Post‑Crash Equipment Evidence Can Defeat Summary Disposition; Spoliation Sanctions Require Explicit Findings on Materiality and Pre‑Suit Preservation Duty

Introduction

This commentary examines the Michigan Supreme Court’s June 11, 2025 order in Estate of William Howard McDuffie‑Connor v. Scott M. Neal et al. (consolidated appeal nos. 166865‑66), which arises from a fatal collision between a passenger car driven by decedent William Howard McDuffie‑Connor and a dump truck operated by Scott Neal in the course and scope of his employment with NSS Construction, Inc. After the Wayne Circuit Court denied NSS’s motion for summary disposition and awarded spoliation sanctions against NSS for discarding certain records, a split Court of Appeals reversed—ordering summary disposition for NSS and vacating sanctions. The Supreme Court vacated in part and reversed in part, reinstating the trial court’s denial of summary disposition, vacating the sanctions order for lack of necessary findings, and remanding for further proceedings.

Two core questions frame the decision:

Whether post‑collision inspection evidence and expert opinions created triable issues of material fact regarding the operability of the truck’s turn signals, breach, causation, and comparative fault, such that summary disposition was improper.
What prerequisites a trial court must satisfy before imposing spoliation sanctions for missing employment and maintenance records.

The Court’s order clarifies that:

Post‑crash equipment findings and expert testimony can generate genuine issues of material fact, even where eyewitnesses claim proper signal use; credibility conflicts must go to a jury.
Comparative fault allocations and the “more than 50% at fault” bar in MCL 500.3135(2)(b) are typically for the fact‑finder when reasonable minds could differ.
The “no duty to anticipate unknown hazards” doctrine (Briggs v Knapp) does not permit judgment as a matter of law where the other vehicle may have been apparent; foreseeability is fact‑bound.
Spoliation sanctions require explicit findings on materiality and on the existence and timing of a duty to preserve evidence (including potential pre‑suit obligations).

Notably, Justice Zahra would have denied leave; Justices Bernstein and Hood did not participate (the latter due to prior service on the Court of Appeals panel).

Summary of the Opinion

Summary disposition: Reversing the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the truck’s turn signals were malfunctioning before the collision (lit but not blinking), whether defendant breached duties under the common law and Michigan Vehicle Code, whether such breach proximately caused the collision, and the allocation of comparative fault. In particular, the Court emphasized that the Court of Appeals erred by disregarding post‑crash investigative findings and failing to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Duty to anticipate: The Court rejected the argument that Neal had no duty to anticipate a pass on the right as a matter of law, distinguishing Briggs v Knapp and underscoring that whether the decedent’s vehicle should have been apparent is a jury question on this record.
Spoliation sanctions: The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s sanctions award because the court did not make necessary findings on (a) whether the discarded employment and maintenance records were material to plaintiff’s claims, and (b) whether NSS had a duty to preserve those items—potentially arising even pre‑suit. The case is remanded for the trial court to reconsider sanctions with proper findings. The Court did not disturb the Court of Appeals’ separate conclusion that NSS did not spoliate the dump truck itself, as plaintiff did not challenge that aspect.
Unresolved issues: The Supreme Court expressly left unaddressed NSS’s other summary disposition arguments not passed on below (e.g., the wrongful conduct rule and any MCR 2.116(C)(8) grounds).

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

Summary disposition standards:
- El‑Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152 (2019): Review de novo; (C)(10) is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact.
- Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109 (1999): Courts must consider substantively admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
- McCart v J Walter Thompson USA, Inc, 437 Mich 109 (1991): Credibility determinations are for the fact‑finder, not for resolution at summary disposition.
Negligence elements and duties:
- Loweke v Ann Arbor Ceiling & Partition Co, LLC, 489 Mich 157 (2011): Establishes the four elements of negligence.
- Zarzecki v Hatch, 347 Mich 138 (1956): Drivers owe “ordinary and reasonable care and caution.”
- Zeni v Anderson, 397 Mich 117 (1976); Klanseck v Anderson Sales & Serv, Inc, 426 Mich 78 (1986): A penal statute violation can create a rebuttable presumption of negligence.
- Ray v Swager, 501 Mich 52 (2017): Proximate cause requires foreseeability analysis.
- Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153 (1994): Causation must follow a “logical sequence of cause and effect,” not speculation.
Comparative fault and no‑fault:
- MCL 500.3135(1), (2)(b): Tort recovery for noneconomic loss after death; no recovery if plaintiff > 50% at fault.
- MCL 600.2957(1): Fault allocation is by the trier of fact in proportion to each party’s percentage of fault.
- Huggins v Scripter, 469 Mich 898 (2003): Conflicting evidence on fault normally precludes summary disposition under the >50% bar.
Duty to anticipate hazards:
- Briggs v Knapp, 513 Mich 857 (2023): No duty to anticipate unknown hazards until they are perceived or should be apparent, but application is fact‑specific.
Owner liability and wrongful death:
- MCL 257.401(1): Owner vicarious liability for negligent operation with knowledge or consent.
- MCL 600.2922(1): Wrongful death requires a “wrongful act, neglect, or fault.”
Vehicle code operational duties implicated:
- MCL 257.648(1): Must determine a turn/stop can be made safely and give a signal.
- MCL 257.642(1)(a): Must not move from a lane until the movement can be safely made.
- MCL 257.637(2): Passing on the right must be done only under conditions permitting safe overtaking; driving off the main‑traveled portion is restricted.
Spoliation:
- Teel v Meredith, 284 Mich App 660 (2009): Courts have inherent authority to sanction when loss of material evidence causes unfair prejudice.
- Brenner v Kolk, 226 Mich App 149 (1997): A duty to preserve evidence may arise pre‑suit when litigation is reasonably foreseeable.
Procedural rule used:
- MCR 2.116(C)(10): Summary disposition—no genuine issue of material fact.
- MCR 7.305(I)(1): Order in lieu of granting leave to appeal.

