Introduction

The Third Circuit’s non-precedential opinion in United States v. Taire Hardeman affirms a four-year term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation of supervised release, followed by three years of supervision. The decision is notable for how it applies the Supreme Court’s 2025 decision in Esteras v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2031, to the mechanics of revocation sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).

After pleading guilty to drug offenses, Taire Hardeman began supervised release. About eleven months later, law enforcement responded to an incident that involved reported gunfire. A woman reported that Hardeman had threatened and physically assaulted her during a domestic violence episode in the presence of a baby and that a shot was fired. Though state charges (terroristic threats, simple assault, harassment) were later withdrawn, the Probation Office petitioned to revoke supervised release. Following an evidentiary hearing, the District Court found that Hardeman assaulted the woman, caused injuries, and possessed a firearm that was discharged during the assault. It classified the conduct as a Grade A violation and imposed 48 months’ imprisonment—an upward variance from the Chapter 7 policy-statement range of 27 to 33 months—plus three years’ supervised release.

On appeal, Hardeman challenged both procedural and substantive reasonableness. The key issues were:

• Whether the District Court impermissibly considered § 3553(a)(2)(A) “just-deserts” considerations (seriousness, respect for law, just punishment) in contravention of Esteras, and
• Whether the 15-month upward variance was inadequately explained or excessive under the totality of the circumstances.

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirmed. Reviewing the unpreserved procedural claim for plain error, the Court held that the District Court did not violate Esteras. Although the judge referenced the “seriousness” of the episode, the context showed the court was discussing the seriousness of the violation conduct—a domestic violence incident with a firearm in the presence of a baby—and the breach of trust, not imposing punishment to reflect the seriousness of the underlying offense of conviction. Those considerations are proper under § 3583(e) when tied to deterrence and protection of the public.

Substantively, the panel held that—given the violent conduct, firearm involvement, presence of a child, and the goals of deterrence and public safety—no reasonable sentencing court would be compelled to impose a lower sentence. The explanation for the upward variance was adequate, and the sentence was affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• Esteras v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2031, 2036, 2045–46 (2025): The Supreme Court held that courts may not consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) (seriousness of the offense, respect for law, just punishment) when revoking supervised release under § 3583(e) because Congress did not cross-reference (2)(A) in § 3583(e). The panel applies Esteras by distinguishing between:
  • Impermissible reliance on retributive punishment to reflect the seriousness of the underlying offense of conviction, and
  • Permissible consideration of the seriousness of the violation conduct as evidence of breach of trust, risk, and the need for deterrence and protection of the public (factors that § 3583(e) does incorporate).
• United States v. Dees, 467 F.3d 847, 853 (3d Cir. 2006): Establishes that the “primary” focus in a revocation sentence is the defendant’s “breach of trust,” while courts may account, to a limited degree, for the seriousness of the violation conduct and criminal history. The panel leans on Dees to explain why the district court permissibly discussed the domestic violence episode, the firearm, and the presence of a baby.
• United States v. Clark, 726 F.3d 496, 500 (3d Cir. 2013): Confirms that, under § 3583(e), courts consider selected § 3553(a) factors—particularly deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation—when imposing revocation sentences. The district court expressly referenced these factors.
• United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 545–46 (3d Cir. 2007): Upholds an above-Guidelines revocation sentence where recent domestic violence signaled a threat to the community and a significant breach of trust. The panel cites Bungar to validate the upward variance here.
• United States v. Simmons, 69 F.4th 91, 94 (3d Cir. 2023); United States v. Payano, 930 F.3d 186, 192 (3d Cir. 2019); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993): Set out the plain-error framework applied to unpreserved procedural challenges.
• United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567–68 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007): Provide the substantive reasonableness standard—reviewing the totality of the circumstances and affirming unless no reasonable sentencing court would impose the sentence for the reasons stated. The panel applied those principles to affirm.
• United States v. Azcona‑Polanco, 865 F.3d 148, 151 (3d Cir. 2017): Confirms abuse-of-discretion review for substantive reasonableness.

Legal Reasoning

The opinion separates two analytically distinct inquiries: procedural reasonableness and substantive reasonableness.

1. Procedural Reasonableness (Plain-Error Review):
   • The district court explicitly recognized the § 3583(e) framework and the pertinent § 3553(a) factors it permits: deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation. It also addressed breach of trust, stating it is “more lenient at the initial sentencing but ‘less lenient down the line’” because revocation reflects a “breach of [the Court’s] trust” and a risk that the defendant is “going down the wrong path.”
   • Although the court used the word “seriousness,” the Third Circuit read the context to show it referred to the seriousness of the violation conduct—a domestic violence incident, with a firearm present, a gunshot, and a baby in the home—rather than an impermissible retributive goal under § 3553(a)(2)(A). This is consistent with Dees and compatible with Esteras because the judge tied the discussion to deterrence and public protection, both expressly allowed by § 3583(e).
   • The court weighed mitigating factors (Hardeman’s employment and good conduct while incarcerated) but found that the “seriousness of the offense and the breach of the Court’s trust” warranted an upward variance. Given the record-linked rationale, there was no procedural error, much less plain error.
2. Substantive Reasonableness (Abuse-of-Discretion):
   • Considering the “totality of the circumstances,” including a domestic violence assault, the discharge of a firearm, the presence of a baby, and ongoing risks to the victim and the public, the panel held that reasonable sentencers could impose this upward variance to deter future conduct and protect the public.
   • Anchored in Tomko and Gall, the panel concluded no abuse of discretion occurred. The sentence was not outside the broad range of permissible outcomes for the reasons the district court stated.

