PLRA’s 90-Day Clock Requires Mootness Dismissal and Munsingwear Vacatur of Expired Prison TROs

Commentary on Voice of the Experienced v. LeBlanc (5th Cir. Aug. 28, 2025)

Introduction

In Voice of the Experienced v. LeBlanc, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit dismissed as moot an appeal from a temporary restraining order (TRO) that had enjoined certain heat-related practices on the Angola prison “Farm Line.” The court also vacated the district court’s TRO under the Munsingwear doctrine. The plaintiffs—Voice of the Experienced (a nonprofit advocating for inmates) and several incarcerated individuals—challenge Angola’s Farm Line operations as violating the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. They sought immediate measures to mitigate heat risks: issuing a Heat Alert whenever the heat index reached at least 88 degrees and monitoring the heat index every 30 minutes.

After a hearing, the district court granted a TRO on May 23, 2025, concluding that plaintiffs were substantially likely to show a substantial risk of serious harm and deliberate indifference by prison officials. The defendants (the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, the Angola Warden, the Secretary, and related entities) appealed. Both sides acknowledged that, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), preliminary injunctive relief automatically expires after 90 days unless extended or converted to permanent relief. When that statutory clock ran on August 21, 2025, the TRO expired. The Fifth Circuit held the appeal was moot and vacated the TRO.

This is the second appeal in the same litigation to meet that fate. Earlier in the month, a different panel dismissed the appeal of a prior TRO as moot and vacated under Munsingwear. The present decision reinforces the same rule: when PLRA clocks run out, appellate challenges evaporate, and vacatur removes the unreviewed order’s possible legal consequences.

Summary of the Judgment

• The court treated the TRO as having the “practical effect” of a preliminary injunction and therefore normally appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
• Because the TRO expired by operation of the PLRA’s 90-day limit (18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2)), there was no live controversy; the appeal was dismissed as moot.
• Applying the Munsingwear doctrine, the court vacated the district court’s May 23, 2025 TRO so it would not “spawn legal consequences” despite having become unreviewable.
• The court noted the district court entered a new PLRA preliminary injunction on August 22, 2025, which is the subject of a separate, live appeal. Requests to consolidate and for a stay in the now-moot appeal were denied (the stay denial without prejudice to filing in the new appeal).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950) — The cornerstone for vacatur when a case becomes moot on appeal. It “clears the path for future relitigation … and eliminates a judgment, review of which was prevented through happenstance.” The panel uses Munsingwear to vacate the expired TRO.
• U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18 (1994) — Limits Munsingwear vacatur when mootness results from voluntary settlement: the losing party “voluntarily forfeited” its appellate rights. Here, by contrast, mootness resulted from PLRA’s statutory expiration, not settlement, making vacatur proper.
• Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer, 601 U.S. 1 (2023) — Reiterates that Munsingwear practice is “well settled.” The Fifth Circuit cites Acheson for the established nature of vacatur when appellate review becomes impossible through no party’s fault.
• Church of Scientology of California v. United States, 506 U.S. 9 (1992); Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895) — Articulate the fundamental mootness principle: if intervening events make it impossible to grant “any effectual relief,” the appeal must be dismissed.
• Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85 (2013); Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87 (2009); Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982) — Teach that Article III demands a live case or controversy throughout all stages, including appeal. That requirement failed once the TRO expired.
• Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692 (2011) — Emphasizes that vacatur prevents unreviewed decisions (especially preliminary injunctions) from producing adverse legal consequences.
• Westcott (Voice of the Experienced v. Westcott, No. 24-30420, 2025 WL 2222990 (5th Cir. Aug. 5, 2025)) — In the same litigation, another panel dismissed the appeal of the first TRO as moot and vacated under Munsingwear. This case applies the same reasoning to the second TRO.
• Yates v. Collier, 677 F. App’x 915 (5th Cir. 2017) — Held that once a PLRA preliminary injunction expired, an appeal became moot; vacatur was appropriate where plaintiffs “allowed” the injunction to lapse.
• Smith v. Edwards, 88 F.4th 1119 (5th Cir. 2023) — Reinforces that PLRA-caused expiration moots appeals, and where the defendant is “frustrated by the vagaries of circumstance” rather than its own conduct, vacatur is fair.
• Staley v. Harris County, 485 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2007) — Provides the fairness rationale cited in Smith for vacatur when mootness is not attributable to the appellant’s choice or misconduct.
• Wickes Corp. v. Industrial Financial Corp., 493 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1974) — Early Fifth Circuit authority recognizing that when an injunction expires “by its own terms,” review is generally moot.
• 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2) — The PLRA’s 90-day limit on preliminary injunctive relief in prison conditions cases. This statutory clock is the engine of mootness here.
• 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) — Allows interlocutory appeals from preliminary injunctions. The court reaffirmed that a TRO can be appealable when it has the “practical effect” of a preliminary injunction, even though that did not save the appeal from mootness once the order expired.

Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning proceeds in two steps.

