Post-Habeas Removal of Illegal Restitution Is Not a Resentencing: The Oral–Written Sentence Rule Does Not Apply — Woods v. Wead (Mont. 2025)

Post-Habeas Removal of Illegal Restitution Is Not a Resentencing: The Oral–Written Sentence Rule Does Not Apply — Woods v. Wead (Mont. 2025)

Introduction

In Woods v. Wead (Mont. Oct. 7, 2025), the Montana Supreme Court denied Jeremy Cord Woods’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court’s opinion clarifies a recurring procedural question at the intersection of illegal-sentence remedies, restitution orders, and the “oral pronouncement controls” doctrine: when an illegal restitution component is corrected post-judgment pursuant to habeas relief, the sentencing court may issue an amended written judgment striking the illegal term without conducting a new sentencing hearing or orally pronouncing sentence anew. Consequently, the statutory rule that the oral sentence controls over a conflicting written judgment, § 46-18-116(2), MCA, does not apply in that corrective posture.

The case also reaffirms two complementary limitations on appellate and habeas relief: (1) a defendant’s “substantial rights” must be affected to warrant appellate review of post-judgment orders, and (2) habeas corpus relief under § 46-22-101(1), MCA, requires that the petitioner be unlawfully incarcerated on the challenged judgment—relief is unavailable when the sentence being attacked has expired and current custody arises from different convictions.

Parties: Petitioner Woods proceeded pro se, challenging the 2019 Amended Judgment and Commitment entered by the Lewis and Clark County District Court after the Montana Supreme Court’s limited habeas remand in 2018. The Respondent was Woods’s custodian (Warden Wead), representing the State’s interest in the legality of custody at the Montana State Prison.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court denied and dismissed Woods’s latest habeas petition, holding:

  • Section 46-18-116(2), MCA—the rule that an oral pronouncement controls over a conflicting written judgment—does not apply where there was no new sentencing hearing or oral pronouncement in 2019. The 2019 Amended Judgment merely removed an illegal restitution term identified via habeas relief; it was not a resentencing.
  • The 2019 amendment was consistent with § 46-18-116(3), MCA, which authorizes correcting an illegal sentence. The District Court properly implemented the Montana Supreme Court’s limited remand by striking the illegal restitution condition.
  • Woods’s “substantial rights” were not affected by the 2019 amendment; indeed, it benefitted him by eliminating restitution altogether, as previously recognized in State v. Woods, No. DA 19-0194 (Mont. Nov. 26, 2019).
  • Habeas relief is unavailable because Woods is not incarcerated under the 1994 judgment he challenges; that sentence “expired many years ago.” He remains in custody due to two consecutive life sentences from a separate 1995 homicide case. Thus, he failed to show illegal incarceration under § 46-22-101(1), MCA.
  • Given repeated litigation over resolved issues, the Court cautioned that any future original proceedings or direct appeals from Woods must be preceded by a verified motion for leave to file, effectively imposing a gatekeeping measure for future filings.

