Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc.:
The Second Circuit’s First Full Winter–McKinney § 10(j) Decision and a Strong Reaffirmation of Successor Employer Obligations

I. Introduction

Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc., 24-3324-cv (2d Cir. Dec. 19, 2025), is a significant Second Circuit decision at the intersection of labor law and federal injunctive practice. The case does three important things:

1. It formally replaces the Second Circuit’s pre‑existing, labor‑specific standard for National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 10(j) injunctions with the traditional four-factor Winter test, as mandated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 602 U.S. 339 (2024).
2. It clarifies how district courts and appellate courts should conduct the “likelihood of success” analysis in § 10(j) cases, including reliance on an Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ’s) post‑district‑court decision and credibility findings.
3. It strongly endorses the National Labor Relations Board’s (“NLRB” or the “Board”) successorship framework, including the “perfectly clear” successor doctrine and the presumption that a discriminatory successor is bound by the predecessor’s collective bargaining agreement (CBA) from the outset.

The case arises out of the transition of valet parking services at Stony Brook Hospital, where a new contractor, Parking Systems Plus, Inc. (“Parking Systems”), took over from Classic Valet Parking (“Classic”). Classic’s valet employees had long been unionized under a CBA with Local 1102, RWDSU/UFCW (the “Union”). After initially exploring retention of Classic’s unionized employees, Parking Systems largely refused to hire them, operated with a non‑union workforce, and declined to recognize or bargain with the Union.

Teresa Poor, Regional Director of NLRB Region 29, sought a temporary injunction under § 10(j) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(j), seeking (among other relief) reinstatement of the former Classic employees, recognition of the Union, and restoration of the prior terms and conditions of employment pending completion of the Board’s administrative process.

The district court (Brown, J.) denied the petition in a four‑sentence text order, principally stating that Poor had “failed to articulate any cognizable irreparable harm,” and noting the pendency of the ALJ proceeding and perceived delay. On appeal, the Second Circuit (Calabresi, Chin, and Lee, JJ.; opinion by Chin, J.) reversed and remanded with instructions to issue the requested injunction.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Procedural Posture

After the Union filed unfair labor practice charges against Parking Systems in December 2023, Regional Director Poor investigated and issued a complaint in April 2024, triggering a § 10(j) authorization. The ALJ held a trial in June–July 2024. While the administrative case was pending, Poor filed a § 10(j) petition in the Eastern District of New York in October 2024.

The district court denied the petition and a hearing request in a short electronic order, finding no “cognizable irreparable harm,” pointing to pending ALJ proceedings and “eight months” of delay. Poor appealed. After the district court’s order, the ALJ issued a decision in January 2025 finding that Parking Systems:

• violated § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA by refusing to hire Classic’s employees because they were represented by the Union, and
• violated § 8(a)(5) by refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union and unilaterally changing terms and conditions of employment.

Those ALJ findings (with exceptions pending before the Board) became part of the record relevant to the court’s assessment of the likelihood of success.

B. Holdings

The Second Circuit makes several key rulings:

1. Rule 52(a)(2) Violation. The district court’s four‑sentence text order denying injunctive relief failed to state “the findings and conclusions that support its action” as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(2). Merely asserting that Plaintiff failed to show irreparable harm and that there was “delay” is conclusory and insufficient for appellate review.
2. Adoption of the Winter/McKinney Four‑Factor Standard for § 10(j). Post‑McKinney, the Second Circuit’s former two‑part “reasonable cause/just and proper” test (from cases like Paulsen v. Remington Lodging & Hosp., LLC) is no longer valid. District courts must apply the traditional equitable standard: likelihood of success on the merits, likelihood of irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest, as articulated in Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7 (2008).
3. Misplaced Reliance on Parallel ALJ Proceedings. The district court erred to the extent it treated the ongoing ALJ proceeding as a reason to deny § 10(j) relief. The “dual‑track” system—administrative merits proceedings and interim judicial relief—is exactly what § 10(j) authorizes.
4. Likelihood of Success on the Merits. Poor demonstrated a strong likelihood of success before the Board (and on eventual enforcement) on:
   • A § 8(a)(3) refusal‑to‑hire claim: Parking Systems refused to hire Classic’s unionized employees based on anti‑union animus.
   • Two § 8(a)(5) claims:
     • Failure to recognize and bargain with the Union as the representative of a substantially continuous and appropriate bargaining unit at Stony Brook.
     • Unilateral implementation of new employment terms in violation of the “perfectly clear successor” doctrine, requiring adherence to the predecessor’s CBA at the outset.
5. Irreparable Harm. The court held that the ongoing harm was to the unionization process and employee collective bargaining rights—recognized repeatedly as irreparable—rather than merely to individual employees. The Board’s five‑and‑a‑half‑month delay between complaint issuance and filing the petition did not defeat irreparable harm, particularly in light of:
   • the continued absence of full reinstatement and bargaining, and
   • the Board’s inability to issue enforceable orders due to a lack of quorum, making judicial interim relief uniquely necessary.
6. Balance of Equities & Public Interest. The equities favored injunctive relief: the unlawfully displaced Classic employees’ rights trumped the interests of replacement employees hired through the violation, and any operational and economic burdens on Parking Systems were limited and temporary. Public interest in effective enforcement of the NLRA and protection of collective bargaining relationships strongly supported relief.
7. Remedy: Direct Entry of Injunction. Rather than remanding for a new hearing, the Second Circuit exercised its discretion to reverse and remand with instructions to enter the requested § 10(j) injunction, relying on a fully developed record and the ALJ’s decision.

