Positive Equities Over Presumption: Commentary on United States v. Garcia and Pretrial Detention under the Bail Reform Act

I. Introduction

This commentary examines the Tenth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Garcia, No. 25-1370 (10th Cir. Dec. 5, 2025), an order and judgment reversing a pretrial detention order in a serious federal narcotics and money-laundering prosecution. Although designated nonprecedential, the decision is important for its careful re-application of the Bail Reform Act’s framework, its insistence on accurate fact-finding, and, most significantly, its emphasis that a defendant’s positive history and characteristics can outweigh both the statutory drug-case presumption of detention and the seriousness of the charged conduct.

At the center of the case is Erika Esmeralda Garcia, a lawful permanent resident charged with:

• Conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute fentanyl, heroin, and cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846;
• Possession with intent to distribute fentanyl and aiding and abetting distribution, under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and
• Conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h).

Despite the breadth and gravity of these charges—which triggered the statutory presumption of detention under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(A)—the panel majority concluded that three of the four statutory factors in § 3142(g) favored release, that the government had not carried its burdens to prove flight risk and dangerousness, and that conditions could reasonably assure Ms. Garcia’s appearance and community safety. The decision sharply contrasts with the district court’s ruling and drew a dissent from Judge Phillips, underscoring a tension within pretrial detention jurisprudence over how to weigh “positive equities” against serious drug and firearms evidence.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit exercised jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the district court’s order affirming the magistrate judge’s pretrial detention of Ms. Garcia. The district court had:

• Found that the drug charges triggered the § 3142(e)(3)(A) presumption that no conditions could reasonably assure appearance or community safety;
• Concluded that all four § 3142(g) factors favored detention; and
• Held that the government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Ms. Garcia posed a flight risk warranting detention.

The panel majority:

1. Accepted the governing framework from the Bail Reform Act, United States v. Stricklin, and United States v. Cisneros (presumption, burdens, and standards of proof and review);
2. Agreed that the first factor (nature and circumstances of the offense) favored detention due to the serious drug charges, large fentanyl quantity, and potential lengthy sentence;
3. Held that the district court’s critical finding about a wiretapped call was clearly erroneous, and—once corrected—the “weight of the evidence” factor favored release because the evidence, while real, was not so strong as to likely motivate flight;
4. Held that the “history and characteristics” factor strongly favored release, finding that the district court gave insufficient weight to Ms. Garcia’s lack of criminal history, strong family and community ties, and stable employment;
5. Concluded that the “danger to the community” factor also favored release given Ms. Garcia’s personal characteristics and lack of prior criminality, despite the drugs and firearms found in her residence; and
6. Determined that, because three of four factors favored release and conditions could reasonably assure appearance and safety, pretrial detention was unwarranted.

The panel reversed the detention order, remanded with instructions to order Ms. Garcia’s release pending trial, and directed the district court to fashion appropriate conditions. It also granted a motion to seal a volume of the appendix.

Judge Phillips dissented, emphasizing the strength of the evidence (drugs, weapons, financial transfers, and incriminating phone calls) and deferring to the district court’s “close call” assessment of Ms. Garcia’s history and characteristics, ultimately concluding that all four factors supported detention.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

After a grand jury in the District of Colorado indicted Ms. Garcia, the U.S. Probation Office prepared a pretrial services report that recommended release on conditions. The government sought detention. A magistrate judge ordered detention pending trial, and the district court, reviewing de novo, affirmed that order.

Key aspects of the government’s proffered evidence included:

• The seizure from Ms. Garcia’s apartment of:
  • 8,128 fentanyl pills,
  • 27.9 grams of methamphetamine,
  • 285.7 grams of heroin,
  • 471.6 grams of cocaine,
  • two AR-style “ghost guns,” a stolen firearm, extended magazines, drug packaging, and suspected drug ledgers.
• Evidence that Ms. Garcia transferred money to a codefendant (her boyfriend) using various financial instruments (Cash App, bank accounts, Zelle);
• A wiretapped post-search call in which Ms. Garcia told a codefendant that someone had broken into the apartment and, when asked if “the things” had been taken, said she did not know and asked him to come over;
• A wiretapped call the day before the search where the codefendant told Ms. Garcia he was coming over “to hustle at the house” and referenced “things” pending there and “transfers” to be done.

