Post-Muldrow Clarity in the Sixth Circuit: Written Reprimands, Proposed Removals, and Mere Threats Do Not Constitute Adverse Actions; Rigor in Comparator Proof Reaffirmed

Introduction

This commentary examines the Sixth Circuit’s unpublished decision in Terry Palmer v. Department of the United States Air Force (No. 24-3755, Oct. 15, 2025), in which the court affirmed summary judgment against a federal employee on claims of race and sex discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation under Title VII. The opinion, authored by Judge Batchelder and joined by Chief Judge Sutton and Judge Larsen, is notable for how it applies the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis to the adverse-action inquiry in discrimination cases and, at the same time, preserves the distinct, “materially adverse” standard for retaliation claims. It also reinforces the Sixth Circuit’s strict approach to comparator evidence and clarifies what is—and is not—actionable under Title VII when employees receive reprimands, are threatened with discipline, or receive a notice of proposed removal that never culminates in a final employment decision.

The case arises from workplace conflict and discipline during 2017–2019 involving Terry Palmer, an African American male who had worked for the Air Force since 1985. Following interpersonal disputes and multiple directives he allegedly failed to follow, Palmer was reassigned, reprimanded, suspended, charged AWOL after extended leave without compliant medical documentation, and issued a Notice of Proposed Removal—after which he voluntarily retired prior to the hearing. In federal court, he alleged race/sex discrimination, a hostile work environment, and retaliation tied to EEO activity and a congressional complaint.

Summary of the Opinion

Applying de novo review of the summary-judgment record, the Sixth Circuit affirmed on all claims:

• Discrimination (race and sex): The court held that a written reprimand placed in Palmer’s file and a Notice of Proposed Removal (never finalized due to his voluntary retirement) were not “adverse employment actions” under Title VII as articulated by Muldrow. Even assuming Palmer’s suspension or AWOL charge could qualify, his claims failed at the prima facie stage because he identified no similarly situated comparator who engaged in comparable misconduct but was treated better.
• Hostile work environment: The claim failed for lack of evidence—no race- or sex-based slurs, incidents, or remarks were identified, and the “relatively high bar” for severe or pervasive harassment was not met.
• Retaliation: The court concluded that a threatened AWOL charge is not an adverse action for retaliation purposes. The written reprimand did not constitute an adverse action absent materially adverse consequences, and Palmer failed to show a causal nexus between his protected activities and the AWOL charge, which followed repeated, pre-existing directives to supply compliant medical documentation.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and Sixth Circuit applications:
  • Moore v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 113 F.4th 608 (6th Cir. 2024); Thompson v. Fresh Prods., LLC, 985 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2021): The opinion applies McDonnell Douglas to Palmer’s circumstantial evidence claims—prima facie case, employer’s legitimate reason, and pretext. The court stops at step one for lack of a proper comparator.
  • Jackson v. VHS Detroit Receiving Hosp., Inc., 814 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2016): Reinforces that comparators must be similar in “comparable seriousness,” though not identical. The court holds Palmer’s proffered comparator (Angela Brown) did not engage in comparable misconduct.
  • Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1992): Sets the strict “similarly situated in all respects” comparator standard—same supervisor, same standards, and same conduct without differentiating circumstances. Palmer’s comparator proof failed under Mitchell.
  • Dodd v. Donahoe, 715 F.3d 151 (6th Cir. 2013): Addresses the necessity of similar acts for a comparator; cited to show Palmer’s comparator lacked analogous conduct.
• Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024):
  • Muldrow reoriented the discrimination “adverse action” inquiry, making clear a plaintiff must show a disadvantageous change (some harm) to a term, condition, or privilege of employment—but need not demonstrate the historically higher “materially adverse change” threshold some circuits had applied. The court invokes Muldrow to assess whether Palmer’s reprimand and proposed removal altered the “terms or conditions” of his employment; because they produced no concrete changes, they were not adverse actions.
• Bilyeu v. UT-Battelle, LLC, 2025 WL 2754017 (6th Cir. Sept. 29, 2025):
  • Key post-Muldrow guidance in the Sixth Circuit: for retaliation, the “materially adverse” standard remains (i.e., conduct that could dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a discrimination charge). The court relies on Bilyeu to hold that a mere threat of an AWOL charge is not a materially adverse action and to underscore that, after Muldrow, the adverse-action standards differ for discrimination and retaliation.
• Taylor v. Geithner, 703 F.3d 328 (6th Cir. 2013):
  • Written reprimands unaccompanied by materially adverse consequences are not adverse actions for retaliation. The court applies Taylor to reject Palmer’s retaliation theory premised on the reprimand.
• Harrell v. Delaware N. Companies, 642 F. App’x 543 (6th Cir. 2016):
  • Cited for the proposition that a voluntary resignation cannot ground a Title VII claim based solely on a proposed removal; here, Palmer retired before any final removal decision. The court uses Harrell to confirm that a Notice of Proposed Removal, without more, is not actionable as an adverse employment action for discrimination.
• Ladd v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., 552 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 2009) and Phillips v. UAW Int’l, 854 F.3d 323 (6th Cir. 2017):
  • Outline the hostile work environment standards—Title VII is not a civility code; the “severe or pervasive” bar is high and the harassment must be tied to protected status. The court finds no evidence of race- or sex-based harassment.
• Yazdian v. ConMed Endoscopic Techs., Inc., 793 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2015) and Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 714 (6th Cir. 2008):
  • Provide the Title VII retaliation framework and prima facie elements (protected activity, knowledge, adverse action, causation). The court holds Palmer failed to show an adverse action (as to the threat/reprimand) and failed to establish causation for the AWOL charge.
• Summary judgment standards:
  • Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) and Sixth Circuit authorities such as Moore, Blount v. Stanley Eng’g Fastening, 55 F.4th 504 (6th Cir. 2022), and Jackson on viewing the evidence in the nonmovant’s favor and assessing genuine disputes of material fact.