III. Factual and Legal Background

A. The Stony Brook Valet Operation

Stony Brook Hospital, a public medical center on Long Island, contracts out valet services. From 2015 to 2023, Classic held the contract. Classic’s valet attendants (34 of them in the relevant bargaining unit) were unionized with Local 1102, and worked under successive CBAs, the latest running through October 31, 2025.

In 2023, Stony Brook rebid the contract and awarded it to Parking Systems, which operates parking facilities across more than 250 locations in the Tri‑State area with around 1,000 employees. Parking Systems did not price its bid using union wage rates and disputes whether it knew the Classic employees were unionized at the time of bidding.

B. Parking Systems’ Recruitment and Refusal to Hire

Initially, Parking Systems considered retaining Classic’s workforce:

• October 2023 internal emails described “the biggest domino” as contacting Classic’s staff and determining “how many we’re retaining.”
• In early November, the Union’s counsel emailed Parking Systems asking it to retain Classic’s employees, recognize the Union, and assume the CBA. Parking Systems forwarded the email to its lawyer but never responded to the Union.
• The very next day, Parking Systems calculated the cost of hiring Classic employees at union wages, noting its bid was already “close to the bone.”
• Despite cost concerns, Parking Systems managers visited the Stony Brook lot, spoke with Classic employees, and distributed business cards with QR‑code links to online job applications.

Over the following weeks, Classic employees applied via the QR codes but received no responses. Internal emails referred to them as “35 lost soul attendants chatting with no info,” and managers voiced concern about potential “walk outs in the last 10 days or so” before Classic’s contract ended—suggesting a strategy of keeping them in the dark while securing continued service.

Parallel to this, Parking Systems posted an “urgently hiring” advertisement for valet attendants at Stony Brook, yet still did not hire Classic’s unionized employees.

C. The Reyes Interview and Direct Evidence of Animus

One standout Classic valet, Francis Gil Reyes, applied and was interviewed on November 25, 2023. At that meeting:

• Parking Systems offered Reyes a job, describing it as a “singular offer” while declining to hire the rest of Classic’s workforce.
• Reyes testified that co‑owner/account executive Bobby Gust told her that Parking Systems would not interview or hire other Classic employees because “they worked with the Union,” and “the company didn’t work with the Union.”
• Reyes refused the “singular” job offer because she found it unfair that her union co‑workers were excluded.
• Two days later, she texted the Union’s business agent, in Spanish, that the new company did not want to hire them “because we have a union and they do not work with the union.”

Gust denied making any anti‑union statements, but the ALJ later deemed Reyes more credible than Gust, labeling their conflicting testimony “the primary credibility dispute” and resolving it in Reyes’s favor based on documentary corroboration, demeanor, and logical inferences. Those ALJ credibility findings became central to the Court of Appeals’ likelihood of success analysis.

D. The Takeover and Non‑Union Operation

On December 1, 2023, Parking Systems took over Stony Brook’s valet operations. It did not hire any Classic employees at the transition date:

• Parking Systems claims it “operates very differently” than Classic—pointing to changes in valet station locations, traffic lanes, key handling, and revenue collection.
• But it conceded that it “continued to operate substantially the same parking service operation as existed under Classic Valet,” serving the same hospital parking needs.
• The new workforce at Stony Brook was non‑union.
• Former Classic employees, many of whom later found other jobs, told the Union they “lost faith” in it after losing their positions while unionized.

E. Administrative and Judicial Proceedings

The sequence of administrative and judicial actions is important:

• Dec. 4, 2023 – Union files unfair labor practice charge.
• Apr. 23, 2024 – Regional Director Poor issues a complaint (the earliest point at which § 10(j) relief is statutorily available).
• June–July 2024 – ALJ trial is held.
• Oct. 7, 2024 – Poor files § 10(j) petition in the E.D.N.Y., seeking:
  • Reinstatement of former Classic employees at Stony Brook without prejudice to their former rights and privileges,
  • Recognition of and bargaining with the Union,
  • Rescission, upon request, of unilateral changes in terms and conditions introduced by Parking Systems.
• Nov. 14, 2024 – District court issues a four‑sentence text order summarily denying the injunction.
• Jan. 24, 2025 – ALJ issues a decision finding § 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) violations and recommending corresponding remedial orders; Parking Systems files exceptions to the Board.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Rule 52(a)(2) and the Necessity of Findings in Injunction Orders

1. The Rule

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(2) provides:

In granting or refusing an interlocutory injunction, the court must . . . state the findings and conclusions that support its action.

