Pleading Religious-Discrimination Claims in NYC Vaccine-Mandate Cases: Conclusory Allegations Are Insufficient; Post-Rescission Claims Are Moot

Introduction

Currid v. City of New York, 2025 NY Slip Op 04702 (App Div, 2d Dept, Aug. 20, 2025), squarely addresses a cluster of recurring issues arising from New York City’s 2021 COVID-19 vaccination mandate for municipal employees. A long-serving firefighter alleged religious discrimination under the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) after his request for a religious accommodation was denied and he subsequently retired rather than receive the vaccine. He also sought declaratory relief regarding the City’s accommodation “policy and practice,” asserted a free exercise damages claim under the New York Constitution, and pleaded intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and constructive discharge.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed dismissal under CPLR 3211(a) and denied leave to amend. The decision clarifies the pleading threshold for religious-discrimination and accommodation claims in the vaccine-mandate context, the unavailability of certain ancillary theories against municipal defendants, and the effect of the mandate’s rescission on forward-looking claims for declaratory relief.

Summary of the Judgment

The court affirmed the Supreme Court’s order dismissing the complaint against the City of New York, FDNY, and the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene and denying leave to amend. Key holdings include:

Religious discrimination claims under both NYSHRL and NYCHRL were properly dismissed at the pleadings stage where the complaint alleged only conclusory assertions without specific facts giving rise to an inference of discrimination or showing that the plaintiff was treated “less well” because of religion.
No aiding-and-abetting claim lies absent a viable underlying discrimination claim, and an entity cannot aid and abet its own alleged violation.
Declaratory relief regarding the City’s vaccine-accommodation policy is moot because the mandate was rescinded in February 2023, and no exception to mootness applies.
There is no private right of action for damages under the New York Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause when alternative remedies exist (here, the NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims pursued).
Public policy bars IIED claims against governmental entities.
Constructive discharge was not plausibly pleaded; the complaint did not allege working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign.
Leave to amend was properly denied because the proposed amendments were patently devoid of merit.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Pleading standard on a motion to dismiss (CPLR 3211[a][7]): Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87–88, and Acala v Mintz Levin Cohn Ferris Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., 222 AD3d 706, 707, reiterate that courts accept the complaint’s facts as true and give every favorable inference to determine whether the allegations fit any cognizable legal theory. The panel applied this lens but found the allegations too conclusory to state claims.
Substantive discrimination standards:
- NYSHRL: Ayers v Bloomberg, L.P., 203 AD3d 872, 874, and Reichman v City of New York, 179 AD3d 1115, 1116–1117, set out the prima facie elements: protected class membership, qualification, adverse employment action, and circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination.
- NYCHRL: Recognized as more protective (Alvarez v New York City Tr. Auth., 230 AD3d 541, 542; Brouillard v Sunrun, Inc., 219 AD3d 560, 562), the statute asks whether the plaintiff was treated “less well” because of a protected characteristic (Ayers, 203 AD3d at 874). It also imposes a stand-alone duty to engage in a “cooperative dialogue” on accommodation requests (Admin Code § 8-107[28][a]; Matter of Smith v New York City Fire Dept., 239 AD3d 870; Matter of Marsteller v City of New York, 217 AD3d 543, 545).
Application to the pleadings: The court relied on Shahid v City of New York, 231 AD3d 888, and Acala, 222 AD3d at 707–708, to conclude that bare, conclusory assertions unsupported by facts cannot sustain discrimination claims. The court contrasted, by “cf.”, Cagle v Weill Cornell Med., 680 F Supp 3d 428, 434–437 (SDNY), where more detailed allegations sufficed at the pleadings stage.
Aiding and abetting: Where the primary discrimination claim fails, derivative aiding-and-abetting claims necessarily fail (Kelly G. v Board of Educ. of City of Yonkers, 99 AD3d 756, 758–759). Moreover, an entity cannot aid and abet its own alleged wrongdoing (Perez v Y & M Transp. Corp., 219 AD3d 1449, 1451).
Mootness of declaratory relief: With the vaccine mandate rescinded in February 2023, a declaratory challenge to the policy became academic; no exception (e.g., “capable of repetition yet evading review”) applied (Matter of Ferrera v New York City Dept. of Educ., 230 AD3d 772, 774; Matter of New York City Mun. Labor Comm. v Adams, 222 AD3d 437, 438).
No damages remedy under the New York Constitution where alternatives exist: Martinez v City of Schenectady, 97 NY2d 78, 83, forecloses a private right of action for damages under the State Constitution when the plaintiff has alternative remedial avenues (as here, NYSHRL/NYCHRL). The court followed Berrio v City of New York, 212 AD3d 569, 569, and Peterec v State of New York, 124 AD3d 858, 859.
Governmental immunity from IIED claims: Public policy bars intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against governmental entities (Shahid v City of New York, 208 AD3d 1381; Ball v Miller, 164 AD3d 728, 730; Crvelin v Board of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of City of Niagara Falls, 144 AD3d 1649, 1650).
Constructive discharge: An employee must plausibly allege deliberately created, intolerable conditions that would compel a reasonable person to resign (Golston-Green v City of New York, 184 AD3d 24, 44; Blackman v Metropolitan Tr. Auth., 206 AD3d 602, 604). The appellant’s allegations fell short (Dhar v City of New York, 204 AD3d 976, 977).
Leave to amend: Courts deny leave where proposed amendments are “patently devoid of merit” (Singh v T-Mobile, 232 AD3d 662, 667; Precious Care Mgt., LLC v Monsey Care, LLC, 221 AD3d 922, 924; Derago v Ko, 189 AD3d 1352, 1353).

