Post-Esteras boundaries on “seriousness” at supervised-release revocation: Third Circuit affirms upward variance in United States v. Hardeman

Introduction

In United States v. Taire Hardeman, the Third Circuit affirmed a 48-month term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation of supervised release, followed by a new three-year term of supervision. The appeal challenged both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of an above-Guidelines revocation sentence arising from a domestic-violence incident that involved a firearm and occurred in the presence of a baby. Although the underlying state charges were withdrawn, the District Court found by a preponderance that Hardeman committed a Grade A violation of his supervised release based on simple assault, resulting injuries, and possession of a firearm that was discharged during the altercation.

The most notable feature of the opinion is its application of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Esteras v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2031 (2025), which holds that courts may not consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) “punishment” factors—seriousness of the offense, respect for law, and just punishment—when imposing a sentence upon revocation under § 3583(e). The panel held there was no procedural error in the District Court’s references to the “seriousness” of the conduct because, read in context, the court was discussing the nature and circumstances of the supervised-release violation as it bears on the defendant’s breach of trust and the permissible goals of deterrence and protection of the public.

Summary of the Opinion

The District Court found that Hardeman physically assaulted a woman, caused injuries, and possessed a firearm that was fired during the episode. It classified the conduct as a Grade A violation and calculated an advisory Chapter 7 range of 27 to 33 months (Criminal History Category II). After weighing the relevant § 3553(a) factors available under § 3583(e)—including deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation—and emphasizing the breach-of-trust inherent in supervised-release violations, the court imposed an upward variance to 48 months’ imprisonment and three additional years of supervised release. Hardeman did not object at sentencing.

On appeal, the Third Circuit:

Reviewed procedural reasonableness for plain error due to the lack of a contemporaneous objection.
Held the District Court permissibly discussed the seriousness of the violation conduct (domestic violence with a firearm present and a child nearby) in the context of breach of trust, deterrence, and public safety, consistent with § 3583(e) and Esteras.
Concluded the upward variance was adequately explained and substantively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances, particularly given the dangerous conduct and the need to deter future violations and protect potential victims.

The sentence was therefore affirmed.

Detailed Analysis

Procedural posture and standards of review

Hardeman’s appeal raised both procedural and substantive challenges. Because he did not object to the District Court’s explanation or to any alleged reliance on impermissible factors, the panel reviewed procedural reasonableness for plain error. That standard requires a showing that (1) error occurred, (2) the error was clear or obvious, and (3) it affected substantial rights; even then, a court of appeals corrects the error only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

Substantive reasonableness was reviewed for abuse of discretion under the familiar “no reasonable sentencing court” formulation, focusing on the totality of the circumstances and the reasons the District Court provided.

Precedents cited and their role in the decision

Esteras v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2031 (2025): The Supreme Court held that when revoking supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), courts may not consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors (seriousness of the offense, respect for law, just punishment). The panel situated the District Court’s remarks within the permissible factors: deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation—not punishment for the “seriousness” of the underlying offense of conviction. By contextualizing the District Court’s references to “seriousness” as describing the violation conduct for breach-of-trust and risk assessment, the panel found no Esteras error.
United States v. Dees, 467 F.3d 847 (3d Cir. 2006): The Third Circuit’s foundational revocation case articulating that the “primary” consideration in revocation sentencing is the defendant’s breach of the court’s trust, while taking into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness of the violation conduct and the violator’s criminal history. Dees anchors the permissible focus of revocation sentencing, which the panel reaffirmed here.
United States v. Clark, 726 F.3d 496 (3d Cir. 2013): Clarifies that, in revocation, courts must consider the relevant § 3553(a) factors as cross-referenced by § 3583(e). The panel used this to confirm the District Court properly identified and worked through the authorized factors (deterrence, public protection, rehabilitation).
United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 2007): Upholds an above-Guidelines revocation sentence where recent domestic violence demonstrated ongoing danger and a profound breach of trust. Bungar provided close factual support for affirming Hardeman’s upward variance, given the presence of a firearm and risk to a victim and child.
United States v. Simmons, 69 F.4th 91 (3d Cir. 2023); United States v. Payano, 930 F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 2019); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993): These cases set and apply the plain-error framework for unpreserved procedural claims. The panel relied on them to assess whether the District Court plainly relied on impermissible factors.
United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): The cornerstones for reviewing substantive reasonableness—focus on the totality of the circumstances, deference to the district court’s judgment, and affirmance unless no reasonable sentencing court would impose the same sentence for the reasons given. The panel invoked these to sustain the upward variance.
United States v. Azcona-Polanco, 865 F.3d 148 (3d Cir. 2017): Confirms abuse-of-discretion review for substantive reasonableness, which framed the panel’s ultimate affirmance.