The Second Circuit has consistently emphasized that a central purpose of Rule 52(a) is to facilitate meaningful appellate review. See, e.g.:

• NAACP v. Town of East Haven, 70 F.3d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 1995) – Findings and conclusions must enable a “clear understanding” of the basis of decision.
• Fair Housing in Huntington Committee Inc. v. Town of Huntington, 316 F.3d 357, 364 (2d Cir. 2003) – Conclusory orders do not satisfy the rule.

Orders that merely recite the legal standard or state bottom‑line conclusions on the injunction factors (likelihood of success, irreparable harm, etc.) are not enough. Cases like Alleyne v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 516 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), Romer v. Green Point Sav. Bank, 27 F.3d 12 (2d Cir. 1994), and Tekkno Lab’ys, Inc. v. Perales, 933 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1991) all held that bare assertions—e.g., simply declaring “irreparable harm” or “likelihood of success”—violate Rule 52(a).

2. The District Court’s Text Order

The district court’s full order stated:

Having failed to articulate any cognizable irreparable harm — the sine qua non of preliminary relief — plaintiff has failed to meet the demanding standard for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Notably, plaintiff has already sought the very same relief before an Administrative Law Judge, and seeks the same remedy here as in their filings in that proceeding, which remain sub judice. Additionally, the timing of plaintiff's filings, some eight months after the acts complained of, raises the specter of delay, which strongly weighs against the relief sought. Thus, the motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED.

The Second Circuit held this was inadequate under Rule 52(a)(2):

• The statement that Poor failed to “articulate any cognizable irreparable harm” is unsupported and offers no factual findings or explanation.
• The reference to “eight months” of delay does not explain what happened during those months, why it matters, or how it affects harm or the status quo.
• The order does not address likelihood of success on the merits, the balance of equities, or public interest in any meaningful way.

Thus, the order is conclusory and cannot be reconciled with prior precedent requiring articulated findings on each relevant factor.

3. Non‑Jurisdictional but Reviewable

Importantly, the court reiterates that Rule 52(a) errors are non‑jurisdictional. Relying on Hsu ex rel. Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 3, 85 F.3d 839, 848 n.1 (2d Cir. 1996), and Davis v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 166 F.3d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 1999), the court explains:

• The usual practice is to vacate and remand for proper findings—but that is not obligatory.
• If the appellate court can “discern enough solid facts from the record” (including the ALJ record) to make its own evaluation, it may proceed to decide the injunction question itself.

Here, because the record was fully developed before the ALJ and district court, and the ALJ had already issued a detailed decision with credibility findings, the Second Circuit elected to decide the § 10(j) injunction on the merits itself.

B. The Governing Legal Standard: Winter and Starbucks v. McKinney

1. The Pre‑McKinney Two‑Part Test

Before Starbucks v. McKinney, the Second Circuit applied a specialized, two‑prong test for § 10(j) petitions, derived from cases such as Paulsen v. Remington Lodging & Hospitality, LLC, 773 F.3d 462 (2d Cir. 2014):

1. Whether there is “reasonable cause” to believe an unfair labor practice has occurred; and
2. Whether temporary relief is “just and proper.”

This labor‑specific test essentially adjusted the normal injunction standards in deference to the Board’s role and the remedial purposes of § 10(j).

2. McKinney’s Rejection of Special § 10(j) Standards

In Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 602 U.S. 339 (2024), the Supreme Court rejected an analogous, lenient two‑part test used by the Sixth Circuit. The Court held that:

• Nothing in § 10(j) displaces “traditional equitable principles” governing injunctions.
• The appropriate standard is the familiar four‑factor test set out in Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7 (2008).

Under Winter, a movant must show:

• a likelihood of success on the merits,
• a likelihood of suffering irreparable harm absent relief,
• that the balance of equities tips in its favor, and
• that an injunction is in the public interest.

The Supreme Court observed that while “traditional equitable standards” apply, courts must apply them in the specific context of federal labor law and the NLRA’s policies—something the Second Circuit explicitly does here.

3. The Second Circuit’s Application and Clarifications

The Second Circuit in Poor expressly discards its pre‑McKinney standard and adopts Winter as the governing test for § 10(j) in this Circuit. It further refines several points:

• Likelihood of success is a prediction about the Board and eventual enforcement. Quoting Justice Jackson’s concurrence in McKinney, the court stresses that the district court is not predicting how it will ultimately rule on the merits, but how the Board will decide and whether that Board decision will be enforced by a Court of Appeals. See also Kaynard v. Mego Corp., 633 F.2d 1026, 1033 (2d Cir. 1980).
• Pre‑McKinney discussions of “irreparable harm” remain instructive. Although the formal framework changed, prior cases discussing when interim relief is “just and proper” under § 10(j) frequently turned on irreparable harm and preservation of the status quo. Those insights remain relevant to the Winter harm and equities analysis.

C. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

1. Use of the ALJ Decision and Silverman

Significantly, the court relies heavily on the ALJ’s post‑district‑court decision in assessing likelihood of success. Citing Silverman v. J.R.L. Food Corp., 196 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 1999), it explains that where:

• the ALJ’s findings rest on the same record as that before the district court, and
• the ALJ has resolved credibility disputes after live testimony,

an appellate court may consider whether the Board is likely to reject those credibility assessments or overturn factual findings grounded in them. If that seems unlikely—and deference to ALJ credibility determinations is strong—the ALJ’s findings become a “useful benchmark” in predicting the Board’s decision.

2. The § 8(a)(3) Refusal‑to‑Hire Claim and the Wright Line Framework

Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to encourage or discourage union membership “by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment.” The classic test is the Wright Line burden‑shifting framework:

1. The General Counsel (here, via the Regional Director) must show that protected activity (union activity or union status) was a motivating factor in the employer’s adverse action.
2. The burden then shifts to the employer to show, as an affirmative defense, that it would have taken the same action even absent the protected activity.

See Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981); Dir., OWCP v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 276 (1994); Pergament United States, Inc. v. NLRB, 920 F.2d 130, 137–39 (2d Cir. 1990).

a. Evidence of Animus

The court finds a powerful circumstantial and direct record showing anti‑union motive:

• Parking Systems initially discussed “retaining” Classic’s employees, consistent with hiring them.
• The company did a union‑rate cost analysis almost immediately after receiving the Union’s recognition and assumption request—revealing concern about union‑level wage costs.
• Managers distributed QR‑code applications to Classic employees and gave every appearance of recruiting them.
• At the Reyes interview, which the ALJ credited, Gust said it would not hire other Classic employees because “they worked with the Union” and “the company didn’t work with the Union.”
• Subsequently, Parking Systems hired no Classic employees, even as it posted “urgently hiring” advertisements for the very same positions.

The court references prior Second Circuit precedent permitting inference of anti‑union animus from similar statements and patterns, such as NLRB v. Staten Island Hotel Ltd. P’ship, 101 F.3d 858 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam), where a manager allegedly said the employer would not hire “anybody from the union.”

b. Rejection of the Employer’s Defense

Parking Systems argued that it maintained a neutral “policy” of not hiring predecessor employees. But this asserted policy was undermined by:

• its documented initial intention to hire Classic employees,
• its recruitment activities directed at Classic’s workforce, and
• the timing of its reversal after learning about the Union’s involvement and union wage rates.

Given these facts and the ALJ’s credibility findings, the court concludes that Poor is likely to show that union affiliation substantially motivated the refusal to hire, and that Parking Systems cannot sustain its Wright Line affirmative defense.

3. The § 8(a)(5) Duty to Bargain and Successorship

Section 8(a)(5) makes it unlawful for an employer to “refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees.” The central issues here are:

1. Whether Parking Systems was a “legal successor” to Classic at Stony Brook, triggering a duty to recognize and bargain with the Union.
2. Whether the Stony Brook unit remained an “appropriate” bargaining unit.

a. “Substantial continuity” and the Fall River/ Burns framework

Under NLRB v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972), and Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987), a successor employer has a duty to recognize and bargain with the predecessor’s union where:

• there is “substantial continuity” of business operations, and
• a majority of the new employer’s workforce are former employees of the predecessor in an appropriate unit.

“Substantial continuity” is evaluated under a totality‑of‑the‑circumstances test that looks to:

• whether the business of both employers is essentially the same;
• whether employees perform the same jobs, in the same conditions, under the same supervisors;
• whether the same facilities, production processes (or in service contexts, functional operations), and customers are involved;
• importantly, whether employees “view their job situations as essentially unaltered.”

See Fall River, 482 U.S. at 43.

Applying those factors, the court finds:

• Classic and Parking Systems both provided valet parking at Stony Brook for the same hospital and the same types of customers.
• Parking Systems admitted that it “continued to operate substantially the same parking service operation as existed under Classic Valet.”
• Operational changes (new lane, changed station locations, revised key and revenue procedures) were “minor” and would not change employees’ perception that they were doing the same basic job.

Thus, Poor is likely to show substantial continuity.

b. The Presumption of Majority Status Where Discrimination Occurs

Ordinarily, the successorship duty attaches when the new employer hires a “substantial and representative complement” of employees, at which point one can determine whether a majority are predecessor employees. But where a new employer refuses to hire predecessor employees due to anti‑union discrimination, the Board presumes that, but for that discrimination, predecessor employees would have represented a majority. See Pressroom Cleaners & Service Employees Int’l Union, Local 32BJ, 361 NLRB 643 (2014).

The court endorses this presumption and notes that Second Circuit precedent is consistent with it. In Staten Island Hotel, for example, the court approved a Board remedy imposing predecessor contract terms where discriminatory hiring created uncertainty about what the bargaining relationship would otherwise have been, holding that the “wrongdoer” must bear the risk of that uncertainty.

