PLRA Screening Must Ordinarily Permit Amendment; Mattress Deprivation Alone Insufficient to Plead Eighth Amendment Violation Without Specific Risk of Serious Harm

Introduction

In Darrin Bass v. Officer Keebaugh, No. 24-1780 (6th Cir. Oct. 17, 2025) (not recommended for publication), the Sixth Circuit addressed two recurring issues in prisoner civil-rights litigation:

The level of factual specificity required to allege an Eighth Amendment claim based on conditions of confinement, here a 30-day deprivation of a mattress in solitary confinement; and
Whether a district court, at the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) screening stage, may dismiss a pro se prisoner’s complaint with prejudice and without granting leave to amend.

Plaintiff-Appellant Darrin Bass, a Michigan state prisoner housed in administrative segregation at Ionia Correctional Facility, alleged that Officer Keebaugh removed his mattress for 30 days as a sanction for purported destruction or misuse of state property, and that Deputy Warden Dale Bonn repeatedly re-approved the restriction despite a hearing officer’s dismissal of the underlying misconduct charge. Bass brought First and Eighth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking compensatory and punitive damages. The magistrate judge (by consent) screened and dismissed the complaint with prejudice under the PLRA for failure to state a claim. Bass appealed the dismissal of his Eighth Amendment claim and—critically—the with-prejudice disposition without leave to amend.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part:

Eighth Amendment: The panel agreed that, as pleaded, the complaint did not state an Eighth Amendment claim. Simply alleging a 30-day mattress deprivation and having to sleep on a “concrete slab with metal screws,” without specific facts showing a sufficiently serious risk of grievous harm or resulting injury, fails the objective prong of an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim.
Leave to amend: The panel held the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the pro se complaint with prejudice and without leave to amend. Given the liberal amendment policy—particularly for pro se prisoners at the PLRA screening stage—Bass must be afforded an opportunity to amend both his Eighth Amendment claim and his unappealed First Amendment retaliation claim.

Disposition: The court vacated the with-prejudice dismissal and remanded with instructions to permit amendment and for further proceedings.

Factual and Procedural Background

Facility and status: Bass, in administrative segregation (up to 23 hours/day in cell), Ionia Correctional Facility, Michigan.
February 6, 2024: Officer Keebaugh issued a misconduct ticket for destruction/misuse of property (the cell mattress) and recommended a 30-day mattress restriction.
February 9, 2024: The mattress was removed. Bass slept on a concrete slab with metal screws, allegedly causing physical and psychological harm.
February 15, 2024: A hearing officer dismissed the misconduct charge, finding no evidence of effective communication with Bass (who is deaf/hard of hearing).
Despite dismissal: Deputy Warden Bonn re-approved the mattress restriction in weekly intervals, as permitted by Michigan Department of Corrections Policy Directive 04.05.120, ¶¶ HH, JJ (2019).
Grievances: Bass pursued Step I–III grievances between February 19 and March 21, 2024; rejections were upheld.
District court: The magistrate judge dismissed the complaint with prejudice under PLRA screening, finding no viable First or Eighth Amendment claim.
Appeal: Bass (now represented) challenged the Eighth Amendment dismissal and the with-prejudice disposition; he did not contest the merits ruling on his First Amendment claim but sought leave to amend both claims.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

PLRA screening: 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) (authorizing sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim).
Pleading standards: Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
Eighth Amendment framework:
- Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (objective/subjective prongs; “deliberate indifference”).
- Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) (“does not mandate comfortable prisons”).
- Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993) (contemporary standards of decency; risk not tolerated by society).
- Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991) (wantonness requirement; subjective component).
- Sixth Circuit applications: Rhodes v. Michigan, 10 F.4th 665 (6th Cir. 2021) (conditions claims; objective/subjective analysis); Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2011).
- Richmond v. Settles, 450 F. App’x 448, 455 (6th Cir. 2011) (mattress restriction alone for a finite period, absent physical injury, does not state an Eighth Amendment claim).
- Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 868 (6th Cir. 2000) (protruding anchor bolts into sleeping area posed unreasonable risk of future injury; sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim).
- Zakora v. Chrisman, 44 F.4th 452, 469 (6th Cir. 2022) (objective prong asks if risk violates contemporary standards of decency).
Pro se and amendment:
- LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013) (district courts can allow amendment even when dismissing at PLRA screening).
- Newberry v. Silverman, 789 F.3d 636, 645–46 (6th Cir. 2015) (liberality in permitting amendment).
- Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 614–16 (6th Cir. 2011) (special solicitude for pro se litigants; remand to allow amendment).
- Additional Sixth Circuit remands allowing amendment for pro se litigants: Rashada v. Flegel, 2024 WL 1367436 (6th Cir. Apr. 1, 2024); Lucas v. Chalk, 785 F. App’x 288 (6th Cir. 2019); Gordon v. England, 354 F. App’x 975 (6th Cir. 2009); Berndt v. Tennessee, 796 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1986).
- Sister-circuit guidance: Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794 (2d Cir. 1999); Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 2002); Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2013); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Razzoli v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 230 F.3d 371 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
- Standards of review: Wershe v. Combs, 763 F.3d 500 (6th Cir. 2014) (de novo on PLRA dismissal); Ernst v. Rising, 427 F.3d 351 (6th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (abuse-of-discretion on with/without prejudice); United States v. Silvers, 129 F.4th 332, 348–49 (6th Cir. 2025) (abuse-of-discretion definition).
- Pro se construction: Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 2011); Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710 (6th Cir. 2004).

