Porter Smith v. MDOC: Sixth Circuit Rejects a Private Retaliation Cause of Action Under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

Porter Smith v. Michigan Department of Corrections: Sixth Circuit Rejects a Private Retaliation Cause of Action Under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

I. Introduction

In Porter Smith v. Michigan Department of Corrections, No. 24-1439 (6th Cir. Nov. 21, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit resolved a question that had long been assumed but never squarely decided: whether § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, provides a private cause of action for retaliation.

For at least a quarter-century, the Sixth Circuit (like every other circuit) analyzed retaliation claims brought under the Rehabilitation Act in parallel with retaliation claims under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), both of which contain express anti-retaliation provisions. Those analyses proceeded on the assumption that a similar cause of action existed under § 504, often grounded in § 504(d)’s cross-reference to ADA “standards.”

The Smith panel majority (Judge Bush, joined by Judge Batchelder) rejects that assumption and holds that:

  • § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act does not create a private right of action for retaliation, and
  • thus, Smith’s jury-tried retaliation claim must fail as a matter of law, irrespective of any trial error.

The court also affirms summary judgment for the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) on Smith’s failure-to-accommodate claim, holding that he was not an “otherwise qualified” individual for his corrections officer position, and that his proposed accommodation—to remain in a transitional light-duty assignment—was not reasonable.

Judge Bloomekatz concurs in the failure-to-accommodate ruling but dissents on retaliation. She would:

  • decline to reach the cause-of-action question (which she views as forfeited and contrary to MDOC’s long-held position),
  • hold that § 504(d) does incorporate the ADA’s retaliation cause of action (42 U.S.C. § 12203), and
  • vacate the judgment because the district court used an incorrect “sole cause” causation standard instead of “but-for” causation for retaliation.

The decision is recommended for publication and thus binds future Sixth Circuit panels. It squarely breaks with the uniform practice of other circuits recognizing Rehabilitation Act retaliation claims and creates a significant doctrinal and practical shift in disability discrimination law within the Sixth Circuit.

II. Case Background

A. Parties

  • Plaintiff–Appellant: Porter Smith, a long-serving corrections officer employed by MDOC since 1998.
  • Defendants–Appellees: Michigan Department of Corrections and the State of Michigan (recipients of federal funds, thus subject to § 504).

B. Factual Overview

Smith suffered a serious hip injury in July 2017 while attempting to handcuff an inmate. After exhausting medical leave and trying conservative treatments, he returned to work in December 2017 under significant medical restrictions:

  • no lifting over 10 lbs,
  • no kneeling, squatting, climbing, jumping, twisting,
  • limited walking/standing, and
  • “sitting job only,” “office type work only,” “no bending.”

To accommodate him, MDOC assigned Smith to Transitional Employment (TE) in the Training Department: a temporary light-duty assignment, while he remained classified and paid as a corrections officer. TE assignments are generally limited to six months; Smith’s was extended to seven.

In June 2018, Smith’s doctor noted that accommodations were needed “permanent - until [hip] replacement.” Smith submitted an ADA accommodation request seeking a permanent light-duty placement (e.g., front desk or similar posts). MDOC denied the request citing:

  • exhaustion of his TE entitlement, and
  • lack of vacant positions meeting his restrictions.

MDOC then sent an “options” form: if Smith could not return to full duty by August 10, 2018, he had to select among medical layoff, leave of absence with waived rights, retirement, or resignation. Smith chose a waived rights leave of absence, ending active employment but preserving seniority and related benefits for up to a year.

C. Misconduct Investigations

In Smith’s final months at MDOC:

  • A nurse filed a sexual harassment complaint in June 2018. Internal Affairs reviewed Smith’s emails; though no inappropriate emails were found, personal and realtor emails suggested possible violation of MDOC’s computer-use policy.
  • In August 2018 (while Smith was on leave), the warden initiated a separate investigation into Smith’s email use. The state IT department reported that Smith’s email account had been deleted and records were unrecoverable.
  • The sexual-harassment complaint was closed as unsubstantiated in September 2018.
  • The computer-use inquiry remained open. On October 6, MDOC mailed a questionnaire to Smith, requesting a response by October 9. Smith says he received it October 10 and returned it (without proof of mailing); MDOC says it never received it.
  • Internal Affairs ultimately concluded there was insufficient evidence of computer misuse, but MDOC nonetheless found Smith violated Work Rule #38 (“Reporting Requirements”) by failing to respond to the questionnaire.
  • Smith, then on leave, was not informed of the outcome or allowed to contest it.

