Positive Newborn Toxicology, Medication-Assisted Treatment, and the Causation Requirement for Neglect Under FCA § 1012(f): Commentary on Matter of Raivyn BB.

Positive Newborn Toxicology, Medication-Assisted Treatment, and the Causation Requirement for Neglect Under FCA § 1012(f): Commentary on Matter of Raivyn BB.

I. Introduction

The Appellate Division, Third Department’s decision in Matter of Raivyn BB. (Courtney BB.), 2025 NY Slip Op 06564 (Nov. 26, 2025), is a significant contribution to New York neglect jurisprudence under Family Court Act (FCA) article 10, particularly in cases involving:

  • Newborns with positive toxicology screens for controlled substances, and
  • Parents who are engaged in medication-assisted treatment (MAT), here involving prescribed Subutex.

The decision also reaffirms limits on the reach of neglect findings against non-custodial or newly-established fathers, clarifying that:

  • Hostility toward agency or hospital staff, and
  • Refusal to sign a birth certificate or acknowledgment of paternity,

do not, without more, constitute neglect absent proof of actual or imminent impairment to the child’s condition.

The case arises from neglect proceedings brought by the Tompkins County Department of Social Services (DSS) against the mother, Courtney BB., and the father, Kip AA., after their infant (born in 2022) tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamines. Family Court found both parents neglected the child and continued the child’s placement in foster care, subjecting both parents to orders of supervision. On appeal, the Third Department reversed both neglect findings and dismissed the petitions.

This commentary examines the decision’s factual background, summarizes the holdings, and offers a detailed analysis of the court’s legal reasoning, its use of precedents, and its broader implications for child protective litigation in New York.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Parties and the Child

  • Respondent-mother: Courtney BB.
  • Respondent-father: Kip AA.
  • Child: Raivyn BB., born in 2022.
  • Petitioner: Tompkins County Department of Social Services.
  • Court of first instance: Family Court, Tompkins County (Rowley, J.).

B. Initiation of the Proceedings

After the child’s birth, both the mother and the newborn underwent toxicology testing:

  • Urine screens for both mother and child were positive for:
    • Amphetamines, and
    • Subutex (a brand name for buprenorphine, commonly used in medication-assisted treatment for opioid use disorder).
  • The child’s meconium tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamines.

A hotline report followed these results. DSS sought and obtained a temporary removal order against the mother and later filed a neglect petition against her under FCA article 10. After the father’s paternity was established, DSS also filed a separate neglect petition against him.

C. Family Court Proceedings and Orders

The matters proceeded to a consolidated fact-finding hearing on the neglect allegations. Family Court ruled that:

  • Mother: Neglected the child, principally based on:
    • The child’s positive toxicology for amphetamines/methamphetamines,
    • The mother’s admission to using “ICE” (a methamphetamine) once during pregnancy, and
    • The child’s “low birth weight” and signs interpreted as consistent with in utero drug exposure (e.g., high-pitched cry, need for extra comforting).
  • Father: Neglected the child, based on:
    • His “hostile” behavior toward DSS and hospital staff,
    • His refusal to sign the birth certificate or an acknowledgment of paternity, characterized by Family Court as “effectively abandoning” the child once the mother was deemed unsafe, and
    • An imputed duty and knowledge—that he knew of the mother’s drug use and failed to prevent her from using drugs during pregnancy.

After a dispositional hearing, Family Court:

  • Continued the child’s placement with DSS (in foster care), and
  • Placed both parents under orders of supervision requiring participation in services.

D. Appeals to the Appellate Division

Both parents appealed. The father also raised a threshold argument that Tompkins County was an improper venue because both parents resided in Cortland County.

The Third Department (Clark, J.P., Aarons, Pritzker, Reynolds Fitzgerald and McShan, JJ.; opinion by Pritzker, J.):

  • Rejected the father’s venue argument as waived, and
  • Reversed the neglect findings against both the mother and the father, dismissing the petitions.

