner held that a Fourteenth Amendment plaintiff need not show subjective awareness of risk. Instead, the plaintiff must show that the official “acted deliberately (not accidentally), but also recklessly in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known” (internal quotation to Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)).

Westmoreland adapted this standard to the failure-to-protect context, using a four-part test for pretrial detainees:

1. Intentional (non-accidental) conduct by the defendant;
2. That places the detainee at substantial risk of serious harm;
3. Without reasonable steps to abate the risk, in reckless disregard of an unjustifiably high risk; and
4. Actual causation of the detainee’s injuries.

Buetenmiller v. Macomb County Jail, 53 F.4th 939 (6th Cir. 2022), had suggested that the “intentional conduct” prong is met only if a reasonable juror could find that officials “knew about” the danger—sliding back toward a subjective-knowledge requirement.

In Poynter, the court explicitly disapproves that reading:

• It holds that to the extent Buetenmiller requires subjective knowledge for the first prong, it is inconsistent with Brawner.
• Consistent with Helphenstine v. Lewis County, 60 F.4th 305 (6th Cir. 2023), and Grote, the court reaffirms that Brawner—the earlier decision—controls.
• “Intentional” means non-accidental action (as Kingsley suggests), not proof that an official actually knew of a particular risk.

Thus, the governing standard in the Sixth Circuit for pretrial or civil detainee failure-to-protect claims is an objective recklessness test: the plaintiff need not prove that any official actually knew of the risk, only that they acted deliberately (not accidentally) in the face of a risk so serious and obvious that any reasonable official would have appreciated it.

4. Failure-to-Protect and Prior Assaults – Farmer, Young, Richko, and Schoonover

Farmer established that prisons must protect inmates from violence by other inmates and that knowing failure to respond to a substantial risk of serious harm constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

Within the Sixth Circuit, several decisions have recognized that housing an inmate with another known to be assaultive can itself create such a risk:

• Young v. Campbell County, 846 F. App’x 314 (6th Cir. 2021), held that a jail’s failure to reclassify a violent inmate, despite known misconduct and threats, allowed a finding that the plaintiff was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.
• Richko v. Wayne County, 819 F.3d 907 (6th Cir. 2016), held that housing a detainee with a newly arrested, mentally ill inmate who had committed a violent assault presented a sufficient risk to support a deliberate-indifference claim.
• Schoonover v. Rogers, 2022 WL 12258998 (6th Cir. Oct. 21, 2022), noted that the “risk of violent attack by fellow [inmates] known to have previously committed serious assaults, absent precautions, can create a substantial risk of serious harm.”

Poynter draws heavily on these precedents. But the factual record here is stronger: Wix and Guess each had multiple prior cellmate assaults; together, they had assaulted other detainees in their cells eleven times before attacking Poynter. This made the “substantial risk” question relatively straightforward under the court’s prior case law.

5. “Pattern,” “Notice,” and “Tacit Approval” – Franklin, Simpkins, Leach, Peet, and Others

The opinion also situates itself within the line of municipal-liability “pattern” cases:

• Franklin held that five similar violations over three years could establish a pattern; the violations must infringe the same constitutional right “in the same way,” but need not be “identical” or “almost identical.”
• Simpkins v. Boyd County Fiscal Court, 2022 WL 17748619 (6th Cir. Sept. 2, 2022), similarly treated five prior violations as sufficient to show pattern.
• Peet v. City of Detroit, 502 F.3d 557 (6th Cir. 2007), by contrast, found two instances in a single investigation, plus the plaintiff’s own case, insufficient for pattern.
• Leach v. Shelby County Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241 (6th Cir. 1989), suggested that “at least” ten similar incidents over a period of years can amount to municipal custom, and that multiple similar complaints can establish notice.
• Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011), cautioned that a small number of materially different incidents over many years may not provide notice.

Poynter aligns with Franklin and Simpkins, treating approximately five relevant assaults over about eighteen months (counting only those after Wix and Guess had already shown themselves dangerous) as a sufficient pattern, particularly where the same aggressors and the same sort of harm (cellmate assaults) were repeatedly involved.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning in Detail

1. No Improper “Expansion” of Claims at Summary Judgment

BCDC argued that Poynter’s amended complaint did not fairly put it on notice of a Monell theory specifically based on a custom of failing to classify inmates, and that raising that theory at summary judgment was an improper expansion of the case under Tucker v. UNITE, 407 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2005).

