Post-Erlinger Rule: ACCA “Different Occasions” Must Be Found by a Jury (or Admitted), and Sentencing-Court Factfinding Requires Vacatur Absent Harmlessness

I. Introduction

United States v. Christopher Deon Townsel (11th Cir. Jan. 12, 2026) addresses the intersection of federal felon-in-possession prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and enhanced sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The defendant, Christopher Townsel, pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The central dispute on appeal concerned not guilt, but whether the district court could impose ACCA’s 15-year mandatory minimum by itself finding—at sentencing—that Townsel’s prior convictions occurred on “occasions different from one another.”

While Townsel’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024), holding that ACCA’s “different occasions” determination increases the penalty range and therefore must be decided by a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt (or admitted in a guilty plea). Townsel also raised, for the first time on appeal, constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1) under the Commerce Clause and Second Amendment, relying on New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) and United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024).

Key Issues

ACCA procedure after Erlinger: May a sentencing judge find the “different occasions” fact by a preponderance of the evidence, and if not, was the error harmless?
Constitutionality of § 922(g)(1): Is § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause or the Second Amendment in light of newer Supreme Court Second Amendment doctrine?

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Townsel’s conviction under § 922(g)(1), holding that his Commerce Clause and Second Amendment challenges are foreclosed by binding circuit precedent. However, the court vacated Townsel’s 180-month ACCA sentence and remanded because, under Erlinger, the “different occasions” finding must be made by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt (or admitted). The government conceded both the existence of Erlinger error and that it could not show the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly because the record lacked “different-occasions factors” evidence and no Shepard documents were introduced.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. ACCA “Different Occasions” and the Sixth Amendment

Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024)
Role in Townsel: This is the controlling rule change driving the disposition. Erlinger holds that the “different occasions” inquiry is penalty-enhancing factfinding and thus must be resolved by a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt (or admitted in a guilty plea). The Townsel panel applies Erlinger straightforwardly: because the district court made the “different occasions” determination itself at sentencing, constitutional error occurred.
Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. 360 (2022)
Role in Townsel: Wooden frames the “occasions” inquiry as fact-intensive. In Townsel, Wooden appears as the doctrinal backdrop for why the inquiry is not merely formalistic. The panel also notes Wooden in describing the “fact-laden task,” aligning with Erlinger’s later constitutional allocation of that task to the jury.
United States v. Rivers, 134 F.4th 1292 (11th Cir. 2025)
Role in Townsel: Rivers is the Eleventh Circuit’s post-Erlinger implementation decision. It supplies the operative circuit articulation: judicial factfinding by a preponderance that predicates occurred on different occasions violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and the error is reviewed for harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. Townsel relies on Rivers for both the constitutional violation statement and the harmless-error framework.
United States v. Perez, 86 F.4th 1311 (11th Cir. 2023)
Role in Townsel: Perez provides the general harmless-error allocation in preserved-error cases: when an error is preserved, the government bears the burden to show harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. Townsel uses Perez to place the burden squarely on the government—then finds the government cannot carry it.
United States v. Bennett, 472 F.3d 825 (11th Cir. 2006)
Role in Townsel: Bennett is cited for the sentencing evidentiary burden rule: when a defendant objects to the factual basis for sentencing, the government must establish the disputed fact. This matters because Townsel objected to the PSR’s underlying facts, and the government introduced no Shepard documents.

2. Shepard Documents and Proof of Prior Convictions

Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005)
Role in Townsel: Shepard defines the “restricted set of materials” a court can consult to determine the nature of prior convictions (e.g., charging documents, plea colloquies, judicial records). Townsel notes Shepard in a footnote and through Erlinger’s description of Shepard materials. The critical point is not merely what materials exist, but that none were offered to establish the disputed “different occasions” facts after Townsel objected.
Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024) (discussion of Shepard documents)
Role in Townsel: The panel quotes Erlinger’s explanation that sentencing courts may consult Shepard documents in evaluating prior convictions. But post-Erlinger, that does not authorize a judge to resolve the “different occasions” question by a preponderance—rather, it underscores what evidence might be relevant for a jury determination or for establishing admissions in a plea.

3. § 922(g)(1) Challenges: Commerce Clause and Second Amendment

United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708 (11th Cir. 2010)
Role in Townsel: Wright supplies both the plain-error review point (new issues raised on appeal) and the Commerce Clause “minimal nexus” application: a firearm manufactured out of state satisfies the interstate-commerce nexus.
United States v. Edwards, 142 F.4th 1270 (11th Cir. 2025), United States v. Scott, 263 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2001), United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387 (11th Cir. 1996)
Role in Townsel: These cases collectively maintain the circuit’s longstanding view that § 922(g) is a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause power, and that the minimal-nexus test is satisfied if the firearm traveled in interstate commerce. Townsel concedes foreclosing precedent and does not contest that the firearm was manufactured out of state.
United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008)
Role in Townsel: Archer is invoked for the “prior panel precedent” rule: a later panel must follow prior panel holdings unless overruled or effectively abrogated by the Supreme Court or en banc court. This is the mechanism the court uses to reject Townsel’s Commerce Clause and Second Amendment arguments without revisiting the merits.
New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) and United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024)
Role in Townsel: Townsel relies on these cases to argue § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment. The panel does not engage in fresh Bruen-style historical analysis; instead it holds that circuit precedent remains controlling.
United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010) and United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025)
Role in Townsel: Rozier is the Eleventh Circuit’s core holding that felon disarmament statutes like § 922(g)(1) do not violate the Second Amendment. Dubois holds that neither Bruen nor Rahimi abrogated Rozier. Townsel applies Dubois, concluding the constitutional challenge is foreclosed in this circuit.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Conviction Affirmance: Foreclosure and Plain Error