Legal Reasoning

1) Discrimination (race and sex)

Because Palmer relied on circumstantial evidence, the court applied McDonnell Douglas. The Air Force did not dispute that Palmer (1) belonged to protected classes and (2) was qualified; the dispute centered on (3) whether he suffered an adverse employment action and (4) whether similarly situated comparators existed.

• Adverse action under Muldrow: The court reiterated that an adverse action in discrimination cases must entail a disadvantageous change in a term, condition, or privilege of employment. Two events did not meet this standard:
  • Written reprimand: Merely placed in Palmer’s file with removal after two years; no actual change in job terms or conditions.
  • Notice of Proposed Removal: Never finalized because Palmer voluntarily retired; thus, it yielded no change to employment terms or conditions.
• Even if a five-day suspension or an AWOL charge were adverse actions (the court did not definitively decide), Palmer still failed at the prima facie stage because he identified no valid comparator treated more favorably. His sole comparator, Angela Brown, was not similarly situated: the conduct for which Palmer was disciplined (failing to follow directives, improperly delegating work after instructions not to, and failing to provide compliant medical certification for extended leave) was not comparable to Brown’s isolated emotional outburst or to Palmer’s subjective perception of her job performance. Without comparable misconduct under the same supervisors and standards, the comparator element failed.

2) Hostile Work Environment

The court emphasized that Title VII is not a “code of workplace civility.” Palmer’s claim relied on his personal perception that discipline was racially or sexually motivated, but he identified no specific race- or sex-based conduct—no comments, slurs, or incidents tied to protected status. Because the record showed that discipline stemmed from documented performance and policy-compliance issues, and because there was no evidence that any harassment was based on race or sex or was severe or pervasive, summary judgment was appropriate.

3) Retaliation

Adopting the McDonnell Douglas framework for retaliation, the court addressed three allegations:

• Reprimand after an EEO meeting: The supervisor (Norsworthy) did not know the content of the EEO meeting, weakening any inference of retaliatory motive. Timing also undercut causation: the reprimand occurred two to four months later. In any event, a written reprimand without materially adverse consequences is not an adverse action for retaliation purposes.
• Threat of an AWOL charge: A mere threat is not a materially adverse action that would dissuade a reasonable worker from protected activity. The court cites Bilyeu to clarify that, post-Muldrow, the retaliation standard remains the “materially adverse” test.
• Actual AWOL charge following a congressional complaint: Palmer failed to establish causation. The record showed that by the time he announced and then filed his congressional complaint, he had already been absent for a month without submitting compliant medical documentation after repeated directives and warnings. The employer’s consistent, pre-existing expectations and continued opportunities to comply broke any causal chain, defeating the prima facie case.

Impact and Implications

A. Adverse-Action Standards After Muldrow

• Discrimination claims: This opinion underscores that even under Muldrow’s clarified standard—requiring a disadvantageous change (some harm) to a term, condition, or privilege of employment—courts will still weed out actions that do not concretely alter the employment relationship. Written reprimands placed in a file, without tangible effects, and unconsummated notices (like proposed removals) generally will not suffice.
• Retaliation claims: The Sixth Circuit confirms the continued vitality of the “materially adverse” standard (consistent with Burlington Northern) in retaliation cases. Mere threats, absent real consequences, remain nonactionable.

B. Comparator Rigor

• The opinion reaffirms the Sixth Circuit’s stringent comparator requirement: plaintiffs must identify individuals outside their protected class who engaged in comparably serious conduct under the same supervisors and standards and received more favorable treatment. Divergent conduct (e.g., performance noncompliance versus an isolated emotional outburst) will not satisfy Mitchell/Jackson.

C. Hostile Work Environment Proof

• Generalized perceptions of unfairness or hostility are insufficient; plaintiffs must marshal evidence that the environment was severe or pervasive and based on race or sex. Absent race/sex-based remarks or incidents—and where employer actions are well-documented responses to policy noncompliance—HWE claims will falter.