1. Appealability: Although styled a TRO, the order had the “practical effect” of a preliminary injunction—thus generally appealable under § 1292(a)(1). This is especially common in PLRA contexts where TROs are extended or functionally operate as preliminary relief.
2. Mootness and Vacatur: The dispositive point is that the PLRA imposes a firm 90-day lifespan on preliminary injunctive relief in prison conditions litigation, unless the district court extends or converts the order into permanent relief. The parties agreed the order expired on August 21, 2025. After that date, the injunction ceased to bind the defendants. No live controversy remained and no “effectual relief” could be granted; thus, the court lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal as moot.
   • Having found mootness, the court turned to Munsingwear. Because mootness arose from statutory expiration—not from settlement or any voluntary act by the party that lost below—vacatur was warranted to ensure the unreviewed district court order does not produce collateral legal consequences. The court emphasized parity and fairness: defendants pursued their appeal diligently but were “frustrated by the vagaries of circumstance,” namely the PLRA’s expiration clock.
   • The court also stressed the litigation’s posture: vacating clears the path for relitigation of class certification, further preliminary relief, and a full merits adjudication. Notably, the district court issued a new preliminary injunction on August 22, 2025, now before the Fifth Circuit in a separate appeal—precisely the sort of “reset” Munsingwear contemplates.

One textual note: At one point, the opinion references “the August 2025 Order” expiring on August 21, 2025. Given the record, this appears to be a minor scrivener’s error; the court consistently treats the May 23, 2025 TRO as the operative order that expired on August 21, 2025.

Impact and Forward-Looking Consequences

• PLRA clock as a jurisdictional tripwire: This decision underscores that the PLRA’s 90-day limit can end appellate jurisdiction midstream. Even where expedited appeals are granted, once the statutory period lapses, appeals of preliminary relief are typically moot.
• Strategic imperatives for plaintiffs: Plaintiffs seeking prison-conditions relief must vigilantly manage the PLRA timeline—pressing for conversion to permanent relief or securing extensions within 90 days—to preserve both the injunction and appellate review. Otherwise, any hard-won order risks automatic expiration, appellate mootness, and vacatur.
• Strategic benefits for defendants: Defendants prevented from obtaining review due to expiration need not live with unreviewed adverse orders; Munsingwear vacatur removes their potential collateral effects. This may reduce pressure to settle simply to avoid collateral consequences of a preliminary injunction.
• Repeat, rolling injunction practice: The decision signals that, where preliminary orders lapse and are replaced with new injunctions, each new order must be appealed separately. Attempts to consolidate mooted appeals with live appeals will be denied as moot. Litigants must track each order and file fresh notices and motions as needed.
• Substantive merits remain open: Because vacatur wipes the slate clean, district courts and parties re-litigate core issues—likelihood of success, deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment, and PLRA compliance—on a refreshed record. No preclusive effect flows from the vacated order, and courts are not bound by the vacated findings.
• Precedential posture: The panel designated the opinion as unpublished. Under Fifth Circuit practice, unpublished opinions are not binding precedent, but they can be persuasive. Combined with its sibling decision earlier this month (Westcott), the message is clear and consistent on PLRA-driven mootness and vacatur.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• TRO vs. Preliminary Injunction and the “Practical Effect” Doctrine:
  • A TRO is short-term emergency relief; a preliminary injunction is longer and typically follows more process. In federal practice, even an order labeled a “TRO” can be appealable if it operates like a preliminary injunction in scope, duration, or effect. That’s the “practical effect” test the court applies under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
• PLRA’s 90-Day Limit (18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2)):
  • In prison-conditions cases, preliminary injunctive relief automatically expires after 90 days unless the court makes required findings and extends or converts the order. This statutory clock is strict and can moot appeals if it runs out before resolution.
• Article III Mootness:
  • Federal courts only decide live disputes. If events occur that make it impossible to grant effective relief—for example, an injunction expires—then the case is moot and must be dismissed.
• Munsingwear Vacatur vs. Reversal:
  • Vacatur is not a ruling that the lower court was wrong. It simply wipes away an unreviewable judgment to prevent it from having legal consequences when appellate review was frustrated by circumstances outside the appellant’s control.
  • In contrast, reversal means the appellate court reached the merits and found error. Here, the court expressly avoided the merits and vacated solely because the appeal became moot.
• Bancorp’s Settlement Exception:
  • If a party moots a case by settling, vacatur is generally inappropriate because that party chose to forego appellate review. By contrast, when mootness is caused by external circumstances—like a statute’s automatic expiration—vacatur remains appropriate.

Practical Guidance for Litigants

• Calendar the 90-day PLRA deadline from the date of entry of preliminary relief. Seek timely conversion or extension with the required PLRA findings.
• If appealing, move to expedite early, but also pursue district court action to avoid expiration (e.g., request evidentiary hearings or status conferences to convert relief to permanent injunction when warranted).
• If a preliminary order does expire, file a fresh notice of appeal from any newly entered preliminary injunction; do not assume consolidation will cure mootness in the earlier appeal.
• Expect vacatur if an appeal becomes moot due to PLRA expiration and prepare to re-litigate core issues without relying on the vacated order’s findings.

Conclusion

Voice of the Experienced v. LeBlanc delivers a crisp procedural lesson: in prison-conditions litigation, the PLRA’s 90-day limit on preliminary injunctive relief can extinguish appellate jurisdiction and compel vacatur of the district court’s order under Munsingwear. The Fifth Circuit’s approach—mirroring its earlier decision in the same case—cements a predictable sequence: expiration begets mootness, and mootness begets vacatur, absent voluntary mootness by the parties. The ruling neither resolves nor prejudges the underlying Eighth Amendment claims. Instead, it preserves fairness and clears the deck for renewed, fully reviewable litigation—indeed, the district court’s new preliminary injunction is now the subject of a separate appeal. For practitioners, the case is a sharp reminder that timing and procedure are determinative in the PLRA context; substantive victories can evaporate unless the statutory clock is managed with precision.