III. Summary of the Opinion

A. Venue Objection (Father)

The father argued that Tompkins County was an improper venue for these article 10 proceedings because both parents lived in neighboring Cortland County. The Court held that:

  • The father waived any venue objection by failing to request a transfer of the proceedings in Family Court.
  • The Court cited Matter of Sean W. [Brittany W.], 87 AD3d 1318 (4th Dept 2011), lv denied 18 NY3d 802 (2011), and Matter of Brayanna G., 66 AD3d 1375 (4th Dept 2009), lv denied 13 NY3d 714 (2010), distinguishing Matter of Gabriella UU. [Kelly VV.], 83 AD3d 1306 (3d Dept 2011).

B. Neglect Allegations Against the Mother

The Third Department concluded that the neglect finding against the mother was not proven by a preponderance of the evidence, and that there was no “sound and substantial basis” in the record to support Family Court’s determination.

Key points:

  • Under FCA § 1012(f), a neglect finding requires proof that:
    • The child’s physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired, or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired, and
    • The impairment/risk is the result of the parent’s failure to exercise a minimum degree of care—here, through “misusing a drug or drugs.”
  • Relying solely on a positive toxicology result is generally insufficient; there must be a “necessary causative connection” between the substance use and the child’s impairment or imminent risk (Matter of Nassau County Dept. of Social Servs. v Denise J., 87 NY2d 73, 79 (1995)).
  • Although the child was “small for gestational age” and exhibited withdrawal-type symptoms (e.g., high-pitched cry, need for extra comfort), the record did not establish:
    • That these conditions were attributable to the mother’s single admitted use of methamphetamine, as opposed to her prescribed Subutex, and
    • That the mother’s conduct—rather than the medically supervised prescription—constituted misuse of drugs causing impairment or imminent risk.
  • The child was born full term, monitored in the regular nursery, and discharged after a five-day observation period with only routine follow-up, which undercut any inference of serious impairment or imminent risk.

Accordingly, the Court reversed the neglect finding against the mother and dismissed the petition.

C. Neglect Allegations Against the Father

The Third Department reached the same result regarding the father. It held that:

  • There is no legal support for a neglect finding based solely on:
    • “Hostile” behavior toward DSS or hospital staff, or
    • Refusal to sign a birth certificate or acknowledgment of paternity.
  • DSS did not demonstrate that the child’s physical, mental or emotional condition was in imminent danger of impairment due to the father’s conduct (Matter of Micah S. [Rogerio S.], 206 AD3d 1086, 1089 (3d Dept 2022)).
  • Family Court improperly imputed knowledge to the father of the mother’s drug use and then faulted him for failing to prevent it, without:
    • Evidence that the mother’s use extended beyond a single admitted incident, or
    • Proof that the father actually knew of any misuse during the pregnancy (cf. Matter of Niviya K. [Alfonzo M.], 89 AD3d 1027, 1028 (2d Dept 2011)).
  • Therefore, DSS failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the father failed to exercise the “minimum degree of care” required of a reasonable and prudent parent (Matter of Leo RR. [Joshua RR.], 213 AD3d 1190, 1192 (3d Dept 2023)).

The neglect finding as to the father was reversed and the petition dismissed. The Court deemed the parties’ remaining arguments academic.

D. Disposition

The Court ordered:

“ORDERED that the orders are reversed, on the law and the facts, without costs, and petitions dismissed.”

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Procedural Issue: Venue Waiver in Article 10 Proceedings

Although not the central doctrinal contribution of the case, the Court’s treatment of venue reinforces established principles on how and when venue objections must be raised in child protective proceedings.

1. The Father’s Venue Argument

The father contended that Tompkins County was an improper venue because both parents resided in Cortland County. However:

  • The record showed no motion or request in Family Court to transfer the matter to Cortland County.
  • The Appellate Division therefore found the objection waived.

