Post-Remand Ambiguity as Good Cause: Iowa Supreme Court Requires Leniency on § 668.11 Expert Deadlines When Appeals Create Uncertainty

Post-Remand Ambiguity as Good Cause: Iowa Supreme Court Requires Leniency on § 668.11 Expert Deadlines When Appeals Create Uncertainty

Introduction

In Jahn Patric Kirlin and Sara Louise Kirlin v. Dr. Barclay A. Monaster, M.D.; Dr. Christian William Jones, M.D.; and Physicians Clinic d/b/a Methodist Physicians Clinic–Council Bluffs, No. 24-0205 (Iowa Mar. 21, 2025), the Iowa Supreme Court—per Justice Mansfield, with all justices joining—reversed summary judgment in a medical malpractice case for a second time. The core issue this round was procedural: how to treat Iowa Code § 668.11’s 180‑day expert certification deadline when it lapses while the case is on appeal and then returns to the district court after reversal.

Rather than definitively decide whether the statutory deadline “tolls” and revives upon remand, the Court held that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to find “good cause” under § 668.11(2) to excuse the plaintiffs’ timing, given a genuine post-remand uncertainty about which deadline controlled, the absence of prejudice to the defendants, the plaintiffs’ diligence, and defense counsel’s communications suggesting the parties would set new “dates certain.” The decision reinstates the Kirlins’ case and clarifies how trial courts should apply the “good cause” safety valve in § 668.11 when appellate proceedings complicate scheduling.

The plaintiffs, Jahn and Sara Kirlin, allege negligent care by their primary-care providers (Dr. Jones and Dr. Monaster) and their clinic (MPC) led to catastrophic stroke after a neck manipulation, including failures to order imaging and, as alleged, intoxicated treatment and record irregularities. The litigation has a procedural history: an initial dismissal and refiling, a 2023 Iowa Supreme Court reversal on a certificate-of-merit issue under § 147.140, and now this 2025 reversal focused on § 668.11’s expert disclosure regime.

Summary of the Opinion

  • The Court reversed the district court’s summary judgment that had barred plaintiffs’ experts as untimely under Iowa Code § 668.11(1) and dismissed the malpractice action.
  • The Court deliberately did not decide the thorny question of which expert-disclosure deadline controls after remand (statutory tolling vs. trial scheduling/discovery plan (TSDP) default).
  • Instead, it held the district court abused its discretion in refusing to find “good cause” under § 668.11(2), where:
    • there was legitimate uncertainty post-remand about the controlling deadline,
    • defendants suffered no actual prejudice (indeed, they received disclosures 223 days before trial),
    • plaintiffs acted diligently to prosecute the case and disclosed promptly upon dispute, and
    • defense counsel’s own communications suggested a shared expectation of new “dates certain.”
  • The Court emphasized that the “seriousness of the deviation” is not measured solely by elapsed time, but also by whether the deadline was ambiguous and whether plaintiffs complied with a reasonable alternative (the TSDP’s 210‑days‑before‑trial default).
  • The Court distinguished prior authorities cited for a “time machine” theory of reversal (Sleeper v. Killion; Taylor v. Burgus), explaining that those cases do not mechanically restore pre-appeal procedural clocks.
  • The case is remanded for further proceedings with plaintiffs’ expert testimony allowed.

Background and Procedural Posture

The Alleged Malpractice

In April 2019, then-37-year-old Jahn Kirlin presented with severe right-sided neck pain, headaches, and periocular pressure. Dr. Jones at Methodist Physicians Clinic initiated conservative measures and suggested MRI if symptoms persisted. On April 12, persistent symptoms were reported; the office deferred MRI ordering to April 15. On April 15, after returning from alcohol treatment, Dr. Monaster allegedly refused MRI, prescribed steroids, downplayed the need for imaging, and planned follow-up. The next day, after chiropractic manipulation, Kirlin suffered stroke symptoms; imaging confirmed bilateral distal cervical vertebral artery dissections with basilar thrombus and permanent deficits. Plaintiffs further allege record alterations and that Monaster was intoxicated at the April 15 visit and arrested for OWI the next day.