Here, because Poor is likely to succeed on the § 8(a)(3) claim, she is also likely to show that, absent discriminatory refusal to hire, Parking Systems would have retained a majority of Classic’s employees—satisfying the “majority” element for successorship.

c. Appropriateness of the Stony Brook Bargaining Unit

Parking Systems argued that the single‑facility Stony Brook unit was no longer an “appropriate” unit because its 250‑site network is allegedly “functionally integrated” and employees are interchanged between locations.

But the Board and Second Circuit have long applied a strong “single‑facility presumption”: a single facility is presumptively an appropriate unit, even for multi‑facility employers. See Serv. Employees Int’l Union, Local 32BJ v. NLRB, 647 F.3d 435, 449 (2d Cir. 2011); Staten Island Univ. Hosp. v. NLRB, 24 F.3d 450, 454 (2d Cir. 1994).

To overcome this presumption, an employer must show that functional integration with other facilities is so substantial that the single facility lacks a separate identity. Factors include:

• Geographic proximity;
• Similarity of skills, functions, and employment conditions;
• Centralization of administration and supervision;
• Extent of employee interchange;
• Degree of operational integration; and
• Bargaining history.

Here, Stony Brook had:

• A long, eight‑year bargaining history as a standalone unit.
• Dedicated on‑site management.
• No substantial evidence of actual or planned employee interchange between Stony Brook and other locations beyond general corporate practices.
• And tellingly, Parking Systems’ only unionized site was also organized as a single‑facility unit.

Given the “historical unit” status and the heavy burden on successors to show that such units are no longer appropriate, the court concludes that Parking Systems is unlikely to rebut the presumption. See Banknote Corp. of America v. NLRB, 84 F.3d 637, 642–47 (2d Cir. 1996) (enforcing Board’s protection of historical units absent repugnancy to the Act).

d. Result: Likely § 8(a)(5) Violation for Failure to Bargain

Because Parking Systems is likely to be found a legal successor to Classic with an appropriate Stony Brook unit and a presumptive majority of predecessor employees (but for its own discrimination), it was obligated to recognize and bargain with the Union. It did not do so. Poor therefore has a strong likelihood of success on this § 8(a)(5) theory.

4. The § 8(a)(5) Unilateral Change Claim and the “Perfectly Clear” Successor Doctrine

The second § 8(a)(5) theory concerns unilateral changes to terms and conditions of employment—specifically, Parking Systems’ failure to honor Classic’s CBA rates and conditions when it took over.

a. General Rule and the “Perfectly Clear” Exception

Under Burns and Fall River:

• Ordinarily, a successor is not bound by its predecessor’s CBA and may set initial employment terms unilaterally before bargaining begins.
• However, where it is “perfectly clear” that the new employer intends to retain all of the predecessor’s employees from the outset, the duty to bargain attaches immediately, and the employer cannot unilaterally undercut the existing CBA as initial terms. See Burns, 406 U.S. at 294–95.

In traditional “perfectly clear” cases, this is a factual question about the new employer’s announced and actual retention intentions.

b. The “Automatic” Perfectly Clear Rule for Discriminatory Successors

The Board has developed a specialized corollary: where a successor is found to have been a successor only because it unlawfully refused to hire predecessor employees based on union status, the “perfectly clear” rule applies automatically. This is the so‑called Love’s Barbeque line of cases. See:

• Love’s Barbeque Restaurant No. 62, 245 NLRB 78, 82 (1979), enforced in relevant part sub nom. Kallmann v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 1094, 1102–03 (9th Cir. 1981).
• Capital Cleaning Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 999, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
• Adams & Assocs., Inc. v. NLRB, 871 F.3d 358, 374 (5th Cir. 2017).
• Pace Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 118 F.3d 585, 593–94 (8th Cir. 1997).
• U.S. Marine Corp. v. NLRB, 944 F.2d 1305, 1320 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc).

The logic is straightforward: when successorship is predicated on a presumption that a majority of predecessor employees would have been retained absent discrimination, then from a remedial and policy perspective it is as if the employer had declared a “perfectly clear” intention to retain them all but then thwarted that outcome by discrimination.

The Second Circuit strongly endorses this framework. It links the “automatic perfectly clear” rule to its own reasoning in Staten Island Hotel, where it affirmed a Board remedy imposing predecessor CBA rates as backpay until good‑faith bargaining occurred, even though actual terms absent discrimination were uncertain.

Crucially, the court emphasizes:

• The remedy is temporally limited—only until the successor bargains in good faith to agreement or impasse. It is thus restorative, not punitive.
• Any uncertainty about what terms would have existed absent discrimination is caused by the employer’s own unlawful conduct; thus, it is fair that the wrongdoer “bear the risk of the uncertainty which its own wrong created.”

c. Application to Parking Systems

Since Poor is likely to show that:

• Parking Systems is a legal successor to Classic, and
• successorship arises only because of Parking Systems’ discriminatory refusal to hire Classic’s unionized staff,

the “automatic perfectly clear” doctrine applies. Therefore:

• Parking Systems was bound to maintain Classic’s CBA terms from the outset as the initial conditions of employment.
• Its unilateral deviations (e.g., wages, benefits, and other terms inconsistent with the predecessor CBA) constitute a violation of § 8(a)(5) and § 8(d) under NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962) (prohibiting unilateral changes in mandatory bargaining subjects absent impasse).