D. Attempted Return and Litigation

After hip replacement surgery and rehabilitation, Smith sought reinstatement as a corrections officer in August 2019. MDOC denied the request because of the pending discipline for the reporting-violation. After Smith’s deposition suggested he had returned the questionnaire, MDOC made two unconditional offers of reinstatement to the same corrections-officer position; Smith declined both.

In February 2020, Smith filed suit in federal court, asserting:

  1. Failure to accommodate his disability under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and
  2. Retaliation under § 504, alleging adverse actions (disciplinary investigations, denial of reinstatement, etc.) in response to his accommodation requests and legal challenge.

E. District Court Proceedings

  • Both sides moved for summary judgment.
  • The district court:
    • Granted MDOC summary judgment on the failure-to-accommodate claim, finding Smith not “otherwise qualified” and TE continuation not a reasonable accommodation.
    • Denied summary judgment on the retaliation claim, relying on longstanding Sixth Circuit authority that § 504 incorporates the ADA’s anti-retaliation standard (42 U.S.C. § 12203) via § 504(d).
  • The retaliation claim proceeded to a ten-day jury trial. The jury was instructed that Smith had to show MDOC acted against him “solely by reason of” his protected activity—a “sole cause” standard—and returned a defense verdict.
  • Smith appealed, challenging:
    • the jury instruction on causation,
    • other trial rulings, and
    • the earlier grant of summary judgment on failure to accommodate.

III. Summary of the Sixth Circuit’s Decision

A. Retaliation Under the Rehabilitation Act

The majority opinion identifies and resolves what it calls a “question of first impression”:

  • Holding: Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act does not provide a private cause of action for retaliation.

Key steps:

  • The panel requested supplemental briefing on “whether and how the Rehabilitation Act provides a cause of action for retaliation,” even though neither party had questioned it below or in opening briefs.
  • It concluded that previous Sixth Circuit cases had merely assumed, but never held, that such a cause of action exists, and thus were not binding precedent on that specific question.
  • Examining the statute’s text—§ 504(a) (the core anti-discrimination provision) and § 504(d) (the cross-reference to ADA standards)—and applying the Supreme Court’s modern approach to implied rights of action (especially in Spending Clause statutes), the court determined that Congress did not clearly authorize a private retaliation claim under § 504.
  • Because MDOC cannot be liable on a non-existent cause of action, Smith’s trial-based challenges (including the objection to the “sole cause” instruction) are rendered irrelevant; the court affirms judgment for MDOC on the retaliation claim on purely legal grounds.

B. Failure-to-Accommodate Claim

The panel unanimously affirms summary judgment for MDOC on the failure-to-accommodate claim:

  • Position definition: The relevant job is Smith’s formal position of corrections officer, not his temporary TE role.
  • “Otherwise qualified”: Smith admitted he could not perform the essential functions of a corrections officer without accommodation.
  • Proposed accommodation: Continued TE assignment was not a “vacant, funded position” and thus not a reasonable accommodation as a matter of law.
  • Interactive process: MDOC’s alleged failure in the interactive process is not independently actionable because there was no reasonable accommodation available.
  • Undue hardship: Because Smith failed to establish a prima facie case, MDOC’s undue-hardship defense need not be reached.

C. The Concurrence/Dissent

Judge Bloomekatz:

  • Concurs in the failure-to-accommodate ruling (Part V).
  • Dissents from the majority’s treatment of retaliation (Parts II–IV), arguing:
    • The cause-of-action question was not properly “presented” because both parties repeatedly conceded that § 504 allows retaliation claims.
    • Even if reached, § 504(d) unambiguously incorporates the ADA’s anti-retaliation provision (42 U.S.C. § 12203), including its remedial scheme and “but-for” causation standard.
    • The district court erred by applying “sole causation” rather than “but-for” causation to Smith’s retaliation claim, and that error was not harmless; she would vacate and remand for a new trial on retaliation.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Retaliation Question Under § 504

1. Statutory Provisions at Issue

Two subsections of § 504 frame the dispute:

  • § 504(a), 29 U.S.C. § 794(a): Prohibits discrimination against an “otherwise qualified individual with a disability” who is “excluded from participation in,” “denied the benefits of,” or “subjected to discrimination” “solely by reason of” disability under a program or activity receiving federal financial assistance or conducted by a federal agency.
  • § 504(d), 29 U.S.C. § 794(d): For “complaint[s] alleging employment discrimination under this section,” “the standards used to determine whether this section has been violated” are “the standards applied under Title I of the ADA” and “the provisions of sections 501 through 504, and 510” of the ADA (42 U.S.C. §§ 12201–12204, 12210), “as such sections relate to employment.”

