Pleading Religious Objections and Defining Vaccination Status Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: Commentary on Finn v. Humane Society of the United States (4th Cir. 2025)

Pleading Religious Objections and Defining Vaccination Status Under Federal Anti‑Discrimination Law:
A Commentary on Finn v. Humane Society of the United States (4th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

The Fourth Circuit’s published decision in Jennifer Finn & Katherine Muldoon v. Humane Society of the United States, No. 24‑1416 (4th Cir. Nov. 20, 2025), sits at the intersection of three highly charged topics: COVID‑19 vaccine mandates, religious accommodation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

The case arises from the Humane Society’s company‑wide COVID‑19 vaccination mandate, which applied even to remote workers. Two remote employees, Katherine Muldoon and Jennifer Finn, sought religious exemptions based on pro‑life and conscience‑based religious beliefs. Their employer denied their requests and terminated them. They sued under:

  • Title VII – alleging religious discrimination for failure to provide a religious accommodation; and
  • ADA – alleging (i) unlawful disability‑related inquiries regarding vaccination status and (ii) “regarded as” disability discrimination based on being unvaccinated.

The district court dismissed all claims under Rule 12(b)(6). On appeal, the Fourth Circuit:

  • Revived the Title VII religious discrimination claims, holding that the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged religious beliefs that qualify for protection and are plausibly connected to their refusal to be vaccinated; but
  • Affirmed dismissal of the ADA claims, holding that (a) asking about vaccination status is not a disability‑related inquiry, and (b) being unvaccinated is not a physical or mental impairment and therefore cannot support a “regarded as” ADA claim.

In doing so, the court:

  • Reaffirmed and applied its recent precedent in Barnett v. Inova Health Care Servs., 125 F.4th 465 (4th Cir. 2025), which articulated a two‑part pleading standard for Title VII religious objections to COVID‑19 vaccines; and
  • Established clear, published authority in the Fourth Circuit that unvaccinated status and vaccination inquiries, by themselves, do not implicate the ADA.

This commentary explores the opinion’s reasoning, the precedent it builds upon, and its likely impact on future litigation over vaccine mandates, religious accommodations, and disability discrimination.

II. Summary of the Fourth Circuit’s Opinion

A. The Title VII Claims

Title VII prohibits an employer from discharging or otherwise discriminating against an employee “because of … religion.” To state a religious discrimination/accommodation claim, the employee must plausibly allege that:

  1. She has a sincerely held belief; and
  2. That belief is religious in nature and conflicts with an employment requirement (here, the vaccine mandate).

The parties disputed only the second prong. Relying on Barnett, the Fourth Circuit reiterated that, at the pleading stage in vaccine‑mandate cases, a plaintiff must allege that:

  1. Her beliefs are an “essential part of a religious faith”, rather than merely secular, medical, or personal preferences; and
  2. Her beliefs are plausibly connected to her refusal to receive the COVID‑19 vaccine.

The majority held that:

  • Muldoon’s allegations—opposition to vaccines derived from fetal cell lines based on her “Christian upbringing” and belief in the sanctity of fetal life—sufficiently alleged religious beliefs and plausibly connected them to her refusal to be vaccinated.
  • Finn’s allegations—that taking the vaccine would “betray [her] conscience and faith,” supported by references to Catholic teachings on conscience and her “faith in God and Jesus”—also sufficed, though the court characterized them as “more attenuated.”

The court rejected the district court’s view that the plaintiffs needed to identify a specific religion, enumerate current religious practices, or cite a particular doctrinal tenet prohibiting vaccination. It vacated dismissal of the Title VII claims and remanded for further proceedings.

B. The ADA Claims

The plaintiffs brought two ADA-based theories:

  1. Unlawful medical examination or inquiry – arguing that asking about vaccination status was an impermissible disability‑related inquiry not justified by business necessity.
  2. “Regarded as” disabled – claiming the employer perceived them as disabled (based on their unvaccinated status) and terminated them on that basis.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed dismissal of both:

  • On the inquiry claim, the court held that asking about vaccination status is not an inquiry “as to whether such employee is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability” under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). Vaccination status does not meaningfully relate to whether one has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. The court thus did not even reach the “business necessity” defense.
  • On the “regarded as” claim, the court held that being unvaccinated is not a physical or mental impairment and therefore cannot support a “regarded as” theory. Terminating an employee because she is unvaccinated is not, without more, disability discrimination under the ADA.