2. Precedents on Venue Waiver

The Court cited:

  • Matter of Sean W. [Brittany W.], 87 AD3d 1318, 1320 (4th Dept 2011), lv denied 18 NY3d 802 (2011)
  • Matter of Brayanna G., 66 AD3d 1375, 1376 (4th Dept 2009), lv denied 13 NY3d 714 (2010)
  • and distinguished Matter of Gabriella UU. [Kelly VV.], 83 AD3d 1306, 1307 (3d Dept 2011)

These decisions generally stand for the proposition that:

  • Venue in Family Court proceedings is waivable, not jurisdictional.
  • A party who believes venue is improper must timely seek a transfer of proceedings in Family Court.
  • Failure to do so bars raising the issue for the first time on appeal.

In Raivyn BB., the Third Department simply applied this principle and moved on to the merits.

B. Substantive Neglect Allegations Against the Mother

1. Statutory Framework and the Nicholson Standard

FCA § 1012(f) defines a “neglected child” as (in relevant part):

“a child less than [18] years of age . . . whose physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the failure of his [or her] parent . . . to exercise a minimum degree of care . . . in providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship . . . by misusing a drug or drugs.”

The Court quoted Nicholson v Scoppetta, 3 NY3d 357, 368 (2004), the leading Court of Appeals decision construing § 1012(f), to emphasize:

  • Neglect requires two elements:
    1. An actual impairment or “imminent danger of becoming impaired” in the child’s condition, and
    2. A causal link between that impairment/risk and the parent’s failure to exercise a “minimum degree of care.”
  • There is no per se neglect rule based solely on a particular parental conduct (e.g., exposure to domestic violence, or here, a positive toxicology screen).

Nicholson is important here because the Court of Appeals explicitly rejected categorical theories of neglect and demanded a fact-specific, causation-focused analysis. Raivyn BB. extends that logic to the context of newborn toxicology and prenatal drug exposure.

2. The Nassau v Denise J. “Causative Connection” Requirement

The Third Department heavily relied on Matter of Nassau County Dept. of Social Servs. v Denise J., 87 NY2d 73 (1995), where the Court of Appeals held:

“A report which shows only a positive toxicology for a controlled substance generally does not in and of itself prove that a child has been physically, mentally or emotionally impaired, or is in imminent danger of being impaired. Relying solely on a positive toxicology result for a neglect determination fails to make the necessary causative connection to all the surrounding circumstances that may or may not produce impairment or imminent risk of impairment in the newborn child.” (id. at 79)

Raivyn BB. reaffirms and applies this principle:

  • It is not enough that:
    • The newborn has a positive test, or
    • The mother admits to drug use at some point during pregnancy.
  • DSS must establish a causal nexus between:
    • The alleged “misuse” of drugs, and
    • The child’s actual impairment or imminent risk thereof.

3. The Evidence and Why It Fell Short

The key evidentiary points were:

  • Mother’s and child’s post-birth urine:
    • Positive for amphetamines and Subutex.
  • Child’s meconium:
    • Positive for amphetamines and methamphetamines.
  • Mother’s statement to medical staff:
    • She used Subutex pursuant to a prescription during pregnancy.
    • She used “ICE” (a methamphetamine) one time during pregnancy.
  • Child’s condition:
    • Documented as “small for gestational age.”
    • Nurse observed “withdrawal symptoms”—high-pitched, shrill cry; constant need for human touch.
    • Monitored for withdrawal in the nursery for five days, then discharged to foster parents with only routine follow-up.

The Third Department found critical gaps:

  1. No medical linkage between symptoms and methamphetamine use
    There was:
    • No expert or medical testimony that the child’s small size or withdrawal symptoms were attributable specifically to the mother’s single methamphetamine use, instead of to:
      • Her prescribed Subutex (which medical professionals told her might cause withdrawal), or
      • Other non-neglectful factors.
    • No explanation as to whether the symptoms observed were typical, expected side effects of medically supervised Subutex use during pregnancy.
  2. Failure to distinguish between “misuse” and lawful prescription use
    The statutory language—“misusing a drug or drugs”—is critical. The Court highlighted:
    • The mother’s unrefuted testimony that:
      • Subutex was prescribed by a doctor, and
      • She was advised it would be “fine” for the child, though it might cause some withdrawal.
    • The medical records referenced Subutex as a prescribed medication.