Legal Reasoning

1) Eighth Amendment: Objective Prong Not Met on the Pleadings

The panel focused on the objective component of the Eighth Amendment analysis. The complaint alleged that, for 30 days in segregation, Bass slept on a “concrete slab with metal screws,” causing “physical and psychological” injury. But it did not describe how the slab’s features or the screws exposed him to a sufficiently serious risk of grievous harm, nor did it detail concrete injuries (e.g., lacerations, infections, exacerbation of a condition, hypothermia, severe sleep deprivation with medical sequelae). Under Sixth Circuit precedent:

Insufficient as pleaded: Richmond v. Settles teaches that a fixed-term deprivation of a mattress, without evidence of physical injury, does not cross the constitutional threshold.
Potentially sufficient if amplified: Brown v. Bargery recognizes that sleeping conditions featuring protruding sharp objects in the sleeping area can pose an unreasonable risk of injury; allegations specifying such hazards and their effects can satisfy the objective prong.

Applying Helling and Zakora, the panel concluded that the complaint did not plausibly allege conditions “so grave” that contemporary standards of decency would not tolerate them. Because the objective prong failed, the court did not reach the subjective “deliberate indifference” prong.

2) First Amendment Retaliation (Not Appealed on the Merits, But Eligible for Amendment)

The court noted that Bass did not appeal the district court’s holding that his retaliation claim was insufficiently pleaded. It observed, however, that the complaint likely alleged the first two elements—protected conduct (grievances) and adverse action (continued mattress restriction)—but not causation, as it lacked facts linking the re-approvals to the grievances. Importantly, despite the lack of a merits appeal, the panel nonetheless directed the district court to allow amendment of this claim as well.

3) Abuse of Discretion to Dismiss With Prejudice at PLRA Screening Without Leave to Amend

The court emphasized the Sixth Circuit’s “liberality in allowing amendments,” particularly for pro se litigants whose deficiencies likely stem from unfamiliarity with technical pleading standards. LaFountain squarely permits district courts to allow amendment even when dismissing under the PLRA. The panel canvassed in- and out-of-circuit authority encouraging at least one opportunity to amend for pro se plaintiffs whose complaints are screened out for failure to state a claim.

Because Bass could potentially cure the defects with additional factual detail (e.g., explaining the location and configuration of the screws, the surface’s effect on his ability to sleep safely, specific injuries, and prison officials’ knowledge and responses), the district court’s with-prejudice dismissal, without explanation, was an abuse of discretion. The appropriate remedy is to vacate and remand with instructions to grant leave to amend.

Impact and Implications

A. Conditions-of-Confinement Pleading in the Sixth Circuit

No per se rule from mattress deprivation alone: A finite mattress restriction, standing alone, typically will not suffice; plaintiffs must allege specific hazardous features or concrete harms elevating the condition to a serious risk of injury.
Factual granularity matters: Allegations should specify the physical configuration (e.g., protruding screws into the sleeping area), duration, temperature, medical needs, and measurable harm (injuries, sleep deprivation with medical consequences), and any denial of requests for mitigation (extra blankets, medical attention).
Objective vs. subjective prongs: This decision underscores that failure on the objective prong ends the analysis; plaintiffs should plead both prongs robustly to avoid dismissal.

B. PLRA Screening and Leave to Amend

Strong presumption of leave to amend: In the Sixth Circuit, dismissals with prejudice at screening are disfavored for pro se prisoners where amendment could cure deficiencies. District courts should either grant leave or explain why amendment would be futile.
Administrative guidance to district courts: Provide a brief period for amendment following screening dismissals. If denying leave, articulate futility or other recognized grounds.

C. Michigan Corrections Practices

Weekly re-approval policy requires documentation: Re-approvals of deprivations like mattress restrictions should reflect individualized safety and health assessments, particularly after dismissal of a related misconduct charge.
Disability accommodations: The hearing officer’s dismissal due to lack of effective communication with a deaf or hard-of-hearing prisoner highlights the need for compliant communication accommodations during discipline and sanction processes.