The court affirmed in part (as to the ADA claims), vacated in part (as to the Title VII claims), and remanded.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Humane Society’s Vaccine Mandate and Exemption Process

Amid the COVID‑19 pandemic, the Humane Society of the United States (now “Humane World for Animals”) instituted a company‑wide COVID‑19 vaccine mandate. The policy:

  • Applied to all employees, including remote workers;
  • Permitted employees to request religious or medical exemptions; but
  • Warned that employees who did not comply would face termination.

Muldoon and Finn, both remote employees, requested religious exemptions from the mandate.

B. The Plaintiffs’ Religious Assertions

1. Muldoon

Muldoon’s request explained that she objected to:

  • “Injecting a product containing fetal cells or derived from testing involving fetal cells,” because such products were contrary to her “personal moral beliefs on the sanctity of life”; and
  • Receiving a vaccine associated with fetal cell use, because her religious beliefs, “founded in [her] Christian upbringing,” saw fetuses as individuals who did not consent to the use of their bodies in medical testing or production.

She emphasized that taking the vaccine would make her “complicit in an act that offends [her] spiritual and religious faith.”

2. Finn

Finn’s request described her religious objection in conscience‑based terms. She stated that receiving the vaccine would “betray[] [her] conscience and faith.” She:

  • Referred to Catholic teachings and cited statements from Saint Paul VI and the Catholic Bishops of Wisconsin regarding the primacy of conscience; and
  • Declared that her “heart, conscience and faith in God and Jesus prevent [her] from complying with the mandate.”

C. Denial of Exemptions and Termination

The Humane Society spoke with each plaintiff about her religious beliefs but ultimately:

  • Denied both religious exemption requests; and
  • Terminated both employees for noncompliance with the vaccine mandate.

D. The District Court’s Dismissal

Muldoon and Finn filed suit in the District of Maryland, alleging:

  1. Title VII religious discrimination based on denial of religious accommodations (Count I);
  2. ADA unlawful inquiry based on questioning vaccination status (Count II); and
  3. ADA “regarded as” disability discrimination based on allegedly being viewed as disabled because they were unvaccinated (Count III).

Without the benefit of the subsequently decided Barnett case, the district court held that:

  • The plaintiffs had not adequately pleaded that their objections were based on religious beliefs:
    • For Muldoon, the court found no allegation that she currently subscribed to a particular religion or explained her present religious beliefs.
    • For Finn, the court found she did not identify a specific religion or the nature of her religious beliefs.
  • As to the ADA inquiry claim, it was “well settled” that asking about vaccination status is not a medical exam or disability‑related inquiry under the ADA.
  • As to the “regarded as” claim, being unvaccinated could not, as a matter of law, support such a claim because unvaccinated status is not a disability.

The court thus granted the Humane Society’s motion to dismiss in full. The plaintiffs appealed.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Title VII Religious Discrimination: Reaffirming Barnett and Clarifying Pleading Standards

1. The Statutory Framework

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to:

“discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s … religion.”
– 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‑2(a)(1)

The statute’s definition of “religion” includes:

“all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that [it] is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s … religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”
– 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)

Thus, a typical religious accommodation claim involves:

  1. A religious belief or practice that conflicts with a job requirement;
  2. An employer’s knowledge of the conflict;
  3. An adverse employment action for failing to comply with the requirement; and
  4. Potentially, whether providing an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the employer.

At the pleading stage, however, the employee need not prove each element. Under Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506 (2002), the prima facie case is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement. The complaint must simply allege enough facts to make the claim “plausible on its face” under Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).

2. The “Religious” Prong: Seeger, Welsh, and Barnett

The core dispute in Finn concerned whether the plaintiffs’ objections were “religious in nature” rather than merely secular, medical, or personal. The panel drew on several key precedents.

a. United States v. Seeger and the broad conception of “religion”

In United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), the Supreme Court addressed who qualifies as a conscientious objector under federal draft law. The Court held that beliefs qualify as “religious” if they:

“occupy in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption.”