Again, this obligation is not indefinite: once reinstatement and bargaining have occurred and negotiations either succeed or reach lawful impasse, Parking Systems may implement new terms reasonably comprehended in its pre‑impasse proposals. See Emhart Indus., Hartford Div. v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 372, 376 (2d Cir. 1990).

D. Irreparable Harm

1. The Nature of Harm in § 10(j) Cases

Under Winter, a party must demonstrate that irreparable harm is “likely” in the absence of preliminary relief. In the § 10(j) context, the Second Circuit has repeatedly stressed that the relevant harm is not primarily:

• backpay (which can be remedied later), or
• individual employee losses in isolation,

but rather:

• harm to the collective bargaining process, and
• undermining of the unionization process and employee confidence in the union.

See Hoffman ex rel. NLRB v. Inn Credible Caterers, Ltd., 247 F.3d 360, 368–69 (2d Cir. 2001); Paulsen v. Remington Lodging & Hosp., LLC, 773 F.3d 462, 469–71 (2d Cir. 2014).

In successorship situations, this concern is particularly acute. Fall River Dyeing recognized that employees and their union are in a “peculiarly vulnerable position” during the transition; a successor’s refusal to recognize the union or to hire union employees can inflict a “particularly potent wound” on the bargaining relationship. See also Bloedorn v. Francisco Foods, Inc., 276 F.3d 270, 298 (7th Cir. 2001).

2. The Harm in Poor v. Parking Systems Plus

Poor expressly alleged harm to:

• the “national policy protecting workers’ right to unionize,” and
• the rights of Parking Systems’ employees and former Classic employees to engage in collective bargaining.

The record showed:

• Classic employees lost their jobs and their long‑standing union relationship when Parking Systems refused to hire them.
• They became disillusioned, telling the Union that they felt “out of work only because they had a union” and that the Union was “powerless” to help.
• Parking Systems quickly replaced them with a non‑union workforce, who are less likely—if at all—to organize under the same Union, thereby potentially entrenching a non‑union status.

These are precisely the kinds of harms the Second Circuit has held to be irreparable:

• Loss of employees’ collective bargaining rights and weakening or destruction of their ability to act through their chosen representative.
• Damage to employee confidence in the union, rendering later Board orders “meaningless in the context of a new majority workforce committed to non‑unionization.” See Inn Credible Caterers, 247 F.3d at 369.

3. The Role of Delay

Parking Systems and the district court focused on the time between:

• the alleged unlawful acts (late 2023) and
• the filing of the § 10(j) petition (October 2024),

characterizing this period as eight to ten months of “delay” undermining any claim of urgent harm.

The Second Circuit corrects the framing in two ways:

1. Only the period after complaint issuance is relevant to § 10(j).
   Section 10(j) authorizes the Board to seek injunctive relief only “upon issuance of a complaint.” 29 U.S.C. § 160(j). Poor issued the complaint in April 2024 and filed the petition in October 2024. Thus, the operative delay is roughly five and a half months—not eight or ten.
2. Delay alone is not dispositive.
   Drawing on Remington Lodging and HealthBridge Mgmt., the court reiterates that passage of time “alone” does not defeat irreparable harm, especially when there remains an ongoing injury to the unionization process that an injunction can still help to remedy.
   Courts instead ask whether an injunction can still “restore the status quo as it existed prior to the unfair labor practices.” Remington Lodging, 773 F.3d at 471; Kreisberg v. HealthBridge Mgmt., LLC, 732 F.3d 131, 141 (2d Cir. 2013).

The decision distinguishes Remington Lodging, where four months of delay coincided with the employer having:

• offered full reinstatement to all discharged employees, and
• restored their prior pay and benefits,

making further injunctive relief potentially futile. In Poor, by contrast:

• Parking Systems had not fully reinstated the Classic employees under prior terms; only 11 of them had been re‑hired, and there was no evidence they were restored to CBA wages and benefits.
• Many former employees indicated a willingness to return if offered their former terms—demonstrating that a § 10(j) injunction could still meaningfully restore the pre‑violation status quo.

4. The Board’s Lack of Quorum as a Factor in Irreparability

A distinctive factual overlay in this case is that, at the time of the decision, the NLRB lacked a quorum due to the Supreme Court’s interim ruling in Trump v. Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. 1415 (2025), which enjoined the reinstatement of a removed Board member. Under New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674 (2010), the Board requires at least three members to issue final decisions and orders.

As a result:

• The ALJ’s decision in this case cannot yet be adopted or enforced by the Board.
• No final, judicially enforceable Board order resolving the unfair labor practices is forthcoming in the near term.

This deepens the irreparability of the harm: absent § 10(j) relief, Parking Systems would have an extended window to consolidate its non‑union workforce and erode the bargaining rights the ALJ found had been unlawfully suppressed—while the Board remains institutionally unable to act.