The Sixth Circuit rejects this argument, applying the modern approach:

• A complaint need not plead legal theories explicitly; it must plead factual allegations that “impliedly establish[] at least one viable theory” (Dibrell v. City of Knoxville, 984 F.3d 1156 (6th Cir. 2021)).
• Courts ask whether the allegedly “new” theory causes “unfair surprise” (Grinnell v. City of Taylor, 2022 WL 1562291; LunneEN v. Village of Berrien Springs, 2023 WL 6162876).

Here, the complaint alleged that:

• Wix and Guess had long histories of violence;
• BCDC and the Jailer “knew” they posed a frequent risk to inmate safety;
• The “lack of an adequate inmate classification system” left BCDC “largely unable to prepare for or prevent inmate-on-inmate violence”; and
• The County’s “policy and practice” of allowing Wix and Guess to remain in general population constituted deliberate indifference.

These factual allegations plainly encompass the classification-custom theory. The County could not credibly claim “unfair surprise” when Poynter sharpened this theory at summary judgment. This aspect of the opinion reinforces that § 1983 plaintiffs may refine and emphasize specific Monell theories as discovery proceeds, provided the underlying factual narrative was pled from the outset.

2. Constitutional Violation: Applying the Four-Part Westmoreland/Brawner Test

a. Intentional (Non-Accidental) Conduct

The first prong asks whether the conduct in question was intentional rather than accidental. Here, the court stresses the difference between, for example, an officer tripping and falling onto an inmate (accidental) and the deliberate placement of inmates in particular cells or intentional disregard of classification duties.

The record contains evidence that:

• BCDC had a practice of not classifying state inmates and of not considering institutional behavioral history for classification, despite a written policy and state regulations requiring this.
• Wix and Guess, state inmates, were never reclassified by BCDC after numerous violent incidents; BCDC produced no documentation of any classification analyses or reclassifications despite discovery requests.

From this, a jury could reasonably infer that the failure to classify Wix and Guess and their continued placement in general-population cells (including cell 524) resulted from an intentional municipal practice or custom, not from random mistake.

The court views “intentional” through the Kingsley lens: the relevant actions (classification decisions, cell assignments, enforcement of—or failure to enforce—classification policy) were purposeful decisions about how the jail is run, not inadvertent mishaps. Whether those decisions sufficiently appreciated the risk is addressed under the reckless-disregard prong, not here.

b. Substantial Risk of Serious Harm

The second prong asks whether those decisions placed Poynter at a substantial risk of serious harm. The court emphasizes the extensive histories of Guess and Wix:

• Guess:
  • Multiple combative incidents with staff, requiring physical takedowns and restraints;
  • At least six assaults on cellmates in their cells, including attacking a sleeper, punching an inmate “in front of staff” with the statement “I was going to get you tonight anyways mother fucker,” and immediately attacking newly assigned cellmates;
  • Two additional fights in which the reports did not clearly attribute instigation;
  • Threatening notes toward other inmates and threatening phone calls to people outside the facility;
  • Positive tests for methamphetamine and amphetamines; and
  • Recent verbal altercations, including one in cell 524 that resulted in a “keep-apart” order just eight days before the attack on Poynter.
• Wix:
  • Charging a staff member with fists raised after saying “fuck this”;
  • At least five documented cellmate assaults, including “jumping” a cellmate with another inmate and attacking within a minute of a new cellmate’s arrival;
  • A documented fight in cell 524 itself in October 2020 where, after a fight between others had seemingly ended, Wix punched another inmate and resumed fighting.

Built on Young, Richko, and Schoonover, the court holds that the risk posed by housing Poynter in a cell with two inmates who repeatedly assaulted cellmates in general population is more than sufficient to create a genuine dispute about whether he was exposed to a “substantial risk of serious harm.”