Ms. Garcia, a lawful permanent resident with extensive family in the United States (including three daughters and siblings in Colorado), also had family ties to Mexico: two sisters lived there, and her father frequently traveled between the U.S. and Mexico. She herself had traveled to Mexico within the prior year. If convicted, she faced the potential loss of permanent resident status and likely removal.

Despite pretrial services’ recommendation in favor of conditional release, the magistrate and district courts emphasized:

• The seriousness of the drug and money-laundering offenses;
• The statutory presumption of detention;
• The large quantity of fentanyl and presence of firearms in her residence;
• Her familial ties to Mexico and potential immigration consequences as incentives for flight.

On appeal, Ms. Garcia challenged, among other things, the district court’s factual finding about the wiretapped call, the reliance on her father’s travel to Mexico, and the district court’s use of possible loss of immigration status as support for finding a risk of flight.

IV. Doctrinal Framework and Precedents

A. The Bail Reform Act

The Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq., authorizes pretrial detention only when “no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community.” § 3142(e)(1).

Section 3142(g) requires courts to consider four factors:

1. Nature and circumstances of the offense, including whether it involves controlled substances;
2. Weight of the evidence against the defendant;
3. History and characteristics of the defendant, including family ties, employment, length of residence, community ties, past conduct, and criminal history;
4. Nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community posed by release.

In certain cases—such as drug offenses carrying a maximum term of ten years or more—§ 3142(e)(3)(A) creates a rebuttable presumption that no conditions will reasonably assure appearance and safety. That presumption shapes both burdens of production and persuasion.

B. United States v. Stricklin (10th Cir. 1991)

The panel relies on United States v. Stricklin, 932 F.2d 1353 (10th Cir. 1991), to articulate how the statutory presumption operates:

• The presumption arises upon probable cause that the defendant committed an enumerated offense (here, a qualifying drug crime);
• The defendant bears a burden of production to rebut the presumption by offering “some evidence” that she is not a flight risk and does not pose a danger;
• Even if rebutted, the presumption is not erased; it remains as a factor for the court to weigh alongside the traditional § 3142(g) considerations.

Garcia applies this framework: while not explicitly stating that Ms. Garcia rebutted the presumption, the panel’s analysis of the factors—and ultimate conclusion that three favor release—effectively finds the presumption overcome and outweighed.

C. United States v. Cisneros (10th Cir. 2003)

United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610 (10th Cir. 2003), supplies two key elements:

• Burdens of proof:
  • The government must prove risk of flight by a preponderance of the evidence;
  • The government must prove dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence.
• Standard of review on appeal:
  • The appellate court accepts historical factual findings unless clearly erroneous;
  • It reviews de novo the application of law to facts and the ultimate decision to detain or release.

Garcia follows this template: the panel identifies and corrects a clearly erroneous factual finding (about the wiretap call) and then performs a de novo reassessment of the § 3142(g) factors and the detention decision.

D. United States v. Salerno (U.S. 1987)

The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), provides the constitutional backdrop. Salerno upheld the Bail Reform Act’s preventive detention provisions but famously cautioned:

“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.”

The Garcia majority quotes this language in concluding that detention is unwarranted, using Salerno to emphasize that even in serious drug cases the default remains conditional liberty, not incarceration, when statutory standards are not met.

E. United States v. Ailon-Ailon (10th Cir. 2017)

Ms. Garcia relied on United States v. Ailon-Ailon, 875 F.3d 1334 (10th Cir. 2017), to challenge the district court’s reliance on potential immigration consequences. In Ailon-Ailon, the Tenth Circuit held that the phrase “serious risk that such person will flee” in § 3142(f)(2)(A) does not encompass involuntary removal by immigration authorities.

In Garcia:

• The panel clarifies that Ailon-Ailon is limited to the definition of “flee” in § 3142(f)(2)(A);
• Here, that subsection is not directly at issue; the case arises under § 3142(e) and (g);
• The district court did not treat possible involuntary deportation as “flight,” but considered whether fear of losing lawful permanent resident status and subsequent removal might induce Ms. Garcia to voluntarily leave the country before trial.

