Political Facebook Posts Framed as Opinions with Disclosed Basis Are Not Actionable as Defamation under Michigan Law: Lento Law Group, P.C. v. Lewis (6th Cir. 2025)

Political Facebook Posts Framed as Opinions with Disclosed Basis Are Not Actionable as Defamation under Michigan Law: Lento Law Group, P.C. v. Lewis (6th Cir. 2025)

Note: The opinion is “Not Recommended for Publication.” While it carries limited precedential force within the Sixth Circuit, it robustly applies and synthesizes Michigan defamation principles to the context of social media and political discourse.

Introduction

In Lento Law Group, P.C. v. Lewis, the Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of defamation claims arising from Facebook posts in a local political discussion group, holding that the statements were nonactionable opinions under Michigan law. The posts criticized perceived ties between Lento Law Group and certain Flint City Council members, insinuating ethical concerns about personalized firm-branded shirts and suggesting the firm’s attendance at council meetings was to tee up litigation against the city. The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding that in the context of a political Facebook forum, and given the language, framing, and disclosure of underlying facts, no reasonable reader would understand the posts as asserting provable facts about Lento.

The parties were:

  • Plaintiff-Appellant: Lento Law Group, P.C., a law firm active in Flint, Michigan municipal affairs.
  • Defendants-Appellees: Ladel Lewis (a Flint City Council member and political opponent of council members friendly to Lento) and Linda Ann Pohly (a participant in community commentary).

The core legal issue was whether the posts—comprised of questions, subjective assessments, and interpretations of disclosed facts (including a photograph)—could be reasonably read as asserting verifiable facts that are false, as required to sustain a defamation claim under Michigan law.

Summary of the Opinion

  • The court applied Michigan substantive defamation law in this diversity case and reviewed the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo.
  • Michigan requires a defamatory statement to assert facts that are provable as false; opinions not reasonably interpreted as factual assertions are not actionable.
  • Context matters. Statements made in social media forums devoted to political debate (like the “Flint Politics” Facebook group) are generally understood by reasonable readers as opinion-laden and not reliable sources of factual assertions.
  • As to Councilwoman Lewis:
    • Her post used qualifying language (“it appears”), posed questions, and ended with a subjective assessment of “loyalty,” and it disclosed the factual basis (a photo of council members wearing personalized Lento shirts at a public festival).
    • These features signaled opinion, not fact, under Michigan law; thus, the statement was not defamatory.
  • As to Pohly:
    • Her reply that Lento attended council meetings “to set themselves the ability to sue the city” was a subjective assessment of motive in a political forum.
    • Absent a claim of personal knowledge or undisclosed facts, this was nonactionable opinion. Even if the label “ambulance chaser” had been used, in this context it would be rhetorical hyperbole, not a factual assertion.
  • The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal and expressly did not reach whether Lento is a limited-purpose public figure (and thus subject to a heightened “actual malice” standard) because it resolved the case on the “defamatory meaning” element.
  • On appellate jurisdiction, the court found finality under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 after the plaintiff disavowed future claims regarding a voluntarily dismissed defendant, citing Wesco Ins. Co. v. Roderick Linton Belfance, LLP.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • Smith v. Anonymous Joint Enterprise, 793 N.W.2d 533 (Mich. 2010):
    • Sets out Michigan’s defamation elements and underscores that actionable statements must assert false, defamatory facts.
    • Also notes that opinions can be defamatory if they imply undisclosed defamatory facts, but the implication must be reasonable in context.
  • Sarkar v. Doe, 897 N.W.2d 207 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016):
    • Reaffirms that statements must be provable as false; courts must examine context and whether the speaker disclosed the factual basis for a conclusion.
    • The court in Lento draws on Sarkar’s principle that disclosing the basis (e.g., a photograph) signals opinion rather than fact.
  • Ghanam v. Does, 845 N.W.2d 128 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014):
    • A leading case on internet speech, holding that posts on message boards and similar fora are often opinion, rhetorical hyperbole, or otherwise not reasonably read as statements of fact.
    • Crucially informs the “forum context” analysis; the Sixth Circuit leans on Ghanam to classify “Flint Politics” Facebook posts as opinion-heavy and unreliable as factual sources for reasonable readers.
  • Redmond v. Heller, 957 N.W.2d 357 (Mich. Ct. App. 2020):
    • Clarifies that ordinary consumers of social media understand that online posts, even when phrased as assertions, are frequently not intended as factual claims.
    • Used to rebut the argument that named (non-anonymous) authorship makes Facebook posts sufficiently “reliable” to imply facts.
  • Hope-Jackson v. Washington, 877 N.W.2d 736 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015):
    • Introduces the concept of “rhetorical hyperbole” and the impact of contextual indicators of unreliability on whether a reasonable reader would infer factual claims.
  • Hantz Group, Inc. v. Haney, No. 292954, 2010 WL 4864812 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2010):
    • Holds that subjective assessments of conduct and motives (e.g., describing an organization as a high-pressure sales cover) are not statements of fact.
    • Directly parallels Pohly’s motive-based assessment regarding why the firm attended council meetings.
  • Knutson v. Gassert, No. 361675, 2023 WL 5988457 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2023):
    • Concludes that even labeling a business “illegal” may be nonactionable where the speaker discloses an underlying factual basis, signaling opinion rather than undisclosed fact.
    • Supports the court’s reliance on Lewis’s sharing of the photo and framing (“it appears”) to characterize her post as opinion.
  • Daoust v. Reid, No. 361405, 2023 WL 324409 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2023):
    • Reiterates that nonactionable opinion cannot reasonably be read as a factual assertion about the plaintiff.
  • Procedural and Jurisdictional Authorities:
    • Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007): Pleading standard; complaint must state a plausible claim.
    • Warman v. Mount St. Joseph Univ., 144 F.4th 880 (6th Cir. 2025): On a motion to dismiss, court accepts well-pleaded facts as true.
    • Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996): Diversity cases apply state substantive law.
    • Ryniewicz v. Clarivate Analytics, 803 F. App’x 858 (6th Cir. 2020): Whether language is capable of defamatory meaning is a question of law.
    • Wesco Ins. Co. v. Roderick Linton Belfance, LLP, 39 F.4th 326 (6th Cir. 2022): Supports appellate jurisdiction under § 1291 after the plaintiff disclaims future claims related to dismissed parties.
    • Savel v. MetroHealth Sys., 96 F.4th 932 (6th Cir. 2024): De novo review of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals.