    The Court explicitly corrected Family Court’s suggestion that the mother had provided no “credible” evidence of a prescription, noting this was “not entirely accurate” in light of the undisputed testimony and medical records (fn. 2).

    This distinction matters because neglect under FCA § 1012(f) requires “misuse” of drugs—not simply any presence of a controlled substance where the parent is under medical treatment.

  3. Overreliance on the single methamphetamine admission
    The mother admitted to a single use of “ICE” during pregnancy. Family Court referred to “recent and past drug exposure,” apparently inferring multiple uses from testimony about how far back different tests reach. The Third Department rejected that inference:
    • It pointed out that a nurse’s general testimony about detection windows for urine versus meconium did not establish multiple instances of use (fn. 1).
    • Thus, the record showed, at most, one admitted use of methamphetamine, with no medical evidence tying that isolated use to any concrete harm or serious risk to the child.
  4. The child’s overall medical presentation did not support a finding of impairment or imminent danger
    Viewing the medical records “as a whole,” the Court emphasized:
    • The child was full term, though small for gestational age.
    • Monitoring occurred in the regular nursery, not a specialized intensive unit.
    • After the standard five-day observation, the child was discharged to foster parents with only routine follow-up required.

    This presentation contrasted with cases where more severe manifestations—e.g., respiratory distress, NICU admission, or continued serious withdrawal—have supported neglect findings.

In sum, while the presence of controlled substances and withdrawal signs could be cause for concern and justify investigation and monitoring, they did not, on this record, satisfy the causation and impairment elements required for a legal neglect finding under § 1012(f).

4. Comparison with Matter of Winter II. [Kerriann II.]

The Court cited and “compared” its own recent decision in Matter of Winter II. [Kerriann II.], 227 AD3d 1142 (3d Dept 2024), lv denied 42 NY3d 903 (2024), both for:

  • The general neglect standard, and
  • As a contrasting example where the evidence sufficed.

Although the Raivyn BB. opinion does not restate the factual details of Winter II., the “compare” signal indicates that:

  • Winter II. involved a more robust evidentiary record—likely:
    • Evidence of substantial or repeated drug use during pregnancy,
    • Stronger medical testimony linking such use to the newborn’s condition, and/or
    • Clearer manifestations of serious impairment or high risk (e.g., more severe withdrawal, NICU-level complications).
  • Raivyn BB. is meant to occupy the other side of that spectrum—where:
    • The newborn’s positive toxicology and limited symptoms,
    • Combined with a single admitted methamphetamine use and ongoing prescribed Subutex,

    do not, without more, establish neglect.

Taken together, Nassau v Denise J., Winter II., and Raivyn BB. map out a continuum of evidentiary sufficiency in drug-exposure neglect cases:

  • Positive tox alone: Insufficient (Denise J.).
  • Substantial drug misuse with clear causal link and serious newborn impairment: Sufficient (Winter II.).
  • Positive tox, single admitted use, symptoms plausibly attributable to prescribed treatment, and generally stable newborn: Insufficient (Raivyn BB.).

C. Substantive Neglect Allegations Against the Father

1. The Bases for Family Court’s Neglect Finding

Family Court’s neglect finding as to the father rested on three pillars:

  1. Hostility toward DSS and hospital staff
    The father’s behavior was characterized as “hostile beyond what would be deemed acceptable by a reasonable and prudent standard.”
  2. Refusal to sign the birth certificate or acknowledgment of paternity
    The court viewed this as “effectively abandoning the child when the mother was deemed to be an unsafe caregiver.”
  3. Imputed knowledge and duty to prevent maternal drug use
    Family Court imputed to the father knowledge of the mother’s drug use and found that he neglected the child by failing to exercise a minimum degree of care “to prevent the mother from abusing drugs during her pregnancy.”