The ADA provision of special interest is:

  • 42 U.S.C. § 12203: Prohibits retaliation (“No person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter…”) and interference/coercion, and prescribes remedies and procedures.

2. Prior Assumptions vs. Binding Holdings

The majority distinguishes between:

  • Assumed propositions—issues never contested or analyzed—and
  • Holdings—issues “clearly” considered and “consciously” decided, which bind later panels under Wright v. Spaulding, 939 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 2019).

The panel notes that prior Sixth Circuit cases—including Hiler v. Brown, 177 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 1999); Gribcheck v. Runyon, 245 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 2001); A.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Shelby County Board of Education, 711 F.3d 687 (6th Cir. 2013); and Kirilenko-Ison, 974 F.3d 652 (6th Cir. 2020)—assumed that § 504 supports retaliation claims and proceeded to apply a framework (typically the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme) borrowed from ADA/Title VII cases. But none:

  • squarely analyzed the statutory text of § 504,
  • engaged the implied-right-of-action framework of Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), or
  • was asked by the parties to decide whether § 504 creates a retaliation cause of action at all.

Accordingly, those cases do not constitute binding precedent on the specific question of whether a retaliation claim lies under § 504. The same is said of other circuits, which—while uniformly permitting such claims—have typically not subjected § 504’s text to close scrutiny to justify the cause of action’s existence.

3. The Court’s Authority to Reach the Question

Smith and MDOC did not argue below that there was no cause of action; both consistently accepted its existence. The panel nonetheless:

  • invokes cases like United States National Bank of Oregon v. Independent Insurance Agents of America, 508 U.S. 439 (1993), and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013), to justify raising and deciding an “antecedent” legal issue (the existence of a right of action) on its own initiative;
  • relies on the court’s independent duty to “identify and apply the proper construction of governing law,” citing Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, 500 U.S. 90 (1991); and
  • emphasizes that courts are not bound by parties’ concessions on pure questions of law.

The panel treats the cause-of-action question as essential to reviewing the “legal accuracy” of the jury instruction—since, in its view, defining the elements of the claim necessarily requires verifying that the claim exists.

Judge Bloomekatz, by contrast, sees this as an improper departure from party presentation: MDOC explicitly acknowledged the cause of action in district court and in its initial appellate briefing, and switched only in supplemental briefing. She would treat the new theory as forfeited and decline to decide it.

B. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Supreme Court Rehabilitation Act Cases

  • Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979) — The Court’s first major § 504 decision. It held that a nursing program was not required to make fundamental or substantial modifications to accommodate a hearing-impaired applicant. Section 504 requires reasonable accommodations but not changes that fundamentally alter a program. The case clarifies the scope of “discrimination” but did not address retaliation or private causes of action.
  • Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985) — Upheld Tennessee’s 14-day annual inpatient Medicaid limit, finding it provided equal access and did not require special extended coverage for disabled individuals. The Court acknowledged § 504 can support disparate-impact claims but again did not confront retaliation.
  • A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools, 605 U.S. 335 (2025) — Recent decision holding that disability discrimination claims by students under Title II of the ADA and § 504 do not require a special, heightened “bad faith or gross misjudgment” standard in the education context; they use the same “standards” as other disability-discrimination claims. The majority uses Osseo for the proposition that “standards” refer to substantive criteria for evaluating violations—not the creation of new causes of action.

2. Implied Rights of Action & Spending Power

  • Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) — The key modern case limiting implied private rights of action. The Court held that private rights of action must be created by Congress in statutory text; courts cannot infer them from statutory purpose or regulations alone.
  • Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) — Spending Clause legislation is “in the nature of a contract” with states; conditions on federal funds must be stated “unambiguously” so that states can knowingly accept them.
  • Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629 (1999) — In a Title IX context, reaffirms that Spending Clause statutes require clear notice of conditions, including private liability.
  • Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002) — Applies the contract analogy to Spending Clause statutes (including § 504) to limit available remedies; recipients can only be held to terms for which they had clear notice.
  • Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic, 145 S. Ct. 2219 (2025) (cited) — Emphasizes that private rights under Spending Clause statutes must be “clear and unambiguous”; ambiguous provisions do not suffice to expose states to private suits.
  • Kentucky v. Yellen, 54 F.4th 325 (6th Cir. 2022) — The Sixth Circuit invalidated a condition on COVID-relief funds as insufficiently clear; used by the majority to illustrate that “indeterminate” conditions cannot be used to impose obligations on states.