The County’s argument that Wix and Guess had not previously assaulted anyone in that particular cell is rejected as legally and factually immaterial. The risk is defined by the dangerous inmates, not the architecture of the cell. The October 14, 2020 incident in cell 524, in which Wix resumed fighting after the apparent end of a fight, only heightens the risk.

c. Reckless Disregard and Failure to Take Reasonable Steps

The third prong—reckless disregard—turns on what a reasonable official in BCDC’s position should have understood based on the information available, and whether reasonable steps were taken to abate the risk.

Key facts:

• All of Wix’s and Guess’s incident reports were stored in the JailTracker system, accessible to staff and supervisors.
• BCDC’s policy required classification and reclassification that considered institutional behavioral history.
• State regulations likewise required separation of inmates “with a tendency to harm others,” with criteria including “institutional behavioral history.”
• Both experts—including BCDC’s own—agreed that institutional behavior is a critical component of classification decisions.

The court reasons that, in this framework, a reasonable jail official would have recognized that repeatedly assaultive inmates like Wix and Guess posed an ongoing, acute risk to any new cellmate placed with them in general population. Reasonable steps could have included:

• Reclassifying Wix and Guess as maximum-security or otherwise dangerous; and
• Removing them from general-population cells into single-cell protective or administrative segregation.

BCDC did not do so. Although it imposed some short-term discipline (e.g., temporary segregation) after specific incidents, it took no systemic or durable steps to address the obvious pattern of violence. Those individual disciplinary responses did not prevent further assaults—in fact, Wix and Guess collectively assaulted cellmates at least five more times in general population after they should already have been recognized as dangerous.

The County attempted to recast the risk as a generalized fact of jail life (fights happen) and to argue that it had taken “reasonable steps” by:

• “Classifying” inmates (per its own generalized deposition testimony); and
• Following COVID-era intake protocols by housing recently admitted detainees together.

The court finds this unpersuasive on summary judgment. There is no documentary evidence that Wix or Guess were ever reclassified in light of their institutional behavior. The Jail’s own expert testified that any determination that an inmate could not be housed in general population “on a more permanent or continuing basis” should be documented. The absence of any such documentation—particularly when Poynter specifically requested it in discovery—supports an inference of non-compliance with classification obligations.

As to COVID protocols, the court notes that:

• The jailer conceded that new intakes could be moved to a “524 type area,” not necessarily to cell 524 itself; other options likely existed.
• There is no evidence that COVID protocols prohibited or superseded classification, or that the jail could not have separated particularly dangerous inmates from others within the same cohort.

On this record, a jury could find that BCDC’s inaction in the face of Wix’s and Guess’s records amounts to reckless disregard of an unjustifiably high risk of harm.

d. Causation

The fourth prong—causation—is relatively straightforward. Poynter’s expert testified that, had BCDC properly classified Wix and Guess, they would not have been housed in the same general-population cell as Poynter and the attack would “more likely than not” have been prevented.

The County argued:

• Poynter never expressed fear or asked to be moved; and
• The housing arrangement was driven by COVID protocols, not classification practices.

The court rejects both:

• Given that Poynter did not know Guess, was not afraid of Wix, and was attacked within 90 seconds, he effectively had no meaningful chance to complain or seek protective action before the assault.
• As noted above, COVID protocols do not negate the jail’s duty to classify and protect; there is no evidence they forced this dangerous cell assignment.

Accordingly, there is at least a genuine dispute of material fact on whether the County’s classification failures and housing decisions were a but-for and proximate cause of Poynter’s injuries.

3. Monell Custom-of-Inaction Liability

Having found sufficient evidence of an underlying constitutional harm, the court turns to whether that harm can be attributed to a County custom of inaction regarding classification, applying the Franklin/Thomas framework.

a. Clear and Persistent Pattern of Similar Violations

The core question is whether the prior assaults by Wix and Guess constitute a sufficient pattern of “the same constitutional right violated in the same way.”

Here, the “same way” is:

• Failure to consider or act on institutional behavioral history;
• Resulting in dangerous inmates remaining in general-population cells with cellmates; and
• Leading to inmate-on-inmate assaults in those cells.

The court carefully parses the histories of both men:

• For Guess, after several violent and threatening incidents and two earlier cellmate assaults, his institutional record was clearly that of a dangerous inmate. Every subsequent assault on a cellmate in general population could reasonably be seen as a repeat of the same constitutional violation—continuing to house him with others despite that history.
• For Wix, his early violent behavior toward staff and then multiple cellmate assaults likewise created a profile of someone who should have been separated from other inmates. Again, each subsequent assault in a shared cell suggests the same underlying failure-to-classify and failure-to-protect problem.