First Appeal (2023): Certificate of Merit

Plaintiffs initially filed a certificate of merit under § 147.140 signed by a neurosurgeon; defendants challenged the affiant’s specialty match to family medicine under § 147.139. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed and refiled with a family-medicine expert (Dr. Brian Smith). The district court nonetheless granted summary judgment based on the deficiency in the first case. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed, holding that after voluntary dismissal and refiling, § 147.140 “applied anew” and the second, compliant certificate controls. Kirlin v. Monaster, 984 N.W.2d 412 (Iowa 2023).

Post-Remand Scheduling and the Second Summary Judgment

Procedendo issued February 20, 2023. Plaintiffs twice circulated proposed TSDPs; no agreement emerged. On April 4, 2023 the court set a seven-day jury trial for March 18, 2024, but did not enter a new TSDP or expert deadlines. Defendants later moved for summary judgment, arguing plaintiffs missed § 668.11’s expert identification deadline. Their theory: in the pre-appeal case, 29 days remained on the 180-day clock when summary judgment entered on January 18, 2022; upon remand, those 29 days resumed, expiring March 21, 2023.

Plaintiffs resisted, contending that once § 668.11’s period elapsed while the case was on appeal (when the district court could not receive expert disclosures), the default TSDP rule (210 days before trial) applied. They served their expert designations on August 8, 2023—223 days before the March 18, 2024 trial—thus satisfying the TSDP default. Alternatively, they urged “good cause” under § 668.11(2) given the ambiguity, lack of prejudice, and diligence. Defendants served their own expert disclosures August 14, 2023. The district court nonetheless granted summary judgment on November 17, 2023, adopting defendants’ “time machine” approach and rejecting good cause.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • Hantsbarger v. Coffin, 501 N.W.2d 501 (Iowa 1993) (en banc):
    • Key holding: Trial courts may consider the seriousness of the deviation, prejudice (or lack thereof), and actions of opposing counsel when deciding good cause under § 668.11(2).
    • Application here: The Court expanded the notion of “seriousness” beyond sheer delay to include ambiguity about the operative deadline and compliance with a reasonable alternative (the TSDP default). Hantsbarger’s multi-factor lens controlled the outcome.
  • Nedved v. Welch, 585 N.W.2d 238 (Iowa 1998) (per curiam):
    • Key holding: No abuse of discretion in denying late designation filed three months after the deadline with a “questionable” and unsupported justification; lack of prejudice alone cannot save noncompliance.
    • Application here: By contrast, the Kirlins showed more than lack of prejudice—real ambiguity, diligence, and defense counsel conduct—placing their case within Hantsbarger’s lenient side rather than Nedved’s strict side.
  • Donovan v. State, 445 N.W.2d 763 (Iowa 1989):
    • Key holding: No abuse where plaintiffs ignored the statutory deadline for months despite explicit reminder via motion to compel, and only designated after a summary judgment motion.
    • Application here: Plaintiffs did not ignore deadlines; they operated under a colorable, alternative schedule, disclosed promptly after dispute arose, and had previously been prosecuting diligently.
  • Hill v. McCartney, 590 N.W.2d 52 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998):
    • Key holding: No abuse where plaintiff sought a long-delayed extension one month before trial, explaining only an inability to find an expert and offering no confusion about deadlines.
    • Application here: Distinguishable—plaintiffs had experts ready and disclosed them 223 days pretrial; the asserted “good cause” was genuine ambiguity owing to appellate posture, not inability to locate experts.
  • Connolly v. Foudree, 141 F.R.D. 124 (S.D. Iowa 1992):
    • Key holding: Good cause existed to excuse § 668.11 noncompliance in federal court where applicability of the Iowa statute was unclear and plaintiff promptly complied once clarity emerged.
    • Application here: The Court analogized—uncertainty about the controlling deadline post-remand, coupled with prompt action, supports good cause.
  • Sleeper v. Killion, 164 N.W. 241 (Iowa 1917), and Taylor v. Burgus, 262 N.W. 808 (Iowa 1935):
    • These cases explain substantive effects of a general reversal and the posture on retrial, not the recalibration of statutory or scheduling deadlines.
    • The Court clarified that neither case creates a procedural “time machine” that automatically reanimates pre-appeal clocks for discovery or disclosure deadlines.
  • State v. Hamilton, 309 N.W.2d 471 (Iowa 1981):
    • Used by analogy: Upon remand in criminal cases, speedy-trial clocks restart at procedendo, rather than resuming with whatever time remained pre-appeal. The analogy undermines a rigid tolling model for civil expert deadlines.
  • Kirlin v. Monaster, 984 N.W.2d 412 (Iowa 2023):
    • Prior appeal in this same case confirming that a refiled malpractice action triggers a fresh § 147.140 obligation; sets the stage for the present post-remand scheduling dispute.