3. Title IX and Retaliation: Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education

  • Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 544 U.S. 167 (2005) — The Court held that Title IX’s broad ban on sex-based discrimination implies a cause of action for retaliation, even absent an express anti-retaliation clause. The decision rested on:
    • Title IX’s general language (“on the basis of sex”),
    • a long line of cases treating Title IX expansively (starting with Cannon), and
    • the fact that funding recipients had been on notice since 1979 that they were subject to private suits for intentional sex discrimination.

The majority distinguishes Jackson:

  • § 504(a) uses narrower language (“solely by reason of” disability), more akin to Title VII’s “because of such individual’s” phrasing, which Jackson suggested would not support an implied retaliation claim absent express language.
  • The Rehabilitation Act lacks a history of expansive interpretation regarding implied causes of action like Title IX.
  • Here, § 504(d) refers to “standards,” not broad rights-creating language like Title IX’s text; that, the majority says, is a different and more technical mechanism.

The dissent views Jackson as evidence that a statute need not contain a standalone “retaliation” heading if Congress unambiguously incorporates another statute that contains one. The cross-reference to § 12203 in § 504(d), she argues, is Congress speaking “clearly” enough.

4. Sixth Circuit ADA/Rehabilitation Act Cases on “Standards”

  • Bledsoe v. Tennessee Valley Authority Board of Directors, 42 F.4th 568 (6th Cir. 2022) — Addressed whether claims under § 501 of the Rehabilitation Act use “sole cause” or “but-for” causation. The court held that the ADA’s “but-for” standard applies, because the statute explicitly incorporates ADA “standards.” It characterized “causality” as a “standard” used to determine if a violation has occurred.
  • Burns v. City of Columbus, 91 F.3d 836 (6th Cir. 1996) — Early recognition that the ADA “standards” apply in Rehabilitation Act employment cases via § 504(d), primarily in the sense of burdens of proof and related frameworks.
  • Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc) — Addressed ADA causation (“but-for” vs “solely”) and clarified when ADA and Rehabilitation Act standards can diverge. The dissent in Smith uses Lewis to argue that § 504(d) creates an employment “carve-out” that can carry different causation rules, without conflict with § 504(a).

C. The Majority’s Legal Reasoning on Retaliation

1. § 504(a) Contains No Retaliation Language

All parties agree, and the court confirms, that:

  • § 504(a) prohibits discrimination only where the adverse action carries a “solely by reason of” disability causal nexus.
  • It makes no reference to retaliation, opposition, participation in proceedings, or analogous concepts found in express anti-retaliation provisions (e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (Title VII); 42 U.S.C. § 12203 (ADA)).

Under Sandoval, a court may not invent a cause of action from textual silence, even if doing so would arguably further the statute’s purpose. Thus, the only plausible textual source for a retaliation claim under § 504 is § 504(d).

2. “Standards” in § 504(d) Do Not Create New Causes of Action

The majority’s core move is interpretive: it narrows the meaning of “standards” in § 504(d) to refer only to how existing claims are evaluated, not whether the statute contains a claim at all.

  • “Standards” in legal practice typically refers to:
    • pleading standards (e.g., Twombly/Iqbal),
    • evidentiary burdens (preponderance vs. clear-and-convincing),
    • substantive burdens such as “but-for” or “sole cause” causation, or
    • analytical frameworks (e.g., McDonnell Douglas burden shifting).
  • In Bledsoe, for example, the court treated causation as a “standard” imported from the ADA; that importation did not itself create any new causes of action under § 501.

Thus, the majority reads § 504(d) as a technical cross-reference: in employment discrimination cases already cognizable under § 504, courts use ADA standards (causation, burdens, etc.) to determine whether a violation has occurred. But § 504(d) does not by itself establish an independent set of claims (retaliation, interference, etc.) that Congress placed in the ADA but omitted from § 504(a).

3. Spending Clause & Clear-Notice Requirements

The Rehabilitation Act is Spending Clause legislation: Congress conditions federal funds on recipients’ agreement not to discriminate on the basis of disability. Under Pennhurst, Davis, Barnes, and Medina, the terms of that “contract”—including exposure to private suits—must be stated with unmistakable clarity.

