Post-Rahimi Reaffirmation in the Eleventh Circuit: § 922(g)(1) Felon-in-Possession Challenges Remain Foreclosed by Rozier and Dubois III

I. Introduction

In United States v. Ro'Daryus Mitchell (11th Cir. Jan. 28, 2026) (per curiam) (not for publication), the Eleventh Circuit summarily affirmed a felon-in-possession conviction and rejected (as foreclosed) both facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Background. Mitchell was arrested at his girlfriend’s apartment on outstanding warrants; officers found firearms inside. Because Mitchell had prior felony convictions, he was charged under § 922(g)(1). He moved to dismiss the indictment on Second Amendment grounds. After denial, he pleaded guilty while preserving his right to appeal the motion-to-dismiss ruling, and received a 42-month sentence.

Core issues. Whether § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment (1) facially and (2) as applied to Mitchell, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s modern Second Amendment decisions and the Eleventh Circuit’s intervening post-remand authority.

Procedural posture. The government moved for summary affirmance; the court granted the motion, holding that binding circuit precedent resolves the constitutional questions.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit held that Mitchell’s Second Amendment challenges are foreclosed by existing precedent:

His facial challenge is foreclosed by United States v. Dubois (Dubois III), 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025), which reaffirmed that neither N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) nor United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024) abrogated United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010).
His as-applied challenge is foreclosed by Rozier, which held that felons may be disqualified from possessing firearms “under any and all circumstances,” making immaterial the defendant’s purpose (including self-defense) and the location (including the home).

Applying the summary-disposition standard from Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1969), the court concluded the government was “clearly right as a matter of law” and affirmed.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)

Heller recognized an individual Second Amendment right but emphasized it is “not unlimited,” stating that “nothing in [the] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,” calling such restrictions “presumptively lawful.” The Mitchell panel treated this language as foundational support for the continuing validity of § 922(g)(1).

2. United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010)

Rozier is the decisive circuit precedent. It held that “statutes disqualifying felons from possessing a firearm under any and all circumstances do not offend the Second Amendment,” and that self-defense-in-the-home arguments do not change the constitutional outcome for felons. In Mitchell, Rozier foreclosed the as-applied challenge directly and served as the doctrinal anchor for the facial-challenge analysis.

3. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)

Bruen announced a history-and-tradition framework for firearm regulations and repeated that Second Amendment rights extend to “law-abiding, responsible citizens.” Mitchell relied on Bruen to argue § 922(g)(1) fails this test. The panel, however, treated the question as already resolved by circuit precedent interpreting Bruen as not displacing Rozier.

4. The Dubois line: United States v. Dubois (Dubois I), 94 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir. 2024); Dubois v. United States (Dubois II), 145 S. Ct. 1041 (2025); United States v. Dubois (Dubois III), 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025)

Dubois I held Bruen did not abrogate Rozier. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded after Rahimi (Dubois II), and on remand the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed Rozier (Dubois III), explaining that Rahimi “reinforced—not undermined—Rozier” because the Rahimi majority reiterated Heller’s “presumptively lawful” language regarding felons.

In Mitchell, Dubois III functioned as the immediate controlling authority for the proposition that, post-Rahimi, the Eleventh Circuit remains bound to uphold § 922(g)(1) against Second Amendment attacks.

5. United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024)

Although Rahimi concerned § 922(g)(8) (domestic violence restraining orders), the Supreme Court again described felon-possession bans as “presumptively lawful,” quoting Heller. Mitchell argued Rahimi helped his claim; the Eleventh Circuit—tracking Dubois III— treated Rahimi as affirmatively consistent with the felon-disarmament carveout.

6. United States v. White, 837 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2016) (prior-panel-precedent rule)

White supplies the rule of decision for intramural stare decisis: a later panel must follow earlier binding precedent unless overruled en banc or abrogated by the Supreme Court. Mitchell explicitly invoked this principle to explain why it could not revisit Rozier even if Mitchell argued it was wrong.

