Pleading-Stage Statute-of-Limitations Dismissals and No Tolling by Kansas § 12-105b for § 1983 Claims: Boldridge v. City of Atchison (10th Cir. 2025)
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date: October 1, 2025
Docket No.: 24-3190
Panel: Circuit Judges McHugh, Kelly, and Federico
Disposition: Affirmed (unpublished order and judgment; persuasive only under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1)
Introduction
In Boldridge v. City of Atchison, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action as time-barred, offering a concise—but consequential—reaffirmation of several timing and pleading doctrines that frequently control civil rights litigation. Although issued as a nonprecedential order and judgment, the decision underscores three practical rules:
- Federal courts may dismiss a complaint at the pleading stage on statute-of-limitations grounds when the time-bar appears on the face of the complaint and its attachments.
- For § 1983 claims in Kansas, the two-year personal-injury limitations period applies; excessive-force claims accrue on the date the force is used, and false-imprisonment claims accrue when the detention ends (Wallace v. Kato).
- Kansas’s municipal notice-of-claim procedure (Kan. Stat. Ann. § 12-105b) is not a prerequisite to § 1983 claims and does not toll the federal limitations period.
The case arises from an October 31, 2018 confrontation between plaintiff-appellant Bryan C. Boldridge and Atchison Police Officer Darren Kelley outside Boldridge’s home. Following state criminal proceedings (including reversal of a manslaughter conviction on appeal), Boldridge filed his § 1983 case in January 2024, alleging excessive force and “Eighth Amendment” violations. The district court dismissed as untimely, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
Summary of the Opinion
The Tenth Circuit reviewed de novo the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds. It held that:
- It is proper to resolve statute-of-limitations issues at the pleading stage when the complaint and its attachments supply the pertinent dates establishing the time bar.
- The plaintiff did not challenge on appeal the district court’s determination of the accrual dates, the applicable Kansas two-year limitations period, or the non-tolling effect of the Kansas notice-of-claim statute. Given that forfeiture, the court declined to revisit those determinations.
- To the extent the plaintiff argued the district court was required to hear evidence before dismissing for untimeliness, that argument fails under circuit precedent allowing Rule 12(b)(6) resolutions when dates are undisputed.
Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment dismissing the action as untimely.
Background and Procedural History
Underlying Events (October 31, 2018)
According to the Kansas Court of Appeals decision in State v. Boldridge (which the Tenth Circuit judicially noticed to supply background facts), Atchison water department employees and Officer Darren Kelley confronted Boldridge regarding suspected theft of services. The encounter escalated, culminating in both men discharging their firearms in each other’s direction.
State Criminal Proceedings
- Charges included attempted second-degree murder, theft, criminal discharge of a firearm, and criminal damage to property.
- Boldridge pled guilty to theft; the jury convicted him of attempted voluntary manslaughter (as a lesser-included offense), criminal discharge of a firearm, and criminal damage to property.
- The Kansas Court of Appeals reversed the manslaughter conviction in an August 13, 2021 decision, reasoning that on the instructions given, the State had not established legally sufficient provocation for heat-of-passion manslaughter (objective standard). The manslaughter sentence was vacated.
Federal Civil Rights Action
- Filed: January 16, 2024, in the District of Kansas.
- Defendants: City of Atchison and individual officials (including Officer Kelley); on appeal, the caption identifies City of Atchison; Darren Kelly; Jesse Greenly; and Laurachal Young.
- Claims: Excessive force (Fourth Amendment) on October 31, 2018; an additional claim labeled as Eighth Amendment, which the district court construed as a Fourth Amendment false-imprisonment theory.
- Tolling theory: Plaintiff referenced a municipal notice-of-claim purportedly submitted September 13, 2023 under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 12-105b.
- District court ruling: Dismissed as untimely. Excessive-force claim accrued on October 31, 2018; false-imprisonment claim accrued upon release (the court accepted September 30, 2021); Kansas’s notice-of-claim procedure did not toll the federal limitations period.
- Appeal: Timely, to the Tenth Circuit.
Key Dates
- Incident: October 31, 2018.
- Kansas Court of Appeals reversal of manslaughter conviction: August 13, 2021.
- Claimed release date: September 30, 2021 (as asserted by plaintiff in district court).