Legal Reasoning

The Court framed the core question—what becomes of § 668.11’s 180-day expert certification deadline when it lapses during an appeal—but expressly declined to answer it. It described both parties’ positions as “plausible.” Instead, the Court resolved the case on the “good cause” exception in § 668.11(2), finding the district court abused its discretion.

The reasoning proceeded through the Hantsbarger factors, refined and applied to the post-appeal context:

  • Seriousness of deviation:
    • Not merely a matter of elapsed time. The Court emphasized the nature of the deviation—missing a “clear” deadline versus adhering to a reasonable but “ambiguous” one—matters.
    • Here, plaintiffs complied with the TSDP’s default of 210 days before trial (indeed, 223 days before trial) in the absence of a new order and after § 668.11’s period had run during the appeal. Treating that as a serious deviation was untenable.
  • Prejudice:
    • No real prejudice existed. Defendants received plaintiffs’ expert disclosures far earlier relative to the new trial date (223 days) than they would have under the original pre-appeal schedule (146 days).
    • Generalized assertions that late disclosure affects strategy and motion practice, or “presumed prejudice,” did not suffice.
  • Diligence:
    • Plaintiffs promptly sought to reschedule after procedendo and moved the case forward. When defendants first raised the § 668.11 argument in July 2023, plaintiffs served their expert disclosures within eight days—13 days ahead of what they reasonably believed was the TSDP deadline.
    • While the Court noted that “prudent counsel” should seek express clarification of deadlines post-remand, it distinguished an error in judgment from a lack of diligence.
  • Actions of defense counsel:
    • Defense counsel did not simply remain silent. At a March 30 scheduling conference and in follow-up emails, they advocated for setting “dates certain” for experts, signaling that deadlines remained open questions to be fixed, not that a March 21 deadline had already passed.
    • This conduct undercut their later insistence that plaintiffs were out of time, and weighed in favor of finding good cause, consistent with Hantsbarger’s recognition that opposing counsel’s actions may be considered.

The Court also explained why the district court’s reliance on early-twentieth-century precedents was misplaced: Sleeper and Taylor concern the substantive effect of reversals, not the mechanics of discovery deadlines after an appeal. And to the extent a tolling rule was urged for § 668.11, the Court underscored practical concerns (e.g., only a few days remaining upon remand) and analogized to speedy-trial clocks, which restart at procedendo.

Impact and Practical Significance

Although the Court left the tolling question unresolved, this opinion meaningfully develops Iowa law in three ways:

  • Good-cause doctrine under § 668.11(2) now expressly recognizes post-appeal ambiguity as a legitimate basis for relief. Trial courts should evaluate whether deadlines were clear and whether the party adhered to a reasonable alternative ordering regime (e.g., a TSDP default) before imposing the drastic sanction of excluding experts.
  • Lack of prejudice carries significant weight when disclosures occur many months before trial. Where defendants actually receive more time to respond than they would have under the original schedule, prejudice arguments will be weak.
  • Counsel conduct matters. Communications suggesting that expert deadlines are to be set or reset can undermine later attempts to spring a “gotcha” deadline, especially when appellate procedures have disrupted the case calendar.