Counting the period when Wix and Guess had already crossed that threshold of demonstrated dangerousness, the court identifies at least five relevant cellmate assaults in general-population cells over roughly eighteen months before Poynter’s attack. That is well within the range previously held sufficient to show a pattern in Franklin and Simpkins.

The district court mistakenly focused on whether earlier assaults could be directly linked to “misclassification” in a narrow sense—e.g., an explicit record showing that a classification instrument was improperly scored. The Sixth Circuit rejects this requirement. It is enough that:

• The same kind of harm (violent assaults on cellmates) recurred multiple times;
• The assailants were the same inmates (Guess and Wix); and
• These assaults occurred in general-population cells where a proper classification and housing system should have prevented them.

b. Notice (Actual or Constructive)

The next question is whether BCDC had actual or constructive notice that its failure to classify and separate violent inmates was causing constitutional violations.

Evidence of notice includes:

• All incident reports were stored in the JailTracker system and were available in each inmate’s file.
• The jailer testified that incident reports were supposed to be passed up the chain of command.
• The County itself stated in its briefing that it “investigated each of the incidents referenced in the reports,” confirming institutional awareness.

Given at least five similar assaults over eighteen months by the same aggressors, the court holds that a reasonable jury could find that BCDC was on notice that its classification practices (or lack thereof) were resulting in dangerous inmates assaulting cellmates in general population. The pattern is much stronger than in cases like Connick or D’Ambrosio, where only a few dissimilar incidents over a longer period were shown.

c. Tacit Approval / Deliberate Indifference

To prove a custom of inaction, the plaintiff must show that, confronted with this pattern and notice, the municipality took no meaningful action to correct the problem.

Here:

• BCDC imposed only limited, case-specific discipline on Guess and Wix (temporary segregation, etc.).
• After these sanctions, both men repeatedly returned to general population and assaulted more cellmates.
• There is no evidence—documentary or testimonial—that BCDC:
  • Changed their long-term classification status;
  • Implemented any policy changes to ensure that institutional behavior would be integrated into classification decisions; or
  • Undertook targeted remedial training or policy revision in light of the repeated assaults.

A reasonable jury could find that:

• BCDC’s short-term discipline did not effectively address the problem; and
• The County’s failure to update classification practices or remove Wix and Guess from general population, despite ongoing assaults, constitutes tacit approval or deliberate indifference to the risk of further harm to other detainees.

d. Causation (“Moving Force”)

Finally, the plaintiff must show that the custom of failing to classify or reclassify violent inmates—and failing to incorporate institutional behavioral histories—was a moving force behind Poynter’s injury.

The causation analysis largely overlaps with the underlying constitutional causation:

• But for BCDC’s custom of ignoring institutional behavioral history and its practice of leaving state inmates like Wix and Guess in general population regardless of that history, they would likely have been removed to single-bed protective or administrative cells before December 2020.
• Had that occurred, Poynter would not have been placed in the same cell and would not have been attacked as he was.

On these facts, the custom of inaction can reasonably be found to be more than a “but-for” cause: it is precisely the type of systemic failure—ignored risk signs, pattern of assaults, no structural response—that Monell is meant to address.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Monell Liability in Simple Terms

Under § 1983, you usually sue individual officers for violating constitutional rights. But sometimes the problem is not a single bad actor; it is how an entire jail or police department routinely operates. Monell liability is how you hold the city or county itself responsible when:

• The injury flows from an official policy; or
• From a widespread unofficial practice (a “custom”) that is so common it effectively becomes policy.

Where the theory is a “custom of inaction” (for example, systematically failing to train, supervise, or classify inmates), a plaintiff must show repeated similar problems that the municipality knew about and did not correct, and that this systemic failure caused the plaintiff’s injury.

2. Eighth vs. Fourteenth Amendment: Prisoners vs. Detainees

The Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and unusual punishment” clause applies to people who have been convicted of crimes and are serving sentences. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects pretrial detainees and others held without final conviction (including many civil contemnors).