- Municipal notice-of-claim submitted: September 13, 2023.
- Federal § 1983 complaint filed: January 16, 2024.
Analysis
Precedents and Authorities Cited
- Kansas statute of limitations (Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4)). The court applied Kansas’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions to § 1983 claims (consistent with federal practice of borrowing state personal-injury limitations).
- Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007). The district court, and by extension the Tenth Circuit on affirmance, relied on Wallace for the accrual rule for false imprisonment: limitations begin to run when the alleged false imprisonment ends (upon release), not upon favorable termination of the prosecution.
- Aldrich v. McCulloch Props., Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1041 n.4 (10th Cir. 1980). Establishes that statute-of-limitations defenses may be resolved on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion where the complaint’s dates show the claim is time-barred, notwithstanding that limitations is an affirmative defense.
- Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1265 n.24 (10th Cir. 2006). Exhibits attached to a complaint are part of the pleadings for purposes of a motion to dismiss; here, attached documents fixed pertinent dates.
- Brady v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 538 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 2008). De novo standard of review for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals on statute-of-limitations grounds.
- Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Courts construe pro se filings liberally but do not act as a party’s advocate.
- Carney v. Oklahoma Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 875 F.3d 1347, 1351 (10th Cir. 2017). Even for pro se litigants, failure to develop arguments on appeal forfeits those issues; courts will not make arguments for the litigant.
- United States v. Ahidley, 486 F.3d 1184, 1192 n.5 (10th Cir. 2007). Judicial notice of official court filings; used here to notice the Kansas Court of Appeals decision supplying factual context not developed in the district court record.
- Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). Oral argument was not necessary; the case was submitted on the briefs.
- Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1. The order and judgment is nonprecedential but may be cited for its persuasive value.
- Kan. Stat. Ann. § 12-105b. Kansas’s municipal notice-of-claim statute; the district court (and the Tenth Circuit by affirming) held it is not a prerequisite to § 1983 claims and therefore does not toll the federal limitations period.
Legal Reasoning
1) Resolution of timeliness at the pleading stage
The plaintiff argued the district court could not dismiss his case as untimely without first hearing facts and evidence. The Tenth Circuit rejected that view, relying on Aldrich and Tal: where the complaint and its attachments supply the dates necessary to evaluate timeliness, a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is appropriate even though the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense. Here, the complaint and incorporated materials identified the dates of the incident (October 31, 2018), the alleged release (September 30, 2021), the municipal notice (September 13, 2023), and the federal filing (January 16, 2024). Those dates sufficed to resolve the limitations issue on the pleadings.
2) Accrual and limitations for the claims pled
The court accepted the district court’s framing of the two civil-rights theories:
- Excessive force (Fourth Amendment): Accrued on the date the force was used—October 31, 2018—well-settled in § 1983 jurisprudence. With Kansas’s two-year period (K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4)), the last day to sue was October 31, 2020. The January 16, 2024 filing was years too late.
- False imprisonment (construed from the Eighth Amendment label): Under Wallace v. Kato, the claim accrues when the alleged false imprisonment ends (upon release). Accepting plaintiff’s date of September 30, 2021, he had until September 30, 2023. He filed on January 16, 2024—over three months late.
Although the plaintiff contended his claims accrued upon the reversal or vacatur of his manslaughter conviction in 2021, the district court applied Wallace and general accrual rules instead. On appeal, plaintiff did not challenge these accrual rulings or the applicable limitations period, resulting in affirmance.
3) No tolling via Kansas’s municipal notice-of-claim statute (§ 12-105b)
The plaintiff argued his September 13, 2023 municipal notice preserved or tolled his federal claims. The district court rejected that contention, and the Tenth Circuit left that conclusion undisturbed because plaintiff failed to contest it on appeal. The district court’s rationale was straightforward: Kansas’s municipal notice-of-claim statute is not a prerequisite to asserting federal § 1983 claims; it governs state-law tort claims against municipalities and their employees. Because § 1983 is a federal cause of action, compliance with § 12-105b does not toll the federal limitations period.
4) Appellate forfeiture limits review
The Tenth Circuit emphasized that, while it construes pro se filings liberally, it will not construct arguments the appellant does not make. Here, plaintiff did not attack the accrual dates, the applicable statute of limitations, or the non-tolling determination. As a result, the court declined further examination of those topics and affirmed on the grounds presented.
