Introduction

This appeal arises from a pro se challenge by Jeremy Kennedy, an incarcerated individual in the Arkansas Division of Correction (ADC), against the Arkansas Parole Board (APB)—now the Arkansas Post-Prison Transfer Board—and the ADC. Kennedy sought declaratory judgment and a writ of mandamus, contending that the APB acted outside its statutory authority by denying his transfer eligibility for two years and that the ADC would act unlawfully by refusing to transfer him to the Division of Community Correction. He also filed for a preliminary injunction, which he abandoned on appeal.

The Jefferson County Circuit Court granted the appellees’ motion to revoke Kennedy’s in forma pauperis (IFP) status and to dismiss his pleadings, and it designated the dismissal as a “strike” under Arkansas’s three-strikes statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-68-607. Kennedy appealed. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed.

The decision clarifies—and, in practice, tightens—the pleading requirements for inmates seeking declaratory or mandamus relief against corrections entities over parole or transfer eligibility: to pierce sovereign immunity under the ultra vires exception, a petitioner must plead specific conviction dates and tie those dates to the correct, then-effective version(s) of Arkansas’s continually amended parole-eligibility statutes. Failure to do so renders the complaint insufficient as a matter of law and supports dismissal and a “strike.”

Summary of the Opinion

• Sovereign Immunity and Declaratory Judgment: Lawsuits seeking declaratory relief against the State are barred unless the plaintiff pleads facts showing ultra vires, unconstitutional, or illegal acts. Kennedy did not plead sufficient facts—most notably, he omitted his conviction dates—to show that the APB misapplied the relevant parole-eligibility statutes. Without a pleaded misapplication by the APB, no derivative action against the ADC could proceed. Dismissal was affirmed.
• Mandamus: Mandamus requires a clear and certain right to relief and no other adequate remedy. For the same reasons (insufficient factual pleading), Kennedy failed to establish a clear right to relief. Dismissal was affirmed.
• Strike Designation: The circuit court’s designation of the dismissal as a “strike” under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-68-607 was affirmed. Kennedy failed to supply a sufficient appellate record to show an abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s reliance on three prior qualifying cases.
• Abandoned Injunctive Claim: Kennedy’s request for a preliminary injunction was deemed abandoned because he did not argue it on appeal.

The Court applied an abuse-of-discretion standard to the dismissal order while noting that dismissals on pure questions of law are reviewed de novo. The outcome turned on pleading sufficiency under sovereign-immunity doctrine and the specificity demanded by Arkansas’s evolving parole-eligibility framework.

Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Ark. Const. art. 5, § 20 (Sovereign Immunity): “The State of Arkansas shall never be made defendant in any of her courts.” The majority reiterates that this broad immunity bars declaratory actions against the State unless the plaintiff pleads facts showing ultra vires, unconstitutional, or illegal conduct.
• Martin v. Haas, 2018 Ark. 283, 556 S.W.3d 509: Establishes the ultra vires/unconstitutional/illegal-act pathway to declaratory relief notwithstanding sovereign immunity. The Court relies on Martin to frame the exception Kennedy attempted to invoke.
• Williams v. McCoy, 2018 Ark. 17, 535 S.W.3d 266: Even where unconstitutional conduct is alleged, a complaint must plead facts that, if proven, entitle the plaintiff to relief. The Court uses Williams to emphasize the pleading burden—Kennedy’s conclusory assertions, untethered to dates and statutory versions, were insufficient.
• Carroll v. Hobbs, 2014 Ark. 395, 442 S.W.3d 834: “The determination of parole eligibility is solely within the province of the ADC.” This anchors agency roles: ADC has primacy in eligibility determinations; the APB/Post-Prison Transfer Board addresses transfer/release decisions. Carroll frames the structural context and underscores why a legally cognizable claim must identify a statutory misapplication by the decision-making entity.
• Schuldheisz v. Felts, 2024 Ark. 137, 696 S.W.3d 817: Declaratory relief may lie if the ADC acts ultra vires or beyond statutory authority or fails to adhere to a parole statute. Cited to confirm the narrow corridor through which such claims may proceed, provided the pleading is specific and well-founded.
• Lenard v. Kelley, 2017 Ark. 186, 519 S.W.3d 682: A petitioner successfully showed the APB exceeded its statutory authority by denying transfer eligibility. Crucially, Lenard required the Court to identify the correct parole-eligibility statute based on conviction dates because Arkansas statutes have changed often. Lenard thus foreshadows the majority’s insistence here on pleading precise conviction dates and the applicable statutory version.
• Linell v. State, 2019 Ark. 25, 565 S.W.3d 482: Mandamus lies to enforce an established right or a ministerial duty; it requires a clear and certain right and no adequate alternative remedy. Linell frames why Kennedy’s mandamus request falters in the absence of facts establishing a right under the correct statute.
• Worden v. Kirchner, 2013 Ark. 509, 431 S.W.3d 243; Griffin v. State, 2018 Ark. 10, 535 S.W.3d 261: These cases provide the abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing dismissals and define abuse of discretion as arbitrary or groundless action.
• Davis v. Kelley, 2019 Ark. 64, 568 S.W.3d 268; Ark. Code Ann. § 16-68-607: The statute authorizes a “strike” when a case is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim; Davis articulates how courts classify dismissals under this statute.
• McCullon v. State, 2023 Ark. 190, 679 S.W.3d 358: The appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record to demonstrate error or abuse of discretion. Kennedy’s record was insufficient to disturb the strike designation.
• Sylvester v. State, 2017 Ark. 309, 530 S.W.3d 346: Claims not argued on appeal are abandoned; applied to Kennedy’s injunctive-relief request.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) Sovereign immunity and the ultra vires path to declaratory relief. The Court reaffirmed that, under art. 5, § 20, the State generally cannot be sued. The recognized pathway around this bar is limited to cases in which the plaintiff pleads facts that, if proven, show State actors acted ultra vires, unconstitutionally, or illegally. This is not a pleading-lite standard: a bare assertion that officials misapplied law is insufficient; the petition must include facts demonstrating why the act was beyond authority under the specific statute that actually governed at the time of the plaintiff’s convictions.