E. Balance of Equities and Public Interest

1. Competing Hardships

Parking Systems argued that a reinstatement order would:

• Require it to terminate or reassign over twenty employees currently working at Stony Brook.
• Disrupt its operations and personnel allocation across its 250‑plus locations.
• Force it to implement CBA terms “inconsistent” with its preferred operating model.

The court is unpersuaded:

• Parking Systems had originally intended to hire Classic’s employees and has already re‑hired 11 of them, suggesting operational feasibility of integrating the remainder.
• Its own witnesses testified that when it loses accounts, it “always repurpose[s] and reschedule[s]” staff to other sites. It can do the same here: reassign current Stony Brook employees elsewhere rather than necessarily firing them.
• Even if some current employees are terminated, “the rights of improperly discharged employees take priority over the rights of those hired to replace them,” a principle reaffirmed from Remington Lodging, 773 F.3d at 469.
• Operational and financial burdens of temporarily applying the predecessor’s CBA are offset by the need to remedy and deter deliberate unfair labor practices; further, the obligation is limited in time to the negotiation period.

2. Public Interest

Public interest considerations are especially weighty in § 10(j) litigation because:

• Congress specifically added § 10(j) to empower the Board to prevent irreparable erosion of labor rights during lengthy administrative processes.
• Courts have long recognized that § 10(j) operates “in the public interest and not in vindication of purely private rights.” See Seeler v. Trading Port, Inc., 517 F.2d 33, 40 (2d Cir. 1975).

Here, granting the injunction:

• Preserves the integrity of an eight‑year collective bargaining relationship at a single hospital facility.
• Discourages employers from manipulating successorship transitions to “wipe out” existing unions by refusing to hire incumbent unionized staff.
• Signals that anti‑union discrimination and strategic non‑recognition will be met with swift, meaningful interim relief.
• Offsets systemic delays at the Board level, especially in light of quorum issues, thus promoting faith in statutory enforcement mechanisms.

As to the public’s interest in continuity of parking services at Stony Brook, the court implicitly notes that an injunction does not disrupt valet services; it simply changes which employees are performing the work and under what conditions. Indeed, reinstating experienced Classic employees arguably enhances service quality and continuity.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. Section 10(j) Injunctions

What is § 10(j)?
Section 10(j) of the NLRA allows the NLRB, through its General Counsel and Regional Directors, to ask a federal district court to issue temporary injunctions against employers (or unions) accused of unfair labor practices while the Board’s own administrative case is still pending.

Why is it necessary?
Board proceedings can take years: ALJ hearing, Board review, and then enforcement or review in the court of appeals. Without interim relief, by the time the Board issues a final order, the employer might already have:

• broken the union,
• replaced union supporters with a new workforce, and
• made bargaining orders effectively moot.

§ 10(j) allows courts to “freeze” or restore the situation so that a final Board decision can still have real impact.

B. Successor Employers and “Substantial Continuity”

When a business changes hands (e.g., through sale, contract re‑bid, or outsourcing), the new entity may be a “successor employer” under the NLRA. This does not depend on formal corporate relationships but on practical realities:

• Is the “business” essentially the same (same services or products, same customers, same facilities)?
• Are the jobs substantially the same (similar duties, supervisors, working conditions)?
• Would employees feel their jobs are basically unchanged except for the name on the paycheck?

If so, and if a majority of the new workforce consists of the predecessor’s employees in an appropriate unit, the successor must recognize and bargain with the existing union.

C. The “Perfectly Clear” Successor Doctrine

Normally, a successor employer may set its own initial terms and conditions of employment. The duty to bargain arises once it has hired a representative complement and majority status is apparent.

But there is a special rule for “perfectly clear” successors:

• If at the outset the new employer clearly indicates that it intends to hire all of the predecessor’s employees, it cannot then unilaterally impose worse terms.
• In those cases, the employer must first bargain with the union over any proposed changes—effectively starting from the predecessor’s CBA as a baseline.

In cases like Poor, where the successor is found to have hiring predecessor employees precisely to evade union obligations, courts presume it would have hired them and treat it as “perfectly clear” for remedial purposes, binding it to the predecessor’s CBA at least until bargaining occurs.

D. The Single‑Facility Presumption

A “bargaining unit” is the group of employees a union represents. Unions and employers can bargain at different structural levels: a single plant, multiple plants, or the whole company.

For multi‑facility employers, the default assumption is that a single facility—like one hospital or one hotel—is a valid bargaining unit. To upset that presumption, the employer must show that:

• the facility’s operations and employees are so intertwined with other locations that they lack any real separate identity, and
• history and practice no longer support separate bargaining.

Long‑standing history of a single‑facility CBA, as at Stony Brook, makes this presumption particularly strong.

VI. Impact and Significance

A. Doctrinal Impact in the Second Circuit

1. Firm Adoption of Winter/McKinney for § 10(j)

Poor is the Second Circuit’s first detailed application of the Supreme Court’s McKinney directive. It definitively:

• Abrogates the “reasonable cause/just and proper” § 10(j) framework used in cases like Remington Lodging and Paulsen.
• Requires district courts to apply the four Winter factors and to articulate factual findings and legal conclusions on each.
• Stresses that likelihood of success analysis must be framed as a prediction about the Board’s and reviewing court’s future decisions, not a mini‑trial on ultimate liability.