The panel holds that it was not error to consider that possibility within the broader history-and-characteristics analysis, distinguishing impermissible reliance on involuntary removal (barred by Ailon-Ailon) from permissible consideration of potential voluntary flight motivated by immigration consequences.

F. United States v. Kelley (10th Cir. 2004) (Dissent)

The dissent invokes United States v. Kelley, 359 F.3d 1302 (10th Cir. 2004), a sentencing case, for the proposition that courts are not required to engage in a “ritualistic incantation” of every factor or piece of evidence to show they considered it. In Kelley, the Tenth Circuit held that district judges need not recite “magic words” so long as the record reflects reasoned consideration of the statutory factors.

Judge Phillips uses this analogy to argue that the district court’s failure expressly to mention some of Ms. Garcia’s favorable characteristics does not mean they were ignored, especially where the court expressly called the history-and-characteristics factor “a close call.”

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Appellate Oversight: Clear Error vs. De Novo Review

The panel draws a sharp distinction between:

• Review of historical facts for clear error; and
• Review of the ultimate detention determination—application of law to facts—de novo.

Applying that framework, the panel:

1. Identifies a specific, material fact the district court mischaracterized; and
2. Once that error is corrected, re-weighs the statutory factors itself, rather than deferring to the district court’s balancing.

This signals a robust appellate role in pretrial detention decisions: where lower courts misstate or overstate the record or misweight the statutory factors, the court of appeals will not simply defer, even in a nonprecedential order.

B. Factor One: Nature and Circumstances of the Offense

The majority readily agrees with the district court that the nature and circumstances of Ms. Garcia’s offenses “weighed strongly in favor of detention.” Key considerations:

• Charges involve controlled substances—including fentanyl—on a significant scale (8,128 pills), plus heroin and cocaine;
• Potential exposure to a mandatory minimum and a “very long sentence” creates a strong incentive to flee;
• The statutory presumption of detention in serious drug cases underscores the gravity of the offenses.

The panel’s agreement on this factor is important: it demonstrates that its reversal does not rest on minimizing drug-trafficking harms or ignoring fentanyl’s lethality. Instead, the key moves occur in factors two through four.

C. Factor Two: Weight of the Evidence

1. Correcting a Clearly Erroneous Finding

The district court concluded that the “weight of the evidence” favored detention and described one wiretapped call as showing that Ms. Garcia “alerted codefendants that a large cache of drugs and weapons were confiscated at her home.” The panel carefully compares this characterization to the record:

• At the detention hearing, the government proffered that:
  • After the search, Ms. Garcia called a codefendant to say “someone had broken into the apartment”;
  • When asked if “the things had been taken,” she replied she did not know and needed him to come over.
• The record did not show that she told codefendants the drugs and weapons had been confiscated.

On this basis, the panel holds that the district court’s finding was “clearly erroneous.” This is significant: detention decisions often rely heavily on proffers and inferences, but the panel insists that factual findings must be tethered to the record, not embellished.

2. Reframing the “Weight” Factor

Once the erroneous finding is removed, the panel reassesses the weight of the evidence. It acknowledges:

• The call suggests Ms. Garcia understood what the codefendant meant by “the things,” supporting an inference she knew about drugs and weapons in her home;
• Evidence that she transferred money to her codefendant (boyfriend) supports the money-laundering charge;
• There is “some evidence” of involvement in the trafficking scheme.

But the panel then makes a key move: it does not treat the “weight of the evidence” factor as a pure measure of the likelihood of conviction. Rather, it asks whether the evidence is “so strong that it will likely motivate her to flee.” Concluding that it is not that strong, the panel holds that this factor favors release.

This functional reinterpretation aligns the “weight” factor with the Bail Reform Act’s core inquiries—flight and danger—rather than treating it as a freestanding proxy for guilt. In effect, the factor becomes: How strong is the case in a way that matters to risk assessment?

3. The Dissent’s Contrary View

Judge Phillips strongly disagrees, emphasizing:

• The sheer quantity of drugs and the co-location of multiple types of narcotics with firearms and paraphernalia in Ms. Garcia’s apartment;
• Her multiple financial transfers to a codefendant from various accounts and platforms;
• The call the day before the search indicating the codefendant was “coming over to hustle at the house” and that she should “be on the lookout” as “they are going to be doing transfers.”

