Pleading Specificity and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness in ICE Passport Seizures: The Third Circuit Reaffirms That Conclusory Allegations Cannot Sustain Injunctive Return-of-Property Claims

Case: Gregory Ifesinachi Ezeani v. Jimenez, Maloney, Ramotowski, and Tsoukaris (3d Cir. Dec. 4, 2024) — No. 24-2389

Panel: Judges Bibas, Freeman, and Nygaard (Per Curiam). Not precedential under I.O.P. 5.7.

Introduction

This appeal arises from a pro se civil rights action challenging the seizure of passports by U.S. Department of Homeland Security/ICE officers during an early-morning arrest. After the District Court initially denied in forma pauperis (IFP) status on sovereign immunity grounds, the Third Circuit (in an earlier appeal) clarified that a request for injunctive relief seeking the return of allegedly unconstitutionally seized passports is not barred by sovereign immunity. On remand, however, the District Court dismissed the injunctive claim for failure to state a claim, concluding that the complaint’s allegations were conclusory. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint, which again lacked concrete facts, and the District Court dismissed with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Third Circuit now affirms, holding that allegations of “gun duress,” an early-morning operation, and a general assertion of “criminal falsified material” do not, without specifics, plausibly allege an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

The core legal questions were:

What level of factual specificity must a plaintiff plead to plausibly allege that a seizure of personal effects (passports) by immigration officers was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment?
When (and with what detail) must a plaintiff identify purportedly falsified materials relied on by officers to support a Franks-type challenge?
Under § 1915(e)(2)(B), when is it appropriate for a court to dismiss with prejudice at screening for failure to state a claim because amendment would be futile?

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirms dismissal with prejudice of Gregory Ezeani’s amended complaint. Applying the pleading standard from Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the court concludes the complaint fails to set forth sufficient factual matter to state a plausible Fourth Amendment claim. The plaintiff alleged that ICE officers “broke into” his residence near 6:00 a.m., held him “under gun duress,” and seized multiple Nigerian passports “without probable cause,” relying on “criminal falsified material.” But he did not identify the purportedly falsified document(s) or explain the falsity, nor did he provide facts showing the manner of the seizure was unreasonable. The court also notes the “Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien” referenced by the plaintiff indicates he consented to entry, undercutting a bare allegation of forced entry. Having already been permitted one amendment, and offering no indication of what additional facts he could allege, further amendment was deemed futile. The panel thus affirms under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). The court reiterates that to survive dismissal, a complaint must include “sufficient factual matter” to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Conclusory accusations—e.g., that officers acted on “criminal falsified material” or that a seizure lacked “probable cause”—do not suffice without concrete, supporting facts. This principle drives the outcome.
SOLDAL v. COOK COUNTY, 506 U.S. 56 (1992); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). These cases establish the overarching “reasonableness” framework under the Fourth Amendment, requiring a careful balance of governmental and private interests. The panel invokes this standard to assess the overall conduct of the seizure.
TENNESSEE v. GARNER, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). Reasonableness concerns not only the timing of a seizure but also the manner in which it is carried out. The panel quotes this to emphasize that allegations about officers’ guns and the early hour, without more, do not automatically render the seizure unreasonable.
FRANKS v. DELAWARE, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). Though originally addressing challenges to allegedly false statements in warrant affidavits, Franks is cited to illustrate the needed specificity: a plaintiff must identify the precise statements claimed to be false and explain why. The plaintiff’s failure to identify the “criminal falsified material” dooms the claim at the pleading stage.
Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 2020). Confirms plenary review of sua sponte dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B).
GRAYSON v. MAYVIEW STATE HOSP., 293 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 2002). Authorizes dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) if amendment would be inequitable or futile, a point central to the affirmance here.
Vorchheimer v. Philadelphian Owners Ass’n, 903 F.3d 100 (3d Cir. 2018). Cited to support futility where a plaintiff has already amended and does not show what additional facts could cure the deficiencies.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The panel’s analysis turns on two interrelated pillars: (i) plausibility pleading and (ii) objective reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.

Plausibility and Nonconclusory Facts. The court enforces the basic Iqbal rule: labels and conclusions (e.g., “falsified,” “under duress,” “without probable cause”) are insufficient without factual enhancement. A plaintiff must supply facts permitting the court to infer misconduct—who did what, when, with what document or information, and why it was unlawful.
Franks-Type Specificity. If the theory is that officers used falsified materials, the complaint must identify the document, the false statements, and why they are false. The opinion invokes Franks to underscore that specificity—identifying the exact false portion and offering supporting reasons—is essential even at the pleading stage. Merely asserting “criminal falsified material” is not enough.
Reasonableness of the Manner of Seizure. As Garner and Soldal teach, how a seizure is carried out matters. Yet, the mere presence of firearms during an early-morning enforcement action—without facts showing excessiveness, threats, or conduct beyond what is ordinarily attendant to such operations—does not, by itself, plausibly allege unreasonableness. The complaint lacked detail on, for example, whether officers pointed guns at non-threatening persons, issued coercive commands that vitiated consent, or used force disproportionate to any safety concern.
Consent Allegations and Documents Referenced. The plaintiff referenced a “Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien” that, according to the court, indicated he consented to entry. At the pleading stage, courts may consider documents incorporated by reference. Here, that record undercut the bare allegation of a forcible “break-in.” Absent facts explaining why any purported consent was not voluntary (e.g., specific coercive conduct beyond the conclusory “duress”), the Fourth Amendment claim remained implausible.
Futility of Further Amendment. The District Court had already allowed one amendment and identified what was missing. The amended complaint repeated conclusory assertions and added no material facts. On appeal, the plaintiff did not indicate what more he could plead to cure deficiencies. Under Grayson and Vorchheimer, dismissal with prejudice was appropriate.