b) Why the pleading failed. Kennedy argued that his crimes placed him within a target group mandating transfer eligibility and that the APB lacked discretion to deny his transfer for two years. But his petition did not include the dates of his convictions. Arkansas’s parole-eligibility statutes, including Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-615, have been amended several times (the opinion notes effective dates of July 27, 2011; February 20, 2013; August 16, 2013; April 1, 2015; and July 22, 2015, among others). Because eligibility turns on the statute in effect when the operative convictions occurred, the Court could not verify which statutory version applied to Kennedy nor whether the APB’s denial was ultra vires. Without specific conviction dates tied to specific statutory provisions, the claim remained conclusory and could not overcome sovereign immunity.

c) Consequence for the ADC claim. The Court added that, absent a pleading showing the APB misapplied the eligibility statute, no derivative claim against the ADC lies for declining to transfer. Carroll’s allocation of roles informs this: parole/transfer eligibility determinations belong to correctional authorities; to state a claim, a petitioner must tether his allegations to a misapplication by the body with authority to decide.

d) Mandamus rises and falls with the same defect. Because mandamus requires a “clear and certain” right to relief and no other adequate remedy, and because Kennedy’s pleading deficiency prevented him from demonstrating any right conferred by the correct version of the statute, mandamus could not issue.

e) Strike designation affirmed. The Court upheld the circuit court’s finding that this dismissal qualified as a “strike” under § 16-68-607 (frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim), noting appellees identified three prior qualifying cases. Kennedy did not furnish a sufficient record for appellate review to show an abuse of discretion under McCullon, so the strike stands.

3) The Dissent and the Continuing Debate Over Sovereign Immunity

Justice Womack dissented, advancing a robust view of sovereign immunity grounded in the text of art. 5, § 20: absent an express constitutional provision to the contrary, “the State can never properly be a defendant in any of its courts.” Citing prior dissents (e.g., Thurston v. League of Women Voters of Ark., 2022 Ark. 32, and Perry v. Payne, 2022 Ark. 112), he would dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because Kennedy proceeded by a new civil action (No. 35CV-23-920) rather than petitioning within the underlying criminal case(s). In his view, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction, so this Court should reverse and dismiss. The majority neither adopts nor refutes this structural argument, but the dissent underscores an ongoing, significant interpretive divide over the reach of sovereign immunity and the proper procedural vehicle for relief against State actors.

