Pleading-Stage Retaliation Causation Must Follow Twombly/Iqbal—Not Summary-Judgment Temporal-Proximity Rules; Hostile-Environment Summary Judgment Requires Full “Totality” Review Including Post-Notice Conduct

I. Introduction

In Matilde Santana v. Telemundo Network Group, LLC (11th Cir. Jan. 22, 2026) (not for publication), the Eleventh Circuit reversed two pivotal district-court rulings in a Title VII and Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”) employment case: (1) the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal with prejudice of Santana’s retaliation counts, and (2) summary judgment for the employer on her sexual-harassment hostile work environment claim.

The plaintiff, Matilde Santana, alleged repeated sexually charged comments and unwanted physical contact by her manager, Anibal Soto, in a workplace atmosphere she contended was permissive and sexualized, including conduct by the station’s general manager, Luis Roldan. She also alleged that after she complained (including through counsel), the company retaliated by reassigning accounts, manipulating metrics and budgets, delaying her return from medical leave/accommodations, and isolating her at work.

The case presented two recurring litigation flashpoints: (a) what a retaliation plaintiff must plausibly plead—especially for causation—at the motion-to-dismiss stage, and (b) how courts must evaluate hostile-environment claims at summary judgment under the “totality of the circumstances,” including conduct occurring after employer notice and after an internal investigation.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit held:

• Retaliation pleading: Santana’s amended complaint plausibly alleged protected activity, materially adverse actions, and causation. The district court erred by demanding excessive specificity about decisionmakers and by effectively importing summary-judgment temporal-proximity standards into a Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility analysis.
• Hostile work environment: Viewing the evidence in Santana’s favor, genuine disputes of material fact existed as to whether sex-based harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive and whether the employer could be liable (vicariously or directly). The district court improperly minimized the frequency/severity evidence, improperly discounted post-leave/post-notice incidents, and resolved fact questions (including motive and effect) that belong to a jury.

The panel reversed the retaliation dismissal, vacated the hostile-environment summary judgment, and remanded for further proceedings.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Pleading standards: Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal

The court anchored its retaliation pleading analysis in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), emphasizing that a complaint must contain enough factual matter to state a facially plausible claim. It reiterated Iqbal’s core distinction: courts accept well-pleaded facts as true, but not legal conclusions or “threadbare recitals.”

2. Retaliation elements and adverse action: Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, Crawford v. Carroll, and Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White

For the retaliation framework, the panel cited Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84 F.4th 1300 (11th Cir. 2023), and Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961 (11th Cir. 2008), for the prima facie elements: protected activity, materially adverse action, and causation. The definition of “materially adverse” tracked Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006), i.e., actions that could dissuade a reasonable worker from engaging in protected activity.

3. Causation and knowledge: Shannon v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, and Brungart v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc.

The panel used Shannon v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 292 F.3d 712 (11th Cir. 2002), quoting Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571 (11th Cir. 2000), for the proposition that causation requires plausibly alleging decisionmaker awareness and that the protected activity and adverse action were “not wholly unrelated.” It further cited Brungart v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 231 F.3d 791 (11th Cir. 2000), for the practical requirement that the relevant decisionmaker must know of the protected activity.

4. “But-for” retaliation causation: Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar and Eleventh Circuit applications

The court reaffirmed that Title VII retaliation requires “but-for” causation under Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013), and noted the en banc Eleventh Circuit’s focus on causation in Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Georgia, Inc., 967 F.3d 1121 (11th Cir. 2020). Importantly, the panel treated Nassar as a merits standard that can be plausibly alleged through narrative facts at the pleading stage, not as a heightened pleading bar.

5. Temporal proximity—pleading vs. proof: Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, Johnson v. Miami-Dade Cnty., and the opinion’s cautionary footnote

The court cited Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361 (11th Cir. 2007), quoting Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001), for the familiar summary-judgment principle that “mere temporal proximity” must be “very close.” But the court’s key move was methodological: it held the district court erred by evaluating causation through summary-judgment decisions when deciding a motion to dismiss. The opinion expressly cautioned against conflating evidentiary sufficiency (Rule 56) with pleading sufficiency (Rule 12(b)(6)), noting the district court relied on decisions like Johnson v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 948 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2020), in an inapt procedural posture.

6. Comparison case on insufficient pleading: Greene v. Alabama. Dep't of Revenue (unpublished) and the treatment of unpublished authority

The panel distinguished Greene v. Alabama. Dep't of Revenue, 746 F. App'x 929 (11th Cir. 2018) (unpublished), where the plaintiff failed to plausibly allege decisionmaker knowledge and relied on an eight-month gap. Here, Santana identified Soto and Roldan and alleged office discussion of the investigation plus a tighter timeline.