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The panel applied the forgiving CPLR 3211(a)(7) standard but found the complaint lacked factual content connecting the denial of a religious accommodation and the retirement to discriminatory animus or disparate treatment. Under NYSHRL, the complaint failed to support an inference of discrimination tied to an “adverse employment action.” Under NYCHRL’s broader “treated less well” standard, the court still found no factual allegations that the plaintiff was treated less well because of religion or that the City failed to engage in the required “cooperative dialogue” beyond the mere fact of denial.

The court emphasized that “conclusory assertions” do not suffice. What was missing were specifics such as:

Comparators (e.g., similarly situated employees of different faiths receiving accommodations under similar circumstances),
Statements or communications suggesting religious bias,
Particularized facts about the dialogue process indicating refusal to engage or bad faith (timing, content, or absence of interactive steps),
Inconsistencies in applying the policy that could support an inference of discrimination.

With no viable discrimination claim, the derivative aiding-and-abetting count fell away, and in any event, a defendant cannot aid and abet its own acts. The separate declaratory claim, focused on the policy writ large, became moot upon policy rescission, and the court held no exception to mootness applied in this case.

On constitutional and tort theories, the panel reiterated familiar limits: New York does not recognize a damages action under the State Constitution’s free exercise provision where statutory remedies exist, and IIED is categorically barred against public entities. The constructive discharge claim lacked allegations of intentionally created, intolerable working conditions; the plaintiff’s voluntary retirement following the accommodation denial, without more, did not cross that threshold. Finally, because the proposed amendments did not cure these defects, leave to amend was properly denied as patently meritless.