Legal Reasoning

1) Context Is King: Social Media as a Forum for Opinion and Hyperbole

The court began with context: the statements appeared in the “Flint Politics” Facebook group, a venue for local political commentary. Under Ghanam and Redmond, courts recognize that online fora—particularly those devoted to political dispute—are widely understood as vehicles for opinions, not reliable sources for facts “upon which a reasonable person would rely.”

Lento’s attempt to distinguish Ghanam on the basis that the posts there were anonymous failed. The Sixth Circuit explained that named authorship may sometimes increase perceived reliability, but it does not override the broader principle that social media posts, in context, are not typically read as factual assertions. Ordinary consumers know that online commentary is frequently not intended as fact even when framed as seemingly factual statements.

2) Councilwoman Lewis’s Post: Questions, Qualifiers, and Disclosed Facts Signal Opinion

Councilwoman Lewis posted a photo of Councilwomen Winfrey-Carter and Burns wearing personalized Lento shirts at a festival where Lento had a booth and added this commentary:

“According to the 6th Ward’s post defining gifts, it appears that these fancy personalized Lento shirts qualify. Were they more than $25? Can you represent the city and the law firm in litigation with the city at the same time? Is that affecting their votes? Is this why they are not voting to give the residents ARPA dollars? Looks like they are more loyal to Lento than the residents of the City of Flint.”

The court identified two independently sufficient reasons why this was nonactionable:

  • Language and Framing: The post is suffused with qualifiers (“it appears”) and questions rather than assertions. Michigan law recognizes that in context, questions and qualifiers tend to indicate opinion, not fact. The concluding sentence—“Looks like they are more loyal to Lento than the residents of the City of Flint”—is plainly a subjective value judgment, not a verifiable proposition.
  • Disclosed Factual Basis: Lewis presented the underlying facts (the photo, the public setting, and references to gift rules). Under Sarkar and Knutson, when a speaker discloses the factual basis for a conclusion, the characterization is treated as opinion, not a statement implying undisclosed defamatory facts.

In sum, a reasonable reader in that forum would understand Councilwoman Lewis’s post as a critical, opinion-based interpretation of public facts and political conduct—not as an assertion that any particular law was actually broken in a verifiable way.

3) Pohly’s Post: Subjective Assessments of Motive Are Opinion

In response to another user’s remark questioning whether Lento attended council meetings to find ways to sue the city, Pohly replied:

“yes, that is why they are there. We don’t know for sure who is funding these lawsuits, but from looking at the Go Fund Me account, there is not enough money to pay for all of this litigation. I am sure at least some of the money is coming from somewhere else.”

The court treated this as a subjective assessment of motive, analogous to the “high-pressure sales cover” characterization deemed nonactionable in Hantz Group v. Haney. In the absence of a claim of personal knowledge or undisclosed facts, and given the political Facebook context, a reasonable reader would understand Pohly to be speculating about why the firm attended meetings, not asserting verifiable facts about the firm’s intent or funding.

