Post-Wilkinson Deferential Review and the Mitigating Role of Family Assets in “Exceptional and Extremely Unusual Hardship” Analyses

Introduction

This commentary examines the Sixth Circuit’s unpublished decision in Enzo Leomir Canaca Rodriguez v. Bondi (No. 24-3979, Oct. 30, 2025), a petition for review from an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming an immigration judge’s (IJ’s) denial of cancellation of removal. The case sits at the crossroads of two important strands in current immigration jurisprudence:

Post-Wilkinson review of hardship determinations as mixed questions of law and fact, to be conducted under a “deferential” standard; and
The substantive content of the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” threshold under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), including how financial resources and generalized country conditions factor into that calculus.

The Sixth Circuit denied the petition. The court’s opinion reinforces the high bar for cancellation of removal on hardship grounds, clarifies the court’s jurisdictional role after Wilkinson v. Garland, and underscores that substantial family assets and generalized country conditions arguments typically cut against a finding of exceptional hardship—especially where the record lacks individualized, child-specific vulnerabilities.

Case Overview

Petitioner, a Honduran national present in the United States since 2001, conceded removability and sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). He withdrew his earlier asylum application. The government stipulated to three statutory predicates—continuous presence, good moral character, and absence of disqualifying convictions—leaving open only the fourth requirement: whether removal would cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative (here, his two U.S.-citizen children).

The family profile was significant: petitioner is married to a spouse with DACA; their U.S.-citizen children were ages seven and five at the merits hearing, bilingual, enrolled in a private Christian school, and medically healthy. The family enjoyed substantial financial stability: petitioner owns a construction company employing several people, his spouse serves as the company’s accountant, and the couple draws $8,000 per month in salary; petitioner reported approximately $1.5 million in assets, including real estate. Petitioner indicated that, if removed, his wife and children would relocate with him to Honduras.

The IJ denied cancellation, finding no exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the children, and the BIA affirmed without opinion. On petition for review, the Sixth Circuit reviewed the IJ’s decision directly and denied relief.

Summary of the Opinion

Jurisdiction and standard of review: Following Wilkinson v. Garland, hardship determinations are reviewable as mixed questions of law and fact under a “deferential” standard. The Sixth Circuit noted the precise degree of deference remains unresolved within the circuit but concluded petitioner would lose under any level of deference.
Scope of review: The court reiterated it lacks jurisdiction to reweigh or revisit underlying factual findings; its role is to apply the IJ-found facts to the legal standard for exceptional hardship.
Merits: The court affirmed the IJ’s determination that the hardships alleged—exposure to generalized country conditions (including gangs), reduced educational opportunities, emotional impacts of relocation, and potential employment difficulties—are typical consequences of removal and not “rare” or “well outside the norm.”
Evidence handling: The court applied a presumption of regularity to the IJ’s consideration of the record, rejecting arguments that the IJ failed to consider particular articles or studies. It also emphasized that the IJ need not discuss every piece of evidence expressly.
Assets as mitigation: The court endorsed the IJ’s view that petitioner’s substantial financial assets would ease resettlement and mitigate the alleged hardships.
Aggregation: The court found that the IJ expressly considered all hardship factors “in the aggregate” before concluding they did not meet the elevated statutory threshold.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024): The Supreme Court held that the determination whether proved facts satisfy the statutory “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard presents a reviewable mixed question of law and fact. The Court directed that the reviewing court’s posture should be “deferential,” without specifying whether that deference takes the form of “substantial evidence,” “clear error,” or another standard. In Canaca Rodriguez, the Sixth Circuit adopts Wilkinson’s framework and highlights continued uncertainty about the precise degree of deference, but finds the outcome the same under any approach.
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1): Statutory eligibility for non-LPR cancellation of removal requires continuous presence, good moral character, no specified criminal bars, and a showing that removal would cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative (U.S. citizen or LPR spouse, parent, or child).
Hernandez v. Garland, 59 F.4th 762 (6th Cir. 2023); Singh v. Rosen, 984 F.3d 1142 (6th Cir. 2021): The Sixth Circuit lacks jurisdiction to revisit the IJ’s pure factual findings underpinning the hardship analysis; it reviews only the application of law to facts. Singh also underscores that diminished educational options, without more, are typically insufficient to meet the “exceptional” threshold.
Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland, 124 F.4th 416 (6th Cir. 2024): Clarifies that the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard demands circumstances that are “rare” and “well outside the norm,” and identifies typical hardships—financial loss, reduced educational opportunities, and separation or relocation-related emotional strains—as insufficient in the usual case.
Valdez-Arriaga v. Barr, 778 F. App’x 380 (6th Cir. 2019): Describes the hardship standard as “onerous,” reserved for “truly exceptional situations.”
Diaz-Zanatta v. Holder, 558 F.3d 450 (6th Cir. 2009): Where the BIA affirms without opinion (an AWO), the court reviews the IJ’s decision directly as the final agency action.
Aoraha v. Gonzales, 209 F. App’x 473 (6th Cir. 2006); Navarro v. Holder, 505 F. App’x 441 (6th Cir. 2012): Establish the presumption of regularity in agency decision-making and confirm that an IJ need not mention every piece of evidence to be deemed to have considered the record.
Barrios-Ortega v. Garland, No. 23-3292, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 6675 (6th Cir. Mar. 20, 2024): Approves considering a petitioner’s assets as mitigating hardship, including the ability to liquidate assets to facilitate resettlement.
Trinidad-Contreras v. Bondi, No. 22-3352, 2025 WL 2732495 (6th Cir. Sep. 25, 2025): Notes that the precise standard of review for the hardship inquiry in the Sixth Circuit remains unresolved post-Wilkinson, while reaffirming that review is deferential.

