Post-Bruen/Rahimi Felon-in-Possession Challenges Remain Foreclosed in the Eleventh Circuit; Brief § 3553(c)(2) Variance Explanations Suffice When the Record Is Clear

I. Introduction

This appeal arose from a federal felon-in-possession prosecution following a domestic-violence report that led police to obtain a search warrant and recover a pistol and ammunition. The defendant, Randall Demetrius Broaden, pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), but challenged (i) the statute’s constitutionality under the Second Amendment in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, and (ii) the reasonableness of a substantial upward variance from the recalculated advisory Guidelines range.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on all grounds, emphasizing two recurring appellate themes: (1) the binding force of prior circuit precedent upholding § 922(g)(1), and (2) the limited scope of reversal for allegedly inadequate sentencing explanations when the record makes the district court’s rationale apparent.

II. Summary of the Opinion

• Second Amendment: The court held Broaden’s constitutional challenge was foreclosed by circuit precedent—United States v. Rozier and, more recently, United States v. Dubois (“Dubois II”). Neither Bruen nor United States v. Rahimi abrogated those decisions.
• Procedural reasonableness (§ 3553(c)(2)): Reviewing only for plain error (because Broaden did not object), the court held the district court’s explanation—principally that Broaden’s criminal history was “horrendous”—was sufficient for meaningful appellate review, especially given the sentencing record.
• Substantive reasonableness: The 105-month sentence (27 months above the 63–78 month range) was not an abuse of discretion given Broaden’s extensive criminal history and the district court’s consideration of sentencing purposes; the sentence also sat well below the 180-month statutory maximum.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Drove the Result)

1. Second Amendment / § 922(g)(1)

• United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010)
  Rozier is treated as the controlling circuit decision holding that “statutory restrictions of firearm possession, such as § 922(g)(1), are a constitutional avenue to restrict the Second Amendment right of certain classes of people,” including felons. The panel emphasized that Rozier relied on language from District of Columbia v. Heller approving “longstanding prohibitions” on felon firearm possession, and that Rozier rejected the idea that this was non-authoritative dicta.
• District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)
  The opinion uses Heller as the anchor for the “presumptively lawful” category of firearm regulations, particularly restrictions on felons. In this case, Heller matters less as a direct test and more as the foundational language that Rozier incorporated into Eleventh Circuit doctrine.
• New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)
  Broaden invoked Bruen to argue § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied. The panel, however, treated the post-Bruen question as already resolved by subsequent Eleventh Circuit authority rather than an open question to be reconsidered anew.
• United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024)
  Rather than supporting Broaden, Rahimi is quoted (via Dubois II) for expressly disavowing any suggestion that the Second Amendment prevents legislatures from barring gun possession by categories of persons thought to present a “special danger of misuse,” and for reiterating that prohibitions on possession by “felons and the mentally ill” are “presumptively lawful.”
• United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025) (“Dubois II”)
  Dubois II is the immediate gatekeeper precedent. The panel treats it as having already decided the precise “abrogation” argument Broaden made (i.e., that Bruen and Rahimi undermined Rozier). Because Dubois II held “Rozier remains good law,” it directly foreclosed Broaden’s challenge.
• Laguna Rivera v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 130 F.4th 915 (11th Cir. 2025)
  Cited for the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule: earlier panel holdings bind later panels unless overruled en banc or abrogated by the Supreme Court. This supplies the formal mechanism by which § 922(g)(1) challenges are rejected even if litigants present novel arguments.
• Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174 (2018)
  Cited for the proposition that a guilty plea does not bar a defendant from challenging the constitutionality of the statute of conviction on direct appeal—important because it clears the procedural path for the argument even though it ultimately fails on the merits/precedent.

2. Standard of Review, Waiver, and Plain Error

• 11th Cir. R. 3-1
  Because Broaden did not object to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the panel applied waiver principles that limit review to plain error for unobjected-to conclusions.
• United States v. Steiger, 99 F.4th 1316 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc)
  Steiger is central both for the plain-error framework and for a key limitation: a § 3553(c) explanation error affects substantial rights only when the district court’s reasoning is unclear on the face of the record. If the record permits meaningful appellate review, reversal is not warranted under plain-error review.
• Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a), (b)
  Reinforces harmless-error and plain-error principles: unpreserved errors are corrected only under strict conditions.

3. Sentencing Explanation and Reasonableness

• Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007)
  Used for two propositions: the explanation requirement enables “meaningful appellate review,” and an upward variance must be justified in relation to the degree of deviation, though “extraordinary circumstances” are not required.
• United States v. Oudomsine, 57 F.4th 1262 (11th Cir. 2023)
  Cited for the procedural reasonableness rule that a sentence is procedurally unreasonable when the court fails to adequately explain the sentence, including any variance from the Guidelines range.
• United States v. Carpenter, 803 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2015)
  Cited for preservation doctrine: a defendant must clearly object on specific grounds; broad objections do not preserve specific procedural claims.
• United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015)
  Supports the broad discretion to weigh § 3553(a) factors and to give significant weight to criminal history; also assigns the burden to the challenger to show unreasonableness.
• United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) and United States v. Campa, 459 F.3d 1121 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
  Provide the abuse-of-discretion/substantive-reasonableness framework: reversal requires a “definite and firm conviction” of a clear error of judgment in weighing § 3553(a).
• United States v. Dorman, 488 F.3d 936 (11th Cir. 2007)
  Cited for the point that the district court need not explicitly recite each § 3553(a) factor if the record reflects consideration of the relevant factors.
• United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2022)
  Cited for the proposition that district courts have “wide discretion” to impose upward variances based on § 3553(a).
• United States v. Goldman, 953 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2020)
  Used for the common indicator of reasonableness: a sentence well below the statutory maximum tends to support substantive reasonableness.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The Second Amendment claim fails as a matter of binding precedent

