Post-Chiaverini Qualified-Immunity Shield: Sixth Circuit Affirms Summary Judgment in Rasawehr v. Grey

Introduction

Jeffrey Rasawehr, an outspoken critic of the Mercer County (Ohio) Sheriff’s Office, was prosecuted in 2016 for obstructing official business, menacing by stalking, and telecommunications harassment. Although a state-court jury acquitted him of the obstruction counts, it convicted him of one count each of stalking and harassment. In 2019 Rasawehr sued Mercer County, Sheriff Jeff Grey, and Detective Chad Fortkamp under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the Sixth Circuit—Judges Gibbons, McKeague, and Stranch—has now affirmed.

The opinion is “not recommended for publication,” but it provides an important clarification: when the Supreme Court changes the standard for malicious prosecution (Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, 602 U.S. 556 (2024)), officers remain entitled to qualified immunity for conduct predating that change, because the law was not “clearly established” at the time of their actions. That point, together with a reaffirmation of statute-of-limitations accrual rules for First Amendment claims, forms the crux of the decision.

Summary of the Judgment

First Amendment claims (suppression, prior restraint, retaliatory prosecution): time-barred. The events triggering the limitations period occurred in July and October 2016, more than two years before suit was filed (Sept. 17, 2019).
Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution: fails because Detective Fortkamp and Sheriff Grey are protected by qualified immunity. Under the precedents existing at the time of prosecution (notably Howse v. Hodous), probable cause for even one charge barred malicious-prosecution liability. The later-decided Chiaverini does not alter that immunity retroactively.
County liability (Monell): fails for want of proof of an official policy or custom.
All district-court rulings therefore affirmed.

Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Beaver St. Investments, LLC v. Summit County, 65 F.4th 822 (6th Cir. 2023) – sets Ohio’s two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims.
Cooey v. Strickland, 479 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2007) – explains that accrual begins when a plaintiff “knows or has reason to know” of the injury.
Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006); Bickerstaff v. Lucarelli, 830 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2016) – framework for First-Amendment retaliatory-prosecution claims.
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007); Rapp v. Putman, 644 F. App’x 621 (6th Cir. 2016) – claim accrues when prosecution is initiated.
Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294 (6th Cir. 2010) – elements of § 1983 malicious prosecution.
Howse v. Hodous, 953 F.3d 402 (6th Cir. 2020) – a single charge supported by probable cause bars malicious-prosecution liability as to all charges (pre-Chiaverini rule).
Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, 602 U.S. 556 (2024) – overrules categorical rule, now requiring a charge-by-charge probable-cause inquiry.
Wesby, Mullenix v. Luna, and classic qualified-immunity authorities – for clearly-established-law analysis.

The Sixth Circuit relied heavily on Cooey and Beaver Street to hold that Rasawehr’s First-Amendment claims accrued no later than October 2016. For the malicious-prosecution count, the court acknowledged that Chiaverini changed the legal landscape but emphasized that officers are judged against the “clearly established” law of the moment; under Howse, they had probable cause for at least one charge, so qualified immunity applied.

B. Court’s Legal Reasoning

Statute-of-Limitations Accrual
– The July 2016 cease-and-desist letter restricted Rasawehr’s ability to contact the Sheriff’s Office, thereby immediately implicating free-speech concerns.
– The October 2016 criminal complaint quoted Rasawehr’s speech, putting him on notice that his speech was the focus of prosecution.
– Consequently, the two-year window closed in July/Oct 2018; suit filed in Sept 2019 was untimely.
Retaliatory - Prosecution Accrual
– Accrues when charges are filed, not when motives become crystal clear at trial. The plaintiff “need not know the full extent of the government’s animus.”
Malicious Prosecution & Qualified Immunity
– Step 1: Determine whether the right alleged was “clearly established” on the date of defendants’ conduct (2016). Answer: No, because Howse allowed a single valid charge to defeat the claim.
– Step 2: If law was not clearly established, defendants are immune regardless of whether Chiaverini would change the analysis today.
– Step 3: Even assuming no immunity, probable cause existed for at least one obstruction count (harassing, profanity-laden calls after a cease-and-desist order), satisfying Howse.
Monell Liability
– No evidence of an official policy or custom causing a constitutional violation; county therefore cannot be held liable.

C. Potential Impact of the Decision

Reinforces that qualified immunity locks in the state of the law at the moment of officers’ conduct; later-announced standards (even from the Supreme Court) cannot retroactively remove protection.
Signals to litigants that statute-of-limitations defenses remain a powerful tool in First-Amendment § 1983 suits, especially where a plaintiff’s own speech is quoted in charging documents.
Suggests future plaintiffs must plead county-policy allegations with specificity; mere disagreement with prosecution strategy is insufficient under Monell.
Because the opinion is unpublished, it is not binding precedent in the Sixth Circuit, but it will be persuasive authority—especially on the timing-of-accrual and qualified-immunity interplay with Chiaverini.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified Immunity: A legal doctrine that shields government officials from personal liability unless (1) they violated a constitutional right and (2) that right was “clearly established” at the time. It is designed to give officials breathing room for reasonable mistakes.
Statute of Limitations Accrual: “Accrual” is when the clock starts ticking. In § 1983 cases, it begins when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury—not when all evidence, motives, or downstream consequences become known.
Prior Restraint: Any government action that prohibits speech before it occurs (e.g., a cease-and-desist letter). Prior restraints are highly disfavored under the First Amendment.
Malicious Prosecution (Fourth Amendment sense): Prosecution without probable cause that results in a deprivation of liberty (arrest, bond, etc.) and ends in the plaintiff’s favor. In § 1983, the plaintiff must tie the prosecution to a constitutional violation.
Probable Cause: Facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant a prudent person’s belief that the suspect committed an offense—“reasonable probability,” not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Jeffrey Rasawehr v. Jeff Grey underscores two practical lessons for constitutional litigants. First, plaintiffs must act promptly: where speech is expressly referenced in charging documents, the limitations clock starts immediately. Second, when the Supreme Court reshapes constitutional doctrine—as it did in Chiaverini—officials remain protected for pre-decision conduct unless the earlier law already made unconstitutionality “beyond debate.” While unpublished, the case offers persuasive guidance on how lower courts should navigate the intersection of evolving precedent, qualified immunity, and malicious-prosecution claims.