Post-Bruen Challenges to Pistol Permit Denials: Second Circuit Reaffirms Absolute Judicial Immunity and Eleventh Amendment Limits on Suits Against State Judges

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Second Circuit’s summary order in Sibley v. Watches, No. 24-855-cv (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 2025), affirming the dismissal of pro se plaintiff Montgomery Blair Sibley’s federal civil rights claims arising from the denial of his New York pistol permit. After the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen (2022), Sibley sought to revive his suit on remand by filing a Fifth Amended Complaint against the licensing judge who denied his application and a roster of New York appellate judges who rejected his Article 78 petition and appeals.

The case presented intertwined questions of judicial immunity, the limited availability of injunctive relief against judges under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the scope of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity (particularly as to retrospective declarations and injunctions), and whether New York’s Article 78 proceeding provides adequate procedural due process for post-deprivation review of pistol permit decisions. Also lurking in the background was Bruen’s recalibration of Second Amendment doctrine and the plaintiff’s effort to have the court “certify” to the Supreme Court a challenge to the continuing vitality of judicial immunity in § 1983 actions.

Although issued as a summary order without precedential effect under Second Circuit rules, the court’s reasoning consolidates and applies core doctrines that will meaningfully guide future litigants who seek damages or coercive relief from state judges in firearms licensing disputes after Bruen.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal in full, holding:

Absolute Judicial Immunity (Damages): The claims for money damages against the appellate Judges were barred because the actions challenged—adjudicating an Article 78 proceeding and appeals—are “paradigmatic” judicial acts.
Injunctive Relief Against Judges under § 1983: Injunctive relief against judicial officers is available only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. Sibley alleged neither.
Eleventh Amendment (Retrospective Relief): Requests for retrospective declaratory and injunctive relief—such as a declaration that defendants violated rights in the past and an order compelling the licensing judge to issue a permit—are barred by sovereign immunity. The Ex parte Young exception does not allow judgments declaring past violations of federal law.
Due Process: New York’s Article 78 proceeding provides a wholly adequate post-deprivation hearing for due process purposes, even if a plaintiff disagrees with the outcome.
Bruen: The panel, which remanded earlier for consideration of Bruen’s impact, did not need to reach the Second Amendment merits; established immunity doctrines and sovereign immunity disposed of the case.
Certification Motion: Sibley’s motion to “certify to the Supreme Court” whether the Civil Rights Act of 1871 preempts judicial immunity was denied.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Oliva v. Heller, 839 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1988); Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2009): These Second Circuit decisions reaffirm that judges enjoy absolute immunity from suits for money damages for acts taken in their judicial capacity. The panel relied on these cases to hold that the appellate Judges were immune from damages claims grounded in their rulings in the Article 78 proceeding and subsequent appeals.
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871): A foundational Supreme Court case cited via Bliven for the classic rationale: judicial officers must be free to act according to their convictions without fear of personal liability. This principle undergirds the modern doctrine of absolute judicial immunity.
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988): The Supreme Court’s functional approach: immunity turns on the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor. The panel emphasized that resolving disputes in court (including Article 78 petitions and appeals) is “paradigmatic” judicial work—squarely protected.
McCray v. Caparco, 761 F. App’x 27 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order); Brodsky v. NYC Campaign Finance Bd., 796 F. App’x 1 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order): While non-precedential, these decisions align with the principle that judges presiding over Article 78 cases are performing judicial acts and are therefore immune from damages suits.
42 U.S.C. § 1983; Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757 (2d Cir. 1999): The 1996 amendment to § 1983 sharply limits injunctive relief against judges: it is available only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. Montero applies that limit. The panel held Sibley satisfied neither prong, dooming his injunctive claims.
T.W. v. New York State Board of Law Examiners, 110 F.4th 71 (2d Cir. 2024): A declaration framed in the past tense that a state actor “violated” the law is “facially retrospective” and barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The panel relied on this framing to reject Sibley’s backward-looking declaratory requests.
Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993): The Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity does not permit judgments declaring that state officers violated federal law in the past. The court invoked this to reject Sibley’s requested retrospective relief.
Locurto v. Safir, 264 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2001); Gudema v. Nassau County, 163 F.3d 717 (2d Cir. 1998): Article 78 proceedings provide an adequate post-deprivation remedy for due process purposes. The panel applied this to hold that Sibley’s ability to pursue (and his actual pursuit of) Article 78 review satisfied procedural due process, regardless of the outcome.
Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2002); Butcher v. Wendt, 975 F.3d 236 (2d Cir. 2020): These cases supply the de novo standard for reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal and confirm that the court may resolve immunity at the pleading stage.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s analysis proceeded in logical layers, each independently dispositive of categories of relief:

Functional nature of “judicial acts” and absolute immunity: Applying Forrester’s functional test, the panel held that the appellate judges’ decisions in Sibley’s Article 78 proceeding and ensuing appeals are the heartland of judicial action. Under Oliva and Bliven, judges are absolutely immune from damages for such actions. The allegations—essentially that the judges erred or refused to reach certain issues—attack rulings, not nonjudicial conduct.
Injunctive relief against judges under § 1983 is narrowly cabined: Congress’s 1996 amendment to § 1983 restricts injunctive relief against judges to two narrow scenarios: a violated “declaratory decree” or “unavailability” of declaratory relief. Echoing Montero, the panel found none was pleaded. In short: even if a judge is alleged to be wrong on the merits, § 1983 generally does not authorize injunctions against judicial officers performing judicial acts absent these precise predicates.
Eleventh Amendment bars retrospective relief against the state and its judges: Sovereign immunity precludes federal courts from awarding retrospective declaratory or injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities. The court characterized Sibley’s requested declarations (that rights were violated “in the past”) and the order compelling issuance of a pistol permit as retrospective. T.W. and Puerto Rico Aqueduct underscore that Ex parte Young’s prospective-relief pathway does not permit backward-looking judgments declaring past violations.
Procedural due process satisfied by Article 78: Regardless of whether the initial license denial was correct, New York provides an adequate post-deprivation process—Article 78—to test and remedy alleged legal errors. Under Locurto and Gudema, that suffices for due process. The Constitution requires a fair opportunity to be heard, not a guaranteed result.
Bruen did not alter immunity or sovereign immunity doctrines: Although the case had been remanded to consider Bruen’s impact, the panel did not reach any Second Amendment merits. Substantive changes to firearms law do not displace long-standing judge-protective doctrines or the Eleventh Amendment. Thus, plaintiffs cannot leverage Bruen to obtain damages or coercive orders against state judges for judicial acts.
Certification to the Supreme Court denied: The court declined Sibley’s request to “certify” whether § 1983 preempts judicial immunity. Given Supreme Court and Second Circuit case law recognizing judicial immunity in § 1983 suits, and the extraordinary nature of certification, denial was unsurprising.

Impact and Practical Implications

Though non-precedential, this order sends important signals with broad application beyond firearms licensing:

Post-Bruen litigation strategy: Plaintiffs challenging pistol permit denials should not sue state judges for damages or seek injunctions compelling judges to grant permits. Absolute judicial immunity and § 1983’s injunctive bar foreclose that approach, and the Eleventh Amendment blocks retrospective relief.
Target proper defendants for prospective relief: Prospective Ex parte Young claims must be directed at appropriate executive officials responsible for enforcing the allegedly unconstitutional statute or policy (e.g., licensing authorities or enforcement personnel), not judges acting in a judicial capacity. The relief must address an ongoing violation of federal law, not merely correct a past decision.
Framing declaratory requests: Declarations framed in the past tense (e.g., “X violated my rights”) are likely “facially retrospective” and barred. Plaintiffs seeking declaratory relief should carefully frame claims prospectively to avoid sovereign immunity barriers.
Article 78 as the due process channel: New York’s Article 78 remains the prescribed mechanism for reviewing licensing denials. Its availability generally defeats procedural due process claims in federal court, regardless of whether the petitioner prevailed in state court.
Judicial independence preserved: The decision underscores separation-of-powers concerns: judicial decisionmakers cannot be haled into damages suits or enjoined for their rulings, absent narrowly-defined statutory exceptions.
No Bruen carveout to immunity: Bruen’s recalibration of the Second Amendment does not create exceptions to judicial immunity or sovereign immunity; plaintiffs must navigate those doctrines unchanged.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Absolute Judicial Immunity: A shield protecting judges from money damages for acts undertaken in their judicial role (like issuing orders or deciding cases). It applies even if the judge is alleged to have made legal or factual errors, so long as the acts are judicial and not taken in the clear absence of jurisdiction.
Functional Approach (Forrester): Courts ask what function the official was performing, not who the official is. Deciding cases is a judicial function; administering a court’s employment policies might not be.
Injunctive Relief Against Judges under § 1983: Since 1996, a plaintiff can enjoin a judge only if a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief is unavailable—rare circumstances. Ordinary disagreement with a ruling is not enough.
Eleventh Amendment and Ex parte Young: The Eleventh Amendment bars federal suits against states and state officials for retrospective relief or damages. Ex parte Young allows suits for prospective relief to stop ongoing violations of federal law, but not to declare past violations or undo completed state-court judgments.
Retrospective vs. Prospective Relief: Retrospective relief looks backward (e.g., “declare my rights were violated in 2019” or “order the judge to reverse that past denial”). Prospective relief prevents future or ongoing violations (e.g., enjoin enforcement of an unconstitutional policy going forward).
Article 78 Proceeding: A New York state-court mechanism for prompt review of administrative or quasi-judicial decisions. Federal courts routinely deem it an adequate process to satisfy procedural due process requirements after an alleged deprivation.
Summary Order (Second Circuit): Not binding precedent under the court’s rules, but citable and often persuasive regarding how the court applies controlling law.

Broader Context and Observations

Sibley illustrates a recurring pattern after Bruen: plaintiffs recast firearms licensing disputes as § 1983 suits against state judges, seeking damages or coercive orders. This decision reiterates that such a strategy runs headlong into entrenched immunities and sovereign immunity. The path to federal relief—if any—lies in carefully framed suits against non-judicial officials responsible for ongoing enforcement of allegedly unconstitutional laws, not in collateral attacks on judicial rulings or attempts to compel judges to enter specific orders.

Importantly, the court did not reach or opine on the merits of the Second Amendment claim. This is a reminder that even potentially meritorious substantive claims cannot proceed against immune defendants or in the face of jurisdictional bars. For litigants, the message is strategic: identify the correct defendants, seek prospective relief, and ensure the relief sought fits within the Ex parte Young doctrine.

Conclusion

The Second Circuit’s decision in Sibley v. Watches affirms four core propositions:

Absolute judicial immunity forecloses damages claims against judges for judicial acts, including decisions in Article 78 proceedings and appeals.
§ 1983 severely restricts injunctive relief against judges; absent a violated declaratory decree or the unavailability of declaratory relief, injunctions are off the table.
The Eleventh Amendment bars retrospective declaratory and injunctive relief against state officials; Ex parte Young does not authorize backward-looking judgments declaring past violations.
Article 78 provides adequate procedural due process for reviewing pistol permit denials in New York.

While not precedential, the order reinforces longstanding doctrines that shape litigation strategy in the wake of Bruen. Plaintiffs must calibrate their claims to avoid immune targets, frame relief prospectively, and utilize the state’s established review mechanisms. The judiciary’s independence—protected by absolute immunity—and the state’s sovereign immunity remain robust constraints on § 1983 suits aimed at judicial actors.