The court also clarified the non-binding nature of unpublished decisions using Collado v. J. & G. Transp., Inc., 820 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2016), quoting Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2007).

7. Protected opposition complaints: Little v. United Techs., Carrier Transicold Div.

To confirm that internal complaints (including through counsel) can qualify as protected opposition, the court cited Little v. United Techs., Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956 (11th Cir. 1997), requiring a good-faith, reasonable belief that discrimination occurred.

8. Hostile work environment standards: Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., and later Eleventh Circuit gloss

On the merits of hostile environment, the court relied on:

• Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), for the foundational prohibition against discriminatory abusive environments.
• Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2002), for the elements and the “totality of the circumstances” factors (frequency, severity, humiliating/threatening character, interference with work).
• Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc), as a benchmark of comparatively less severe conduct—and a foil the panel found distinguishable on Santana’s evidence.
• Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), for context sensitivity and “constellation of surrounding circumstances.”
• Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2009), reinforcing the “fact-intensive” nature of the inquiry.
• Fernandez v. Trees, Inc., 961 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2020), emphasizing that no single factor is required.
• Copeland v. Georgia Dep't of Corr., 97 F.4th 766 (11th Cir. 2024), for how persistent humiliating conduct and authority-undermining behavior can satisfy severity/pervasiveness in context.

9. Summary judgment methodology: Edmondson v. Velvet Lifestyles, LLC and Rule 56

The panel invoked Edmondson v. Velvet Lifestyles, LLC, 43 F.4th 1153 (11th Cir. 2022), to reiterate that at summary judgment, courts must not weigh credibility and must draw reasonable inferences for the nonmovant—an instruction directly relevant to the district court’s minimization of Santana’s account.

10. Employer liability—supervisor status and negligence: Vance v. Ball State University, Breda v. Wolf Camera & Video, and Watson v. Blue Circle, Inc.

On vicarious liability, the court cited Vance v. Ball State University, 570 U.S. 421 (2013), for who is a “supervisor” (power to take tangible employment actions). On direct (negligence-based) liability, it cited Breda v. Wolf Camera & Video, 222 F.3d 886 (11th Cir. 2000), for actual/constructive notice and remedial action, and Watson v. Blue Circle, Inc., 324 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2003), for the principle that an employer can avoid liability if it takes immediate and appropriate corrective action.

11. Procedure and appellate restraint: Singleton v. Wulff, Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. v. Crum, and INS v. Bagamasbad

The panel noted its general practice not to decide issues not reached below, citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976), and Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. v. Crum, 54 F.4th 1312 (11th Cir. 2022). It also declined to address Santana’s Rule 59 issues because remand made them unnecessary, citing INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24 (1976).

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Retaliation: the court re-centers Rule 12(b)(6) on plausibility (not proof)

The district court dismissed because Santana allegedly failed to plead who did what, when, and with what knowledge. The Eleventh Circuit agreed the complaint was “not a model of specificity,” but held it crossed the plausibility threshold because it: (a) identified protected activity (complaints internally and through counsel; later EEOC charge), (b) alleged materially adverse actions (account reassignments, budget/metric changes, isolation, delayed accommodations/return), and (c) alleged causation by connecting Soto and Roldan to the adverse actions while alleging their awareness (including that they discussed the investigation openly).

Critically, the panel rejected the district court’s approach of assessing temporal proximity through the lens of summary-judgment cases. The panel’s reasoning is procedural as much as substantive: at Rule 12(b)(6), the question is whether the pleaded narrative permits a reasonable inference of liability, not whether the plaintiff has already marshaled evidence that would survive Rule 56 scrutiny.

2. Retaliation: “but-for” causation is pleadable through context and sequence

While reaffirming Nassar’s “but-for” causation requirement, the court held Santana plausibly alleged it by portraying a post-complaint negative shift: after the April 2019 complaint, adverse account/budget decisions and ostracizing conduct followed in close temporal sequence. The panel treated the alleged pattern as sufficient at the pleading stage to infer retaliatory motivation, without demanding evidentiary corroboration at Rule 12.

3. Hostile work environment: the panel restores the “totality” inquiry and rejects categorical discounting

On summary judgment, the district court viewed the record as a “handful” of incidents and treated much of the conduct as jokes/innuendo. The Eleventh Circuit—applying Miller, Harris, Mendoza, and Oncale—held that a reasonable jury could credit Santana’s evidence of near-daily sexually explicit commentary, unwanted touching, and humiliation over an extended period, and could find it severe or pervasive when aggregated.