This functional, rather than doctrinal, test recognizes that religious beliefs need not align with traditional creeds, but must be sincerely held and play a role akin to religious conviction.

b. Welsh v. United States: moral and ethical beliefs as religious

In Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), the Court broadened this concept, holding that:

“an individual may deeply and sincerely hold beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source and content but that nevertheless impose upon him a duty of conscience … [in] a place parallel to that filled by ‘God’ in traditionally religious persons.”

The Fourth Circuit in Finn quotes Welsh to emphasize that:

  • Religious beliefs can be expressed in moral or ethical terms;
  • They need not map neatly onto a particular denomination’s doctrine; and
  • What matters is the role and depth of the belief, not its institutional label.
c. Dachman v. Shalala and the distinction between beliefs and preferences

In Dachman v. Shalala, 9 F. App’x 186 (4th Cir. 2001), the court emphasized that:

“While an employer has a duty to accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs, [it] does not have a duty to accommodate an employee’s preferences.”

This distinction is crucial: opposition to a workplace rule must be grounded in religious conviction, not merely in personal ideology, political belief, or lifestyle choice.

d. Barnett v. Inova Health Care Servs.: the two‑part pleading standard

In Barnett v. Inova Health Care Servs., 125 F.4th 465 (4th Cir. 2025), the Fourth Circuit articulated a specific test for the “religious” nature of beliefs in the context of vaccine mandates. To plead a viable religious discrimination claim, a plaintiff must show:

  1. Her beliefs are an “essential part of a religious faith”; and
  2. Those beliefs are “plausibly connected with her refusal to receive the COVID‑19 vaccine.”

The first prong ensures that the objection is genuinely rooted in religion, broadly understood. The second prong prevents plaintiffs from repackaging non‑religious objections (such as health concerns, distrust of government, or generalized skepticism) as “religious” after the fact.

In Barnett, the plaintiff alleged that her “religious reasons for declining the covid vaccinations … were based on her study and understanding of the Bible and personally directed by the true and living God.” The Finn court views this as a paradigm of how a plaintiff can satisfy both prongs at the pleading stage.

3. Applying the Barnett Framework to Muldoon and Finn

a. Muldoon: Pro‑life convictions and fetal cell use

Muldoon alleged that:

  • She objected to “injecting a product containing fetal cells or derived from testing involving fetal cells”;
  • Her opposition was rooted in her “Christian upbringing,” specifically the belief that:
    • “fetuses are individuals” whose lives are sacred; and
    • fetuses did not consent to the use of their bodies in medical testing;
  • Receiving such a vaccine would make her “complicit in an act that offends [her] spiritual and religious faith.”

The court held that these allegations:

  • Sufficiently allege a religious belief:
    • Her pro‑life convictions, tied expressly to a Christian understanding of the sanctity of life, are not merely political or ethical preferences; they are framed as religiously grounded moral imperatives.
    • The court notes that we “give great weight” to a person’s own assertion that her belief is an “essential part of a religious faith.”
  • Plausibly connect that belief to vaccine refusal:
    • The link is direct: her belief about the immorality of using aborted fetal tissue in medical products leads her to refuse a vaccine derived from or tested on such cell lines.
    • This fits comfortably within the Barnett framework.

Thus, the complaint plausibly alleges that her refusal to be vaccinated “derives from an aspect of her religious practices or beliefs,” satisfying both prongs.

b. Finn: Conscience, faith in God and Jesus, and Catholic teachings

Finn’s allegations were less doctrinal and more conscience‑oriented. She:

  • Stated that receiving the vaccine would “betray[] [her] conscience and faith”;
  • Invoked her “heart, conscience and faith in God and Jesus” as the reason she could not comply with the mandate; and
  • Cited Catholic authorities (Saint Paul VI and the Catholic Bishops of Wisconsin) for the proposition that one must follow a properly formed conscience.

The court candidly described her theory as “more attenuated” than Muldoon’s but still sufficient:

  • Religious nature: The references to God, Jesus, and Catholic teachings position her conscience‑based objection as religious rather than purely personal or philosophical.
  • Connection to vaccine refusal: She explicitly alleges that her religiously formed conscience prevents her from complying with the vaccine mandate, which is a direct conflict between belief and job requirement.

The court analogized this to Barnett’s statement that her refusal was based on “her study and understanding of the Bible and personally directed by the true and living God,” viewing Finn’s allegations as “close enough” for pleading purposes.

