Point‑Blank Spede‑Heat Is Deadly Force: Sixth Circuit Narrows Qualified Immunity for Riot‑Control Munitions and Demands Specific Proof for Monell Ratification

Introduction

This published decision from the Sixth Circuit arises from a late‑May 2020 Black Lives Matter demonstration in Grand Rapids, Michigan, that devolved into violent unrest. Plaintiffs Sean Hart and Tiffany Guzman sued the City of Grand Rapids and three officers—Sergeant Brad Bush and Officers Benjamin Johnson and Phillip Reinink—alleging excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell municipal liability, with related state‑law claims.

Three discrete uses of force were at issue, each captured in part on video:

Officer Johnson approached Hart and Guzman’s stopped vehicle and pointed a 40mm launcher loaded with a “less‑lethal” munition toward the passenger window.
Sergeant Bush pepper‑sprayed Hart from roughly 8–10 feet as Hart advanced toward the police line.
Officer Reinink stepped out from the line and fired a Spede‑Heat chemical canister—designed for indirect, long‑range deployment—directly at Hart from a few feet away, striking his left shoulder.

The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants on the federal claims (qualified immunity for the officers; no municipal liability), and declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. The Sixth Circuit largely affirmed—but carved a critical exception: it held that launching a Spede‑Heat canister at a person at close range constitutes potential deadly force, and that, on this record, a jury could find both a Fourth Amendment violation and that the unlawfulness was clearly established in May 2020. The court therefore reversed the grant of qualified immunity to Officer Reinink and remanded that claim for further proceedings.

Summary of the Opinion

Officer Johnson (launcher pointed at vehicle): Affirmed. Qualified immunity applies. Plaintiffs did not identify clearly established law prohibiting an officer from briefly pointing a 40mm less‑lethal launcher at a vehicle’s passenger during a volatile, dispersal‑order context. The court distinguished in‑home gunpoint cases and emphasized the heightened dangers during vehicle encounters in public unrest.
Sergeant Bush (pepper spray): Affirmed. Qualified immunity applies. Although pepper spray can be excessive against a non‑resisting person, plaintiffs’ cited cases (Wright, Grawey, Ciminillo) did not clearly establish unlawfulness where the plaintiff actively advanced toward officers during a rapidly evolving riot scenario.
Officer Reinink (Spede‑Heat canister): Reversed. No qualified immunity. The court held that shooting a Spede‑Heat canister directly at a person at point‑blank range is potential deadly force. Viewing the video and record in the plaintiff’s favor, a jury could find no imminent threat when the canister was fired. The prohibition on deadly force against an unarmed person posing no immediate threat was clearly established well before May 2020 (Garner and its progeny). Mistake‑of‑weapon intent is irrelevant to objective reasonableness.
City of Grand Rapids (Monell): Affirmed. Plaintiffs’ ratification theory failed for lack of evidence showing a pattern of comparable, inadequately investigated prior violations. A bare spreadsheet of excessive‑force complaints and isolated discipline details did not satisfy the pattern and specificity required by Sixth Circuit precedent. Plaintiffs forfeited any failure‑to‑train theory.

Judge Larsen concurred in part and dissented in part. She would have extended qualified immunity to Officer Reinink, emphasizing the Supreme Court’s insistence on highly specific, fact‑matched precedents in excessive‑force cases and distinguishing plaintiffs’ authorities.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Roles