Legal reasoning

The Third Circuit’s analysis proceeded in two steps.

First, on procedural reasonableness, the panel emphasized the statutory architecture of revocation sentencing: § 3583(e) authorizes consideration of certain § 3553(a) factors (including deterrence, protecting the public, and rehabilitation), and—after Esteras—excludes § 3553(a)(2)(A)’s punishment factors. The District Court explicitly acknowledged the proper framework and underscored the unique nature of revocation as a sanction for breach of the court’s trust rather than a second punishment for the underlying offense. When the court referred to the “seriousness” of “the nature and circumstances of the offense here,” the panel read that reference in context: it described the gravity of the violation conduct (domestic violence, presence of a baby, possession and discharge of a firearm, resulting injury) to explain the need to deter similar conduct and protect the public. In that light, the court did not plainly rely on § 3553(a)(2)(A) “punishment” considerations.

The District Court also provided case-specific reasons for an upward variance: (1) the particularly dangerous nature of the violation episode, (2) the need to deter future violations and interrupt a trajectory the judge described as “going down the wrong path,” and (3) the paramount importance of protecting the public, including potential victims in this case. The judge acknowledged mitigating considerations—post-incarceration employment and positive prison conduct—but found they were outweighed by the breach-of-trust and the risk profile evidenced by the conduct. That explanation satisfied the requirement to give a reasoned, factor-based account for varying above the advisory range.

Second, on substantive reasonableness, the panel applied deferential review and concluded that, given the totality of the circumstances, it could not say no reasonable sentencing court would impose a 48-month term. The seriousness of the violation episode (especially the firearm and presence of a child), coupled with the need to deter and protect, supported the chosen sentence under the governing framework and within the statutory revocation limits.

Applying Esteras: what “seriousness” courts can still discuss at revocation

A central contribution of this opinion is its concrete application of Esteras. After Esteras, district courts may not impose or lengthen a revocation prison term to reflect the “seriousness of the offense,” “to promote respect for the law,” or “to provide just punishment,” because § 3583(e) omits § 3553(a)(2)(A). Yet courts may still describe and weigh the violation conduct’s gravity as it bears on the permissible factors—deterrence, protection of the public, rehabilitation—and the breach-of-trust principle that animates revocation.

The Third Circuit’s contextual approach signals that a district court’s use of the word “seriousness” is not disqualifying per se. What matters is how the court uses that concept:

Prohibited: Using seriousness to justify punishment for its own sake (a § 3553(a)(2)(A) rationale).
Permitted: Discussing the dangerousness and circumstances of the violation episode to assess the defendant’s risk, to deter future violations, to protect the public, and to evaluate the degree of breach of trust.

Here, the panel found the District Court stayed on the permissible side of that line.

Substantive reasonableness and the upward variance

The advisory Chapter 7 range for a Grade A violation with Criminal History Category II was 27–33 months. The District Court varied upward to 48 months (an increase of 15 months above the top of the range). On appeal, the panel deferred to the District Court’s weighing, highlighting:

The dangerousness of the violation conduct: domestic violence culminating in injuries, with a firearm present and a shot fired, while a baby was nearby.
The breach of the court’s trust inherent in violating supervised release conditions—especially where the violation mirrors or escalates public-safety concerns the court sought to guard against through supervision.
The forward-looking goals of deterrence and protecting potential victims.

The panel’s reliance on Bungar underscores that violent conduct during supervision can justify substantial upward variances, particularly where the conduct shows ongoing community danger and a significant breach of trust.

Guidelines, proof standard, and the breach-of-trust doctrine

Although the opinion refers to a “Guidelines range,” revocation ranges derive from Chapter 7’s advisory policy statements (e.g., USSG §§ 7B1.1, 7B1.4). The District Court classified the conduct as a Grade A violation based on simple assault and possession of a firearm and calculated the range accordingly. Importantly, while the state charges were later withdrawn, revocation proceedings are governed by a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, and courts may find violation conduct regardless of whether that conduct yields a conviction. That is because revocation is a sanction for violating conditions of supervised release—a breach of the court’s trust—rather than a new criminal punishment.