The panel also faulted the district court for excluding (or minimizing) post-leave/post-notice conduct as merely “retaliatory rather than sex-based.” The panel treated motive and characterization as fact questions: a jury could infer that continued physical encroachment and contact after a complaint was part of the same sex-based harassment dynamic, and thus must be considered in the hostile-environment “totality.”

4. Employer liability: supervisor status and negligence are jury questions on this record

The district court held Soto was not a “supervisor” under Vance because he lacked authority to take tangible employment actions. The panel concluded a reasonable jury could find otherwise, given evidence that Santana’s managers controlled accounts, budgets, assignments, and compensation-impacting metrics. Separately, even if Soto were a coworker under Vance, the panel found triable issues on negligence because the employer had notice (at least by the April 2019 counsel letter) and the adequacy/effectiveness of the response—particularly where the investigation credited the accused on key points without obtaining available corroboration and where harassment allegedly continued—could be found insufficient by a jury.

C. Impact

1. Litigation discipline: courts must not “upgrade” Rule 12 to Rule 56

The opinion’s most practically important contribution is its explicit warning that Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility should not be evaluated through summary-judgment temporal-proximity case law. For Title VII retaliation claims in particular, defendants often argue that a plaintiff must plead granular decisionmaker identity, knowledge, and timing with near-evidentiary precision. This decision pushes back: while conclusory recitations remain insufficient under Twombly/Iqbal, a coherent narrative linking known managers to post-complaint harms can be enough.

2. Hostile environment: “totality” means what it says, including post-notice conduct

On the merits, the remand underscores that courts must consider the full course of conduct and context, not atomize incidents. It also signals that post-complaint conduct is not automatically reclassified out of the sex-harassment analysis; the same act may bear on both retaliation and hostile environment. That framing will matter in future cases where employers argue that once a complaint is made, later conduct is “retaliation only” and therefore cannot support the harassment “severe or pervasive” showing.

3. Investigations and remedial action: “prompt” is not synonymous with “adequate”

The court’s treatment of the investigation highlights that an employer’s invocation of policies, training, and an investigation timeline does not end the liability inquiry. Where an investigation fails to seek readily available corroboration (e.g., texts, client/account documents) or where a reasonable jury could find it functioned as acceptance of the accused’s account without verification, employer “reasonable care” and negligence remain triable issues.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility vs. Rule 56 proof: At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the plaintiff must allege enough facts to make the claim plausible; she does not need to prove the claim with evidence. Summary judgment happens later, after discovery, and asks whether admissible evidence could let a reasonable jury find for the plaintiff.
• Protected activity (Title VII retaliation): Complaining about discrimination or harassment—internally or through counsel—can be protected if the employee reasonably believes unlawful discrimination occurred.
• Materially adverse action: Retaliation is not limited to firing or demotion; it includes actions that could deter a reasonable person from complaining (e.g., account reassignments affecting pay).
• “But-for” causation: The employee must ultimately show retaliation was the determinative reason for the adverse action, but at pleading she can allege it through timing, knowledge, and a narrative of changed treatment.
• Hostile work environment (“severe or pervasive”): The law looks at the whole situation—how often, how serious, humiliating or threatening, and whether it interfered with work—rather than demanding any single “magic” level of misconduct.
• Supervisor under Vance: A “supervisor” for vicarious liability is someone empowered to take tangible employment actions (like significant reassignments or compensation-impacting decisions), not merely someone who directs daily tasks.
• Employer negligence: Even if the harasser is not a supervisor, an employer can be liable if it knew (or should have known) about harassment and failed to take effective corrective action.

V. Conclusion

Santana v. Telemundo Network Group, LLC reinforces two core principles in Title VII/FCRA practice: (1) retaliation claims should be assessed at the pleading stage under Twombly/Iqbal plausibility—without importing summary-judgment temporal-proximity rigor—and (2) hostile work environment claims demand a genuine “totality of the circumstances” evaluation at summary judgment, including post-notice conduct and the real-world adequacy of an employer’s response. By remanding both the retaliation and hostile-environment claims, the Eleventh Circuit signaled that where pleadings and evidence present a coherent narrative of complaint, knowledge, adverse change, and persistent sex-based mistreatment, the case belongs with a factfinder rather than being terminated through procedural shortcuts.