The Third Department rejected each theory as a valid legal basis for a neglect finding.

2. Article 10’s Child-Centered Standard: Micah S. and Leo RR.

The Court emphasized that neglect under FCA § 1012(f) focuses on:

  • The child’s condition—actual impairment or imminent danger of becoming impaired, and
  • The causal connection between that condition and the parent’s failure to exercise a minimum degree of care.

Citing Matter of Micah S. [Rogerio S.], 206 AD3d 1086, 1089 (3d Dept 2022), the Court reiterated that:

  • It is not enough that a parent’s behavior is objectionable, hostile, or uncooperative with authorities.
  • DSS must still prove that such behavior placed the child’s physical, mental, or emotional condition in imminent danger of impairment.

The Court also relied on Matter of Leo RR. [Joshua RR.], 213 AD3d 1190, 1192 (3d Dept 2023), to emphasize the objective “reasonable and prudent parent” standard and the requirement that failure to exercise a minimum degree of care be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

3. Hostility and Non-Cooperation as Non-Neglect

The decision firmly holds that:

  • There is no support in the law that:
    • Hostile behavior toward DSS staff or hospital staff, or
    • Refusal to sign a birth certificate or acknowledgment of paternity,

    in and of themselves, constitute neglect.

  • DSS did not show that the child’s condition was in imminent danger of impairment as a result of such behaviors.

This portion of the opinion serves as a clear warning against conflating:

  • A parent’s lack of cooperation, distrust of the system, or even aggressive demeanor,
  • with legally cognizable “neglect.”

While such behavior may complicate service delivery and may even justify certain procedural responses (e.g., requesting court orders, supervised visits, etc.), it does not by itself satisfy the statutory elements of neglect.

4. Limits on Imputed Knowledge and Duty: Distinguishing Niviya K.

Family Court’s third rationale—that the father neglected the child by failing to prevent the mother’s drug use during pregnancy—implicated two problematic assumptions:

  1. That there was substantial “abuse” of drugs by the mother during pregnancy; and
  2. That the father knew of such use and had a duty to stop it.

The Third Department addressed both:

  • It noted that the statement “exaggerates what the testimony revealed was the extent of the mother’s drug use”—i.e., at most, there was an admission to a single use of methamphetamine.
  • “There simply was no evidence regarding the father’s knowledge of her use.”

The Court cited Matter of Niviya K. [Alfonzo M.], 89 AD3d 1027, 1028 (2d Dept 2011), with a “compare” signal. In Niviya K., the Second Department upheld a neglect finding where there was evidence that a father knew of the mother’s dangerous conduct and yet left the child in her care. By contrast, in Raivyn BB.:

  • There was no similar proof that the father knew of ongoing drug misuse during pregnancy.
  • No factual predicate existed for imputing such knowledge or imposing a duty on the father to “prevent” prenatal drug use.

The opinion thus cabined the practice of imputing knowledge and responsibility to non-using parents in substance-use cases. Without evidence that the father was actually aware (or should reasonably have been aware) of substantial misuse and that his failure to act placed the child in imminent danger, a neglect finding is unsustainable.

D. Medication-Assisted Treatment (Subutex) and Neglect

A particularly important implicit holding of Raivyn BB. concerns how courts should treat pregnant individuals who are on medically prescribed substance-use-disorder treatment, such as Subutex.

  • The mother:
    • Testified that Subutex was prescribed during pregnancy.
    • Was told by medical professionals that it would be “fine” for the child, though there might be some withdrawal symptoms.
  • The medical records characterized Subutex as a prescribed medication.

The Third Department’s analysis implicitly recognizes that:

  • Medication-assisted treatment is not per se neglectful.
  • Withdrawal symptoms in a newborn that are:
    • Expected or predictable consequences of prescribed treatment, and
    • Managed in a controlled hospital environment,

    cannot automatically be equated with statutory “impairment” or “imminent danger of impairment” from “misuse” of drugs.