4. Rejecting Heightened Particularity: No Need to Plead Denominational Doctrine

A key contribution of Finn is its explicit rejection of a heightened pleading standard that would require plaintiffs to:

  • Name their religion;
  • Cite specific religious texts or doctrines prohibiting vaccination; or
  • Demonstrate that their beliefs are consistent with official denominational positions.

The court endorses the view, shared by sister circuits, that plaintiffs need not explain:

“how any particular tenet or principle of [their] religion prohibited vaccination.” – quoting Passarella v. Aspirus, Inc., 108 F.4th 1005, 1012 (7th Cir. 2024), and citing Lucky v. Landmark Med. of Mich., P.C., 103 F.4th 1241 (6th Cir. 2024)

It also invokes the Supreme Court’s admonition in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), that:

“courts must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim.”

In combination, these authorities reinforce that:

  • Civil courts assess whether a belief is sincerely held and religious in character, not whether it aligns with theological orthodoxy or majority practice.
  • At the motion‑to‑dismiss stage, courts must give significant deference to the plaintiff’s own characterizations of her beliefs.

5. Sincerity and Undue Hardship: Issues for Later Stages

The Fourth Circuit underscores that:

  • It is not deciding whether Muldoon and Finn’s beliefs are in fact sincere—only that they have alleged enough to move past dismissal. Sincerity is a factual issue that may be tested via evidence at summary judgment or trial.
  • It is not yet considering whether accommodating these employees would impose an undue hardship on the employer. That issue arises under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) and is typically considered under a burden‑shifting framework (e.g., EEOC v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2008)) at or after summary judgment once the prima facie case is established.

Thus, Finn is about pleading, not ultimate entitlement to accommodation.

B. ADA Claims: Vaccination Status as Non‑Disability

1. Legal Standards Under the ADA

a. Definition of disability

The ADA defines “disability” as:

  • A physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities;
  • A record of such an impairment; or
  • Being “regarded as” having such an impairment.

“Major life activities” include, by regulation, activities such as:

“Caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, sitting, reaching, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, interacting with others, and working.” – 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i)
b. Unlawful medical examination or inquiry

Under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A), an employer may not:

“make inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job‑related and consistent with business necessity.”

An inquiry violates the statute only if it is disability-related, i.e., it tends to elicit information about whether the person has a disability or about its nature or severity.

. “Regarded as” disabled

The ADA’s “regarded as” prong, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A), covers individuals who:

are “subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.”

The focus is on the employer’s perception of an impairment. As the Fourth Circuit explained in Wilson v. Phoenix Specialty Mfg. Co., 513 F.3d 378 (4th Cir. 2008), the key is the employer’s “reactions and perceptions.”

2. Inquiries into Vaccination Status: Not Disability‑Related

Muldoon and Finn alleged that the Humane Society unlawfully inquired into their vaccination status in violation of § 12112(d)(4)(A), arguing that such an inquiry was not justified by job‑related business necessity, particularly because they worked remotely.

The Fourth Circuit rejected this claim at the threshold, holding that:

  • Asking about vaccination status is not an inquiry about:
    • whether an employee is an “individual with a disability”; or
    • the nature or severity of any such disability.
  • Vaccination status, in itself, is not a proxy for any physical or mental impairment.

The court favorably cited a district court decision, Jorgenson v. Conduent Transp. Sols., Inc., No. 22‑01648, 2023 WL 1472022 (D. Md. Feb. 2, 2023), aff’d, 2023 WL 4105705 (4th Cir. June 21, 2023), which similarly concluded that inquiries about COVID‑19 vaccination status are not disability‑related under the ADA.

Because the inquiry was not disability‑related, the court did not need to analyze whether it was “job‑related and consistent with business necessity.” That defense is only relevant once an inquiry is found to be disability‑related in the first place.

3. Being Unvaccinated Is Not an Impairment: The “Regarded As” Claim

On the “regarded as” claim, Muldoon and Finn contended that:

  • The Humane Society treated them as though they were disabled because of their unvaccinated status; and
  • Terminated them for that reason, thereby violating the ADA’s prohibition against discrimination based on perceived disability.