Graham v. Connor (U.S. 1989): Provides the objective reasonableness framework and “tense, uncertain, rapidly evolving” perspective. The panel applied Graham’s carve‑up approach to evaluate each use of force separately and to assess each officer’s conduct independently.
Scott v. Harris (U.S. 2007): Video evidence controls where it blatantly contradicts a party’s account. The panel relied heavily on video to sequence events and to assess Hart’s movements and proximity at the moment of force.
Pearson v. Callahan (U.S. 2009): Permits courts to decide either prong of qualified immunity first. The court led with the clearly‑established prong for Johnson and Bush.
Tennessee v. Garner (U.S. 1985) and progeny (e.g., Smith v. Cupp; Walker v. Davis): Deadly force is impermissible absent probable cause of an immediate threat of serious harm. The panel extended Garner’s logic to a riot‑control munition used in a lethal manner.
Henry v. Purnell (4th Cir. 2011): Mistake‑of‑weapon intent is irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis; objective reasonableness governs.
Palma v. Johns (6th Cir. 2022): Supplies a multi‑factor framework for assessing imminence and reasonableness in deadly‑force cases. The panel emphasized Palma merely consolidated earlier Sixth Circuit law; it did not create new law for 2020 events.
Binay v. Bettendorf (6th Cir. 2010) and Robinson v. Solano County (9th Cir. 2002): Plaintiffs’ gun‑pointing authorities were distinguished due to setting (home search vs. street during riot), weapon type (firearm vs. less‑lethal launcher), and duration/risks associated with cars and public disorder.
Wright v. City of Euclid (6th Cir. 2020), Grawey v. Drury (6th Cir. 2009), Ciminillo v. Streicher (6th Cir. 2006): Pepper‑spray and less‑lethal force precedents. The majority distinguished Wright and Grawey on active resistance and context; it relied on Ciminillo to underscore that even during riots force cannot be used against non‑aggressive individuals—and, a fortiori, deadly force cannot be used absent an imminent threat.
Latits v. Phillips (6th Cir. 2017): Violations of policy (e.g., body‑cam off; no witness for munition loading) do not themselves defeat qualified immunity but are relevant to the reasonableness analysis. The court cited these violations in evaluating the context of Reinink’s force.
Monell v. Department of Social Services (U.S. 1978), City of Canton v. Harris (U.S. 1989), Pineda v. Hamilton County (6th Cir. 2020), Berry v. City of Detroit (6th Cir. 1994), Wright v. City of Euclid (6th Cir. 2020): Set the standards for municipal liability and ratification. The panel reiterated that ratification via failure to investigate requires multiple, comparable, inadequately investigated prior incidents; raw complaint counts are insufficient.
Qualified immunity specificity cases: Kisela v. Hughes (U.S. 2018), Mullenix v. Luna (U.S. 2015), Rivas‑Villegas v. Cortesluna (U.S. 2021), White v. Pauly (U.S. 2017), Wesby (U.S. 2018). The majority balanced these with Garner’s enduring rule; the dissent would have applied them to grant QI to Reinink.

Legal Reasoning

The court followed the well‑established “segmenting” approach: each discrete use of force is judged at the moment it occurred, and each officer’s qualified‑immunity defense is evaluated separately. It also carefully applied Scott v. Harris to anchor the facts shown on video, refusing to accept accounts contradicted by the footage.

For Officer Johnson, the clearly‑established prong did the work. Binay’s in‑home, one‑hour detention at gunpoint did not map onto a brief street encounter amid a riot, involving a 40mm launcher preloaded with a less‑lethal round and the inherent risks of a vehicle stop. Similarly, Robinson’s in‑home context and firearm were materially different. In short, no case would have put a reasonable officer on notice that briefly pointing a less‑lethal launcher at a passenger during a volatile dispersal operation was unconstitutional.

For Sergeant Bush, the court again resolved qualified immunity at prong two. Wright and Grawey clearly prohibit pepper‑spraying a non‑resisting or compliant person at close range, but the video depicted Hart advancing toward the line, disobeying commands. Ciminillo, a riot case, involved a plaintiff approaching with hands raised, attempting to leave—behavior materially more passive than Hart’s advance. Because the cited cases did not “place the question beyond debate” in these specific circumstances, Bush received qualified immunity.

The analysis for Officer Reinink was different in two decisive respects:

Classification of force: The record—training materials and command testimony—established that firing a Spede‑Heat canister directly at a person at close range carries a risk of serious injury or death. The court therefore analyzed the shot as deadly force, emphasizing that “it is the nature of the force, not the weapon, that matters.”
Objective reasonableness and imminence: Applying Palma’s factors, the panel recognized the tumult but found that, when the canister was fired, Hart was unarmed, had retreated and turned, was several feet away, and was not advancing or threatening. Only the general riot conditions favored the officer; other factors pointed away from an imminent threat of serious bodily harm. Policy violations (no witness for loading; body‑cam off despite pre‑event reminders) were not dispositive but colored the reasonableness assessment.

On the clearly‑established prong, the court rooted its conclusion in long‑standing Garner‑line principles: a reasonable officer has fair warning that deadly force cannot be used against an unarmed person who poses no immediate threat. It found further support in Sample (suspect visibly unarmed and not charging) and in Ciminillo’s riot‑context admonition that force is unreasonable against non‑aggressive individuals. The court underscored that mistake‑of‑weapon intent does not sanitize an objectively unreasonable use of deadly force (Henry v. Purnell).

Monell Ratification and Evidence

Plaintiffs pursued a ratification theory: the City allegedly endorsed unconstitutional force by inadequately investigating and under‑disciplining officers, evidenced by a spreadsheet reflecting roughly 90 excessive‑force complaints over five years with only two sustained.

The Sixth Circuit reaffirmed that ratification via failure to investigate requires proof of a clear and persistent pattern of prior, comparable incidents that were inadequately investigated—not simply raw counts. The spreadsheet lacked qualitative detail (what happened, how investigations were conducted, why complaints were unfounded or exonerated). Without testimony or documents showing earlier, comparable investigative deficiencies, summary judgment for the City was appropriate. Plaintiffs’ failure‑to‑train claim was forfeited by not being developed below or on appeal.