The majority reasons:

  • Congress knows how to create express anti-retaliation provisions and has done so repeatedly (Title VII, ADA, ADEA, FLSA, OSHA, FMLA, etc.).
  • In those statutes, Congress nearly always distinctively separates anti-discrimination provisions from anti-retaliation provisions.
  • By contrast, the Rehabilitation Act contains no separate anti-retaliation clause and no language in § 504(a) that fairly reads as retaliation (as Jackson did for Title IX).
  • Because § 504’s obligations attach as conditions to federal funding, an indirect cross-reference in § 504(d) to “standards” in the ADA cannot fairly be read as providing “clear and unambiguous notice” that states are exposed to private suits for retaliation.

In other words, importing ADA causation rules or burden-shifting regimes is one thing; importing entirely new categories of liability via a generic reference to “standards” is something else—and, in the majority’s view, incompatible with Spending Clause clear-notice requirements.

4. Distinguishing Jackson and Title IX

Two key distinctions drive the court’s refusal to analogize from Title IX:

  • Textual breadth: Title IX broadly prohibits discrimination “on the basis of sex,” without limiting phrasing like “solely by reason of” or “such individual’s” sex. The Rehabilitation Act instead uses more targeted language akin to Title VII and does not suggest an open-ended, effect-based concept of “discrimination.”
  • Doctrinal landscape: By the time of Jackson, Title IX had already been interpreted to include an implied private right of action and was construed with “a sweep as broad as its language.” Funding recipients had decades of notice. No similar tradition exists of reading § 504 expansively to add causes of action not found in its text.

Thus, the majority concludes that Jackson cannot be extended to read a retaliation right into § 504 or § 504(d).

5. Agency Regulations Cannot Create a Cause of Action

Smith also invoked a Department of Labor regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 33.13, which prohibits retaliation in programs conducted by the Department of Labor. The majority:

  • notes that this regulation does not apply to state agencies like MDOC in any event, and
  • cites Sandoval to hold that regulations cannot create a private right of action where the statute does not.

Thus, regulations cannot fill the statutory gap.

D. The Bloomekatz Concurrence/Dissent on Retaliation

1. Party Presentation and Forfeiture

Judge Bloomekatz’s first objection is procedural:

  • In the district court, MDOC never argued that § 504 lacked a retaliation cause of action; it defended purely on the merits.
  • The district court explicitly recognized a § 504 retaliation cause of action by cross-referencing the ADA’s anti-retaliation provision via § 504(d).
  • In its opening appellate brief, MDOC expressly told the Sixth Circuit that “Section 504 creates the basis for Smith’s cause of action” and that “Smith’s claim of retaliation arises under the plain language of Section 504.”
  • Only in supplemental briefing (after the court’s invitation) did MDOC reverse course and argue that no such cause of action exists.

She regards this as a double forfeiture:

  • Not raised in the district court, and
  • Not raised in the appellee’s opening brief.

Although appellate courts have discretion to decide issues not briefed, she warns that treating supplemental briefing as an opportunity to adopt contradicting “new arguments” risks undermining party presentation and stability. In her view, this case does not properly “present” a question of first impression, but instead invites the court to unsettle well-accepted circuit and national practice.

2. Textual Reading of § 504(d)

Substantively, Judge Bloomekatz would hold that § 504(d):

  • creates a carve-out for claims “alleging employment discrimination,”
  • directs courts to use “the standards applied under Title I of the ADA” and “the provisions of sections 501 through 504, and 510” of the ADA in those cases, and
  • explicitly cross-references § 12203 (ADA’s anti-retaliation clause) as one such “provision[].”

From this, she concludes:

  • ADA § 12203 indisputably creates a private right of action; the majority itself recognizes this.
  • By expressly incorporating that “provision” as part of the “standards used to determine whether this section has been violated” in employment cases, Congress has given clear notice that retaliation in violation of § 12203 will also constitute a violation of § 504.
  • Under Medina, this is sufficiently clear notice; Congress need not use “magic words” to authorize such actions.