The Fourth Circuit rejected this theory, holding that:

  • Being unvaccinated is not a “physical or mental impairment” within the meaning of the ADA.
  • Because unvaccinated status is not an impairment, an employer’s decision to fire an employee for being unvaccinated cannot be reframed as “regarded as” disability discrimination without more.

This is a categorical ruling of significant practical importance: vaccination status alone, without an underlying health condition or impairment, does not trigger the ADA.

C. Precedents and Authorities: How They Shape the Opinion

1. Barnett v. Inova Health Care Servs. (4th Cir. 2025)

Barnett is the linchpin of the Title VII portion of the Finn opinion. In Barnett, another COVID‑19 vaccine‑mandate case, the Fourth Circuit addressed employees’ religious objections and articulated the now‑controlling two‑part test:

  1. Beliefs must be an “essential part of a religious faith.”
  2. Beliefs must be “plausibly connected with [the] refusal to receive the COVID‑19 vaccine.”

In Finn, the panel:

  • Explicitly reaffirms Barnett and applies its test to the plaintiffs’ allegations;
  • Uses Barnett’s factual posture—religious objections based on biblical study and God’s direction—as a comparative benchmark; and
  • Confirms that Barnett governs not just clinical employees or in‑person workers but also remote employees subject to vaccine mandates.

Thus, Finn entrenches Barnett as the controlling framework for evaluating religious objections to COVID‑19 (and likely other) vaccination mandates at the pleading stage in the Fourth Circuit.

2. Seeger and Welsh: Functional Definitions of Religion

By citing Seeger and Welsh, the Fourth Circuit embeds its Title VII religious‑belief analysis within the more general, functional approach to “religion” recognized in selective‑service and First Amendment jurisprudence:

  • The emphasis is on the role of the belief in the believer’s life;
  • Courts avoid doctrinal or theological judgments; and
  • Moral or ethical convictions can be religious when deeply held and occupying a place parallel to that of traditional religious convictions.

3. Dachman v. Shalala: No Duty to Accommodate Preferences

Dachman provides the counterweight: not all strongly held preferences, even if framed in ethical terms, are “religious.” By citing Dachman, the court signals that:

  • Employees must still articulate an authentically religious basis for their objections;
  • Courts are permitted to distinguish between religious and secular motivations; but
  • They must do so without entangling themselves in doctrinal evaluation.

4. Swierkiewicz and Iqbal: Pleading Standards

The opinion implicitly harmonizes:

  • Swierkiewicz v. Sorema – which held that a plaintiff need not plead a full prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas at the complaint stage; and
  • Ashcroft v. Iqbal – which requires enough factual content to allow a reasonable inference of liability.

Finn reflects the view that:

  • Plaintiffs do not need detailed doctrinal exposition or proof of sincerity at the pleading stage; but
  • They must provide more than conclusory assertions; they must describe the underlying nature of their beliefs and connect those beliefs to the challenged employment requirement.

5. Firestone Fibers & Textiles: Burden-Shifting and Undue Hardship

By citing EEOC v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., the court signals that the classic burden‑shifting framework still applies:

  1. Employee establishes a prima facie case (including a religious belief in conflict with job requirements);
  2. Burden shifts to employer to show:
    • It offered a reasonable accommodation; or
    • Any accommodation would impose an undue hardship.

Finn stops at the first step—whether the plaintiffs have alleged a qualifying religious belief at all.

6. Jorgenson and ADA Vaccination Jurisprudence

The court’s ADA analysis builds on Jorgenson v. Conduent Transp. Sols., Inc., a district court opinion (later summarily affirmed) holding that:

  • Questions about vaccination status are not disability‑related inquiries under the ADA; and
  • Such questions therefore do not implicate § 12112(d)(4)(A)’s restrictions.

By adopting that view in a published appellate opinion, Finn gives it binding precedential force within the Fourth Circuit.

7. Sister Circuits: Passarella and Lucky

The court aligns itself with:

  • Passarella v. Aspirus, Inc. (7th Cir. 2024) – which held that employees need not plead specific denominational tenets forbidding vaccination; and
  • Lucky v. Landmark Medical of Mich., P.C. (6th Cir. 2024) – which likewise rejected an overly rigid doctrinal requirement at the pleading stage.

This emerging inter‑circuit consensus holds that Title VII does not require plaintiffs to act as theologians in their complaints; plausible allegations of religious motivation and conflict suffice.