The Separate Opinion (Concurrence/Dissent)

Judge Larsen agreed with the majority as to Johnson, Bush, and the City, but dissented on Reinink. She emphasized two qualified‑immunity pillars: the plaintiff’s burden to identify controlling, fact‑specific precedent, and the Supreme Court’s insistence on specificity in excessive‑force cases. In her view, Ciminillo is not a deadly‑force case and is factually distinct (hands raised versus not; compliant departure versus advancing, then turning back “mad”), and Sample and Lewis either materially differ or cannot clearly establish the law (Lewis is unpublished). On that approach, she would have affirmed qualified immunity for Reinink.

Impact

Deadly force classification for riot‑control munitions: The opinion squarely treats a point‑blank Spede‑Heat launch as potential deadly force, extending Garner beyond firearms and vehicle rammings to 40mm chemical munitions when misused. Agencies using similar munitions should expect deadly‑force scrutiny if they are fired directly at people at close range.
Qualified immunity boundaries in protest policing: Officers retain latitude amid riots, but lethal force still requires an imminent threat. Even “split‑second” decisions do not justify deadly force where the suspect is unarmed, not advancing, and not threatening at the critical moment.
Policy compliance matters to reasonableness: Although policy violations do not automatically defeat qualified immunity, failures like unlabeled or unwitnessed munition loading and deactivated body cameras can weigh against reasonableness in close cases.
Monell ratification proof standards: Plaintiffs cannot rely on raw complaint tallies. They must marshal multiple, comparable prior incidents with evidence of investigative inadequacy (e.g., internal reports, supervisor testimony describing patterns). Minimal discipline in a single case, without more, is generally insufficient.
Practitioner takeaways:
- Plaintiffs: Develop detailed records of prior investigations (internal affairs files, deposition testimony, expert opinions on policy compliance). Preserve and present high‑quality video that captures the precise moment of force.
- Defendants (officers): Maintain body‑camera operability and adhere to loading/witness protocols; contemporaneously document munition selection and perceived threats.
- Municipalities: Clarify munition classifications and usage restrictions in policy and training; implement verified loading protocols; ensure robust investigative documentation to withstand Monell scrutiny.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified Immunity: Shields officers from damages liability unless (1) their conduct violated a constitutional right and (2) that right was clearly established at the time. Courts may address either prong first.
Clearly Established: The law must have placed the question “beyond debate” for the specific context faced by the officer. In excessive‑force cases, close factual fit to prior precedent is typically required. However, some general rules (e.g., Garner’s prohibition on deadly force absent an imminent threat) can suffice in obvious cases.
Deadly Force: Force that poses a significant risk of death or serious bodily injury. It is the nature of the force, not the label or intent, that controls; misusing a so‑called “less‑lethal” tool can amount to deadly force.
Segmenting the Encounter: When multiple force events occur, courts analyze each “slice” independently, focusing on what a reasonable officer perceived at that exact moment.
Monell Ratification: Municipal liability can arise when a final policymaker ratifies unconstitutional acts, often through repeated, inadequate investigations of similar incidents. Plaintiffs must show a pattern of comparable prior failures, not a single episode.
Imminent Threat: For deadly force, the suspect must pose an immediate threat of serious harm to officers or others. Factors include distance, visible weapons, conduct (advancing vs. retreating), ability to de‑escalate, and duration of the encounter.
Mistake‑of‑Weapon: An officer’s claimed intent to use a lesser degree of force (e.g., Taser or Muzzle Blast) does not immunize an objectively unreasonable use of deadly force if a different weapon (e.g., firearm or Spede‑Heat) is actually deployed.

Conclusion

Hart v. City of Grand Rapids establishes a significant doctrinal clarification within the Sixth Circuit: when fired directly at a person from a few feet away, a Spede‑Heat chemical canister constitutes potential deadly force subject to Garner’s stringent limits. The court held that, on the record and video presented, a jury could find no imminent threat at the moment of firing and that the unlawfulness of such deadly force was clearly established by May 2020. At the same time, the court reaffirmed qualified immunity for brief, less‑lethal weapon pointing amid riot conditions and for pepper spray deployed against an advancing, non‑compliant individual where analogous precedent did not clearly prohibit the conduct. On municipal liability, the decision underscores that plaintiffs must present detailed, pattern‑based proof of inadequate investigations to sustain a ratification theory; raw complaint counts will not suffice.

In the broader legal landscape, the opinion will resonate in protest‑policing and crowd‑control cases. Agencies and officers should treat certain misuses of “less‑lethal” munitions as potentially deadly force, with all the constitutional constraints that entails. Plaintiffs, for their part, are reminded that success on Monell theories turns on granular, historical evidence of investigative failures—not aggregate numbers. The split on the panel highlights the continued tension between Garner’s enduring rule and the Supreme Court’s demand for high specificity in qualified‑immunity analysis, a tension that will continue to shape litigation strategy and law enforcement policy in this space.