For the dissent, this constellation of evidence clearly supports the inference that Ms. Garcia knowingly participated in a major trafficking and laundering operation, and thus the weight-of-the-evidence factor favors detention. The disagreement between majority and dissent thus centers both on how to read the record and on what “weight of the evidence” should mean in the detention context.

D. Factor Three: History and Characteristics of the Defendant

1. District Court’s “Close Call” and Majority’s Reassessment

The district court characterized Ms. Garcia’s history and characteristics as “a close call” that ultimately weighed in favor of detention. It credited:

• Her strong U.S. ties: three daughters and siblings in Colorado, parents in Ohio and Texas;
• But also noted:
  • Two sisters in Mexico;
  • Her father’s frequent travel to Mexico;
  • Her own recent travel to Mexico.

The court concluded these latter facts supported the government’s contention that absconding to Mexico was a serious risk, especially in light of likely deportation and loss of residency status if convicted.

The panel majority makes two key moves:

1. It upholds the district court’s reliance on:
   • The father’s Mexico travel as evidence of family ties to that country; and
   • The possibility that immigration consequences could incentivize voluntary flight (distinguishing Ailon-Ailon);
2. But it finds the district court’s balancing flawed, because it failed to acknowledge or adequately weigh the full spectrum of Ms. Garcia’s positive characteristics.

2. Positive Equities the Majority Finds Determinative

The majority lists a robust array of favorable factors:

• No criminal history whatsoever;
• No history of drug or alcohol abuse;
• No gang affiliation;
• Stable employment history, supported by a letter from her employer;
• Strong community ties, evidenced by “numerous character letters” from friends and family;
• Strong family ties in Colorado:
  • She lives with and financially supports her youngest daughter;
  • She has two adult daughters and a sister living nearby.

These “positive equities,” the court holds, “significantly outweigh the evidence that Ms. Garcia poses a flight risk.” It thus concludes that the history-and-characteristics factor “cuts strongly in favor of release.”

In doing so, the panel implicitly instructs district courts that when a defendant presents a substantial record of law-abiding life, deep community integration, and concrete caregiving responsibilities, those factors should carry real weight—even in the face of foreign family ties and speculative concerns about future immigration proceedings.

3. Dissent’s Deference to the District Court

The dissent accepts that Ms. Garcia’s “lack of criminal history and other positive equities may lessen her risk,” but agrees with the district court that the factor is a “close call” ultimately favoring detention. Judge Phillips emphasizes:

• The district court explicitly recognized the issue as close, implying it considered the various equities;
• Under Kelley, the court was not required to recite every positive item of evidence to show it weighed them.

The divergence here is less about what facts exist and more about how much weight positive characteristics should receive relative to serious charges and foreign ties.

E. Factor Four: Nature and Seriousness of the Danger Posed by Release

The district court found that Ms. Garcia’s release would endanger the community, stressing that her residence was the “epicenter” of the government’s seizure of large quantities of narcotics and illegal firearms.

The majority takes a fundamentally different approach:

• It reasons that Ms. Garcia’s lack of criminal history is a strong indicator she is not likely to endanger the community if released;
• Her employment history and family and community ties further suggest that she is embedded in law-abiding networks that reduce the likelihood of reoffending;
• On this record, the panel finds that the government has not met its burden—by clear and convincing evidence—to show that she poses a continuing danger.

Notably, the majority does not ignore the contraband seized, but treats it as insufficient, standing alone, when juxtaposed with the defendant’s otherwise clean record and strong stabilizing factors. This re-centers the “danger” analysis on the individual’s demonstrated propensity and circumstances rather than the mere presence of contraband at a particular location.

The dissent, by contrast, would affirm the district court’s danger finding for the same reasons the lower court articulated, viewing the drugs, firearms, and other paraphernalia as sufficient to warrant concern about community safety notwithstanding Ms. Garcia’s lack of prior convictions.