Legal Reasoning

The Supreme Court’s analysis proceeds from first principles of summary disposition: courts must credit the nonmovant’s evidence and draw reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Applying that rule, the Court held that the Court of Appeals improperly minimized or disregarded critical post‑collision evidence.

1) Triable dispute on turn‑signal operability and breach

Michigan State Police Officer Ryan Wilson inspected the truck six days after the collision, documenting that all four turn signals illuminated but did not blink and that five brakes were out of adjustment. Based on his training and experience, he concluded the defects predated the crash. Two experts—collision reconstructionist Timothy Abbo and mechanic/CDL examiner Larry Baareman—opined the turn signals were not functioning properly before impact. Although the driver (Neal) and an eyewitness (Matthew Pace) testified the right rear signal was blinking, the conflict is quintessentially a credibility dispute, which cannot be resolved on summary disposition (McCart).

This dispute is material. An inoperable or malfunctioning turn signal speaks directly to whether: (a) Neal exercised ordinary care (Zarzecki), (b) he complied with statutory duties to ascertain the safety of a turn and to signal (MCL 257.648(1); MCL 257.642(1)(a)), and (c) NSS, as owner, faces vicarious exposure for negligent operation (MCL 257.401(1)). The Court also invoked Zeni/Klanseck to note that statutory violations may yield a rebuttable presumption of negligence—another reason the signal’s operability matters.

2) Proximate cause and non‑speculative inferences

On causation, the Court held it is reasonable to infer that if Neal’s turn signals only illuminated (without blinking), the decedent could have interpreted the steady light as braking rather than a right turn, making a pass on the right appear safe. This inference reflects the “logical sequence of cause and effect” required by Skinner and is not mere speculation. Foreseeability is likewise triable: a reasonable juror could find that harm to motorists in the right‑side periphery is a foreseeable consequence of turning without functioning signals (Ray).

3) Comparative fault is for the jury on this record

Although video captured the decedent passing on the right from a parking lane, the Court underscored that a jury could reasonably apportion blame to both drivers. The decedent may have violated or disregarded the limitations of MCL 257.637(2), but Neal may have violated MCL 257.642(1)(a) and MCL 257.648(1). Because reasonable minds could differ about who exceeds the 50% threshold, the statutory bar in MCL 500.3135(2)(b) cannot be applied as a matter of law (see Huggins).

4) Duty to anticipate hazards—Briggs distinguished

Invoking Briggs, NSS argued Neal had no duty to anticipate a right‑side pass. The Supreme Court explained that Briggs concerned a nighttime pedestrian stepping into a highway lane—an “unknown hazard” under those conditions. Here, by contrast, a jury could find the decedent’s vehicle should have been apparent, particularly because Neal had passed it on the left seconds earlier and then immediately turned right. Visibility and perception render duty and breach fact‑dependent; summary disposition was therefore improper.

5) Spoliation sanctions—required findings on materiality and preservation duty

The trial court sanctioned NSS for spoliation of employment and maintenance records without explicit findings on two threshold issues:

Materiality: Whether the discarded records were material to plaintiff’s claims (Teel).
Preservation duty: Whether, and when, NSS’s duty to preserve arose, including pre‑suit if litigation was reasonably foreseeable (Brenner).

Because those findings are prerequisites to any sanctions order, the Supreme Court vacated the sanction and remanded for reconsideration. It also vacated the Court of Appeals’ merits discussion on this issue as unnecessary once the trial court’s lack of findings is recognized. The Court preserved the Court of Appeals’ distinct ruling that failing to preserve the dump truck was not spoliation (plaintiff did not challenge that point).