Anticipated ripple effects:

  • Trial judges in professional liability actions may be more inclined to grant § 668.11(2) leave after remand when the statutory period expired during the appeal and the parties did not secure a fresh TSDP.
  • Parties will likely move promptly post-procedendo for explicit orders clarifying whether § 668.11 resumes, restarts, or yields to TSDP benchmarks; scheduling orders may begin to expressly address “post-appeal” deadlines.
  • Appellate practitioners and trial counsel should avoid relying on silence; they should paper their understanding of deadlines to avoid later disputes and accusations of sandbagging.
  • The Legislature or Iowa Rules Committees may consider clarifying whether § 668.11 tolls or restarts upon remand, to avoid recurring uncertainty.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Iowa Code § 668.11:
    • Requires plaintiffs in professional liability cases to identify experts within 180 days of a defendant’s answer, including qualifications and the general substance of testimony.
    • Section 668.11(2) provides a safety valve: if a party fails to disclose timely, the expert is barred unless the court allows testimony “for good cause shown.”
  • Certificate of Merit vs. Expert Certification:
    • § 147.140 (certificate of merit) is an early-case affidavit attesting to the breach of standard of care by a qualified expert; § 668.11 (expert certification) is a disclosure rule governing trial experts and timing.
    • This decision concerns § 668.11; a previous 2023 decision in the same case addressed § 147.140.
  • Procedendo:
    • The formal issuance from an appellate court sending the case back to the district court after the appeal concludes.
  • Trial Scheduling and Discovery Plan (TSDP):
    • A case-specific scheduling order. Here, the TSDP contained a default rule: expert disclosures 210 days before trial unless an earlier date is mandated by statute (e.g., § 668.11).
  • Tolling vs. Restarting:
    • Tolling pauses a running period and resumes where it left off; restarting begins a new period. The Court did not decide whether § 668.11 tolls or restarts after remand, leaving that issue open.
  • Abuse of Discretion:
    • A deferential standard of review. A court abuses its discretion when it bases its ruling on clearly untenable grounds or exercises discretion to a clearly unreasonable extent.

Key Practice Pointers

  • Move promptly after procedendo for a clarified or new TSDP expressly addressing expert deadlines, including whether § 668.11’s 180-day clock is revived, reset, or replaced by dates certain.
  • Memorialize in writing any mutual expectations regarding “dates certain” for experts; avoid relying on informal understandings.
  • When in doubt, disclose early. In this case, disclosing 223 days before trial powerfully undercut prejudice arguments.
  • If you must seek § 668.11(2) relief, build a record on ambiguity, diligence, and lack of prejudice; include communications evidencing the parties’ mutual understanding or ongoing negotiations about deadlines.

Unanswered Questions

  • Does § 668.11’s 180-day period “toll” during an appeal and resume with the remaining days at procedendo, or is a new deadline set by the court (or the TSDP default) upon remand? The Court expressly left this open.
  • What is the precise interplay between § 668.11 and TSDP clauses that set a default relative to the trial date? This decision suggests trial courts should clarify which governs post-remand rather than assume a statutory tolling model.

Conclusion

The Iowa Supreme Court’s unanimous decision charts a pragmatic path for cases disrupted by appeals: when expert-deadline compliance is clouded by post-remand ambiguity—and plaintiffs act diligently, without prejudicing defendants—trial courts should employ § 668.11(2)’s good-cause safety valve rather than impose the draconian sanction of exclusion and dismissal. The Court refused to adopt a mechanistic “procedural time machine” that would resurrect pre-appeal clocks without regard to fairness, clarity, or practicalities, and instead reaffirmed the flexible, factor-based approach of Hantsbarger.

For litigants and judges, the message is twofold. First, communicate and clarify deadlines post-remand—preferably via a new or amended TSDP—to avoid uncertainty. Second, in the absence of clarity, courts should evaluate the seriousness of any deviation in context: whether the deadline was ambiguous; whether an alternative, reasonable deadline was met; whether defendants suffered real prejudice; and how the parties conducted themselves. Against that balanced backdrop, the Court rightly reversed and remanded to give the Kirlins their day in court.

Case Details

Comments