F. Balancing the Factors, the Presumption, and the Salerno Principle

Having evaluated each factor, the majority concludes:

• Factor 1 (nature/circumstances): favors detention;
• Factor 2 (weight of evidence): favors release (once the erroneous finding is corrected);
• Factor 3 (history/characteristics): strongly favors release;
• Factor 4 (danger): favors release.

Against this backdrop, the court invokes Salerno:

“Detention is unwarranted in Ms. Garcia’s case because three of the four § 3142(g) factors weigh in favor of her release, and we have no doubt that there are release conditions that can reasonably assure her appearance at trial.”

While the statutory presumption of detention in serious drug cases remains a factor, the decision illustrates that it is not dispositive. Where a defendant marshals substantial evidence of stability, law-abiding history, and community integration, and where the record does not clearly show that she is likely to flee or reoffend, the presumption can be rebutted and outweighed.

VI. Complex Concepts Explained in Plain Terms

A. Pretrial Detention vs. Release on Conditions

Before trial, a federal court can:

• Release a defendant on personal recognizance (a promise to appear);
• Release on conditions (e.g., travel restrictions, supervision, electronic monitoring, drug testing); or
• Order detention (incarceration until trial).

Detention is not supposed to punish guilt (which has not yet been established) but to manage:

• Risk of flight—that the defendant will not appear in court; and
• Risk of danger—that the defendant will harm others or continue dangerous criminal activity.

B. Rebuttable Presumption of Detention

In certain serious cases (like large-scale drug trafficking), the law assumes at the outset that no conditions will be enough to manage risk. This is the “presumption of detention.”

However:

• It is rebuttable: the defendant can offer evidence to show she is not a serious flight risk or danger;
• Once the defendant produces “some evidence” on these points, the presumption does not disappear, but remains one factor the judge weighs along with everything else.

C. Burdens of Proof

• Preponderance of the evidence: “More likely than not.” The government must meet this standard to show risk of flight;
• Clear and convincing evidence: A higher standard than preponderance, but lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” The government must meet this standard to show danger to the community.

D. Standards of Review

• Clear error: An appellate court will overturn a factual finding only if it has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made—i.e., the finding is not supported by the record;
• De novo review: The appellate court reaches its own legal conclusions without deference, applying the law to the facts as it sees them.

In Garcia, the panel used clear-error review to correct the misstatement about the wiretap and then engaged in de novo weighing of the § 3142(g) factors.

E. Flight Risk vs. Involuntary Removal

“Flight” means voluntary avoidance of prosecution—choosing not to appear in court or trying to flee the jurisdiction. Under Ailon-Ailon:

• Being forcibly removed by immigration authorities (deportation) is not “flight” for purposes of authorizing a detention hearing under § 3142(f)(2)(A);
• But Garcia clarifies that courts may still consider whether a defendant, fearing immigration consequences, might voluntarily leave the country to avoid prosecution—so long as this is treated as one element in a broader risk-of-flight analysis.

F. Dangerousness

“Danger to the community” under the Bail Reform Act is broader than just risk of physical violence; it includes the danger of ongoing serious criminal conduct, such as continued drug trafficking. But the government must prove such risk by clear and convincing evidence. Courts look not only at the charged conduct but also at:

• Past criminal history or lack thereof;
• Substance abuse history;
• Stability in employment, housing, and family life;
• Any history of complying with court orders.

G. Nonprecedential Orders and Persuasive Authority

The panel notes that its order and judgment is “not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel,” but that it “may be cited for its persuasive value” under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. This means:

• Future panels are not strictly required to follow this decision; but
• District courts and litigants can still cite it as an example of how the Tenth Circuit has interpreted and applied the Bail Reform Act.

VII. Impact and Future Significance

A. Emphasis on Positive History and Characteristics

Garcia stands out for the weight it places on a defendant’s positive life record—no criminal history, strong family and community ties, stable work, and favorable character references—even in a case involving a large drug seizure and firearms.

For defense counsel, the decision underscores the importance of:

• Building a detailed record of employment history, caregiving responsibilities, and community involvement;
• Submitting supporting letters from employers, family, and community members;
• Highlighting the absence of prior criminal conduct, substance abuse, or gang involvement.

For courts, the decision signals that these factors are not merely background: they can and should decisively tip the scales toward release when balanced against the presumption of detention and serious charges, unless the government’s evidence of flight or danger is compelling.