The breach-of-trust doctrine remains the organizational principle of revocation sentencing in the Third Circuit. This opinion reaffirms that doctrine and shows how courts can emphasize breach-of-trust alongside the statutorily authorized purposes of deterrence, public protection, and rehabilitation, while avoiding impermissible reliance on punishment rationales barred by Esteras.

Impact and implications

Operationalizing Esteras in the Third Circuit: This decision illustrates a practical, context-sensitive method for appellate courts to separate permissible references to the gravity of violation conduct from impermissible § 3553(a)(2)(A) punishment considerations. Expect district courts to continue describing “seriousness” so long as they link it to breach of trust, deterrence, and public safety—not to “just deserts.”
Preservation matters: Because no objection was made below, review was for plain error. Defense counsel should object if a district court appears to rely on § 3553(a)(2)(A) at revocation, request clarification on the record, and, if necessary, invite an explicit statement disavowing reliance on punishment rationales. Absent an objection, contextual readings like Hardeman’s will often defeat plain-error claims.
Domestic violence and firearms as aggravators: The opinion signals that violent conduct—especially with firearms and in the presence of children—will support substantial upward variances in revocation settings, given the acute public-safety and deterrence interests and the pronounced breach of trust such conduct reflects.
Sentencing explanations post-Esteras: District courts should structure explanations around: (1) breach of trust, (2) the nature and circumstances of the violation episode as they bear on risk, (3) the need for specific and general deterrence, (4) protection of the public, and (5) the defendant’s rehabilitative progress or needs (while avoiding lengthening imprisonment to promote rehabilitation). Doing so will withstand appellate scrutiny.
Substantive reasonableness and range of permissible outcomes: By affirming a significant upward variance on these facts, the Third Circuit reinforces substantial discretion at revocation, provided the reasons are anchored in permissible factors and the record.

Complex concepts simplified

Revocation vs. new punishment: Revocation is not a second punishment for the original crime. It sanctions the defendant’s breach of the court’s trust by violating supervision conditions.
What factors the court may consider at revocation: Under § 3583(e), courts may consider deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation, along with the nature and circumstances of the violation and the defendant’s history and characteristics. After Esteras, courts may not rely on “just punishment,” “seriousness of the offense,” or “respect for the law” to impose or lengthen a revocation prison term.
“Breach of trust” doctrine: The core revocation principle: the sentence should reflect the betrayal of the court’s trust by violating conditions of supervised release, not re-punish the original offense of conviction.
Grade A violation and advisory range: Violation conduct is classified (e.g., Grade A/B/C) under Chapter 7 policy statements, which produce an advisory range based on the grade and the defendant’s criminal history category. The court can vary from that range with adequate explanation.
Plain-error review: If a defendant does not object at sentencing, the appeal must show a clear, obvious error that affected substantial rights; even then, the appellate court will correct it only if failing to do so would seriously affect the fairness or integrity of the proceedings.
Substantive reasonableness: An appellate court will affirm as long as a reasonable sentencing judge could impose the same sentence for the reasons given, considering all circumstances. It does not reweigh factors de novo.
Dismissed state charges vs. revocation: Even if arrest charges are withdrawn or dismissed, a court can revoke supervised release based on the same conduct if it finds, by a preponderance, that the conduct occurred.

Conclusion

United States v. Hardeman offers a timely and practical guide to revocation sentencing in the wake of Esteras. It affirms that district courts may not invoke § 3553(a)(2)(A) punishment factors when imposing revocation sentences but may thoroughly discuss the gravity of the violation episode—especially violent conduct with firearms—in service of permissible aims: deterring future violations, protecting the public, and addressing breach of trust. The Third Circuit’s contextual approach to the District Court’s “seriousness” language, coupled with its deference to a well-reasoned upward variance, provides a roadmap for both trial judges crafting revocation explanations and practitioners preserving or contesting such sentences on appeal. The decision underscores that when the record clearly ties the sentence to breach of trust, deterrence, and public safety, even substantial upward variances will withstand review.