  • The key inquiry remains:
    • Did the parent misuse a drug, and
    • Did that misuse cause or imminently threaten harm to the child?

This is a crucial doctrinal clarification in an era where:

  • Medication-assisted treatment is generally supported by public health policy, and
  • There is tension between encouraging pregnant individuals to seek treatment and penalizing them via neglect proceedings for outcomes related to that treatment.

E. Clarification of the “Causative Connection” Requirement

Across both the mother’s and father’s cases, Raivyn BB. underscores the centrality of the “necessary causative connection” language from Nassau v Denise J.:

  • For the mother:
    • No adequate showing that:
      • Any misuse of drugs caused the child’s condition, as opposed to prescribed Subutex or benign factors.
  • For the father:
    • No evidence that:
      • His hostility or refusal to sign paperwork caused any actual or imminent harm to the child’s physical, mental, or emotional condition.

The decision sends a clear message: Neglect adjudications are not intended to punish disfavored parental conduct in the abstract. They are grounded in the child’s safety and well-being, and they demand proof that the parent’s conduct (or omission) has a concrete nexus to actual or imminent harm.

F. Evidentiary Lessons for Practitioners

1. For Child Protective Agencies

DSS and similar agencies must:

  • Go beyond positive toxicology reports and admissions to drug use.
  • Develop:
    • Medical testimony expressly linking drug misuse to the newborn’s condition and symptoms.
    • Evidence distinguishing effects of:
      • Illegal or non-prescribed drug misuse, from
      • Medically supervised treatments (e.g., Subutex).
    • Proof of:
      • Regular, chronic, or heavy substance use (if alleged), and
      • Specific risks or manifestations of impairment.
  • Be cautious about:
    • Relying on generalized inferences such as “small for gestational age” without an expert explaining causation.
    • Conflating hostility or non-cooperation with statutory neglect, absent a showing of risk to the child.

2. For Parents’ Counsel

Defense counsel should:

  • Highlight:
    • Any prescribed nature of medications and the medical advice given regarding their use during pregnancy.
    • Medical records showing stability of the newborn (e.g., nursery care vs. NICU, routine discharge).
  • Press the requirement of:
    • Causation—the “necessary causative connection,” and
    • Impairment or imminent danger, drawing on Nicholson, Denise J., and now Raivyn BB.
  • Challenge:
    • Attempts to turn hostility, poor communication, or legal decisions (such as not signing an acknowledgment of paternity) into evidence of neglect.
    • Imputation of knowledge or duties to non-using parents without evidence (Niviya K. vs. Raivyn BB.).

3. For Attorneys for the Child

Attorneys for children must:

  • Evaluate whether:
    • The record truly supports a finding of actual or imminent harm, and
    • The statutory elements of neglect—as interpreted by Nicholson, Denise J., Winter II., and Raivyn BB.—are met.
  • Ensure:
    • The child’s best interests are not reduced to a presumption that removal is always safer than remaining with a non-misusing or minimally involved parent.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. “Neglected Child” Under FCA § 1012(f)

A child is “neglected” under FCA § 1012(f) when:

  1. The child’s physical, mental, or emotional condition:
    • Has been impaired, or
    • Is in imminent danger of becoming impaired.
  2. That impairment or danger results from the parent’s failure to exercise a “minimum degree of care”.

In drug cases, the statute specifically mentions “misusing a drug or drugs” as a way a parent can fail to provide proper supervision or guardianship.

B. “Imminent Danger of Becoming Impaired”

“Imminent danger” means:

  • Not a remote or speculative possibility of harm,
  • But a near or impending risk that the child’s condition will be harmed if nothing changes.

It does not require that harm has already occurred, but it does require more than generalized fears or possibilities.

C. “Minimum Degree of Care”

This is an objective standard based on what a reasonable and prudent parent in similar circumstances would do, not on ideals of perfect parenting. It recognizes:

  • Parents can make mistakes or be imperfect without being legally “neglectful.”
  • Neglect requires conduct that falls below this minimum threshold, in a way that harms or seriously endangers the child.