Because Townsel raised his Commerce Clause and Second Amendment claims for the first time on appeal, the court reviewed for plain error (via United States v. Wright). But the panel effectively resolves the issues earlier in the analysis: under United States v. Archer (prior-panel-precedent rule), existing Eleventh Circuit authority upholding § 922(g) under the Commerce Clause and § 922(g)(1) under the Second Amendment binds the panel. On the Commerce Clause point, the panel reiterates the circuit’s “minimal nexus” test from United States v. Scott, satisfied when the firearm traveled in interstate commerce—here, the out-of-state manufacture sufficed under Wright.

On the Second Amendment claim, the court does not re-run Bruen’s methodological framework; it instead relies on the circuit’s post-Bruen and post-Rahimi decision United States v. Dubois, which holds that United States v. Rozier remains controlling. Thus, even if Townsel’s arguments reflect an emerging national debate about felon-in-possession statutes, the Eleventh Circuit’s internal hierarchy of authority dictates affirmance of the conviction.

2. Sentence Vacatur: Erlinger Error and Harmlessness

The ACCA enhancement turns on whether the defendant has three qualifying predicates “committed on occasions different from one another.” After Erlinger, that “different occasions” fact is treated as an increase in the statutory penalty range and therefore must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt (or freely admitted as part of a guilty plea). Townsel admitted only the elements of § 922(g)(1) at his plea colloquy; he did not admit the “different occasions” facts.

The district court nonetheless imposed the ACCA mandatory minimum after finding—based on the PSR’s description of prior offenses—that the predicates occurred on different occasions. Under United States v. Rivers, that is constitutional error.

The remaining question is remedy: whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Because Townsel preserved his objection, United States v. Perez places the burden on the government to prove harmlessness. The government conceded it could not meet that burden, acknowledging the absence of “record evidence” addressing the different-occasions factors. The panel agrees, stressing two compounding points:

Townsel objected to the “underlying facts” in the PSR relevant to ACCA application, triggering United States v. Bennett’s rule that the government must establish disputed sentencing facts.
The government did not offer Shepard-type documents at sentencing to support the contested facts, leaving no reliable record basis on which an appellate court could declare the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, without reaching Townsel’s alternative argument about whether his Florida cocaine convictions qualify as ACCA “serious drug offenses.”

C. Impact

1. Practical Consequences for ACCA Litigation in the Eleventh Circuit

Charging and plea practice: Post-Erlinger, if the government seeks ACCA’s mandatory minimum, it must either obtain a defendant’s clear admissions in a plea that establish the “different occasions” fact, or submit that question to a jury and prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. Townsel illustrates that merely advising a defendant that ACCA applies (or might apply) is not the same as obtaining a “freely admitted” occasions finding.
Sentencing records and evidence: The decision underscores the litigation risk of relying on PSR narratives—especially where the defendant objects— without producing Shepard documents or other admissible evidence suitable for the applicable burden of proof.
Appellate harmlessness review: Townsel signals that, when the record lacks developed “different-occasions” evidence, harmlessness will be difficult or impossible for the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, increasing the likelihood of vacatur and remand.

2. Stability (for Now) of § 922(g)(1) in the Eleventh Circuit

Townsel also reflects doctrinal stability in this circuit on two recurring constitutional attacks: (i) Commerce Clause challenges remain governed by the minimal-nexus framework; and (ii) Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) remain foreclosed by Rozier as reaffirmed in Dubois, notwithstanding broader national litigation after Bruen and Rahimi.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

ACCA (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)): A federal sentencing law that increases penalties for certain firearm offenders who have at least three prior convictions for specified crimes. It raises both the floor (mandatory minimum) and the ceiling of punishment.
“Occasions different from one another”: Even if a defendant has multiple prior convictions, ACCA applies only if at least three of the qualifying crimes were committed on separate “occasions” (not essentially part of the same criminal episode). This often depends on timing, location, and intervening events.
Shepard documents: A limited set of reliable court records (e.g., indictments, plea agreements, plea colloquies, judgments) that courts may consult to determine what a prior conviction necessarily involved.
Plain error review: A demanding appellate standard applied when a defendant raises an issue for the first time on appeal; relief is limited and typically unavailable when binding precedent forecloses the claim.
Harmless beyond a reasonable doubt: A strict standard requiring the government to show that a constitutional error did not affect the outcome. If the record is underdeveloped, meeting this burden is difficult.
Minimal nexus (Commerce Clause): In § 922(g) cases, the interstate-commerce element is satisfied if the firearm previously traveled across state lines, such as being manufactured in another state.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Townsel is primarily a post-Erlinger correction: it enforces the constitutional allocation of ACCA’s “different occasions” determination to the jury (or to the defendant’s explicit admissions) and demonstrates that, absent a developed record, the government may be unable to prove harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt—necessitating vacatur and remand.

At the same time, the opinion reaffirms that, in the Eleventh Circuit, § 922(g)(1) remains insulated from Commerce Clause and Second Amendment challenges by binding precedent, leaving future change—if any—to en banc reconsideration or the Supreme Court.