Post-Appeal Receivership Appointments Moot Turnover and Enforcement Order Appeals

Introduction

This commentary examines the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Weslease 2018 Operating, L.P. v. Behan (No. 24-10246, consolidated with Nos. 24-10366, 24-10460, 24-10822, 24-10898), handed down on June 5, 2025. At issue were turnover and enforcement orders entered under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 31.002, by which judgment creditor Weslease 2018 endeavored to satisfy two earlier money judgments by seizing (a) real property held by River North Farms, Inc., and (b) the Behans’ equity in that entity. After the district court granted turnover of the Behans’ stock and issued four enforcement orders imposing access requirements, sanctions, and attorneys’ fees, the Behans appealed. Subsequently, a district court appointed a receiver who took control of all assets at issue and expressly “superseded and/or amended” the prior turnover and enforcement orders. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeals as moot—except for the fee and sanction awards—and offered a threshold jurisdictional analysis grounded in federal mootness principles.

Summary of the Judgment

The Fifth Circuit’s per curiam opinion addressed two categories of orders:

The “Turnover Order” directing the Behans to transfer 100 % of their River North stock to the U.S. Marshals.
Four “Enforcement Orders” compelling the Behans to facilitate Weslease’s access to River North–owned real estate, to desist from parallel state-court litigation, and to pay attorneys’ fees plus sanctions.

After the appeals were docketed, the district court appointed a receiver with “exclusive custody, control, and possession” of the Behans’ assets and expressly superseded all prior turnover and enforcement directives (except for the fee/sanction provisions). Because the receivership order rendered it impossible to grant Weslease any additional relief under the appealed orders, the Fifth Circuit held that the appeals were moot under Article III. The court preserved jurisdiction only to review the fee and sanction awards, which it declined to disturb at this time.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 69(a)(1) – Authorizes federal courts to use state law (here, Texas turnover statute) to execute judgments.
28 U.S.C. § 1291 – Establishes appellate jurisdiction over “final decisions” of district courts, including turnover orders (Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Quanta Storage, Inc., 961 F.3d 731, 741–42 (5th Cir. 2020)).
Mootness Doctrine – The court relied on Pool v. City of Houston, 978 F.3d 307, 313 (5th Cir. 2020), and Environmental Conservation Org. v. City of Dallas, 529 F.3d 519, 527 (5th Cir. 2008), for the principle that events occurring post-filing that eliminate an actual controversy deprive the court of jurisdiction.
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Barton, No. 22-11242, 2024 WL 1087366 (5th Cir. Mar. 13, 2024) – Held that a new receivership order ratifying an earlier settlement moots an appeal of the earlier order because the later order is the “operative” ruling.
In re Ondova Ltd. Co., 619 F. App’x 362, 365 (5th Cir. 2015) – Dismissed as moot an appeal where subsequent bankruptcy and district-court orders effectively vacated the appealed order.

Legal Reasoning

The Fifth Circuit framed its reasoning around Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement:

Threshold Jurisdictional Inquiry: Mootness is a non-waivable jurisdictional defect. If intervening events post-appeal eliminate any effective relief, the appeal must be dismissed (Pool, 978 F.3d at 313).
Operative Order Doctrine: When a district court issues a new order that supersedes prior orders—in this case, a receivership order taking exclusive control of the same property—the new order becomes the operative ruling. An appeal of the old orders therefore cannot produce any practical relief.
No Appeal of Receivership Order: Because the Behans did not challenge the receivership order, the Fifth Circuit declined to second-guess the district court’s jurisdiction to appoint a receiver, and it refused to transform the appeal into an advisory opinion on the validity of the receivership.
Fees and Sanctions Excepted: The statute (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 31.002(c), (e)) authorizes fee awards and sanctions in turnover proceedings. The district court retained those portions of its earlier orders, and the Fifth Circuit observed that further proceedings in the receivership context might alter or vacate the underlying holdings, at which point the Behans could seek relief from the fee/sanction orders.

Impact

This decision clarifies that in § 31.002 turnover proceedings:

A post-appeal receivership order can moot an appeal of turnover or enforcement orders if it takes exclusive control of the same property and expressly supersedes the earlier orders.
Appellate courts will not entertain collateral challenges to receivership jurisdiction when the receivership order itself is unappealed.
Fee and sanction awards survive such mootness dismissals and await potential challenge in subsequent district-court or appellate proceedings once the underlying property disputes are finally resolved.

Practitioners should note the strategic importance of moving for receivership before or contemporaneously with appeals of turnover orders when the judgment creditor seeks comprehensive control of a debtor’s assets.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Mootness: A lawsuit (or appeal) goes moot when events after it begins mean there is nothing for the court to fix. Here, once a receiver took full control, there was no way to “un-turnover” assets or enforce access rights against the Behans.

Turnover Statute (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 31.002): Allows a judgment creditor in Texas to seize non-exempt property of a judgment debtor in district court, but only property actually owned by the debtor.

Receivership: A receivership is an equitable tool by which a court appoints an independent officer to manage and preserve property subject to a dispute. Once appointed, the receiver’s control typically supersedes other lien or turnover claims.

Conclusion

The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Weslease 2018 v. Behan establishes that a properly framed, post-appeal receivership order can moot turnover and enforcement order appeals under Texas law, except for discrete fee and sanction awards. Appellate counsel must be alert to intervening receivership proceedings that may deprive the court of jurisdiction over contested orders. Meanwhile, fee and sanction provisions will persist until the underlying property questions are adjudicated in the receivership or subsequent appeals.