Legal Reasoning and Application

The court’s reasoning proceeds in three steps: identifying the review posture, articulating the statutory hardship standard, and evaluating whether the IJ’s application of that standard to the facts was legally sound.

1) Review posture and jurisdictional guardrails

The Sixth Circuit reaffirmed that, after Wilkinson, hardship is a mixed question reviewable on petition for review. However, the court is barred from reweighing evidence or disturbing the IJ’s factual determinations; it may only decide whether the facts as found by the IJ satisfy the legal standard. The panel expressly noted ongoing intra-circuit uncertainty about whether the standard is “substantial evidence,” “clear error,” or some other formulation, but declined to choose because the petition fails under any deferential approach.

2) The substance of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”

Drawing on Moctezuma-Reyes and related authority, the court emphasized:

The hardship must be “rare” and “well outside the norm,” exceeding what families ordinarily experience upon a parent’s removal.
Ordinary or typical consequences—emotional distress, educational trade-offs, reduced financial prospects, difficulty finding work in the destination country—do not, without more, clear the high bar.
Courts and the agency must consider all asserted hardships “in the aggregate.” An IJ’s failure to aggregate can be reversible error; here, however, the IJ expressly stated she performed a cumulative assessment.

3) Applying the standard to the record

The petitioner’s arguments clustered around four themes: country conditions and safety; education; emotional and psychological impacts; and employment/financial stability. The court treated each as follows:

Country conditions and safety: The IJ acknowledged some evidence of gang-related dangers in Honduras (including risks to youth on the way to school) but concluded the record did not establish that petitioner and his family “could not settle safely somewhere in Honduras.” The court deemed that conclusion compatible with the legal standard. Generalized dangers do not equate to “exceptional” hardship; individualized and localized risk is required. The fact that petitioner has close family (his father and siblings) in Honduras further undermined the claim of pervasive, unmanageable danger, and the court accepted the IJ’s finding that relocation within Honduras remained a viable mitigation measure.
Education: Although petitioner submitted articles critiquing Honduras’s education system, the court relied on Singh to reaffirm that reduced educational opportunities—standing alone—rarely suffice. The IJ also noted that petitioner had not researched specific schools, which weakens a claim that education-related hardship is extreme or unavoidable. Absent proof the children would be deprived of schooling altogether, the asserted educational shortfall remained within the “typical” range.
Emotional and psychological impacts: The IJ recognized the children would be “detrimentally” affected by uprooting, but the court observed that emotional strains from relocation are paradigmatically “typical” and not “rare.” Without evidence of clinical diagnoses, special needs, or particular vulnerabilities, this factor did not elevate the case into the “exceptional” category.
Employment and financial stability: Petitioner argued that crime, violence, and labor market constraints would render it hard for him to secure work in Honduras. The court noted that difficulty obtaining a job is a standard byproduct of removal, not an exceptional hardship to the children. Critically, the IJ highlighted petitioner’s “significant assets” as a mitigating factor—consistent with Barrios-Ortega—because liquid assets can facilitate resettlement and cushion the transition.

The court also disposed of process-oriented challenges. It invoked the presumption of regularity and reiterated that an IJ need not cite every exhibit or article to be credited with having considered the record. It further rejected the claim that the IJ failed to aggregate hardships, pointing to the IJ’s express statement that she considered “all hardships … in the aggregate.”

What the Court Did Not Decide

The panel did not fix the precise standard of review (e.g., substantial-evidence versus clear-error) for the legal application component of the hardship inquiry in the Sixth Circuit. It simply emphasized that any permissible standard must be deferential and that the outcome here is the same under any of them.
The court did not hold that assets always defeat hardship, only that in this case, substantial assets reasonably mitigate ordinary resettlement burdens and thus weigh against a finding of exceptional hardship.
The court did not address scenarios involving children with significant medical, educational, or psychological special needs, which often drive different outcomes in cancellation matters.

Practical Impact and Guidance

Although unpublished and therefore nonprecedential, the decision is instructive for litigants and adjudicators in the Sixth Circuit.

