Post-Loper Bright CIMT Doctrine: Knowing Receipt of Stolen Property Categorically Involves Moral Turpitude

Introduction

In Cesar Solis-Flores v. Pamela Jo Bondi, the Fourth Circuit revisited whether a Virginia conviction for receiving stolen property qualifies as a “crime involving moral turpitude” (CIMT) under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) after the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which overruled Chevron deference. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit held—without deferring to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)—that knowing receipt of stolen property under Virginia Code § 18.2-108 categorically constitutes a CIMT. The decision clarifies the Fourth Circuit’s post-Loper Bright framework for CIMT determinations, emphasizes Skidmore-style persuasive weight for long-standing BIA precedent, distinguishes theft from receipt-of-stolen-property for CIMT purposes, and reaffirms the “realistic probability” constraint on categorical analysis.

The parties were (1) Petitioner Cesar Solis-Flores, a Mexican national seeking cancellation of removal, and (2) Respondent, the Attorney General, defending the agency’s determination that Solis-Flores was ineligible for cancellation because he had a CIMT conviction. The dispositive legal issue was whether the Virginia offense of receiving stolen property—with statutory and common-law elements requiring knowledge the goods were stolen and a dishonest intent—is a CIMT, even though the offense does not include as an element an intent to permanently deprive the owner of property.

Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit denied the petition for review. Conducting de novo review of the CIMT question and expressly not applying Chevron deference after Loper Bright, the Court held that:

• Under the Fourth Circuit’s established definition of moral turpitude, CIMTs require both a culpable mental state and reprehensible conduct.
• Virginia’s receipt-of-stolen-property offense, as defined at the time of conviction, requires knowledge that the property was stolen and a dishonest intent (malo animo) to continue acting adversely to the owner’s property interest.
• For receipt offenses, knowledge that the goods are stolen is the salient element rendering the conduct morally turpitudinous; an intent to permanently deprive the owner need not be an element of the receipt offense (unlike larceny/theft).
• Applying the categorical approach, the Court rejected hypotheticals positing a defendant who knowingly receives stolen property but intends to return it to the owner; neither Virginia’s elements nor realistic Virginia prosecutions support such convictions.
• The Court further rejected the “passive benefit” theory of receipt (benefiting from proceeds without receiving the goods), citing the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision in Whitehead as foreclosing that interpretation of “receipt.”
• While the BIA’s view is no longer entitled to Chevron deference, it remains persuasive under Skidmore; decades of consistent BIA decisions treat knowing receipt-of-stolen-property as a CIMT.

The Court therefore affirmed the BIA’s determination and denied relief.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion rests on a curated set of precedents shaping the CIMT framework, the standard of review after Loper Bright, and the categorical approach:

• Chevron v. NRDC (1984) and Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024): The Court acknowledged its prior decision had deferred to the BIA under Chevron. Loper Bright overruled Chevron, prompting the Supreme Court to vacate and remand. On remand, the Fourth Circuit performed a de novo interpretation of “crime involving moral turpitude,” while recognizing that agency interpretations may carry Skidmore persuasive weight depending on consistency and thoroughness.
• Skidmore v. Swift & Co. (1944): Cited via Loper Bright to underscore that Executive Branch interpretations “may have power to persuade if lacking power to control.” The Court leveraged the BIA’s long line of decisions (e.g., Matter of Salvail; Matter of Patel) consistently treating knowing receipt-of-stolen-property as a CIMT, not as binding authority, but as persuasive support aligned with the Fourth Circuit’s own definition.
• Pereida v. Wilkinson (2021): Reinforced the burden allocation—applicants for cancellation of removal must establish eligibility, including that they have not been convicted of a CIMT. The Court concluded Solis-Flores failed to carry this burden.
• Fourth Circuit’s CIMT line: Uribe v. Sessions; Mohamed v. Holder; Ramirez v. Sessions; Sotnikau v. Lynch; Gomez-Ruotolo v. Garland; Ortega-Cordova v. Garland; and Chavez v. Bondi (post-Loper Bright). Together, these decisions define “moral turpitude” as requiring both culpable mens rea and morally reprehensible conduct, with corrupt scienter as the touchstone. The Court emphasized that its own definition remains “sound” and continues to guide analysis post-Loper Bright.
• Categorical approach cases: Prudencio v. Holder (4th Cir.); Martinez v. Sessions (4th Cir.); and Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez (U.S. Supreme Court). The opinion reaffirmed that courts examine statutory elements, not case-specific facts, and that defendants must show a realistic—not merely theoretical—probability that the statute reaches non-turpitudinous conduct.
• Sister-circuit CIMT receipt cases: Michel v. INS (2d Cir.); De Leon-Reynoso v. Ashcroft (3d Cir.); United States v. Castro (5th Cir.); Hashish v. Gonzales (7th Cir.); Okoroha v. INS (8th Cir.); De Leon v. Lynch (10th Cir.); Nasrallah v. U.S. Att’y Gen. (11th Cir.). These cases uniformly emphasize that knowledge the property was stolen is sufficient to render a receipt offense morally turpitudinous, supporting the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion.
• Ninth Circuit divergences: Castillo-Cruz v. Holder required a theft-style “intent to permanently deprive” for receipt crimes. The Fourth Circuit, aligning with other circuits and the BIA, declined to follow Castillo-Cruz, noting receipt and theft are conceptually distinct. The opinion also referenced Randhawa v. Ashcroft (9th Cir.) and Santana v. Barr (2d Cir.) to illustrate that knowledge often implies an intent to deprive the owner of rights of ownership, even if not an element.
• Virginia authorities: Patterson v. Commonwealth (Va. 1935) and Whitehead v. Commonwealth (Va. 2009) define the elements of § 18.2-108 (knowledge and dishonest intent) and reject “passive benefit” as “receipt.” Marshall v. Commonwealth and Jones v. Commonwealth provide contemporary applications (theft requires intent to permanently deprive; receipt requires knowledge and dishonest intent to act adversely to owner’s interests). Welch v. Commonwealth confirms Virginia’s definition of larceny as permanent deprivation, which matters because receipt requires that an underlying theft has occurred.
• BIA decisions: Matter of Salvail; Matter of Patel; Matter of G-; Matter of Serna; Matter of S-; and Matter of K-. The Court read this line to show the BIA’s settled position: receipt crimes are CIMTs when knowledge of stolen nature is an element, and neither BIA precedent nor Matter of K- requires proof that the receiver intended to permanently deprive the owner.