3) Impact and Prospective Significance

Pleading bar for vaccine-mandate religious claims: Currid reinforces that courts will dismiss at the pleadings stage when complaints merely assert disagreement with a vaccine policy and its application without concrete facts linking outcomes to religious bias or a failure to engage in the cooperative dialogue. Plaintiffs must plead specific, nonconclusory facts to leverage the NYCHRL’s broader protections.
Clear limits on “policy and practice” challenges post-rescission: Declaratory or injunctive challenges to rescinded public health mandates will ordinarily be deemed moot absent a well-pleaded exception (e.g., a reasonable expectation of recurrence to the same party and evading review). This cabining of justiciability will likely streamline or end similar legacy challenges.
Channeling claims to statutory remedies: The decision fortifies the line that state constitutional damages claims are generally unavailable when statutory avenues (NYSHRL/NYCHRL) exist, ensuring that litigants hew to those frameworks.
Governmental immunity and tort pleading choices: Reaffirming the unavailability of IIED against municipal defendants will influence pleading strategies, steering plaintiffs away from such claims and toward viable statutory or equitable theories.
Constructive discharge in mandate contexts: The opinion signals that policy-based workplace requirements—even significant ones like vaccine mandates—do not, without additional intolerable conditions, meet New York’s rigorous constructive discharge standard.
Practical guidance for future complaints: To survive CPLR 3211 dismissal in analogous cases, plaintiffs should consider pleading:
- Particular statements or communications suggesting religious stereotyping or bias;
- Specific comparator facts showing disparate accommodation outcomes among similarly situated employees;
- Detailed chronology evidencing a failure to engage in a cooperative dialogue (ignored requests, perfunctory denials, lack of interactive discussion of alternatives);
- Feasible accommodation options and why they would not pose undue hardship to the employer.
The federal district court example in Cagle illustrates how such particulars can carry a complaint past the pleadings stage.

Complex Concepts Simplified

CPLR 3211(a)(7) – Failure to state a cause of action: A motion asking the court to assume the alleged facts are true and decide if, even so, the law recognizes a claim. Conclusory recitations of elements without factual detail are not enough.
NYSHRL vs. NYCHRL standards: NYSHRL requires, among other things, an “adverse employment action” and an inference of discrimination. NYCHRL is broader; it asks whether the plaintiff was treated “less well” because of a protected trait and independently requires employers to engage in a “cooperative dialogue” on accommodation requests.
Cooperative dialogue (NYC Admin Code § 8-107[28][a]): An employer must timely and in good faith discuss reasonable accommodations with the employee, exploring options and documenting outcomes. A mere denial does not, by itself, prove a failure to engage; facts showing refusal to interact are needed.
Mootness and exceptions: Courts decide live controversies. If a policy is rescinded, forward-looking relief is usually moot unless an exception applies (e.g., the issue is likely to recur between the same parties yet evade review). The court found no such exception here.
Constructive discharge: Occurs when an employer deliberately creates conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel forced to resign. Ordinary policy disagreements or denials of accommodations, without more, generally do not suffice.
Aiding and abetting under HRL: Liability for assisting another’s discrimination. It cannot attach if the primary claim fails, and an entity cannot aid and abet its own conduct.
No private damages action under the NY Constitution (when alternatives exist): New York limits damages suits under the State Constitution if statutory routes (like NYSHRL/NYCHRL) provide remedies for the same harms.
IIED against the government: Intentional infliction of emotional distress claims are barred by public policy when brought against governmental entities.
CPLR 3025(b) – Leave to amend: Courts freely grant amendments unless the proposed changes are “patently devoid of merit,” meaning they could not survive a motion to dismiss even if accepted as true.

Conclusion

Currid v. City of New York provides a clear, practical roadmap for litigating religious accommodation disputes arising from the City’s COVID-19 vaccination mandate. The Appellate Division confirmed that:

Religious-discrimination claims under NYSHRL and NYCHRL must be supported by concrete, nonconclusory facts—mere disagreement with a policy or its outcome is insufficient.
NYC’s broader “cooperative dialogue” duty does not transform a denial into liability absent allegations of an actual failure to engage in the interactive process.
Post-rescission, “policy and practice” declaratory challenges are generally moot.
Collateral theories—IIED, aiding and abetting (by the same entity), and damages under the NY Constitution—are not viable pathways against municipal defendants when statutory remedies exist or when underlying claims fail.
Constructive discharge remains a high bar, not satisfied by a policy disagreement or an accommodation denial alone.

As vaccine-mandate litigation matures, Currid underscores a disciplined application of pleading standards, justiciability limits after policy changes, and the channeling of public employment discrimination disputes into the NYSHRL/NYCHRL frameworks—with their distinct but rigorous requirements. The decision will likely streamline similar cases and sharpen the factual showing plaintiffs must make to proceed beyond the pleadings.