Post-Wilkinson review remains narrow in practice: Petitioners should expect the Sixth Circuit to confine itself to whether the IJ applied the correct standard and properly aggregated the hardships. Attempts to reargue the underlying facts, or to claim inadequate evidentiary discussion, are unlikely to succeed absent clear misapplication of law or a failure to conduct cumulative analysis.
Assets can materially undermine hardship claims: Substantial, liquidatable assets will be treated as a buffer against the disruption of relocation. Practitioners should anticipate probing questions about the family’s financial resources and should be prepared to explain, with evidence, why assets would not meaningfully mitigate the specific harms to the qualifying relatives (e.g., extraordinary medical costs not defrayed by resources, inaccessible specialty care at destination, etc.).
General country conditions are not enough: Articles about nationwide violence, crime, or educational problems rarely carry the day. Stronger records typically include localized, individualized risks to the children, supported by affidavits, expert testimony, and documentation tailored to the specific destination community where the family would likely live.
Education claims require detail: It is not sufficient to assert that schools are inferior. Petitioners should present granular comparisons of available schools (curriculum, language of instruction, special services, safety measures, transportation realities) and, when applicable, evidence that the child would be deprived of necessary services or any schooling at all.
Emotional harm needs clinical grounding: Where the theory of hardship turns on psychological impact, corroborating evaluations from qualified mental health professionals, evidence of ongoing therapy, and specific diagnoses with treatment implications can be pivotal.
Aggregation is essential—but so is substance: While IJs must aggregate hardships, aggregation of typical hardships seldom yields an exceptional outcome. The record must include at least one or more non-typical, child-specific hardships that, when combined with other factors, push the case “well outside the norm.”
Family decision paths matter: Here, the family planned to relocate together, which narrowed the analysis toward relocation hardships rather than separation hardships. In cases where the qualifying relatives would remain in the United States, petitioners should document concrete consequences of separation (e.g., loss of primary caregiver for a child with special needs).

Complex Concepts Simplified

Cancellation of removal (non-LPR): A discretionary form of relief allowing certain non–lawful permanent residents to avoid removal if they meet four requirements: 10 years’ continuous presence, good moral character, no disqualifying convictions, and proof that removal would cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative (U.S.-citizen or LPR spouse, parent, or child).
“Exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”: A very high bar. The hardship must be rare and far beyond the typical difficulties associated with deportation, such as emotional distress, financial loss, and schooling disruptions.
Mixed question of law and fact: A legal issue that asks whether established facts meet a legal standard. Post-Wilkinson, courts may review this question but must do so deferentially.
Deferential review: The reviewing court gives significant leeway to the agency’s application of law to facts. The Sixth Circuit has not definitively chosen among competing deferential formulations for hardship cases, but in practice it rarely second-guesses an IJ’s well-reasoned application of the standard.
Presumption of regularity: Courts presume that IJs and the BIA have considered all evidence in the record, even if they do not mention each document or argument specifically.
BIA affirmance without opinion (AWO): When the BIA summarily affirms, the IJ’s decision becomes the dispositive agency determination for purposes of judicial review.

Conclusion and Key Takeaways

Canaca Rodriguez reinforces an already demanding message in cancellation-of-removal jurisprudence: absent individualized, child-specific vulnerabilities or extraordinary conditions, the ordinary consequences of relocation or separation—emotional distress, educational trade-offs, employment uncertainty, and generalized safety concerns—do not amount to “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” The decision also highlights two post-Wilkinson points of practice:

Appellate review is available but constrained: the Sixth Circuit will not reweigh facts and will defer to the IJ’s assessment so long as the correct legal framework is used and an aggregate analysis is performed.
Financial wherewithal matters: significant assets are a meaningful mitigating factor that can tip the cumulative hardship analysis away from “exceptional,” especially where the children are healthy, bilingual, and lack special needs.

For practitioners, the opinion is a roadmap for building (or challenging) hardship records: move beyond generic country reports, document localized and individualized risks, substantiate emotional claims with clinical evidence, present concrete school-by-school comparisons, and anticipate that financial resources will be viewed as reducing hardship. Even though the decision is not precedential, it is squarely in line with the Sixth Circuit’s emerging post-Wilkinson approach: deferential review coupled with a stringent substantive threshold that reserves cancellation for truly uncommon cases.

Appendix: Factual Matrix Recap (as cited in the opinion)

Petitioner: Honduran national; entry in 2001; no departure since 2005.
Family: Spouse (DACA), two U.S.-citizen children (ages 7 and 5 at hearing), bilingual, healthy.
Education and activities: Children attend private Christian school; involved in gymnastics, ice-skating, piano/soccer.
Financial situation: Owns Bethel Construction (6–9 employees); spouse is company accountant; $8,000 monthly salary; approximately $1.5 million in assets including real estate.
Relocation plan: Family would relocate together to Honduras; petitioner has family there (father and four siblings).
Country conditions evidence: Articles on gangs, educational quality, and emotional effects of parental deportation; IJ found evidence insufficient to show inability to settle safely somewhere in Honduras.