Post-Deprivation Prison Grievance Procedures Satisfy Due Process for Temporarily Withheld Inmate Funds; Supervisory Liability Requires Personal Involvement, Not Grievance Denials

Introduction

This Third Circuit, non-precedential per curiam decision arises from a prisoner civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Carl Edward Bell against the Superintendent of Benner Township State Correctional Institution (SCI) and the prison’s mailroom supervisor. Bell alleged First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations relating primarily to a federal stimulus check that did not promptly reach his inmate account and alleged retaliation following his grievances.

Procedurally, the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissed all claims except a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against the mailroom supervisor, Stewart Boone, and later granted summary judgment on that claim. On appeal, the Third Circuit reopened the case after an initial dismissal for failure to prosecute, granted Bell in forma pauperis (IFP) status, found the appeal timely under the prison mailbox rule, and summarily affirmed because the appeal presented no substantial question.

At the core of the opinion are two reaffirmed rules: (1) supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory, and mere involvement in grievance decisions does not establish the personal involvement necessary for a First Amendment retaliation claim; and (2) a temporary inability to access funds, even if more than de minimis, does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment where adequate post-deprivation remedies—here, the prison grievance process—are available.

Summary of the Opinion

Reopening and IFP: The court reopened the appeal under 3d Cir. L.A.R. Misc. 107.2(a) and granted IFP status (Sinwell v. Shapp), while reminding that the PLRA still requires installment payments of appellate fees.
Jurisdiction and Timeliness: The court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The appeal was timely under the prison mailbox rule (Houston v. Lack), notwithstanding a later docketing date, and the separate judgment rule (Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a)) was satisfied.
Fifth Amendment: Dismissal affirmed. The Fifth Amendment constrains federal actors; the defendants are state officials (Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh; Nguyen v. U.S. Catholic Conference).
First Amendment Retaliation: Dismissal affirmed for lack of personal involvement. Allegations that subordinate staff interfered with mail and law library access do not suffice to impose liability on supervisors absent personal direction or knowledge and acquiescence. Denial of grievances is not enough (Jutrowski; Dooley; Rode).
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process: Summary judgment affirmed. Bell ultimately received the stimulus funds; any temporary deprivation was adequately addressed by post-deprivation remedies—namely, the prison grievance system (Hudson; Tillman). Even assuming a non-de minimis deprivation, due process was satisfied. The panel found no evidence of bad faith and noted institutional policy that checks signed by family members are returned.
Disposition: Summary affirmance pursuant to 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 because the appeal raised no substantial issues.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited and Their Influence

Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907); Nguyen v. U.S. Cath. Conf., 719 F.2d 52 (3d Cir. 1983): These decisions anchor the principle that the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause applies to federal—not state—action. The court relied on this to affirm dismissal of Bell’s Fifth Amendment claim because the defendants are state prison officials; any due process claim against state actors arises under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2018); Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 2020); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1988): These cases collectively set the Third Circuit’s standard for personal involvement in § 1983 claims: liability requires personal direction, or actual knowledge and acquiescence; respondeat superior is insufficient. The court applied these authorities to reject Bell’s First Amendment retaliation claim, noting that he tied alleged retaliatory acts to unnamed subordinates and to the grievance-appeal process, which is not enough to establish personal involvement by Houser or Boone.
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972): Fuentes articulates that due process attaches upon a deprivation of a protected property or liberty interest. The panel cited it to frame the threshold deprivation inquiry for Bell’s Fourteenth Amendment claim.
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984); Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2000): Hudson holds that when a deprivation of property is random and unauthorized, adequate post-deprivation remedies can satisfy due process. Tillman recognizes prison grievance procedures as such an adequate remedy. The panel deemed the grievance system sufficient here, foreclosing a due process claim even if Bell experienced a temporary, non-de minimis loss of use of funds.
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring): The concurrence is often cited to highlight that temporary loss of the use of money can be a significant deprivation (e.g., wage garnishment). The panel acknowledged this but explained that, regardless, the existence of an adequate post-deprivation remedy defeated the due process claim.
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995): Sandin recalibrates liberty-interest analysis in the prison context, focusing on “atypical and significant hardship.” Bell argued the District Court misapplied a de minimis threshold. The panel avoided deciding whether the loss was de minimis, concluding instead that adequate post-deprivation remedies defeated the due process claim, thereby making Sandin non-dispositive.
Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam): The court may affirm on any ground supported by the record. This principle supports the panel’s streamlined affirmance of the due process issue.
Procedural Authorities: - Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988); Jenkins v. Superintendent of Laurel Highlands, 705 F.3d 80 (3d Cir. 2013); United States v. Rinaldi, 447 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 2006); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a): Establish timeliness under the prison mailbox rule and the separate judgment rule. - Sinwell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1976); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) & (b)(1): Govern IFP status and PLRA fee collection. - 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6: Permit summary action where no substantial question is presented. - 3d Cir. L.A.R. Misc. 107.2(a): Provides for reopening of appeals dismissed for failure to prosecute. - St. Luke’s Health Network, Inc. v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 967 F.3d 295 (3d Cir. 2020); Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2014): Plenary review standards for dismissal and summary judgment rulings.