What This Opinion Adds Post‑Esteras

While non-precedential, Hardeman offers practical guidance for district courts within the Third Circuit in the wake of Esteras:

• Judges may still describe the violation conduct as “serious” if that characterization is used to assess breach of trust, risk, deterrence, and public protection—not to impose punishment to reflect the seriousness of the original offense of conviction.
• Expressly tying the court’s concerns to permissible § 3583(e) factors—deterrence and protection of the public—and the breach-of-trust paradigm will help insulate revocation sentences from procedural challenges.
• Upward variances above Chapter 7 policy-statement ranges remain supportable where the record shows dangerous violation conduct (e.g., domestic violence with a firearm) and the court balances mitigation against the breach-of-trust and public-safety needs.

Impact and Practical Implications

• For District Courts: The opinion illustrates a post‑Esteras template:
  • State clearly that § 3583(e) governs and emphasize deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation.
  • Discuss “seriousness” only in relation to the violation conduct’s import for breach of trust and risk—not as retribution for the underlying offense of conviction.
  • Make an individualized assessment: here, the presence of a baby and a firearm, a discharged shot, and injuries to the victim were highlighted as aggravators.
• For Counsel: Preservation matters. Because Hardeman did not object to procedural reasonableness, the panel applied plain-error review, which is defendant-unfriendly. Defense counsel should:
  • Object contemporaneously if the court references § 3553(a)(2)(A) concepts or appears to rely on retribution to reflect the “seriousness of the offense” of conviction.
  • Ask the court to clarify that any “seriousness” reference pertains to violation conduct in service of deterrence/public protection.
  • Develop mitigation records that demonstrate compliance and rehabilitation during supervision to balance breach-of-trust concerns.
• For Revocation Practice: The opinion underscores that conduct underlying withdrawn or uncharged state offenses may be found by a preponderance of the evidence at revocation and may support a Grade A finding and an upward variance, so long as the court explains its reasons within § 3583(e)’s permissible factors.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Revocation is about breach of trust, not retribution for the original offense: When supervised release is revoked, the sanction addresses the defendant’s failure to abide by court-ordered conditions. Under § 3583(e)—and as reinforced by Esteras—courts may not impose imprisonment to “reflect the seriousness of the offense” of conviction or to “provide just punishment.”
• Permissible § 3553(a) factors at revocation: Section 3583(e) allows consideration of certain § 3553(a) factors, notably:
  • Deterrence of criminal conduct (§ 3553(a)(2)(B))
  • Protection of the public (§ 3553(a)(2)(C))
  • Rehabilitation/needed treatment (§ 3553(a)(2)(D))
  • Nature and circumstances of the offense and history and characteristics of the defendant (§ 3553(a)(1))
  But the retributive factor—§ 3553(a)(2)(A)—is not incorporated.
• “Seriousness” after Esteras: Judges may describe violation conduct as serious in evaluating breach of trust and risk, provided they do not frame the sentence as needed to reflect the seriousness of the original offense or to provide just punishment.
• Grade A violation (Chapter 7 policy statements): Generally refers to serious violation conduct such as crimes of violence, certain drug offenses, or firearms offenses punishable by more than one year. It typically yields higher advisory ranges. The panel notes Hardeman’s range of 27 to 33 months based on a Grade A violation and Criminal History Category II.
• Variance vs. departure in revocation: Chapter 7’s ranges are advisory policy statements. A court may vary upward or downward based on § 3583(e) factors. Here, the court varied upward to 48 months with an individualized explanation tied to deterrence, protection of the public, and breach of trust.
• Plain-error review: If a defendant does not object at sentencing, appellate courts ask whether there was an error, it was clear or obvious, it affected substantial rights, and it seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. This demanding standard often defeats unpreserved claims.
• Considering dismissed or withdrawn charges: In revocation proceedings, the court may consider the underlying conduct based on a preponderance of the evidence, even if related state charges are withdrawn or dismissed. The district court here made findings after an evidentiary hearing.

Conclusion

United States v. Taire Hardeman provides a clear, practical application of Esteras in the revocation context. The Third Circuit affirms that a sentencing court may emphasize breach of trust and the seriousness of the violation conduct—including domestic violence with a firearm and the presence of a child—so long as its rationale is grounded in the permissible § 3583(e) objectives of deterrence, public protection, and rehabilitation, not the retributive aims of § 3553(a)(2)(A). The district court’s recognition of those distinctions, coupled with its individualized assessment and explicit balancing of mitigation, supported both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the upward variance.

Although non-precedential, this decision offers instructive guidance to sentencing judges and practitioners navigating revocation after Esteras: keep the focus on breach of trust, risk, and forward-looking goals; articulate how the violation conduct bears on those aims; and avoid retributive justifications. Properly framed, even significant upward variances from Chapter 7 ranges will withstand appellate scrutiny.