Legal Reasoning

The Fourth Circuit’s reasoning proceeds through four key steps.

1. Post-Loper Bright standard of review and methodology:
   • The Court reviews the CIMT question de novo, no Chevron deference. It adopts its own “sound definition” of moral turpitude (corrupt scienter plus reprehensible conduct), which it has long developed in harmony with—but independent of—the BIA.
   • BIA decisions retain persuasive value under Skidmore, particularly where consistent and well-reasoned.
2. Elements of Virginia § 18.2-108 and categorical analysis:
   • At the time of conviction, § 18.2-108 required: (1) goods were stolen by someone else; (2) defendant bought/received/aided in concealing them; (3) at that time, defendant knew they were stolen; (4) defendant acted “malo animo” (dishonest intent).
   • Virginia larceny requires intent to permanently deprive. Because receipt requires that an actual theft occurred, receipt inherently presupposes that someone committed larceny (i.e., took with intent to permanently deprive).
   • For the receiver, Virginia case law clarifies the requisite dishonest intent: the receiver intends to continue acting adversely to the owner’s property interest. That mental state, combined with knowledge of the stolen character, constitutes the required corrupt scienter.
3. Rejecting hypotheticals and the “permanent deprivation” importation:
   • The petitioner hypothesized a “fence with a heart of gold” or a joyrider who knowingly receives a stolen car but intends to return it to the true owner; the Court found no realistic probability Virginia applies § 18.2-108 to such conduct given the dishonest-intent element and Virginia’s case law (e.g., Jones rejecting an “intend to return” hypothesis unsupported by evidence and contrary to adverse-to-owner intent).
   • Invoking Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, the Court required a realistic probability, not legal imagination; the petitioner identified no case where Virginia convicted on the hypothesized facts.
   • The Court refused to import the theft-specific “intent to permanently deprive” element into receipt crimes. Theft and receipt are distinct offenses; the moral turpitude of receipt flows from knowing possession of another’s stolen property with dishonest intent, not from proving the receiver’s own intent to permanently deprive.
4. Disposition of the “passive benefit” theory:
   • The petitioner argued one could be convicted merely by benefiting from proceeds of stolen goods. The Virginia Supreme Court in Whitehead was unequivocal that “such a manner of receipt does not fall within the plain meaning” of the statute; thus, the hypothetical is not a realistic application of § 18.2-108.

Integrating these points, the Court concluded that all realistic applications of § 18.2-108 involve morally turpitudinous conduct: the defendant knowingly engages with stolen property and does so with dishonest intent adverse to the owner’s rights. That satisfies the Fourth Circuit’s two-pronged CIMT test.