Impact and Practical Implications
- Strong reinforcement of timeliness discipline in § 1983 suits: Litigants in Kansas must file excessive-force claims within two years of the incident and false-imprisonment claims within two years of release. Later developments in state criminal cases—such as reversal of a conviction—do not reset accrual for these claims.
- Administrative notices to municipalities will not rescue untimely federal claims: Filing a § 12-105b notice close to the deadline (or after it) does not toll or extend the statute for § 1983 claims. Plaintiffs pursuing both state tort and federal § 1983 theories should file the federal action within the two-year window irrespective of any municipal notice process.
- Pleading-stage dismissals on limitations are squarely in play: Defense counsel can and should raise statute-of-limitations defenses on Rule 12(b)(6) when the complaint or its attachments reveal the dates. Conversely, plaintiffs should be mindful that attaching documents identifying dates can facilitate a timeliness dismissal.
- Pro se litigants must address timeliness arguments on appeal: The court’s application of Carney and Hall reiterates that leniency does not extend to crafting substantive arguments the appellant fails to present.
- Wallace v. Kato’s accrual framework guides claim selection and timing: Where ongoing criminal proceedings may intersect with § 1983 claims, Wallace contemplates accrual at arrest/end of detention for false-arrest/false-imprisonment claims. The proper tool in some cases is a stay, not delay in filing. Plaintiffs should not assume that waiting for favorable termination will extend the filing deadline for these categories of claims.
- Judicial notice as a background tool: When district court records are sparse, appellate courts may judicially notice related state-court decisions for context, without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.
Complex Concepts Simplified
- Section 1983: A federal statute allowing individuals to sue state or local officials for violating federal rights. It borrows the forum state’s personal-injury limitations period (two years in Kansas) but applies federal rules to determine when the claim “accrues.”
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Accrual: The date a claim becomes actionable and the limitations clock starts. In § 1983:
- Excessive force generally accrues on the date the force is used (injury occurs).
- False imprisonment accrues when the detention ends (release), per Wallace v. Kato.
- Statute of limitations (SOL): The time limit to file a lawsuit. If the plaintiff files after the SOL expires, the claim is dismissed as time-barred unless a tolling doctrine applies.
- Tolling vs. accrual: Accrual starts the clock; tolling pauses it. State tolling rules may apply in § 1983 cases if not inconsistent with federal law. But administrative preconditions that do not apply to federal claims (like Kansas’s municipal notice for state torts) generally do not toll § 1983 claims.
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False arrest/false imprisonment vs. malicious prosecution:
- False arrest/false imprisonment target pre-legal-process detention and accrue at release (Wallace).
- Malicious prosecution targets wrongful institution of charges and typically implicates favorable-termination concepts. This case did not analyze malicious prosecution; the district court construed the pleadings as excessive force and false imprisonment.
- Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on SOL: Although SOL is an affirmative defense, a court may dismiss at the pleading stage if the complaint itself (including attached exhibits) shows the claim is untimely.
- Judicial notice: Courts may notice indisputable facts from official records—such as state appellate decisions—without taking evidence or converting a motion to summary judgment.
- Pro se leniency and forfeiture: Courts read pro se filings generously but require litigants to raise and develop arguments. Failure to challenge a dispositive ruling (e.g., accrual or SOL) forfeits appellate review of that issue.
Conclusion
Boldridge v. City of Atchison offers a clear, practice-focused reminder that § 1983 plaintiffs must vigilantly track accrual and limitations deadlines. Excessive-force claims accrue when the force is used; false-imprisonment claims accrue when detention ends; and in Kansas, both must be filed within two years. Administrative steps under Kansas’s municipal notice statute do not toll federal claims, and courts may resolve timeliness at the pleading stage when the dates are apparent. Finally, while courts are solicitous of pro se litigants, they will not invent arguments not raised on appeal.
Though nonprecedential, this decision is citable for its persuasive value and is tightly aligned with Supreme Court guidance (Wallace) and entrenched Tenth Circuit practice (Aldrich, Tal, Carney, Hall). For litigants and counsel, the message is straightforward: file § 1983 claims promptly; do not rely on state administrative processes to preserve federal rights; and be prepared to address timeliness head-on from the outset.
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