D. Clarifying Complex Concepts

1. What Counts as “Religion” Under Title VII?

In everyday speech, “religion” often means membership in a recognized faith (e.g., Catholic, Jewish, Muslim). Under Title VII, however:

  • “Religion” encompasses beliefs, practices, and observances, not just membership or labels;
  • Beliefs can be unconventional, unpopular, or idiosyncratic and still be protected;
  • Moral and ethical convictions may qualify as long as they:
    • are deeply and sincerely held; and
    • occupy a place in the person’s life comparable to that of traditional religious convictions.

What does not count as “religion” are:

  • Purely political views;
  • Personal preferences or lifestyle choices; or
  • General distrust of government, corporations, or medicine, if unconnected to religious conviction.

2. “Essential Part of a Religious Faith” vs. Personal Preference

The phrase “essential part of a religious faith,” taken from Barnett and applied in Finn, is a shorthand for:

  • Beliefs that are integral to the believer’s religious identity or practice; not incidental or selectively invoked;
  • Convictions that are shaped and governed by the believer’s understanding of God, the divine, or ultimate moral reality (broadly conceived).

In practice, courts look for:

  • Explicit references to religious sources (e.g., scripture, teachings of religious figures, religious upbringing);
  • Descriptions of how the belief guides conduct, not just thoughts; and
  • Consistency between the asserted belief and the specific conduct at issue (e.g., refusing a vaccine due to pro‑life convictions about fetal cells).

3. Belief vs. Accommodation: The Role of Undue Hardship

It is crucial to distinguish:

  • Whether a belief is religious (threshold question); from
  • Whether the employer must accommodate that belief (which turns on “undue hardship”).

Even if a belief is plainly religious and sincerely held, an employer may still deny accommodation if it can show that accommodating the practice would impose an undue hardship on its operations. That is a separate inquiry that was not reached in Finn, because the district court dismissed at the pleading stage.

4. ADA: Impairment, Major Life Activities, and “Regarded As”

Under the ADA:

  • An impairment is a physiological or psychological condition affecting one or more body systems (e.g., neurological, musculoskeletal, respiratory).
  • To be a disability, the impairment must substantially limit one or more major life activities (e.g., walking, breathing, working).
  • Under the “regarded as” prong, an employee is covered if the employer acts against her because of a perceived impairment—even if the employer is mistaken about its severity or limiting effect.

Finn makes clear:

  • Unvaccinated status is not itself an impairment. It is a choice or medical status, not a physiological or psychological disorder.
  • Therefore, an employer’s decision to terminate someone for being unvaccinated does not, without more, reflect a perception that the person has a disability.

5. Vaccine Mandates, Remote Work, and “Business Necessity”

Although the court did not reach “business necessity” under the ADA, the opinion implicitly recognizes:

  • Vaccination mandates can be imposed even on remote workers; the Humane Society’s policy applied universally.
  • But ADA “business necessity” analysis is only triggered for questions that are disability‑related. Since vaccination status is not, the court does not evaluate whether asking remote workers to be vaccinated was necessary.

For future cases, this means that challenges to the wisdom or scope of employer vaccination policies for remote workforces will generally not fit within an ADA inquiry‑based theory, though they may be litigated under other statutes (e.g., Title VII or state law).

E. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

1. Impact on Employees Seeking Religious Accommodations

Finn lowers the threshold for employees in the Fourth Circuit (and, by influence, perhaps elsewhere) to survive a motion to dismiss in vaccine‑mandate religious accommodation cases. Employees:

  • Do not need to:
    • identify their denomination by name;
    • cite specific scripture or religious canons banning vaccines; or
    • demonstrate doctrinal consistency with official church positions.
  • Do need to:
    • describe their beliefs in religious terms (e.g., relating to God, conscience as formed by religious teaching, sacred moral convictions);
    • state that these beliefs are sincerely held and form an essential part of their faith; and
    • plausibly connect those beliefs to the refusal to comply with the challenged policy.

This approach makes it much harder for employers to defeat Title VII religious accommodation claims at the pleading stage simply by arguing that the beliefs were “not religious enough” based on sparse complaint allegations.