Impact

The decision has several important implications:

• Post-Loper Bright administrative law in immigration: The Fourth Circuit cements a de novo, court-centered approach to interpreting “crime involving moral turpitude,” expressly disavowing Chevron deference but still crediting the BIA’s consistent precedents under Skidmore where persuasive. Expect litigants to emphasize the consistency and reasoning quality of BIA decisions to secure Skidmore weight.
• Clarification of receipt vs. theft for CIMT purposes: The Court separates theft’s “permanent deprivation” intent from receipt’s “knowledge-plus-dishonest-intent” analysis. This distinction narrows the relevance of theft cases when analyzing receipt statutes and undercuts arguments that import theft’s mental-state requirements into receipt offenses.
• Reinforcement of the realistic probability test: The Fourth Circuit continues to demand concrete examples showing a state actually applies its statute to non-turpitudinous conduct. Hypotheticals unsupported by text or case law will not defeat categorical classification.
• State-specific signal for Virginia and similar statutes: For Virginia § 18.2-108, knowing receipt with dishonest intent is categorically a CIMT. Jurisdictions with materially similar elements (knowledge that property is stolen and dishonest intent) are likely to be treated likewise. Defense counsel and noncitizens should expect heightened immigration consequences from such convictions.
• Inter-circuit dynamics: The opinion aligns the Fourth Circuit with the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits and distances it from the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Castillo-Cruz. Practitioners litigating within or across circuits should be mindful of this divergence and the Fourth Circuit’s explicit rationale for rejecting Castillo-Cruz’s conflation of theft and receipt.
• Burden of proof in cancellation: Pereida’s burden allocation remains decisive. Where the categorical inquiry points toward a CIMT, applicants must rebut with more than theoretical possibilities; failing that, ineligibility follows.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Crime Involving Moral Turpitude (CIMT): A class of offenses that not only violate law but are also inherently immoral, requiring both a culpable mental state (corrupt scienter) and reprehensible conduct. Examples often involve fraud, theft, or deceit.
• Categorical Approach: A method that looks to the statutory elements of the offense of conviction, not the defendant’s actual conduct. If all realistic applications of the statute involve moral turpitude, the offense is categorically a CIMT. If the statute covers both turpitudinous and non-turpitudinous conduct, it is not categorically a CIMT.
• Realistic Probability Test: To show a statute is overbroad, a noncitizen must demonstrate a realistic probability—via actual cases or authoritative interpretations—that the state applies the statute to non-turpitudinous conduct. Hypotheticals are insufficient.
• Chevron vs. Skidmore vs. Loper Bright:
  • Chevron (overruled): Courts deferred to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes.
  • Skidmore: Agencies can persuade courts through the thoroughness, consistency, and logic of their interpretations, but courts decide independently.
  • Loper Bright: Eliminates Chevron deference; courts interpret statutes de novo, while agency views may still receive Skidmore weight.
• Receipt of Stolen Property vs. Theft:
  • Theft/Larceny: Typically requires intent to permanently deprive the owner at the time of taking.
  • Receipt: Requires that a theft has already occurred and that the receiver knows the property is stolen and acts with dishonest intent. The receiver need not possess the thief’s original intent to permanently deprive; the offense’s turpitude stems from knowing engagement with stolen property and adverse-to-owner intent.
• “Malo animo” (Dishonest Intent): In Virginia’s receipt statute, this denotes an intent to act adversely to the true owner’s property interest, beyond mere possession; it reflects the moral blameworthiness associated with knowingly handling stolen property.
• Cancellation of Removal Eligibility and Burden: Nonpermanent residents must show they lack disqualifying convictions, including CIMTs. Failure to negate a CIMT bars relief before any discretionary analysis.

Conclusion

Solis-Flores v. Bondi sets a durable post-Loper Bright template for CIMT analysis in the Fourth Circuit. The Court conducted a de novo interpretation of “crime involving moral turpitude,” giving Skidmore weight—but not deference—to the BIA’s long-standing, consistent view. It held that receipt-of-stolen-property under Virginia law is categorically a CIMT because the offense requires knowledge the property was stolen and dishonest intent to act adversely to the owner’s rights. The Court rejected attempts to import theft’s “intent to permanently deprive” into receipt crimes and declined hypotheticals unsupported by a realistic probability of application under Virginia law.

Key takeaways:

• After Loper Bright, the Fourth Circuit independently interprets CIMTs, while recognizing persuasive BIA precedent.
• Knowing receipt of stolen property remains a CIMT in the Fourth Circuit; theft and receipt are doctrinally distinct for CIMT purposes.
• The realistic probability test continues to police categorical overbreadth claims; unsupported hypotheticals will not suffice.
• For Virginia § 18.2-108 and similar statutes, noncitizens face significant immigration consequences from convictions given the categorical CIMT classification.

In the broader legal context, this decision harmonizes the Fourth Circuit with the majority of sister circuits, clarifies the standard in a post-Chevron world, and provides a clear analytical pathway for future CIMT disputes involving receipt-of-stolen-property offenses.