Historically, courts applied the same “deliberate indifference” test to both. After Kingsley and Brawner, the standard for Fourteenth Amendment claims in the Sixth Circuit is now more objective:

• The inmate must show that officials acted deliberately (not by accident) and recklessly in the face of a high risk of harm that any reasonable official should have recognized.
• The inmate no longer needs to prove that a particular official subjectively understood and appreciated the risk.

In Poynter, the County could have argued that Poynter was a criminal contemnor entitled only to Eighth Amendment protection, but it did not. Because the parties and district court treated the case as a Fourteenth Amendment matter, the Sixth Circuit did so as well.

3. “Deliberate Indifference” vs. Negligence

“Deliberate indifference” (here, in its Fourteenth Amendment, objective-recklessness form) is much more serious than ordinary negligence. It means:

• Officials made deliberate choices; and
• Those choices ignored a risk that was so serious and obvious that no reasonable official could fail to appreciate it; and
• They did not take reasonable steps to reduce that risk.

By contrast, simple mistakes or accidental omissions—even if careless—usually do not rise to deliberate indifference. Classification errors might be mere negligence in some circumstances; in Poynter, the repeated documented assaults by the same inmates and the clear regulatory and policy requirements make it reasonable for a jury to find reckless disregard.

4. “Pattern,” “Notice,” and “Tacit Approval”

When suing a city or county for a “custom of inaction,” three linked ideas are central:

• Pattern: There must be multiple similar constitutional violations, not just an isolated incident. These incidents show that the problem is systemic, not one-off.
• Notice: The government must have known, or reasonably should have known, about those violations—for example, through internal reports or complaints.
• Tacit Approval: Despite that knowledge, the government takes no meaningful action to fix the problem. That passivity can be treated as an implicit decision to let the conduct continue.

In Poynter, multiple documented assaults by the same inmates on their cellmates, over a relatively short period, created a pattern. The existence of written incident reports, internal investigations, and chain-of-command reporting supported notice. The absence of any change to classification practices, or long-term changes in those inmates’ housing, supported a finding of tacit approval.

5. Classification and Institutional Behavioral History

“Classification” in the jail context is the process of deciding how dangerous an inmate is and where they should be housed. Good classification systems:

• Separate extremely violent or vulnerable inmates;
• Use both the charges and the inmate’s behavior in custody (institutional history); and
• Are updated (reclassification) if the inmate’s behavior changes.

In Poynter, Kentucky regulations and BCDC’s own written policy required classification systems that explicitly evaluated “institutional behavioral history” and separated inmates “with a tendency to harm others.” Yet, according to the plaintiff’s evidence, BCDC:

• Classified county detainees based largely on charges and arrest behavior, not institutional conduct; and
• Did not classify state inmates at all, instead relying on DOC designations designed for work duty, not housing.

Ignoring institutional behavioral history is not automatically a constitutional violation. But when combined with a long, documented history of cellmate assaults that goes unaddressed, it can support a finding of deliberate indifference and a Monell custom of inaction.

V. Impact and Broader Significance

1. For Jail and Prison Administrators

Poynter sends a clear warning to correctional administrators in the Sixth Circuit:

• Written classification policies and state regulations that look good on paper will not shield a county if actual practice routinely disregards them.
• Failure to incorporate institutional behavioral history into classification and housing decisions for known violent inmates can support both individual constitutional claims and Monell liability.
• Repeated assaults by the same inmates on their cellmates, documented in internal systems, will be treated as powerful evidence of pattern, notice, and tacit approval if no durable remedial action is taken.
• State inmates housed in local jails cannot be treated as the Department of Corrections’ responsibility for classification purposes; the jail’s own classification duties remain.

Practically, jails may need to:

• Review and, where necessary, redesign classification protocols to ensure they consistently factor in institutional behavior;
• Institute mandatory reviews and potential reclassifications when an inmate commits an in-custody assault;
• Ensure that reclassifications and housing decisions are documented to demonstrate compliance and thoughtful risk assessment; and
• Integrate information systems (such as JailTracker) more systematically into housing and security decisions.