4) Impact

• Heightened pleading specificity for parole/transfer challenges. Inmates must plead conviction dates and identify the applicable statutory versions governing eligibility. Given the frequency of amendments to Title 16, Chapter 93, failure to anchor allegations to precise dates and statutes will doom claims at the pleading stage under sovereign-immunity doctrine.
• Reinforcement of agency roles. The opinion reiterates that parole eligibility determinations are lodged with the ADC and that transfer decisions implicate the APB/Post-Prison Transfer Board. A viable suit must show a misapplication by the agency with decisional authority under the correct law at the relevant time.
• Mandamus narrowed to ministerial missteps. Absent a well-pleaded, statute-specific right, mandamus will not lie to force parole or transfer outcomes.
• Practical consequences for pro se litigation. The decision will likely increase early dismissals of deficient petitions and accelerate “strike” accrual under § 16-68-607 when filings fail to state a claim. Petitioners should attach judgment-and-commitment orders or other records showing conviction dates and track the statute’s evolution.
• Ongoing jurisprudential tension. The dissent’s jurisdictional view signals continued debate over whether relief must be sought within criminal dockets rather than by civil action and how absolute art. 5, § 20 immunity is in practice.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Sovereign Immunity: A constitutional rule that the State cannot be sued in its own courts unless a recognized exception applies. Arkansas recognizes a narrow path for declaratory suits alleging ultra vires (beyond authority), unconstitutional, or illegal acts—but the plaintiff must plead concrete facts showing the exception.
• Ultra Vires: Latin for “beyond the powers.” An action by a government official or agency that exceeds the authority granted by law.
• Declaratory Judgment: A court’s binding determination of the parties’ rights under law, without ordering specific action or awarding damages. In this context, a declaration that the APB/ADC misapplied the parole statute.
• Writ of Mandamus: A court order compelling a public official or agency to perform a purely ministerial duty that the law requires—available only when the right is clear and no other remedy exists.
• Parole/Transfer Eligibility in Arkansas: Governed by statute and affected by amendments over time. Determining eligibility requires identifying the statute in effect at the time of conviction. The ADC determines parole eligibility; the APB (now the Post-Prison Transfer Board) makes transfer/release decisions.
• In Forma Pauperis (IFP): Permission to proceed without paying filing fees due to indigency. Status can be revoked if the case lacks merit or falls within three-strikes restrictions.
• Three-Strikes Statute (Ark. Code Ann. § 16-68-607): Limits IFP filings by incarcerated persons who, on three or more prior occasions, brought civil actions dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim. A “strike” is such a qualifying dismissal; three strikes bar future IFP filings absent imminent danger.
• Standard of Review: “Abuse of discretion” means the lower court’s decision was arbitrary or groundless; “de novo” means the appellate court decides the legal issue anew. Here, pleading sufficiency and sovereign-immunity application drove the result.

Practice Notes and Takeaways

• Plead with date-and-statute precision: Always allege (and, where possible, attach proof of) exact conviction dates and pinpoint the version of the parole-eligibility statute in force on those dates.
• Align allegations with agency authority: Identify which agency made which decision and show why that decision exceeded its statutory powers under the governing law.
• Avoid conclusory claims: Statements such as “the Board had no discretion” must be supported by the specific statutory language that eliminates discretion for the petitioner’s crime and conviction date.
• Guard against strikes: A dismissal for failure to state a claim can become a strike under § 16-68-607; ensure the appellate record includes all materials necessary to challenge any strike designation.
• Be mindful of procedural vehicles: Although the majority did not adopt the dissent’s jurisdictional view, litigants should note the dissent’s continuing argument that such relief belongs in underlying criminal cases.

Conclusion

The Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision in Kennedy underscores a demanding but clear rule: an inmate challenging parole or transfer eligibility on ultra vires grounds must plead conviction dates and tie those dates to the precise parole statute then in effect. Because Arkansas’s parole laws have been repeatedly amended, this specificity is indispensable to overcome sovereign immunity and to state a claim for declaratory or mandamus relief. Kennedy’s failure to do so rendered his claims legally insufficient, justified dismissal, and supported the “strike” designation under § 16-68-607.

Doctrinally, the opinion reaffirms the narrowness of the ultra vires exception to sovereign immunity, delineates agency roles in parole and transfer decisions, and signals to lower courts and pro se litigants alike that conclusory assertions will not suffice in this arena. The dissent reflects an ongoing jurisprudential divide over sovereign immunity’s breadth and the proper procedural vehicle for seeking relief. Practically, the decision fortifies a front-end screening mechanism: without statute-specific, date-grounded pleadings, parole-eligibility challenges will be dismissed at the threshold—and may count as strikes.