I. Introduction

The Tenth Circuit’s published decision in United States v. Cline, Nos. 24-1119 & 24-1137 (Aug. 21, 2025), settles two recurrent questions in federal white-collar prosecutions:

• How far may the government reach when calculating criminal forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C)?
• When, and for what purpose, may the prosecution reveal a co-participant’s guilty plea to the jury?

Matthew Cline, a vendor in a multi-year embezzlement scheme targeting the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA), challenged his convictions for six counts of wire fraud as well as several evidentiary and instructional rulings. The government cross-appealed the district court’s modest forfeiture order. In a split victory, the Tenth Circuit:

• Affirmed Cline’s convictions, holding that evidence of a co-participant’s plea was properly admitted for credibility purposes and that a “deliberate-ignorance” instruction, even if not supported by the evidence, was harmless where actual-knowledge evidence was overwhelming.
• Vacated and remanded the forfeiture order, adopting a “Full-Scheme Forfeiture” rule: any defendant who ever possesses the proceeds of a § 1343 wire-fraud scheme must forfeit the entire amount, even if part of the money was later kicked back to another conspirator.

II. Summary of the Judgment

The panel (Hartz, Kelly, and Carson, JJ.) reached three decisive holdings:

1. Admissibility of Co-Participant Plea Evidence: Evidence of co-participant John Atwood’s guilty plea was admissible because it was elicited to bolster and contextualise his testimony, not to prove Cline’s guilt. The court reconciled its 1988 precedent, United States v. Peterman, with more recent authority and found no abuse of discretion.
2. Deliberate-Ignorance Instruction: Even if the record contained insufficient proof that Cline “purposely contrived to avoid learning” of the fraud, the erroneous instruction was harmless under Griffin v. United States because ample evidence showed his actual knowledge, which he did not dispute on appeal.
3. Forfeiture Scope: Libretti remains good law post-Apprendi; therefore, a jury need not find forfeiture amounts. Under § 981(a)(1)(C), forfeiture encompasses all proceeds “traceable to” the scheme, including uncharged or acquitted transactions, provided the defendant at some point possessed the money. The panel rejected Cline’s attempt to extend Honeycutt v. United States to shield funds that were quickly passed to the scheme’s mastermind.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. Peterman, 841 F.2d 1474 (10th Cir. 1988) – Original restriction on using a co-defendant’s conviction “as substantive evidence.” Cline clarifies that Peterman bars convictions introduced primarily to prove guilt, but allows them for credibility where accompanied by a limiting instruction.
• United States v. Woods, 764 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2014) – Approved dual use (impeach/bolster) of plea evidence with limiting instruction; heavily relied on by the panel.
• Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1991) – Established doctrine that the presence of one factually unsupported theory does not vitiate a verdict if another supported theory exists; used to uphold the deliberate-ignorance instruction.
• Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29 (1995) – Held that the Sixth Amendment does not require a jury finding on forfeiture; reaffirmed as undisturbed by Apprendi and Southern Union.
• Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) & Southern Union Co. v. United States, 567 U.S. 343 (2012) – Sixth-Amendment sentencing line distinguished because § 981 lacks a statutory maximum.
• United States v. Honeycutt, 581 U.S. 443 (2017) – Limited forfeiture to “property the defendant himself actually acquired” under 21 U.S.C. § 853. Cline adopts the majority approach that Honeycutt bars joint-and-several liability only for defendants who never possessed the proceeds.
• Out-of-circuit forfeiture cases – Lo (9th Cir.), Venturella (7th Cir.), Cox (1st Cir.), Tanner (2d Cir.) – Provided persuasive authority for treating a wire-fraud “scheme” as the unit of account for forfeiture.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Evidentiary Ruling

The panel applied a three-step framework:

1. Proper Purpose? The plea evidence was relevant to Atwood’s credibility: (i) it revealed bias/leniency; (ii) it showed his first-hand knowledge and acceptance of responsibility; (iii) it “blunted” expected impeachment.
2. Limiting Instruction? Jury Instruction 10 expressly forbade using the plea “to establish the guilt of this defendant.”
3. Primary Purpose Test (Peterman) – Record lacked “clear and unequivocal” evidence that the government’s principal aim was substantive proof. The prosecutor’s reasons were on-the-record and facially legitimate.

2. Deliberate-Ignorance Instruction

While the instruction was arguably unsupported, the panel invoked Griffin:

“Jurors are well-equipped to analyze evidence; the risk they convicted on a factually unsupported theory is remote where a supported theory exists.”

Cline never attacked the sufficiency of evidence of his actual knowledge. Thus, any error was harmless.

3. Forfeiture

• No Jury Right: Because § 981(a)(1)(C) has no monetary ceiling, Southern Union does not trigger Sixth-Amendment protections; Libretti controls.
• “Scheme-Wide” Proceeds: Each wire-fraud count necessarily alleges a “scheme to defraud.” Therefore, the “proceeds traceable to the offense” equal all funds generated by that scheme, even if some transfers were uncharged.
• “Possession” Limitation Post-Honeycutt: The court aligned with the First, Second, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits: a defendant who ever acquires proceeds cannot escape forfeiture because he later divvied them up. Only a conspirator who never possessed the tainted funds may rely on Honeycutt.

C. Likely Impact

Forfeiture Litigation: Prosecutors in the Tenth Circuit may now:

• Pursue forfeiture of all money that fleetingly passed through a defendant’s hands, not just that retained.
• Avoid jury trials on forfeiture amounts unless Congress sets a statutory maximum in the future.

Evidentiary Practice: The decision offers a practical roadmap for safely using co-conspirator pleas: disclose early, link clearly to credibility, request a robust limiting instruction, and avoid suggestive closing arguments.

Defense Strategy: Defendants must timely object and, if they wish to preserve forfeiture challenges, cross-appeal. Claims of instructional error must also include attacks on all theories the government used.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Criminal Forfeiture vs. Restitution – Forfeiture is punitive; it strips ill-gotten gains and goes to the government. Restitution is compensatory and flows to victims.
• “Proceeds Traceable To” – Money that can be followed back, directly or indirectly, to a crime. In fraud cases, every dollar paid under the scheme is “traceable,” even if laundered or transferred.
• Deliberate Ignorance – The law treats a defendant who consciously avoids learning the truth as having actual knowledge, preventing a “hear-no-evil” defense.
• Joint-and-Several Liability – Each conspirator can be made to forfeit (or pay restitution for) the entire loss. Honeycutt removed this for defendants who never got the money; Cline holds it still applies when the defendant once possessed the funds.
• Limiting Instruction – A judge’s directive telling jurors they may use certain evidence for one purpose (e.g., credibility) but not another (e.g., guilt). Courts presume jurors follow it.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Cline cements two practical rules in Tenth-Circuit criminal practice:

1. Full-Scheme Forfeiture Rule: A defendant who “touches” the proceeds of a § 1343 scheme must disgorge the entire amount, irrespective of later transfers, and a judge—not a jury—may decide that sum on a preponderance standard.
2. Credibility-Driven Plea Evidence: Co-participant pleas remain admissible where tied to credibility and cabined by an explicit instruction; Peterman survives but is now precisely circumscribed.

By harmonising earlier precedent with modern sentencing jurisprudence and resolving a post-Honeycutt ambiguity, the panel strengthens prosecutorial tools while clarifying defendants’ evidentiary protections. Practitioners should absorb these refinements when structuring plea negotiations, trial strategy, and forfeiture calculations in fraud and corruption cases.