2. Impact on Employers Designing and Administering Mandates

For employers, Finn offers both constraints and clarifications:

  • Constraints (Title VII):
    • Employers must be prepared for courts to treat a broad range of conscience‑based objections as potentially religious.
    • Denials of religious exemptions will be scrutinized more deeply at later stages; dismissal at 12(b)(6) will be the exception, not the rule, in well‑pled cases.
  • Clarifications (ADA):
    • Employers may ask about vaccination status without triggering the ADA’s disability‑related inquiry rules, at least where no specific disability is implicated.
    • Terminating employees for refusal to vaccinate, by itself, does not constitute disability discrimination under a “regarded as” theory, absent a separate perceived impairment.

As a practical matter, employers should:

  • Ensure that their religious exemption processes allow employees to describe their beliefs in their own words;
  • Document the reasoning behind accommodation decisions, especially where undue hardship is asserted; and
  • Separate religious‑accommodation analysis (Title VII) from disability‑accommodation analysis (ADA), as the statutes operate on distinct conceptual tracks.

3. Litigation Strategy at the Pleading Stage

From a litigation perspective:

  • For plaintiffs:
    • Complaints should contain detailed, narrative descriptions of the plaintiff’s religious beliefs and how those beliefs inform her conduct;
    • Conscience and moral language should be explicitly tied to religious sources or frameworks.
  • For defendants:
    • Rule 12(b)(6) motions attacking the “religious” nature of beliefs will often be unsuccessful if the complaint contains even modest religious framing and a plausible link to conduct;
    • Defenses will more likely be decided at summary judgment (e.g., sincerity, inconsistency, undue hardship) rather than at the pleadings stage.

4. Impact on ADA Jurisprudence in Pandemic‑Related Cases

The ADA holding in Finn has clear, prospective ramifications:

  • Inquiries about vaccination status are generally outside the scope of § 12112(d)(4) unless they are deliberately tied to a disability‑related question;
  • “Regarded as” theories cannot rest solely on an employee’s vaccination status; plaintiffs must allege that the employer perceived a specific impairment (e.g., believing the employee had a contagious disease or chronic condition).

This provides employers and courts with a bright‑line rule in a contentious area, reducing the likelihood that pandemic‑related employment policies, without more, will be treated as ADA violations.

5. Broader Context: Statutory Religious Protection vs. Constitutional Claims

It is important to note that Finn is about statutory rights under Title VII and the ADA, not constitutional free‑exercise rights under the First Amendment. Private employers, such as the Humane Society, are generally not subject to the First Amendment, but they are governed by federal anti‑discrimination statutes.

The opinion reflects a general judicial trend of:

  • Broadly construing “religion” for statutory purposes (to avoid entanglement and under‑protection); while
  • Maintaining relatively strict definitions of “disability” and “impairment” under the ADA.

V. Conclusion: Key Takeaways from Finn

Finn v. Humane Society of the United States makes two core contributions to federal anti‑discrimination law in the Fourth Circuit:

  1. Title VII Religious Objections to Vaccine Mandates Are Broadly Plead. The court reaffirms Barnett and holds that employees need only plausibly allege:
    • That their beliefs are an essential part of a religious faith, even if expressed in conscience or moral terms; and
    • That those beliefs are plausibly connected to their refusal to receive a vaccine.
    They are not required to plead detailed doctrinal justifications or denominational prescriptions. This significantly lowers the hurdle to surviving motions to dismiss in religious accommodation cases involving vaccine mandates.
  2. Vaccination Status Alone Does Not Trigger the ADA. The court definitively holds that:
    • Inquiring about COVID‑19 vaccination status is not a disability‑related inquiry under § 12112(d)(4)(A); and
    • Being unvaccinated is not a physical or mental impairment, and thus cannot support a “regarded as” disability claim.
    This shields routine vaccination mandates and status checks from ADA attack, so long as they are not tied to perceived disabilities.

Going forward, litigation over vaccine mandates in the Fourth Circuit is likely to center on:

  • The sincerity and religious character of objections (to be tested at later stages); and
  • Whether accommodating such objections imposes an undue hardship on employers.

Finn thus clarifies the front‑end gatekeeping function of Rule 12(b)(6) in this area: Title VII religious claims based on vaccine mandates will rarely be disposed of at the pleading stage if they are articulated with even modest religious grounding, whereas ADA challenges based solely on vaccination status will almost always fail as a matter of law.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

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