2. For Constitutional Litigation and § 1983 Practitioners

On the litigation front, Poynter is significant in several ways:

• Easier to Survive Summary Judgment on Fourteenth Amendment Claims: By reaffirming Brawner and rejecting any subjective-knowledge gloss in Buetenmiller, the opinion clarifies that pretrial or civil detainees need not show that particular officials “knew” of the risk. Objective evidence that the risk was unmistakable, combined with intentional acts or omissions, can suffice.
• Monell Without Identified Individual Defendant: Plaintiffs may proceed against municipalities even when the precise identity or mental state of each involved officer is unclear, so long as the record shows a constitutional harm resulting from collective action under a municipal policy or custom. This is particularly important in institutional cases where multiple staff members interact with the plaintiff over time and responsibility is diffuse.
• Patterns of Repeated Misconduct by the Same Aggressors: Where the same inmates repeatedly assault others, and the institution does not materially change their classification or housing status, those incidents will strongly support a custom-of-inaction theory. Plaintiffs should focus on building a record comparable to the detailed incident histories of Wix and Guess.
• Pleadings Flexibility: The court’s reliance on Dibrell, LunneEN, and Grinnell underscores that federal notice pleading does not require early doctrinal precision. Plaintiffs who broadly allege that an inadequate classification system or a pattern of ignoring violent inmates created risk will generally be able to refine specific Monell theories as discovery progresses.

3. Doctrinal Development: Solidifying Brawner and Limiting Buetenmiller

Poynter further cements the post-Kingsley, post-Brawner landscape for detainee claims in the Sixth Circuit:

• All Fourteenth Amendment “conditions of confinement” claims—medical care and failure-to-protect alike—are governed by an objective recklessness standard.
• Subjective knowledge requirements in older or inconsistent cases are subordinated to Brawner.
• “Intentional conduct” means deliberate action or inaction regarding the detainee, not an internal mental state of awareness of risk.

This doctrinal clarification will likely be cited in future cases involving suicides, assaults, and medical neglect of pretrial detainees and civil contemnors, where plaintiffs can now focus more on what the institution knew or should have known collectively and less on an individual official’s subjective state of mind.

4. Use of State Regulations as Evidence (But Not as Separate Causes of Action)

While violations of state regulations do not themselves create federal constitutional claims, Poynter shows how they can be powerful evidence:

• They help define what reasonable jail practices look like in the particular state context.
• Deviations from those regulations, especially when combined with predictable harms (like repeated cellmate assaults), can demonstrate objective recklessness and a custom of inaction.

Here, Kentucky’s requirement that classification systems consider “institutional behavioral history” and separate inmates “with a tendency to harm others” dovetailed closely with the constitutional duty to protect. BCDC’s alleged failure to follow that regulation helped support the deliberate-indifference and Monell analyses.

VI. Conclusion

Poynter v. Bennett is a significant precedential decision in the Sixth Circuit’s developing body of law on detainee rights and municipal liability. It establishes, or clarifies, several important principles:

• A county jail can face Monell liability for a custom of failing to classify and reclassify violent inmates, especially where written policies and state regulations mandate classification based on institutional behavior and the jail disregards those requirements in practice.
• Municipal liability does not depend on identifying a single individual constitutional violator; it is enough that a “constitutional harm” was inflicted through collective conduct under a policy or custom.
• Fourteenth Amendment failure-to-protect claims are governed by an objective recklessness standard under Brawner and Westmoreland, and to the extent prior cases suggested a subjective-knowledge requirement, they do not control.
• Repeated, documented assaults by the same inmates on their cellmates in general population can establish a “clear and persistent pattern” of constitutional violations, provide municipal notice, and support a finding of tacit approval where no systemic corrective action is taken.
• State regulatory frameworks and jail policies on classification, while not themselves sources of federal liability, are important benchmarks in assessing deliberate indifference and institutional custom.

The decision underscores that when correctional authorities are repeatedly confronted with clear evidence that particular inmates are dangerous to others and yet leave them in general population without meaningful classification-based safeguards, they expose themselves not only to individual § 1983 suits, but also to institutional liability for systemic constitutional violations. On remand, a jury will decide whether Barren County’s practices in fact rise to that level. Going forward, however, Poynter will guide both litigants and correctional administrators throughout the Sixth Circuit in evaluating and reforming inmate-classification and housing practices.