3. Meaning of “Standards” and Surplusage

The dissent criticizes the majority’s narrow definition of “standards” as too confining and as creating severe surplusage problems:

  • “Standards” in ordinary usage can encompass:
    • substantive prohibitions,
    • metrics for evaluating compliance, and
    • the prescribed consequences (remedies, enforcement rights).
  • Even if “standards” refers to “how existing liability is assessed,” § 504(d) makes § 12203’s prohibitions and remedial scheme the yardstick for deciding whether § 504 has been violated in employment cases. If an employer violates § 12203 (retaliation), it has, by definition, violated § 504.
  • Reading “standards” to exclude causes of action renders the cross-reference to § 12203 (and several other ADA provisions such as § 12202 (sovereign immunity waiver) and § 12204 (regulations)) essentially meaningless.
  • Court are instructed to avoid interpretations that make statutory text superfluous or meaningless.

4. Causation Standard for Retaliation: “But-For,” Not “Solely”

Assuming a retaliation cause of action exists, Judge Bloomekatz turns to the central question the parties actually litigated: the proper causation standard for § 504 retaliation.

  • Under ADA § 12203, retaliation requires “but-for” causation (the adverse action would not have occurred but for the protected activity).
  • Section 504(d) incorporates that causation standard for employment-related retaliation under § 504.

She points to Sixth Circuit precedents (Shelby County, M.L. v. Williamson County, Gribcheck) and other circuits that describe § 504 retaliation as requiring a “causal connection” between protected activity and adverse action. In the broader retaliation context, “causal connection” is understood as but-for causation.

The district court’s “solely by reason of” instruction, imported from § 504(a), is therefore erroneous. Because “sole” causation is far more demanding than but-for causation, and the record does not clearly show the jury would have reached the same verdict under a but-for standard, she would vacate and remand for a new trial.

E. Failure-to-Accommodate Under § 504

1. Governing Framework

Failure-to-accommodate claims under the Rehabilitation Act are treated as involving direct evidence of discrimination. Accordingly, courts do not apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework but instead a direct-evidence framework:

To establish a prima facie failure-to-accommodate case, a plaintiff must show:

  1. He is disabled.
  2. He is an “otherwise qualified” individual for the position, with or without reasonable accommodation.
  3. The employer knew or had reason to know of his disability.
  4. He requested an accommodation.
  5. The employer failed to provide a reasonable accommodation.

The plaintiff also bears the initial burden of showing that the proposed accommodation is reasonable. If he does so, the burden shifts to the employer to show that the job requirement is essential or that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship.

2. Defining the Relevant Position

A critical preliminary issue is: what is the “position” for purposes of the “otherwise qualified” analysis?

  • Smith argued: the relevant job is his actual TE assignment in the Training Department, which consisted of sedentary, office-based tasks compatible with his restrictions.
  • MDOC argued: the relevant job is the position in which he was formally classified and paid—corrections officer.

The court adopts MDOC’s view, relying on precedent (Lai Ming Chui v. Donahoe, 580 F. App’x 430 (6th Cir. 2014)) that temporary or modified assignments do not redefine the official position when classification, pay, and benefits remain tethered to the original role.

3. “Otherwise Qualified” and Essential Functions

Given the job is corrections officer, Smith must show he can perform its essential functions:

  • either without accommodation,
  • with an “essential” function removed, or
  • with some other reasonable accommodation.

Smith conceded that, given his permanent restrictions before surgery, he could not perform the essential physical functions of a corrections officer (e.g., physically responding to inmate incidents, standing and walking for extended periods). Thus, the only pathway to “otherwise qualified” status is demonstrating that a reasonable accommodation—consistent with essential functions—would enable him to perform the role.

4. Reasonableness of the Proposed Accommodation

Smith’s principal proposed accommodation was effectively permanent continuation in TE, or reassignment to a similar light-duty post (e.g., “working for ITO Felder”).

The court holds that this proposed accommodation is not reasonable because:

  • TE assignments are not formal, funded, vacant positions; they are ad hoc sets of duties pulled from various roles, temporarily tailored to an injured employee’s restrictions.
  • MDOC’s ADA coordinator and HR officer testified that:
    • MDOC has no specific permanent “light-duty” positions,
    • TE assignments are outside an employee’s formal classification, and
    • TE assignments are not “vacancies” to which someone can be permanently reassigned.
  • A general institutional “need” for some light-duty help does not convert TE into a permanent, funded slot; the ADA does not require employers to create new positions or convert temporary accommodations into permanent roles.

Under Sixth Circuit law, an employee seeking reassignment as a reasonable accommodation must:

  • identify a specific position sought, and
  • show he is qualified for that position.

Smith failed to identify any actual, vacant, budgeted position compatible with his restrictions and pay level. His reliance on a generalized “light-duty need” was insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact. Thus, he did not carry his burden on the reasonableness of the proposed accommodation, nor on “otherwise qualified” status.