The panel’s reasoning proceeds in a controlled sequence:

• Even though Class v. United States allows a post-plea constitutional challenge, Broaden’s argument confronts controlling circuit precedent.
• Under the prior panel precedent rule (reinforced by Laguna Rivera v. U.S. Att'y Gen.), the panel cannot reconsider § 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality unless the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit en banc has clearly overruled or abrogated controlling law.
• United States v. Dubois (“Dubois II”) already held that United States v. Rahimi (and, by implication, Bruen) did not abrogate United States v. Rozier; therefore, the panel must reject Broaden’s Second Amendment challenge.

The key doctrinal move is the court’s reliance on Rahimi—not as a case expanding Second Amendment protections, but as a case that expressly preserves legislative authority to disarm “categories of persons” presenting a “special danger of misuse,” and that reiterates that bans on possession by “felons” are “presumptively lawful.” That language, as Dubois II held, stabilizes (rather than destabilizes) the Eleventh Circuit’s existing § 922(g)(1) jurisprudence.

2. Procedural reasonableness: § 3553(c)(2) and the “record clarity” rule

Broaden argued the district court inadequately explained the upward variance as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2). The panel emphasized that:

• Because Broaden did not object, review is for plain error under United States v. Steiger.
• Under Steiger, even if an explanation is brief, reversal is not warranted unless the district court’s reasoning is “unclear on the face of the record.”

Applying that standard, the panel found clarity: the district court said it was varying upward because Broaden’s criminal history was “horrendous,” and the record supported that description (33 adult convictions and a pattern of violence, with many convictions not scoring criminal history points but still relevant to § 3553(a)).

3. Substantive reasonableness: upward variance justified by history and characteristics

On substance, the panel rejected the claim that the district court “solely focused” on criminal history. The opinion treats criminal history as a proper, weighty factor under § 3553(a)(1) and closely tied to deterrence and protection of the public under § 3553(a)(2). The court also noted that:

• The district court was aware of and started from the Guidelines range (recalculated to 63–78 months).
• The variance (to 105 months) was measured and even below the government’s requested 115 months.
• The sentence remained well below the 180-month statutory maximum, which the circuit often treats as a reasonableness indicator.

C. Impact

1. Second Amendment litigation in the Eleventh Circuit: “foreclosed unless higher authority speaks”

The opinion reinforces an increasingly settled procedural reality in the Eleventh Circuit: post-Bruen as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) will generally be dismissed at the merits stage because Rozier and Dubois II remain binding. Unless the Supreme Court directly invalidates felon-in-possession prohibitions (or the Eleventh Circuit does so en banc), litigants face an immediate precedent barrier rather than a fresh historical-tradition inquiry.

2. Sentencing: short explanations can survive (especially on plain-error review)

The decision continues the post-Steiger trend: where a defendant fails to preserve a § 3553(c)(2) challenge, appellate courts will focus on whether the district court’s rationale is discernible from the record as a whole. Practically, this incentivizes:

• Defense counsel to make contemporaneous, specific objections to the adequacy of variance explanations; and
• District courts to create a clear record tying the variance to concrete facts (e.g., unscored convictions, patterns of conduct, risk to the public), even if the oral explanation is brief.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Prior panel precedent rule”: In the Eleventh Circuit, a later three-judge panel must follow an earlier panel’s holding—even if the later panel thinks it is wrong—unless the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc changes the rule.
• “Abrogation”: A prior decision is no longer binding only if a higher authority (usually the Supreme Court) so clearly conflicts with it that the earlier rule cannot stand. The panel held Bruen and Rahimi did not clearly conflict with Rozier, especially in light of Dubois II.
• “Plain error” review: If a defendant did not raise an issue in the trial court, the appellate court will reverse only for obvious errors that likely affected the outcome and seriously undermine the fairness or integrity of proceedings.
• “Procedural” vs. “substantive” reasonableness: Procedural reasonableness asks whether the court followed the right steps (correct Guidelines calculation, adequate explanation). Substantive reasonableness asks whether the length of the sentence is reasonable given the § 3553(a) factors.
• “Upward variance”: A sentence above the advisory Guidelines range based on statutory sentencing factors, not because the Guidelines themselves required it.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Randall Broaden underscores two durable Eleventh Circuit principles. First, Second Amendment challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) remain foreclosed by United States v. Rozier and United States v. Dubois (“Dubois II”), notwithstanding New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi. Second, under United States v. Steiger, a brief explanation for an upward variance can satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2)—and will rarely warrant reversal on plain-error review—when the sentencing record makes the district court’s reasoning clear, as it did here through Broaden’s extensive and violent criminal history.