7. Summary disposition and other procedural authorities: Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Gruezo, 66 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir. 2023); Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981)

Groendyke Transp., Inc. provides the standard for summary affirmance when there is “no substantial question” as to the outcome. Gruezo frames the court’s de novo review of statutory constitutionality. Bonner explains why former Fifth Circuit decisions before Oct. 1, 1981 are binding in the Eleventh Circuit—relevant because Groendyke is a Fifth Circuit case.

B. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning is primarily precedent-driven rather than an independent reapplication of the Bruen history-and-tradition test:

Identify binding circuit law. Rozier upheld § 922(g)(1) against Second Amendment challenges, including as-applied claims tied to self-defense and home possession.
Confirm no abrogation. Dubois III held that neither Bruen nor Rahimi abrogated Rozier; therefore the panel remained bound to follow Rozier.
Apply the prior-panel-precedent rule. Under White, the panel could not accept Mitchell’s invitation to reconsider earlier circuit holdings.
Resolve via summary affirmance. Because controlling precedent dictates the result, the government’s position was “clearly right as a matter of law” under Groendyke Transp., Inc..

In practical terms, the court treated Mitchell’s appeal as presenting a question already answered: in the Eleventh Circuit, § 922(g)(1) remains constitutional on its face and in typical as-applied settings unless and until the Supreme Court (or the Eleventh Circuit en banc) says otherwise.

C. Impact

Stabilization of § 922(g)(1) litigation post-Bruen/Rahimi. Mitchell reinforces that, within the Eleventh Circuit, defendants cannot obtain panel-level reconsideration of the felon-in-possession ban using Bruen or Rahimi absent new Supreme Court direction.
Procedural consequence: expanded use of summary affirmance. By invoking Groendyke, the opinion signals that many similar Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) may be resolved without full merits briefing/argument when circuit precedent squarely controls.
Substantive consequence: limited space for as-applied theories. The panel’s reliance on Rozier underscores that individualized circumstances (e.g., asserted self-defense, home possession) do not meaningfully distinguish a felon’s Second Amendment claim under current Eleventh Circuit law.
Inter-circuit and Supreme Court dynamics. Because the opinion is “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” its direct precedential weight is limited, but it illustrates the Eleventh Circuit’s firm alignment with its own binding precedent and its reading of Supreme Court signals (especially repeated references to “presumptively lawful” felon restrictions).

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Facial vs. as-applied challenge: A facial challenge argues a law is unconstitutional in all (or nearly all) applications. An as-applied challenge argues the law is unconstitutional in the defendant’s particular circumstances.
“Presumptively lawful”: A Supreme Court label (from Heller, repeated in Rahimi) suggesting certain longstanding firearm restrictions—like felon-disarmament—are generally treated as constitutional unless a strong reason is shown otherwise. In the Eleventh Circuit, this language has been used to sustain § 922(g)(1).
Bruen “history and tradition” test: Under Bruen, if conduct is covered by the Second Amendment’s plain text, the government must justify the regulation by demonstrating it fits within the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. In Mitchell, the panel did not freshly conduct that historical inquiry because binding circuit precedent had already resolved the issue.
Prior-panel-precedent rule: In the Eleventh Circuit, a later three-judge panel must follow an earlier published panel decision unless the court en banc or the Supreme Court changes the law. Mitchell turns on this rule: even if the panel were persuaded by Mitchell’s arguments, it considered itself bound by Rozier and Dubois III.
Summary affirmance: A streamlined decision procedure used when the outcome is legally obvious under controlling law. The court relied on Groendyke Transp., Inc. to affirm without full merits proceedings.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Ro'Daryus Mitchell does not break new doctrinal ground so much as it crystallizes a post-Rahimi rule of decision in the Eleventh Circuit: Second Amendment challenges—both facial and as applied—to § 922(g)(1) are foreclosed by binding circuit precedent (Rozier as reaffirmed in Dubois III). The case is significant for its procedural message as well: where precedent squarely controls, the Eleventh Circuit will use summary affirmance to dispose of § 922(g)(1) constitutional attacks.