D. Federal-Sector and Practical Litigation Guidance

• Federal employees and agencies: Notices of proposed discipline that never ripen into final actions and routine documentation letters (EAP, no-contact) will rarely qualify as adverse actions in discrimination cases absent concrete employment consequences.
• Retaliation causation: Documented, pre-existing performance or compliance issues can defeat the causal link. Consistent policy enforcement and contemporaneous notices matter.
• Plaintiff strategy: To survive summary judgment, plaintiffs should:
  • Identify robust comparators tied to the same supervisors and standards who engaged in comparably serious conduct.
  • Show how a reprimand or lateral action changed work terms/conditions (duties, schedule, pay, benefits, privileges) in a disadvantageous way.
  • Tie harassment to protected status with concrete, specific incidents.
  • For retaliation, demonstrate not only timing but also knowledge of protected activity and materially adverse consequences linked to that activity.
• Employer strategy: Maintain clear, written directives and deadlines; notify employees of documentation requirements; give warnings; and preserve records of noncompliance. Such documentation can neutralize causation arguments and corroborate legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Adverse employment action (discrimination): After Muldrow, the question is whether the employer’s act caused a disadvantageous change—some harm—to a term, condition, or privilege of employment (e.g., duties, schedule, pay, benefits). Minor or purely paper-only steps that do not alter the job’s terms usually do not qualify.
• Materially adverse action (retaliation): Different standard. The action must be harmful enough that it could well dissuade a reasonable worker from engaging in protected activity (e.g., filing an EEO complaint). Mere threats or trivial harms typically do not qualify.
• Comparator: Another employee outside the plaintiff’s protected class who is truly similarly situated—same supervisor, same standards, and similar misconduct—but received lighter discipline. The point is to show discriminatory unevenness.
• McDonnell Douglas burden shifting:
  1. Prima facie case: Minimal showing to raise an inference of discrimination/retaliation.
  2. Employer’s reason: The employer must produce a legitimate, non-discriminatory (or non-retaliatory) reason.
  3. Pretext: The plaintiff must show the proffered reason is false or insufficient and that discrimination/retaliation actually motivated the action.
• Hostile work environment: The workplace must be permeated with severe or pervasive discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, or insult because of protected status (e.g., race, sex), not mere personality conflicts or generalized unfairness.
• AWOL (Absent Without Leave): A charge employers may use when an employee is absent without approved leave or noncompliant with leave documentation requirements.
• Notice of Proposed Removal: An initial step indicating the employer proposes to remove the employee; if the employee resigns before a final decision, the “proposal” usually does not equate to a final adverse action.
• EEO process (federal sector): Federal agencies often offer a traditional EEO process and, sometimes, an alternative (here, CORE). Palmer selected the traditional path under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.101–110, leading to a Final Agency Decision and the federal court action.

Observations and Nuances

• Voluntary resignation and proposed removal: The court cites Harrell to emphasize that a voluntary resignation cannot be used to convert a non-final proposal into an actionable adverse action for discrimination. Note, however, that Title VII recognizes constructive discharge in appropriate circumstances—Palmer did not pursue that theory here.
• Timing and knowledge in retaliation: Temporal proximity alone seldom suffices; here, the employer’s consistent pre-complaint warnings and efforts to secure compliance undercut causation. The opinion also notes the supervisor lacked knowledge of the EEO meeting’s substance, further weakening any causal inference regarding the reprimand.
• Unpublished status: Marked “Not recommended for publication,” the opinion is not precedential in the Sixth Circuit. Nonetheless, it offers instructive, practical guidance on how the court is applying Muldrow and Bilyeu to everyday personnel actions.

Conclusion

Palmer v. Department of the Air Force reinforces several important themes in contemporary Title VII litigation in the Sixth Circuit:

• After Muldrow, discrimination claims still require a concrete, disadvantageous change to a term or condition of employment; paper-only steps like written reprimands or notices that do not ripen into final action typically will not suffice.
• Retaliation claims continue to require “materially adverse” harm; threats and trivial steps that lack real-world consequences remain nonactionable.
• Comparator proof must be rigorous: the same supervisors and standards, and misconduct of comparable seriousness. Subjective impressions and noncomparable incidents will not do.
• Hostile work environment claims require evidence that hostility was severe or pervasive and tied to protected status; mere workplace friction or performance management is not enough.

Although unpublished, the decision provides a clear, practical roadmap for litigants on both sides: plaintiffs must develop evidence of genuine, consequential changes to their employment and identify truly similarly situated comparators; employers should continue to document expectations, warnings, and reasons for discipline, thereby demonstrating legitimate, non-discriminatory and non-retaliatory motives. In the wake of Muldrow, Palmer signals that routine reprimands, proposed actions that never materialize, and mere threats carry limited litigation risk absent concrete impacts—and that comparator rigor and causation proof remain decisive at summary judgment.