Portal Delivery Triggers Limitations Period; No Equitable Tolling for Portal Access Delays in Title VII Claims

Introduction

The case of Melissa A. Berry Smith v. Texas Children's Hospital, Inc. arises under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Plaintiff‐Appellant Melissa Berry Smith filed a charge of religious discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in December 2021. After the EEOC dismissed her charge and issued a “Dismissal and Notice of Right to Sue” via its online Public Portal on September 8, 2022, Smith waited 91 days and only filed suit on December 8, 2022—one day after the mandatory 90‐day deadline. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer, Texas Children’s Hospital (TCH), holding her claim time‐barred. On appeal, Smith argued (1) that her right‐to‐sue period did not begin until she actually accessed the portal five days later, and (2) that the period should be equitably tolled for those five days. The Fifth Circuit, per curiam, affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The court held that, under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), the 90-day limitations period begins when notice is “given”—here, by delivery to the EEOC Public Portal on September 8, 2022.
Smith’s Rule 36 admissions that she received the notice on September 8 and the EEOC’s portal logs confirming download that same day conclusively established the start date.
Her sworn declaration about password issues did not overcome those binding admissions, and she never moved to withdraw or amend them.
The court declined to equitably toll the limitations period, finding no extraordinary or uncontrollable circumstances; password custody was Smith’s responsibility, and she showed no diligence after accessing the letter on September 13.
Result: Affirmance of summary judgment and dismissal with prejudice.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) & (f): Establishes the EEOC filing requirement and 90-day right‐to‐sue deadline.
29 C.F.R. § 1601.19: Addresses no‐cause determinations by the EEOC.
Espinoza v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 754 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. 1985): Equitable tolling applies but only for extraordinary circumstances; the limitations period is strictly construed.
Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2002): Reiterates strict construction of the 90-day period.
Whitehead v. Reliance Ins. Co., 632 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1980) & Zambuto v. AT&T Co., 544 F.2d 1333 (5th Cir. 1977): Notice is “given” when unambiguous notice is delivered—plaintiff need not await a formal letter.
Ringgold v. Nat’l Maint. Corp., 796 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1986): Confirms the 90-day clock begins upon delivery of the right‐to‐sue letter.
Bernstein v. Maximus Fed. Servs., Inc., 63 F.4th 967 (5th Cir. 2023): Plaintiff must “vigorously pursue” her action to justify tolling.
Castellanos-Contreras v. Decatur Hotels, LLC, 622 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2010) & Granger v. Aaron’s, Inc., 636 F.3d 708 (5th Cir. 2011): Standards for reviewing summary judgment and tolling decisions.

Legal Reasoning

The Fifth Circuit’s ruling rests on three core principles:

“Giving” notice upon delivery: Section 2000e-5(f)(1) begins the 90-day clock when the EEOC “gives” notice of its dismissal. Circuit precedent unambiguously holds that delivery to the address or electronic portal designated by the claimant suffices—even if the claimant does not immediately open the correspondence.
Binding effect of admissions: Under Rule 36, Smith admitted receiving the notice on September 8; she never sought to amend or withdraw those admissions. Admissions are “conclusively established” unless the court permits withdrawal—a showing she did not make.
No equitable tolling: To invoke equitable tolling, a claimant must prove (a) extraordinary circumstances beyond her control prevented timely filing, and (b) diligent pursuit of her rights. Smith’s inability to remember or reset her portal password was a circumstance within her control. Once she accessed the letter on September 13, she had 86 remaining days and showed no additional diligence.

Impact

This decision carries significant implications for Title VII claimants who use the EEOC’s Public Portal:

Notice is effective upon portal delivery, regardless of immediate access.
Claimants must maintain control of portal credentials or risk forfeiture of their rights.
Plaintiffs should avoid Rule 36 admissions regarding receipt of notices or be prepared to move promptly to withdraw/amend if facts change.
Equitable tolling remains narrow—delay in accessing electronic systems will not usually justify extension.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Title VII Charge and Right-to-Sue Letter: Before suing, an employee must charge the EEOC with discrimination, await its decision, and then has 90 days from “notice” to file in federal court.
“Giving” vs. “Receipt” of Notice: The statute speaks of when notice is “given,” not when it is actually read—delivery to the agreed address or portal is sufficient.
Rule 36 Admissions: A party’s written admission in response to requests for admissions is binding unless formally withdrawn or amended.
Equitable Tolling: A judge may extend a filing deadline only when extraordinary, uncontrollable circumstances prevent timely filing despite the plaintiff’s diligence.
Summary Judgment: A decision without trial when no genuine dispute exists over material facts.

Conclusion

The Fifth Circuit’s affirmance in Berry Smith v. Texas Children’s Hospital underscores the strict enforcement of Title VII’s 90-day limitations period and clarifies that electronic delivery via the EEOC Public Portal constitutes effective notice. Delay in accessing the portal for reasons within the claimant’s control does not warrant equitable tolling. Moving forward, Title VII litigants must diligently monitor electronic notifications and treat portal delivery as the critical “start date” for filing suit. This ruling reinforces both the predictability of statutory deadlines and the importance of procedural vigilance in employment‐discrimination litigation.