Background and Procedural Timeline

  1. 1994: Woods pleaded guilty to three felonies in Lewis and Clark County. The written judgment imposed restitution but did not specify the total amount, contrary to § 46-18-244(1), MCA, which requires that the court “specify the total amount of restitution.”
  2. 1995: In a separate case, Woods was convicted of two counts of deliberate homicide and sentenced to two consecutive life terms. See State v. Woods, 283 Mont. 359, 942 P.2d 88 (1997) (affirming the 1995 convictions).
  3. 2018: Woods petitioned for habeas corpus in Powell County to challenge the unspecified restitution term in the 1994 case. The Powell County District Court recognized the partial illegality of the 1994 sentence but lacked jurisdiction to remedy it because it was not the sentencing court. See State v. Heafner, 2010 MT 87.
  4. 2018 (Montana Supreme Court): On review, the Court granted habeas relief in part and remanded to the Lewis and Clark County District Court (the sentencing court) to correct the illegal restitution portion in accordance with § 46-18-244(1), MCA, and § 46-18-116(3), MCA. See Woods v. Michael, No. OP 18-0584 (Mont. Oct. 23, 2018).
  5. January 3, 2019: The Lewis and Clark County District Court issued an Amended Judgment and Commitment removing any requirement to pay restitution, based on the State’s submission that Woods’s life sentences “would diminish his ability to pay any restitution.”
  6. 2019 (Montana Supreme Court): Woods’s direct appeal from the amended judgment was dismissed; the Court held the amendment required no hearing or resentencing, did not affect substantial rights, and worked to Woods’s benefit. State v. Woods, No. DA 19-0194 (Mont. Nov. 26, 2019).
  7. 2020 (Montana Supreme Court): The Court dismissed Woods’s further attempt to appeal matters related to the 1994 case under res judicata and collateral estoppel, emphasizing that the 1994 sentences had expired and Woods remained incarcerated on the life sentences from the separate homicide case. State v. Woods, No. DA 20-0264 (Mont. Sept. 22, 2020).
  8. 2025: Woods returned with a habeas petition arguing that the 2019 written Amended Judgment conflicted with the 1994 oral pronouncement, invoking § 46-18-116(2), MCA. The Court denied relief and dismissed the petition.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • Lott v. State, 2006 MT 279, 334 Mont. 270, 150 P.3d 337: Establishes that a sentence that is illegal or partially invalid may be corrected, and habeas corpus may be an appropriate vehicle to address illegal incarceration stemming from such a sentence. The Court relied on Lott to confirm that an illegal restitution component (failure to specify amount under § 46-18-244(1), MCA) renders that portion of a sentence unlawful and subject to correction.
  • State v. Heafner, 2010 MT 87, 356 Mont. 128, 231 P.3d 1087: Clarifies that only the sentencing court has jurisdiction to amend or correct a sentence. This dictated the procedural routing: the Powell County District Court, acting in habeas, recognized the illegality but lacked jurisdiction to correct it; the Supreme Court remanded to the Lewis and Clark County District Court as the sentencing court.
  • State v. Seals, 2007 MT 71, 336 Mont. 416, 156 P.3d 15: Emphasizes that a court’s authority to resentence based on an illegal sentence depends on when the illegality is discovered and challenged. Seals anchors the Court’s distinction here: what occurred in 2019 was not a new sentencing event but a targeted correction of an illegal term under § 46-18-116(3), MCA.
  • State v. Huffine, 2018 MT 175, 392 Mont. 103, 422 P.3d 102: Addresses res judicata and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) in criminal-related proceedings, including habeas and postconviction contexts. The Court invoked Huffine in 2020 to bar Woods’s repetitive attempts to relitigate issues from the long-final 1994 case, and its reasoning on finality informs the 2025 ruling’s gatekeeping caution.
  • Prior Woods decisions:
    • State v. Woods, No. DA 19-0194 (Mont. Nov. 26, 2019) (“Woods IIA”): Held the 2019 amendment removed restitution without resentencing, required no hearing, and benefitted Woods; his appeal lacked a basis because his substantial rights were not affected.
    • State v. Woods, No. DA 20-0264 (Mont. Sept. 22, 2020) (“Woods IIIA”): Dismissed another appeal as barred by res judicata/collateral estoppel and for lack of effect on substantial rights; recognized the 1994 sentences had expired and custody was due solely to the life sentences in a different case.
    • Earlier orders (2015, 2017, 2018) likewise reflect the Court’s incremental enforcement of finality and the narrow availability of habeas relief where no illegal incarceration is shown.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three steps.

  1. No resentencing occurred in 2019; therefore § 46-18-116(2), MCA, does not apply. Section 46-18-116(2), MCA, codifies the “oral pronouncement controls” rule: if a written judgment conflicts with the oral sentence pronounced in open court at sentencing, the oral pronouncement governs. The predicate of this doctrine is a sentencing proceeding with an oral pronouncement. The Court emphasized that its 2018 habeas remand did not authorize a new sentencing; it authorized correction of an illegal term. The Lewis and Clark County District Court accordingly issued an amended written judgment removing restitution without holding a hearing or pronouncing a new sentence. Because there was no new oral pronouncement in 2019, there could be no oral–written conflict under § 46-18-116(2), MCA.
  2. The 2019 Amended Judgment properly corrected an illegal sentence under § 46-18-116(3), MCA, and § 46-18-244(1), MCA. The original 1994 judgment violated § 46-18-244(1), MCA, by failing to specify the total restitution amount. The Supreme Court in 2018 held that this defect made the restitution portion illegal and remanded to the sentencing court to fix that illegality. The District Court’s solution—striking restitution entirely—comported with the State’s representation that Woods’s consecutive life terms rendered restitution impracticable. The Montana Supreme Court had already ruled in 2019 that this amendment benefitted Woods and did not affect his substantial rights. Nothing in 2025 changed that assessment.
  3. No illegal incarceration is shown; habeas relief is unavailable. Habeas corpus under § 46-22-101(1), MCA, is available to challenge unlawful custody. By 2020, the Court had expressly recognized that Woods’s 1994 sentences had expired and his present custody derived exclusively from his later homicide convictions and consecutive life sentences. Because the 2025 petition again attacked the 1994 case, it failed the threshold “custody nexus” requirement for habeas relief. The Court also reaffirmed that repetitive litigation over resolved issues is barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel (Huffine) and warned Woods that any future filings must be preceded by a verified motion for leave.