D. Retaliation Claims

Causation is the pivot: Plaintiffs must connect protected conduct to adverse action through facts—temporal proximity plus officials’ knowledge, statements, inconsistencies with policy, or differential treatment can suffice at the pleading stage.
Potentially curable on amendment: Bass’s claim may be revived with factual allegations tying the timing and knowledge of grievances to the re-approvals.

Complex Concepts Simplified

PLRA Screening: Early judicial review of prisoner complaints to weed out frivolous or insufficient claims before service on defendants. Even at this stage, courts may allow amendment.
“With Prejudice” vs. “Without Prejudice”: A dismissal “with prejudice” ends the claim permanently; “without prejudice” allows refiling or amendment.
Conditions-of-Confinement Claim (Eighth Amendment): Requires (1) an objectively serious deprivation posing a substantial risk of serious harm, and (2) a defendant’s subjective deliberate indifference to that risk (knowledge and disregard).
“Deliberate Indifference”: More than negligence. The official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.
First Amendment Retaliation (basic elements): (1) protected conduct (e.g., grievances), (2) adverse action that would deter a person of ordinary firmness, and (3) a causal connection (the protected conduct was a motivating factor).
Nonprecedential Opinion: “Not recommended for publication” means the decision is not binding precedent, though it may be cited as persuasive authority in the Sixth Circuit.

Practical Guidance for Remand and Future Litigation

For Plaintiffs Pleading Eighth Amendment Mattress/Bed Claims

Detail the hazard: describe the slab, the location and protrusion of screws relative to the sleeping surface, and how they caused or threatened injury (e.g., lacerations, contusions).
Document harm: allege specific injuries, medical visits or requests, sleep deprivation effects (e.g., headaches, cognitive impairment), temperature-related harms, or aggravation of conditions (e.g., back injuries).
Duration and context: include the length of deprivation, cell temperature, available bedding or blankets, and any refusal to provide mitigation.
Subjective prong: plead facts showing officials knew of the risk (grievances, kites, verbal complaints, visible injuries) and disregarded it (denials, re-approvals despite knowledge).

For Plaintiffs Pleading Retaliation

Allege who knew what and when: identify when each defendant learned of grievances and the sequence of adverse actions.
Include indicia of motive: temporal proximity, statements hinting at retaliatory motive, departures from policy after protected activity, and disparate treatment compared to similarly situated inmates.

For Corrections Officials

Re-approval documentation: articulate health/safety rationale, consider medical input, and re-evaluate after dismissal of underlying misconduct.
Accommodations: ensure effective communication for deaf/hard-of-hearing inmates in disciplinary and grievance processes.

For District Courts

At screening, consider granting leave to amend once for pro se prisoners unless futility is clear; if denying, explain why amendment cannot cure defects.
When dismissing with prejudice, make explicit findings supporting futility, repeated failure to cure, or other recognized grounds.

What the Panel Did Not Decide

Subjective deliberate indifference: The court did not analyze whether the defendants acted with deliberate indifference; the claim failed on the objective prong.
First Amendment merits: The panel did not review the merits dismissal of the retaliation claim, noting only that causation was likely insufficiently pleaded. Amendment is permitted on remand.
Damages limits under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e): The court did not address the PLRA’s physical-injury requirement for mental/emotional damages; plaintiffs should be aware of that separate limitation.

Key Takeaways

A 30-day mattress deprivation, without specific facts showing a serious risk of harm or actual injury, does not itself state an Eighth Amendment claim in the Sixth Circuit.
Specific hazardous features—like protruding bolts or screws into the sleeping area—and concrete injuries can satisfy the objective prong when adequately alleged.
At PLRA screening, district courts generally should permit pro se prisoners at least one opportunity to amend before dismissing with prejudice, absent clear futility.
Retaliation claims often turn on causation; plaintiffs must connect protected conduct to adverse action with factual allegations demonstrating motive or knowledge.

Conclusion

Darrin Bass v. Officer Keebaugh refines two important edges of prisoner civil-rights practice in the Sixth Circuit. Substantively, it reaffirms that mattress deprivation, without more, typically fails the Eighth Amendment’s objective threshold; plaintiffs must plead particularized facts showing a serious risk of harm. Procedurally, it underscores a robust (though not absolute) presumption in favor of granting leave to amend pro se complaints dismissed at PLRA screening—an admonition that dismissals with prejudice should be rare and supported by futility findings. On remand, Bass may be able to cure his pleading deficiencies by detailing the hazardous nature of his sleeping conditions and, if pursuing retaliation, by alleging facts establishing causation. More broadly, the decision guides litigants and courts alike toward fuller factual development before foreclosing prisoners’ constitutional claims at the threshold.