PLRA Exhaustion Requirement Enforced for Eighth Amendment Failure-to-Protect Claims

Introduction

This commentary examines the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Bobby B. Cockerell, III v. Mike Conyers et al., No. 23-2988 (7th Cir. Apr. 21, 2025). The appellant, Bobby Cockerell, an Indiana state prisoner, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Eighth Amendment violations for failing to protect him from an assault by other inmates. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the ground that Cockerell had not exhausted his administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, reaffirming and clarifying the scope of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement for prisoner civil rights claims, even when monetary relief is sought.

Summary of the Judgment

The Seventh Circuit, in a non-precedential disposition, held:

The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims, regardless of whether a prisoner seeks only money damages.
Cockerell’s claim was not exempt as a “tort claim” under the Indiana Department of Correction grievance policy because it challenged staff misconduct rather than property loss.
The grievance process was “available” to Cockerell, and prison records confirmed no timely grievance was filed.
Cockerell’s contradictory sworn statements and hearing testimony about when he learned of the alleged warning letter undermined his claim of staff interference.
Because he failed to exhaust, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants and denied appointment of counsel.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001): Established that the PLRA requires exhaustion of “such administrative remedies as are available,” even if the relief sought cannot be granted administratively.
Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632 (2016): Identified three circumstances under which administrative remedies are not “available”—officials are unable or unwilling to provide relief; processes are opaque; or officials thwart access.
Lockett v. Bonson, 937 F.3d 1016 (7th Cir. 2019) and Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir. 2002): Defined the time, place, and manner requirements for prisoner grievances under the PLRA.
Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008): Outlined procedures for district courts to resolve evidentiary disputes over exhaustion at summary judgment hearings.
Larkin v. Galloway, 266 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2001): Held that failure-to-protect claims against prison staff fall within the administrative process’s authorized jurisdiction.

Legal Reasoning

The Seventh Circuit’s analysis proceeded in two stages:

Scope of the Exhaustion Requirement
The court reaffirmed that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies even when the only relief sought is money damages, so long as “some relief” (disciplinary action, policy changes, etc.) is possible through the grievance process. Cockerell’s claim that it was exempt as a “tort claim seeking monetary compensation” failed because the policy’s tort-claim exception covered only property-damage claims, not staff omission claims.
Availability and Timeliness of Grievances
The Indiana policy required a three-step grievance within 10 business days: formal grievance, appeal to the warden, and appeal to the grievance manager. Prison records showed no grievance filed by Cockerell. His hearing testimony—that he learned of the warning letter on July 4 and handed a grievance to a guard then—contradicted earlier sworn statements that he knew on June 17. Even if believed, a grievance delivered after July 4 would be untimely (deadline July 1).

The court reviewed factual findings for clear error and credibility determinations deferentially, finding no basis to disturb the district court’s rejection of Cockerell’s testimony.

Impact

This decision reinforces several key principles for prisoner litigation in the Seventh Circuit and beyond:

Prisoners must strictly comply with administrative deadlines and procedural rules, even if the harm alleged is imminent violence.
Claiming a constitutional violation does not exempt a prisoner from exhaustion simply because monetary damages are the sought remedy.
Courts will scrutinize inconsistent sworn statements to assess whether administrative remedies were genuinely pursued.
Staff misconduct arguments must clear the high bar of “active thwarting” under Ross v. Blake to excuse non-exhaustion.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Before suing in federal court, a prisoner must use—and complete—all steps of the prison’s grievance process.
PLRA § 1997e(a): A statute requiring prisoners to exhaust internal remedies for any “action brought with respect to prison conditions.”
Non-Exhaustion Defenses Under Ross v. Blake: Remedies are “unavailable” if officials block the process, it’s too confusing, or those who run it can’t offer relief.
Summary Judgment vs. Pavey Hearing: A summary judgment can be granted if no genuine factual dispute exists. If exhaustion is disputed, the district court holds a Pavey hearing to resolve factual conflicts before deciding the motion.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Cockerell v. Conyers underscores the PLRA’s strict exhaustion mandate for prisoner civil-rights claims. It clarifies that constitutional claims against prison staff—like failure to protect—are subject to the same administrative-remedy requirements as any other grievance. Prisoners must timely file and pursue grievances through every required step unless they can show the process was truly inaccessible. This ruling will guide lower courts in enforcing procedural rigor and deter premature filings of prisoner suits in federal court.