B. Accuracy in Government Proffers and Judicial Findings

By labeling the district court’s characterization of the wiretap as clearly erroneous, the panel sends a message that:

• Detention determinations must be anchored in precise, accurate descriptions of the record, especially where proffers and summaries are used instead of full evidentiary hearings;
• Government counsel should avoid overstating the import of evidence in detention hearings;
• District courts should scrutinize proffers and ensure that any critical inferences are clearly supported.

In future cases, defense counsel may more aggressively challenge mischaracterizations at the detention stage, and appellate courts, following Garcia’s lead, may feel more comfortable correcting such errors.

C. Reorienting the “Weight of the Evidence” Factor

The majority’s view that the weight of the evidence should be assessed in terms of whether it is “so strong that it will likely motivate [the defendant] to flee” subtly reframes this statutory factor. It moves away from a purely backward-looking analysis (likelihood of guilt) toward a risk-focused inquiry (does the strength of the case change the defendant’s behavior regarding appearance and safety?).

If embraced by district courts, this approach may:

• Reduce the tendency to equate “strong case” with “automatic detention” in serious offenses;
• Encourage more refined reasoning about how evidence actually bears on risk.

D. Immigration Consequences and Flight Risk

Garcia clarifies that:

• Courts may consider that the prospect of losing lawful permanent resident status and being removed from the country could incentivize voluntary flight;
• But this factor must be balanced against concrete evidence of the defendant’s ties and behavior, and cannot be treated as dispositive or automatic in favor of detention.

For noncitizen or LPR defendants, this decision cuts both ways: it acknowledges that immigration consequences are relevant to risk assessment, but also demonstrates that strong positive equities can overcome speculative fears of absconding.

E. The Role of Appellate Courts in Bail Decisions

Garcia exemplifies a willingness by the Tenth Circuit to:

• Engage closely with the factual and evidentiary record underlying detention decisions;
• Correct both factual misstatements and what it views as misweighting of the statutory factors;
• Reverse detention orders even in serious drug-and-gun cases when the government’s proof of flight or danger is not sufficiently strong.

This may embolden appellate challenges to detention orders, particularly in cases where:

• Pretrial services recommended release;
• The district court’s order is sparse or does not grapple with significant positive equities;
• The government’s proffer relies heavily on inference rather than direct evidence of risk.

F. Majority vs. Dissent: A Window into Judicial Attitudes

The divide between the majority and dissent in Garcia reflects broader judicial debates:

• How much deference is owed to district courts’ “close calls” on risk assessments?
• Should the presence of large drug quantities and firearms at a defendant’s residence strongly default toward detention, or be carefully balanced against positive personal history?
• How heavily should the statutory presumption of detention weigh once a defendant produces some countervailing evidence?

In this case, the majority emphasizes Salerno’s “liberty is the norm” principle and positions itself as a check against overbroad application of the detention presumption. The dissent is more deferential to trial-level judgments about risk and more willing to infer ongoing danger from the seized contraband and financial records.

VIII. Conclusion

United States v. Garcia is a significant articulation of how the Tenth Circuit expects the Bail Reform Act to be applied in serious drug cases. While the statutory presumption of detention and the gravity of fentanyl trafficking remain powerful considerations, they are not determinative. The panel’s decision underscores that:

• Factual findings at the detention stage must be carefully grounded in the record;
• The “weight of the evidence” factor should be evaluated in terms of its real-world impact on flight and danger, not merely as a proxy for guilt;
• A defendant’s positive history and characteristics—no prior criminal record, strong family and community ties, stable employment—can decisively rebut and outweigh the presumption of detention;
• Danger to the community must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, and the existence of contraband at a residence does not automatically establish ongoing dangerousness when set against an otherwise law-abiding life.

Although nonprecedential, Garcia will likely serve as persuasive authority in the Tenth Circuit and beyond for the proposition that robust “positive equities” can overcome the drug-case presumption of detention and that individualized, evidence-based assessments—not categorical assumptions—must guide pretrial liberty decisions. In reaffirming Salerno’s admonition that liberty is the norm and detention the exception, the decision provides an important check on the expansion of preventive detention in the federal system.