Impact

The decision’s practical and doctrinal effects are significant:

  • Clarification of the oral–written rule’s reach: The oral pronouncement rule in § 46-18-116(2), MCA, is limited to conflicts generated at a sentencing event. It does not convert post-judgment, habeas-driven corrections under § 46-18-116(3), MCA, into de facto resentencings. Practitioners should not assume that any modification to a written judgment triggers the oral–written hierarchy.
  • Streamlined correction of illegal restitution terms: When a restitution provision is illegal because an amount was not specified, sentencing courts may cure the illegality via an amended judgment without a hearing, particularly where the State proposes a remedy consistent with the defendant’s circumstances (e.g., no restitution) and the correction does not adversely affect substantial rights. This promotes efficient compliance with § 46-18-244(1), MCA.
  • Habeas custody nexus reaffirmed: Petitioners must be “in custody” on the judgment they challenge to obtain habeas relief. Attacking an expired sentence, while incarcerated on different convictions, will not suffice. This reinforces Montana’s longstanding limits on habeas under § 46-22-101(1), MCA.
  • Finality and gatekeeping: The Court’s warning that future filings will require a verified motion for leave signals a readiness to impose tailored gatekeeping on repetitive litigants. Practically, this will reduce duplicative or jurisdictionally defective filings and conserve judicial resources. Counsel should advise clients that repeated collateral attacks on long-final judgments are likely to be dismissed and may trigger filing restrictions.
  • Victim restitution practice considerations: While § 46-18-244(1), MCA, generally requires specification of the total restitution amount, this case confirms that the remedy for a historical violation may, in appropriate circumstances, be to remove the restitution condition entirely rather than reopen sentencing, especially where the record shows that restitution is not feasible and the correction does not prejudice the defendant’s rights.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Illegal sentence: A sentence is illegal when it violates statutory requirements (here, failure to specify total restitution under § 46-18-244(1), MCA) or otherwise exceeds lawful authority. An illegal sentence, or an illegal portion of a sentence, can be corrected. See § 46-18-116(3), MCA.
  • Oral–written sentence rule: Generally, if there is a conflict between the sentence pronounced orally in court and the written judgment, the oral pronouncement controls. This presupposes an oral sentencing event. It does not apply to post-judgment corrections made without a new sentencing hearing.
  • Habeas corpus in Montana (§ 46-22-101(1), MCA): A remedy to test whether a person’s present incarceration is unlawful. The petitioner must be in custody on the judgment being challenged; collateral consequences from an expired sentence are not enough.
  • Substantial rights (M. R. App. P. 4(1)(a); § 46-20-104(1), MCA): On appeal, a defendant may challenge a final judgment of conviction and post-judgment orders that affect substantial rights. Orders that do not prejudice the defendant—especially those that benefit the defendant—do not warrant appellate relief.
  • Res judicata and collateral estoppel (Huffine): Doctrines that bar re-litigation of claims or issues previously decided, including across direct appeals, postconviction proceedings, and habeas matters. They serve finality and judicial economy.
  • Verified motion for leave: A sworn motion a litigant must file seeking permission to submit future pleadings. Courts use such gatekeeping to curb repetitive or frivolous filings while preserving access for colorable claims.

Conclusion

Woods v. Wead reaffirms that the correction of an illegal restitution term identified through habeas does not transform into a new sentencing event. A sentencing court may implement the Montana Supreme Court’s limited remand by issuing an amended written judgment striking the illegal term, without convening a sentencing hearing or pronouncing sentence orally. Consequently, § 46-18-116(2), MCA’s oral–written priority rule is inapplicable in that posture.

The decision also underscores two enduring limits on relief: post-judgment orders that do not affect a defendant’s substantial rights are not appealable by a defendant as of right, and habeas corpus relief lies only when present custody is unlawful under the judgment being challenged. By pairing these doctrinal guardrails with a tailored gatekeeping warning, the Court advances finality, efficient correction of illegal sentences, and judicious management of repetitive collateral litigation.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Montana

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