5. Interactive Process and Undue Hardship

Smith also argued that MDOC failed to engage in the ADA/Rehabilitation Act–mandated interactive process to explore accommodations and that MDOC failed to establish “undue hardship.”

  • Interactive process: A claim for breakdown in the interactive process is actionable only if a reasonable accommodation actually existed and could have been discovered through that process. Because Smith’s only viable proposed accommodation (permanent TE) was unreasonable, any alleged “breakdown” does not provide an independent basis for liability.
  • Undue hardship: The employer’s burden to show undue hardship arises only if the employee first makes a prima facie showing that a reasonable accommodation existed. Since Smith did not, the court does not reach MDOC’s hardship arguments.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

1. Implied Private Right of Action

A private right of action answers the question: “Can a private person sue in court for violation of this statute?” In the 1960s–70s, courts sometimes inferred such rights from statutory purpose or structure. Recent Supreme Court cases (e.g., Sandoval) insist that:

  • Only Congress can create private rights of action.
  • They must be grounded in statutory text, not in regulations or legislative history alone.

The majority in Smith applies this strict approach: if § 504 does not clearly provide for retaliation suits, courts may not invent them.

2. Spending Clause and Clear Notice

Under the Constitution’s Spending Clause, Congress can condition federal funds on states’ agreement to certain terms (e.g., non-discrimination). Cases like Pennhurst, Barnes, and Medina treat such conditions like a contract:

  • States must have clear and unambiguous notice of the obligations they accept by taking the money—including possible exposure to damages suits.
  • Ambiguous text is interpreted in favor of the state, not against it.

This doctrine amplifies the majority’s reluctance to treat § 504(d)’s reference to ADA “standards” as silently creating new forms of liability like retaliation.

3. “Standards” vs. “Causes of Action”

  • Cause of action: The legal right to sue for a particular kind of injury (e.g., retaliation, discrimination).
  • Standards: The legal rules used to decide whether the elements of a cause of action are met (burdens of proof, causation tests, evidence frameworks).

The majority sees § 504(d) as speaking only to standards (e.g., “sole cause” vs. “but-for” causation) and not to what kinds of claims exist. The dissent would interpret “standards” more broadly to include the incorporated ADA prohibitions themselves.

4. “Sole Cause” vs. “But-For” Causation

  • Sole cause: The protected characteristic or activity is the only reason for the adverse action.
  • But-for cause: The adverse action would not have occurred in the absence of the protected characteristic/activity, even if other reasons also played a role.

“Sole cause” is stricter than “but-for” because it excludes mixed-motive situations where more than one factor contributed. The district court applied “sole cause” to Smith’s retaliation claim; the dissent insists it should have been “but-for,” consistent with ADA retaliation.

5. “Otherwise Qualified” and Essential Functions

An “otherwise qualified” individual is someone who can perform the essential functions of the job:

  • without accommodation,
  • with removal of a non-essential function, or
  • with reasonable accommodation.

Essential functions are the core duties of a position—those that, if removed, would change the nature of the job. Employers are not required to:

  • excuse essential functions, or
  • create new positions or reclassify temporary duties as permanent jobs.

6. Reasonable Accommodation, Reassignment, and the Interactive Process

  • Reasonable accommodation: A change in work environment or way things are done that enables a disabled employee to perform essential functions, without undue hardship on the employer.
  • Reassignment: One form of accommodation: moving an employee to a vacant job they can perform. It does not require:
    • creating new positions,
    • promoting the employee, or
    • converting temporary roles into permanent posts.
  • Interactive process: A collaborative dialogue between employer and employee to explore potential accommodations. A breakdown is only actionable if a reasonable accommodation actually existed and was missed because the process failed.

VI. Impact and Implications

A. Immediate Doctrinal Impact in the Sixth Circuit

The holding that § 504 does not provide a private cause of action for retaliation is a significant shift:

  • It overrules in practice—though not formally—prior Sixth Circuit practice treating such claims as cognizable, by reclassifying those cases as nonbinding assumptions.
  • It directly contradicts the universal practice of all other circuits, which recognize § 504 retaliation claims, usually via § 504(d)’s cross-reference to the ADA.