Impact and Practical Implications

For trial courts and appellate practice

Video evidence does not automatically resolve negligence disputes at the summary disposition stage, particularly where other competent evidence (e.g., post‑crash inspections, expert opinions) supports competing reasonable inferences.
Credibility conflicts—such as driver/witness accounts versus forensic findings—belong to juries.
Comparative fault and the >50% bar under MCL 500.3135(2)(b) are generally jury issues when evidence allows different reasonable allocations.
Briggs’s “unknown hazard” principle remains viable but is tightly cabined: foreseeability and perceptibility to a reasonable driver are usually jury questions in motor‑vehicle contexts with competing evidence.

For motor carriers and commercial drivers

Post‑crash mechanical inspections can be powerful evidence of pre‑crash defects. The decision incentivizes rigorous pre‑trip inspections and precise documentation (given the evidentiary weight juries may give a trooper’s post‑crash findings and expert opinions).
Turn‑signal operability is central: evidence of a steady light (versus a blinking indicator) can support breach and causation, and may trigger a rebuttable presumption of negligence based on statutory violations.
Owner liability attaches to negligent operation with consent. Poor maintenance that translates into negligent operation in the hands of an employee can expose the owner (employer) under MCL 257.401(1).

For record retention and spoliation exposure

Sanctions are not automatic upon loss of records. However, once litigation is reasonably foreseeable—even pre‑suit—parties must preserve material evidence. Failure to implement a timely litigation hold and preserve relevant employment/maintenance materials risks sanctions.
Trial courts must make explicit, record‑supported findings on materiality, the existence and onset of a preservation duty, culpability, prejudice, and proportionality prior to imposing sanctions.
On remand, courts will likely expand evidentiary hearings to develop the factual record on these points, leading to more robust sanction analyses in Michigan practice.

For plaintiffs in auto‑negligence/wrongful‑death litigation

Obtain and preserve post‑crash inspection records promptly. Engage qualified reconstruction and mechanical experts early to link post‑crash conditions to pre‑crash defects.
Frame causation using the Skinner “logical sequence” approach; tie statutory violations (e.g., MCL 257.648(1) and MCL 257.642(1)(a)) to foreseeability and harm.
Anticipate comparative fault issues; prepare to address passing‑on‑the‑right constraints under MCL 257.637 while emphasizing the defendant’s duties to signal and ascertain safety before turning.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary disposition (MCR 2.116(C)(10)): A pretrial ruling when there is no genuine dispute about important facts; if reasonable jurors could disagree, the case should go to trial.
Genuine issue of material fact: A factual disagreement that could affect the outcome; “material” means legally important to the claim or defense.
Rebuttable presumption of negligence: If a driver violates a safety statute (e.g., turn‑signal or safe‑turn duties), the law presumes negligence unless the driver offers evidence to rebut that presumption.
Proximate cause: A legal limit on responsibility; asks whether the harm was a foreseeable result of the conduct, and whether the causal chain is logical and not speculative.
Comparative fault (MCL 600.2957; MCL 500.3135): Each party bears damages in proportion to their percentage of fault. In Michigan auto cases, a plaintiff who is more than 50% at fault cannot recover noneconomic damages.
Owner liability (MCL 257.401): The vehicle’s owner is vicariously liable for injuries caused by the driver’s negligent operation if the owner consented to the driving.
Spoliation of evidence: Destroying or losing material evidence, whether intentional or not. Courts may sanction the responsible party if the loss causes unfair prejudice. Sanctions require findings that the evidence was material and that a duty to preserve existed (which can arise before a lawsuit if litigation is reasonably foreseeable).
No duty to anticipate unknown hazards (Briggs): A driver need not guard against hazards not perceived and not apparent to a reasonable person under the circumstances. Whether a hazard should have been apparent is often a question for the jury.

Conclusion

This order delivers two significant clarifications for Michigan tort and evidence practice. First, it reinforces the centrality of the jury’s role where post‑crash forensic evidence and expert opinions conflict with eyewitness testimony about vehicle equipment. Mechanical defects—particularly turn‑signal malfunctions—can support breach and proximate cause and keep negligence and comparative fault disputes from being resolved on paper. The Court’s treatment of Briggs ensures that defendants cannot convert contested questions of perception and foreseeability into categorical no‑duty rulings.

Second, the Court tightens the framework for spoliation sanctions: before penalizing a party for lost records, trial courts must make explicit findings on materiality and on when and how a duty to preserve arose, including in the pre‑suit window when litigation is reasonably foreseeable. That approach safeguards fairness while ensuring sanctions rest on a solid evidentiary foundation.

On remand, the circuit court must allow the negligence, owner‑liability, wrongful‑death, and comparative‑fault issues to proceed consistent with the identified factual disputes, and it must revisit sanctions with the required findings. More broadly, this decision will shape Michigan motion practice in vehicle cases, promote careful preservation of commercial carrier records, and underscore that contested questions of equipment operability, safety signaling, and foreseeability belong to the trier of fact.