D. “Preponderance of the Evidence”

In neglect proceedings, the petitioner (DSS) must prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence. This means:

  • More likely than not, or
  • More than 50% probability that the alleged neglect occurred.

It is a lower standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt” (used in criminal cases), but still requires credible, persuasive evidence.

E. “Sound and Substantial Basis in the Record”

When the Appellate Division reviews Family Court’s factual findings, it asks whether there is a sound and substantial basis in the record to support them. This means:

  • The findings are not clearly wrong or against the weight of the evidence.
  • There is enough credible evidence that a reasonable fact-finder could reach the same conclusion.

In Raivyn BB., the Appellate Division found that such a basis was lacking as to both parents.

F. Venue and Waiver

“Venue” refers to which county a case is heard in, not whether the court has authority to hear it at all (jurisdiction). Venue can often be changed if a party requests it. But:

  • If a party believes venue is improper, they must ask the trial court to transfer the case.
  • If they do not, the objection is usually considered waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

VI. Impact and Future Implications

A. Substance-Use-Related Neglect Cases

Raivyn BB. will be a frequently cited authority in future New York cases involving:

  • Newborns with positive toxicology screens, and
  • Parents on medication-assisted treatment.

Its impact includes:

  • Reinforcement of the “no per se neglect” rule for positive tox screens, in conjunction with Denise J..
  • Heightened evidentiary expectations for DSS:
    • Need for medical causation testimony, and
    • Specific findings tying drug misuse to the child’s impairment/risk.
  • Protection of medication-assisted treatment from being automatically treated as neglectful conduct.

B. Treatment of Fathers and Non-Primary Caregivers

For non-primary caregivers, especially fathers:

  • The decision constrains the ability of courts and agencies to:
    • Impute knowledge of another parent’s conduct without evidence, or
    • Convert non-cooperation, hostility, or reluctance to assume legal parentage into a neglect finding.
  • It reinforces that neglect must be:
    • Child-centered (impairment or imminent danger), and
    • Supported by proof of a failure to exercise a minimum degree of care that actually endangers the child.

C. System-Level Effects

On a broader level, Raivyn BB. may influence how:

  • Hospitals and DSS handle newborns with positive toxicology but otherwise stable clinical courses.
  • Policies are designed regarding:
    • Screening and reporting of pregnant patients and newborns, and
    • Support for pregnant individuals on prescribed treatment for substance-use disorders.
  • Courts balance:
    • The need to protect children from genuine harm, with
    • The risk of overreach or punitive responses to parents who seek treatment or exhibit non-ideal, but non-harmful behavior.

VII. Conclusion

Matter of Raivyn BB. (Courtney BB.) is a consequential Third Department decision that:

  • Reaffirms the causation requirement for neglect under FCA § 1012(f), emphasizing that:
    • Neither a positive newborn toxicology screen nor limited prenatal drug use,
    • Nor parental hostility or refusal to sign paternity paperwork,

    automatically constitutes neglect.

  • Clarifies that evidence must:
    • Demonstrate actual or imminent impairment to the child’s condition, and
    • Link that impairment/risk causally to the parent’s misuse of drugs or other failures in care.
  • Protects the integrity of medication-assisted treatment by distinguishing prescribed Subutex from “misuse” and refusing to treat expected withdrawal as per se proof of neglect.
  • Limits the reach of neglect findings against non-using fathers, requiring:
    • Evidence of actual knowledge of dangerous maternal conduct, and
    • A demonstrable connection between the father’s omissions and harm or imminent risk to the child.

In doing so, the decision harmonizes and develops the line of authority stemming from Nicholson v Scoppetta and Matter of Nassau County DSS v Denise J., and provides concrete guidance for courts, agencies, and practitioners navigating the fraught intersection of prenatal substance use, newborn health, and state intervention in family life.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, New York

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