In the states of the Sixth Circuit (Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee):

  • Plaintiffs may no longer bring retaliation claims under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
  • They must rely on other statutes for retaliation:
    • Title I of the ADA (for employment),
    • Title II of the ADA (for public services),
    • Title VII (for race, sex, etc.),
    • state civil rights laws, or
    • possibly § 1983 (for certain constitutional violations).
  • Retaliation claims currently pending under § 504 in district courts within the circuit are now vulnerable to dismissal on Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56 grounds based on lack of a cognizable claim.

Rehabilitation Act plaintiffs retain:

  • failure-to-accommodate claims,
  • disparate-treatment discrimination claims, and
  • possibly disparate-impact claims,

but not retaliation claims as such.

B. National Landscape and Likely Future Developments

  • Inter-circuit tension: The Sixth Circuit is now an outlier; every other circuit permits § 504 retaliation claims. This divergence increases the likelihood of:
    • en banc review within the Sixth Circuit, or
    • Supreme Court review to resolve the conflict.
  • Legislative response: Congress could amend § 504 to include an express anti-retaliation clause, mirroring the ADA and Title VII and mooting the interpretive dispute.
  • Spending Clause jurisprudence: The decision further entrenches a stringent “clear notice” approach: cross-references and generic terms (“standards”) are treated as insufficient to add new categories of private suits against states.

C. Practical Guidance for Practitioners

  • Plead ADA retaliation claims explicitly in cases against state or local entities in the Sixth Circuit. Do not rely solely on § 504 for retaliation.
  • When suing a state or state agency, consider:
    • sovereign immunity issues under the ADA (which differ by Title and context),
    • whether Ex parte Young–type suits for prospective relief are available,
    • whether a § 1983 claim (e.g., under the Equal Protection Clause) is viable.
  • In employment cases involving light-duty or transitional assignments:
    • Document and identify specific vacant, funded positions that match the employee’s restrictions and skill set.
    • Gather evidence on whether purported “light-duty” roles are actual positions or just temporary task compilations.
  • When challenging jury instructions in Rehabilitation Act/ADA trials:
    • Distinguish clearly between discrimination and retaliation claims; they may have different causation standards and elements.
    • In retaliation trials under the ADA, insist on a but-for causation instruction, consistent with circuit precedent.

D. Doctrinal Clarification on Accommodation and Position Definition

The failure-to-accommodate portion of the opinion reinforces important principles:

  • Transitional/light-duty work does not, by itself, redefine the employee’s “position” for essential-functions analysis when pay, classification, and benefits remain tied to the original role.
  • Employers are not obligated to:
    • turn temporary light-duty assignments into permanent jobs,
    • create new “light-duty” positions to accommodate permanent restrictions, or
    • reassign employees without an identified vacant funded position.
  • Interactive process claims do not independently survive if the only proposed accommodation is legally unreasonable.

VII. Conclusion and Key Takeaways

Porter Smith v. MDOC is a watershed decision in the Sixth Circuit’s Rehabilitation Act jurisprudence. Its principal contributions are:

  1. New rule on retaliation: § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act does not provide a private cause of action for retaliation. Section 504(d)’s incorporation of ADA “standards” is read to apply only to the evaluation of existing discrimination claims, not to create new categories of liability such as retaliation or interference.
  2. Methodological stance: The majority embraces a stringent, text-centered approach to implied rights of action, especially in Spending Clause statutes, giving substantial weight to clear-notice requirements. It also treats prior assumptions (by this and other circuits) about § 504 retaliation as nonbinding when unsupported by textual analysis.
  3. Entrenched disagreement: The partial dissent underscores a serious and principled disagreement over statutory interpretation, the scope of “standards,” and the court’s role in respecting party presentation. It also sets out a detailed alternative reading of § 504(d) that would both recognize a retaliation cause of action and apply a but-for causation standard.
  4. Clarification on accommodations: On the accommodation front, the decision clarifies that:
    • an employee’s formal job classification controls the essential-functions analysis, not temporary assignments, and
    • permanent continuation of a transitional, non-funded light-duty role is not a reasonable accommodation as a matter of law.

In the broader legal landscape, Smith highlights the tension between:

  • Congress’s frequent use of cross-references and harmonization across related anti-discrimination statutes, and
  • the Supreme Court’s insistence that private enforcement rights in Spending Clause statutes be stated with unmistakable clarity.

Unless altered by en banc or Supreme Court review—or by congressional amendment—Smith will govern Rehabilitation Act practice in the Sixth Circuit: retaliation must be pursued under other statutes, while § 504 remains confined to discrimination and accommodation claims as defined by its text and the incorporated ADA standards.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

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