The court went further, noting that even a direct epithet like “ambulance chaser” would function as rhetorical hyperbole in this context, akin to casual online use of “crook” or “criminal,” which Ghanam treats as nonactionable absent an assertion of specific facts.

4) What the Court Did Not Decide

  • Public Figure / Actual Malice: The court expressly declined to decide whether Lento is a limited-purpose public figure. Because the statements were nonactionable opinions, the panel did not reach whether a heightened fault standard (actual malice) would apply.
  • Other Defamation Elements: Having resolved the case on the first element (defamatory meaning), the court did not reach privilege, fault, or damages questions.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although nonprecedential, the decision crystallizes and operationalizes several Michigan defamation principles in the increasingly common arena of local political commentary on social media:

  • Social media forum effects: Posts in politically charged online groups are presumptively viewed as opinion or rhetorical hyperbole. Plaintiffs face an uphill battle at the pleading stage to show that statements are reasonably read as factual assertions.
  • Framing matters: Qualifiers (“it appears”), question marks, and clear value judgments (“looks like they are more loyal”) will push statements into the “opinion” category.
  • Disclose your basis: When a poster links to or includes underlying facts (e.g., a photo), their subsequent characterizations are more likely to be protected as opinion, because readers can evaluate the basis for themselves.
  • Motive is subjective: Assessments about why a person or company is acting (e.g., “they’re here to sue”) are typically subjective and not verifiable, particularly in political contexts.
  • Rhetorical epithets are rarely actionable: Absent specific factual assertions, labels such as “ambulance chaser,” “crook,” or “criminal” are treated as hyperbole, not as statements of fact.
  • Pleading Strategy: Plaintiffs alleging defamation arising from online posts should focus on concrete, specific factual assertions (who, what, when, where, how) that are demonstrably false—mere expressions of opinion, implication by innuendo without undisclosed facts, or rhetorical questions will not survive Rule 12(b)(6).
  • Trial court gatekeeping: The opinion endorses early resolution where the forum and phrasing show nonactionable opinion, reducing the chilling effect and expense of protracted discovery in speech cases.

This decision will likely be cited for the proposition that Michigan law strongly protects political commentary on social media when statements disclose their basis and are framed as opinion. It further signals that the presence of named authorship does not, by itself, transform social media posts into assertions of fact.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Defamation (Michigan): To win, a plaintiff must show (1) a false and defamatory statement of fact about the plaintiff, (2) unprivileged publication to a third party, (3) at least negligence, and (4) defamation per se or special damages.
  • Provable as false: The key first element requires a statement that can be tested as true or false. Opinions and value judgments—especially about ethics, loyalty, or motive—are usually not capable of such proof.
  • Opinion vs. implied fact: An opinion can imply facts if the speaker suggests they know undisclosed, defamatory facts. But when the speaker discloses the underlying facts, their interpretation is understood as opinion.
  • Rhetorical hyperbole: Exaggerated or figurative language—common in political debates—does not convey factual meaning to reasonable readers.
  • Context: Where and how a statement appears matters. Social media, chat rooms, and political discussion groups are contexts in which readers expect opinions and hyperbolic rhetoric, not sober, verifiable fact reporting.
  • Rule 12(b)(6): A motion to dismiss tests whether the complaint states a plausible claim. Courts accept well-pleaded facts but not legal conclusions. If the alleged statements are not capable of defamatory meaning as a matter of law, dismissal is appropriate.
  • Diversity and choice of law: Federal courts apply state substantive law (here, Michigan) to defamation claims when jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship.
  • Defamation per se vs. special harm: Some statements are so inherently damaging (per se) that damages are presumed; others (per quod) require proof of special harm. But a plaintiff must first clear the threshold that the statement is defamatory (i.e., a provably false statement of fact).
  • Finality under § 1291: An appeal can proceed if all claims are resolved and the plaintiff disavows further litigation against a dismissed party, providing a final decision for appellate review.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Lento Law Group, P.C. v. Lewis reinforces a decisive lesson in Michigan defamation law: in the modern marketplace of ideas—especially on social media platforms dedicated to political discourse—statements framed as questions, couched with qualifiers, expressing value judgments, or assessing motives, and that disclose their factual basis, are nonactionable opinions. The court’s careful attention to context, language, and disclosure aligns with Michigan appellate precedents like Ghanam, Redmond, Smith, Sarkar, Haney, and Knutson.

Even though the opinion is unpublished, it is a clear application of settled principles: defamation law does not convert political criticism into liability absent an assertion of provably false facts. For future litigants, the case underscores the importance of distinguishing between factual accusations and opinionated commentary—particularly in the volatile and opinion-rich environs of social media. For courts, it reaffirms the propriety of resolving such claims at the motion-to-dismiss stage when the statements are, as a matter of law, incapable of defamatory meaning.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

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