3) Impact and Significance

Although the decision is nonprecedential, it offers important practical guidance in an area where immigrants and pro se litigants frequently seek relief:

Pleading burden in immigration enforcement seizures. Plaintiffs challenging the seizure of identity and travel documents by ICE must supply concrete facts showing why the seizure was unreasonable. Reciting constitutional buzzwords or general grievances about “falsified” materials is inadequate.
Franks-style challenges require precision. Where the challenge rests on alleged falsity in materials used to justify action, plaintiffs must identify the specific statements, explain the falsity, and allege facts showing materiality. General claims of forgery or falsification will not survive screening.
Use of firearms and early-morning operations are not per se unreasonable. The panel signals that these common features of enforcement operations, without more, do not establish a Fourth Amendment violation. Plaintiffs must demonstrate why the manner of execution was excessive or coercive in context (e.g., specific threats, pointing weapons at compliant and non-dangerous individuals, or other facts showing unreasonableness).
Consent must be factually challenged, not merely labeled coerced. If documentary evidence suggests the plaintiff consented to entry or seizure, conclusory assertions of “duress” will be insufficient. Facts explaining why consent was involuntary are necessary (e.g., specific conduct that overbore the will).
Practical path for relief is narrow but real. The earlier appeal in this litigation confirms that injunctive return-of-property claims against federal officers (in their official capacities) are not categorically barred by sovereign immunity. However, success on the merits requires factually robust pleadings establishing a Fourth Amendment violation.
Amendment strategy matters. After one amendment, courts may deem further amendment futile if the plaintiff simply repackages the same conclusory assertions. Litigants should add specific, verifiable facts in any amended complaint to avoid dismissal with prejudice.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Plausibility pleading (Iqbal). Your complaint must tell a concrete story. Who did what, when, using which document or authority, and why that violated the law. Courts do not accept mere labels (“unlawful,” “falsified,” “duress”) without supporting detail.
Fourth Amendment reasonableness. The Constitution prohibits “unreasonable” searches and seizures. Reasonableness depends on the whole picture: the government’s interests, the individual’s privacy and property interests, and how the officers executed the action (timing, force, consent, etc.).
Franks challenge. If you claim officials used a document with false statements to justify a warrant or action, you must identify the exact false statements, explain why they are false, and show that, without them, there would be no basis for the action. General accusations of “falsification” are not enough.
Consent. Officers can often enter or seize property if you consent. But consent must be voluntary. If you allege coercion, you need specific facts (e.g., threats, commands, number of officers, visible weapons pointed at you, statements negating your right to refuse) showing your will was overborne.
IFP screening and § 1915(e)(2)(B). When you proceed without paying filing fees, the court screens your complaint. It can dismiss if the claim fails on its face and if further amendment would be futile—meaning no additional facts are likely to fix the defects.
Official-capacity suits and sovereign immunity. Damages claims against federal officers in their official capacities are typically barred by sovereign immunity. However, suits seeking non-monetary relief (like returning property) can sometimes proceed. This case recognizes that narrow path but shows it still requires a well-pleaded constitutional claim.

Practical Takeaways for Future Litigants

If you allege reliance on falsified documents, specify: the document’s name/date, the exact false statements, who made them, how you know they are false, and why they mattered to the officers’ actions.
If you claim lack of consent or coerced consent, detail the circumstances: number of officers, whether weapons were drawn or pointed, exact statements made, whether you were told you could refuse, and any threats or pressures used.
If you assert lack of probable cause, explain why: what facts were missing, why the officers could not reasonably believe you were removable or that the passports were subject to seizure, and what contrary facts the officers ignored.
Attach or reference documents carefully. If a document suggests consent or authority, you must allege facts that rebut or explain it; otherwise, it may be used to evaluate plausibility at the pleading stage.
Use your amendment opportunity to add facts, not restated conclusions. Courts may dismiss with prejudice if you repeat the same bare assertions without new, concrete details.

Contextual Notes

Scope of the decision. The opinion is not precedential and does not create new law; it applies established standards to the specific pleadings before the court. It nevertheless clarifies what kind of factual detail is necessary in this common enforcement context.
Damages vs. injunctive relief. The plaintiff sued the officers in their official capacities only, seeking damages and return of passports. Damages were barred by sovereign immunity; the claim for return of passports (injunctive relief) was allowed to proceed past sovereign immunity in a prior appeal but ultimately failed on the merits for lack of factual specificity.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s decision reinforces a straightforward but often overlooked principle: even in the charged setting of immigration enforcement, a plaintiff must plead concrete, nonconclusory facts to plausibly claim a Fourth Amendment violation. Allegations that officers appeared with firearms at daybreak and seized passports “without probable cause,” or that they relied on unspecified “criminal falsified material,” do not cross the plausibility threshold without specific factual support. Where a plaintiff references a record suggesting consent to entry, absent particularized allegations of coercion or falsity, the complaint will not survive screening. Having already been afforded one opportunity to amend, and with no indication of additional facts to cure the defects, dismissal with prejudice was proper.

While the earlier stage of this litigation confirms that sovereign immunity does not categorically bar a request for the return of allegedly unconstitutionally seized passports, this case demonstrates that access to that remedy is conditioned on meeting the rigorous pleading standards that govern all federal civil rights claims. The practical lesson is clear: specificity matters—from identifying the exact “falsified” statements to detailing why the manner of the seizure was unreasonable. Without it, even potentially meritorious claims will not proceed.