For district judges, this means § 10(j) petitions now require the same sort of structured analysis and explained reasoning expected in other preliminary injunction cases—no summary text orders.

2. Continued Relevance of Pre‑McKinney Case Law

While the formal test changed, the court makes clear that:

• Pre‑McKinney cases analyzing “just and proper” relief under § 10(j) remain highly relevant to the equitable prongs—irreparable harm, balance of harms, and public interest.
• Doctrinal tools such as the emphasis on preserving the status quo and protecting the unionization process still guide the analysis.

B. Strengthening of Successor Obligations and the “Perfectly Clear” Doctrine

The court’s full-throated endorsement of:

• the Pressroom Cleaners presumption (majority status but for discrimination), and
• the Love’s Barbeque–type automatic “perfectly clear” application when successorship exists only because of discriminatory failure to hire,

will reverberate in future successorship cases. Employers contemplating:

• refusing to hire incumbent union employees to “start fresh” with a non‑union staff, or
• using systemic discrimination as a way to avoid recognition duties,

now face an increased risk that:

• courts will treat them as having been obligated to accept predecessor CBA terms from day one, and
• § 10(j) injunctions will restore that status quo even before the Board can act definitively.

C. Practical Guidance for Practitioners

1. For Regional Directors and Unions

Poor offers useful guidance for framing § 10(j) petitions:

• Emphasize the unionization process and long‑standing bargaining relationships as the core irreparable harm.
• Explain the timing of the petition with reference to:
  • the date of complaint issuance (statutory trigger), and
  • Board authorization procedures (which take time).
• Where an ALJ decision issues before appellate review (or even before district court decision), highlight the ALJ’s factual and credibility findings and argue that the Board is unlikely to overturn them.
• In successorship cases, fully develop the Pressroom Cleaners and Love’s Barbeque line of authority and request remedies restoring predecessor CBA terms pending bargaining.

2. For Employers

The decision warns successor employers that:

• Refusing to hire an incumbent unionized workforce because of its union status can not only generate liability but also bind the employer to the predecessor’s CBA via interim injunctions.
• Assertions of across‑the‑board “policies” against hiring predecessor staff will be closely scrutinized against contemporaneous emails, recruitment conduct, and statements to employees.
• Attempted reliance on “delay” will be weighed against proof of ongoing harm, the Board’s internal processes and current institutional constraints (such as quorum), and the extent to which the employer has undertaken voluntary remediation (reinstatement, recognition, bargaining).

D. Institutional Implications

The court’s emphasis on the Board’s lack of quorum and the need for § 10(j) relief to backstop enforcement underscores a larger institutional point: labor law enforcement is vulnerable to political and structural disruptions in the Board’s composition. Courts of appeals may be more inclined to grant robust interim remedies when the Board is temporarily incapacitated.

Additionally, the court’s willingness to reverse outright and order entry of the injunction, rather than remand for further proceedings, sends a clear signal that:

• district courts must perform careful, articulated § 10(j) analyses; and
• when they fail to do so and the record is otherwise complete, appellate courts will not hesitate to supply the missing analysis and relief themselves.

VII. Conclusion

Poor v. Parking Systems Plus, Inc. is a pivotal Second Circuit decision that:

• Firmly aligns § 10(j) practice in the Circuit with the Supreme Court’s Winter/McKinney framework.
• Reaffirms and sharpens the Board’s successorship doctrines, including the presumption of majority status where discriminatory hiring occurred and the automatic application of the “perfectly clear” rule in such cases.
• Clarifies that the gravamen of irreparable harm in labor injunction cases is damage to the unionization process and collective bargaining rights, not merely individual backpay losses.
• Holds that moderate Board delay, viewed from the date of complaint issuance, does not by itself defeat irreparable harm—especially where reinstatement and bargaining have not been restored and the Board is institutionally constrained from issuing final orders.
• Signals that district courts must comply strictly with Rule 52(a)(2) by issuing reasoned, fact‑based injunction orders open to appellate scrutiny.

In practical terms, the opinion strengthens the toolkit available to the NLRB and unions seeking to preserve existing collective bargaining relationships during transitions to successor employers, especially when the successor appears to be exploiting the changeover to remove union influence. For employers, it highlights the legal and remedial risks of discrimination‑based strategies for avoiding union obligations, particularly in industries heavily reliant on contracting and rebidding—like building services, hospitality, and healthcare support.

More broadly, Poor underscores the judiciary’s role in ensuring that the NLRA’s promise of meaningful collective bargaining is not reduced to an empty formality by procedural delay or structural gridlock at the Board. Through a rigorous application of traditional equitable principles, adapted to the unique features of labor law, the decision provides a detailed and authoritative roadmap for future § 10(j) litigation in the Second Circuit and beyond.