Legal Reasoning

The opinion’s reasoning unfolded in three principal steps:

Fifth Amendment Claim: Because the defendants are state actors, any due process claim must proceed under the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fifth. The panel relied on Hunter and Nguyen to affirm dismissal of the Fifth Amendment claim.
First Amendment Retaliation: The complaint tied the allegedly retaliatory conduct (interference with mail and law library access) to unidentified subordinates within the “mail department” and to the superintendent’s role in grievance appeals. Under Jutrowski, Dooley, and Rode, such allegations do not meet the personal involvement threshold. Supervisory liability cannot be predicated on respondeat superior, and participation in the grievance process is not personal participation in the alleged retaliation. The panel therefore affirmed dismissal.
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process:
- Threshold Deprivation: The record on summary judgment showed the stimulus funds were ultimately credited to Bell’s inmate account after a delay, during which the check was returned to the IRS because it had been endorsed by a family member—a circumstance consistent with prison policy. The panel also found no evidence of bad faith.
- De minimis vs. significant deprivation: Bell argued that the District Court misapplied Sandin by characterizing the deprivation as de minimis. The panel avoided the de minimis question, instead assuming arguendo that the temporary loss of use could be significant (with a nod to Justice Harlan’s Sniadach concurrence) and resolving the claim on remedial adequacy.
- Adequate Post-Deprivation Remedy: Under Hudson and Tillman, where the deprivation is random or unauthorized, and pre-deprivation process is not feasible, due process is satisfied by adequate post-deprivation remedies—here, the prison grievance system. Because such remedies existed and were available to Bell, there was no due process violation even if the deprivation was more than de minimis. The panel thus affirmed summary judgment on the Fourteenth Amendment claim.

Layered over these merits holdings, the panel addressed procedural features: it reopened the appeal, applied the prison mailbox rule to find the notice timely, and granted IFP while clarifying the PLRA’s installment-payment requirement. Concluding that the appeal raised no substantial issue, it summarily affirmed pursuant to 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.

Impact and Implications

Prison Property Claims and Temporary Financial Deprivations: The decision reinforces the Hudson line: when inmates experience temporary, unplanned disruptions in access to funds—such as delays in processing third-party checks—prison grievance procedures will typically suffice as due process, foreclosing § 1983 damages claims. This is especially pertinent to stimulus or government-issued checks handled during or after the pandemic.
Supervisory Liability and Grievances: The court reiterates that supervisors are not liable merely because they oversee departments or deny grievances. Future First Amendment retaliation claims must plead and later prove specific acts of personal involvement—either direction of, or knowing acquiescence in, the retaliatory conduct.
Sandin’s Limited Role in Property Claims: Although Sandin reshaped liberty-interest analysis in the prison discipline context, this opinion underscores that property claims are often resolved through the adequacy of remedies framework rather than Sandin’s “atypical and significant hardship” test.
Policy vs. Random/Unauthorized Distinction: While the panel did not expressly classify the deprivation, its reliance on Hudson/Tillman implies treatment as a random or unauthorized occurrence (e.g., return of a check due to third-party endorsement). Had Bell proven a deprivation pursuant to an established policy with feasible pre-deprivation procedures, the analysis could be different. As pleaded and proven here, it was not.
Appellate Practice Pointers: The case provides a succinct refresher on:
- Using the prison mailbox rule to preserve appellate timeliness.
- Reopening dismissed appeals under 3d Cir. L.A.R. Misc. 107.2(a).
- Securing IFP status under Sinwell while anticipating PLRA installment payments.
- Risk of summary affirmance where no substantial question is presented.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Respondeat Superior vs. Personal Involvement: In § 1983 cases, supervisors are not automatically responsible for subordinates’ actions. A plaintiff must show the supervisor personally directed the violation or knew about it and allowed it to occur.
Post-Deprivation Remedy (Hudson Doctrine): If a government actor unexpectedly deprives someone of property (for example, by error or unauthorized act), due process can be satisfied by an after-the-fact remedy like a grievance or tort claim, because a pre-deprivation hearing would be impractical.
Sandin’s Liberty-Interest Test: Sandin says prisoners get due process protections when a sanction imposes an “atypical and significant hardship” compared to ordinary prison life. This test is most relevant to disciplinary segregation and similar restraints on liberty, not all property disputes.
Separate Judgment Rule: Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a), a court’s decision must be set out on a separate document to start the appeal clock, avoiding confusion about the date the judgment becomes final.
Prison Mailbox Rule: A prisoner’s filing is deemed filed when given to prison officials for mailing, not when received by the court. This protects inmates who cannot control postal delays.
In Forma Pauperis and the PLRA: IFP status lets indigent prisoners proceed without prepaying fees, but under the PLRA they must pay filing fees over time in installments from their inmate accounts.
Summary Affirmance: An appellate court may summarily affirm without full briefing or argument if the appeal presents no substantial question of law or fact.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s non-precedential decision in Bell v. Superintendent Benner Township SCI delivers two practical lessons that will shape similar prisoner civil rights litigation. First, supervisory officials cannot be held liable for alleged First Amendment retaliation absent specific allegations and proof of personal involvement; merely denying grievances does not suffice. Second, a temporary inability to access funds—such as a delayed stimulus check—does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause where the prison provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy through its grievance system, even if the delay is more than de minimis. The court’s procedural rulings also provide a blueprint for incarcerated appellants: rely on the prison mailbox rule for timeliness, use mechanisms to reopen dismissed appeals when appropriate, and understand that IFP status under the PLRA involves installment payments of fees. Although non-binding, this opinion reinforces well-settled doctrine on supervisory liability and due process in the prison context and signals that claims premised on temporary property disruptions are unlikely to succeed when functional grievance remedies are available and utilized.

Post-Deprivation Prison Grievance Procedures Satisfy Due Process for Temporarily Withheld Inmate Funds; Supervisory Liability Requires Personal Involvement, Not Grievance Denials (Bell v. Superintendent Benner Township SCI)