Pleading Matters in Title VII/ELCRA: Sixth Circuit Rejects Conclusory Race and Retaliation Claims; Protected Activity Requires a Race-Based Complaint and Leave to Amend Must Be Properly Sought

Pleading Matters in Title VII/ELCRA: Sixth Circuit Rejects Conclusory Race and Retaliation Claims; Protected Activity Requires a Race-Based Complaint and Leave to Amend Must Be Properly Sought

Introduction

In Makale Washington v. Sodecia Automotive, No. 25-1362 (6th Cir. Oct. 21, 2025) (not recommended for publication), a Sixth Circuit panel (Judges Kethledge, Larsen, and Bloomekatz, with Judge Bloomekatz writing) affirmed the dismissal of a Title VII/Michigan ELCRA race discrimination suit and companion retaliation claims under Title VII, ELCRA, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The court also affirmed the denial of leave to amend.

The appeal presented two central questions:

  • Whether the complaint alleged sufficient non-conclusory facts to plausibly support claims of race discrimination and retaliation under Twombly and Iqbal; and
  • Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying a one-line, non-specific request for leave to amend after granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

The panel’s decision reaffirms core federal pleading principles in employment cases: plaintiffs need not plead a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, but they must allege concrete facts permitting a reasonable inference of discrimination “because of” race, and of retaliation “because” they complained about race discrimination. It also underscores Sixth Circuit practice that leave to amend must be sought by a proper motion stating grounds with particularity; a passing request in an opposition brief, without proposed amendments, will not suffice.

Summary of the Opinion

  • Standard of review: De novo for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals; abuse of discretion for denial of leave to amend.
  • Race discrimination (Title VII and ELCRA): Dismissal affirmed. The complaint alleged Washington’s race and various workplace issues, but contained no facts tying any action to racial animus. Bare assertions that conduct was “on the basis of” race were conclusory and insufficient under Iqbal/Twombly.
  • Retaliation (Title VII, ELCRA, § 1981): Dismissal affirmed. The complaint did not allege that Washington actually complained about racial discrimination to his employer; requests for support/tools and objections to disrespect were not protected activity absent a race-based complaint.
  • Leave to amend: Denial affirmed. A one-line, contingent request in an opposition brief, without specifying proposed amendments or attaching a proposed pleading—and coupled with the plaintiff’s statement that the complaint contained “the only facts available”—did not obligate the district court to grant leave.

Factual Background

According to the complaint, Washington, an African American man, joined Sodecia Automotive in January 2023. He was assigned to second shift and paired with a first-shift supervisor, “Carl,” whom he alleges lacked relevant training. He claimed second-shift employees had fewer tools and supports than first-shift employees and that he was criticized for incomplete work beyond his job description and expected to work beyond his paid hours. Despite repeated requests, he could not secure a meeting with the plant manager, “Harry Peoples.”

The pivotal incident occurred after a tool broke on his shift. In a group chat, a co-worker, “Paulo,” told Washington to call for help; Washington responded that such tasks were not part of his supervisory role. A week later, HR (Karla) and Peoples met with Washington regarding that interaction. Karla confirmed that Paulo had asked Washington to perform tasks outside his job description, and management said they would address Paulo’s tone. When Washington returned to work, another employee, “Charles,” yelled at him. The next day, Sodecia terminated Washington for “performance reasons.” After exhausting administrative remedies, Washington sued for race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, ELCRA, and § 1981.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

  • Twombly and Iqbal: Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) require factual allegations sufficient to render a claim plausible; “naked assertions” and “conclusory” allegations are disregarded. The panel applied these standards to find the complaint lacked factual content linking treatment to race (discrimination) and linking the termination to protected activity (retaliation).
  • Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002): The plaintiff need not plead a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case at the motion-to-dismiss stage. The panel cited Swierkiewicz (and Sixth Circuit’s Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605 (6th Cir. 2012)) to emphasize that while the prima facie structure is not a pleading requirement, ordinary plausibility rules still apply.
  • Pedreira v. Kentucky Baptist Homes, 579 F.3d 722 (6th Cir. 2009): Reinforces that plausibility requires factual matter supporting an inference of discriminatory motive—used here to show the complaint came up short.
  • Retaliation doctrinal anchors:
    • Title VII: 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a) bars retaliation for opposing Title VII violations.
    • ELCRA: Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2701 similarly bars retaliation.
    • Section 1981: CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (2008) recognizes retaliation claims for opposing racial discrimination.
    • Sixth Circuit uniform standard: Jackson v. Genesee Cnty. Rd. Comm’n, 999 F.3d 333 (6th Cir. 2021) and Boxill v. O’Grady, 935 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2019). The panel cited Jackson’s “more than a vague charge of discrimination” principle (quoting Yazdian v. ConMed Endoscopic Techs., Inc., 793 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2015)). It also referenced Prida v. Option Care Enters., Inc., No. 23-3936, 2025 WL 460206 (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 2025), for the pleading requirement that adverse action be “because” of a race-based complaint.
  • Leave to amend practice: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) favors amendment, but Sixth Circuit cases (Evans v. Pearson Enters., Inc., 434 F.3d 839 (6th Cir. 2006); Kuyat v. BioMimetic Therapeutics, Inc., 747 F.3d 435 (6th Cir. 2014); Beydoun v. Sessions, 871 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2017)) hold that offhand requests without particularity do not require leave. Louisiana School Employees’ Retirement System v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 622 F.3d 471, 486 (6th Cir. 2010) makes clear that a one-line request in a brief “is not a motion to amend.” United States ex rel. Owsley v. Fazzi Assocs., Inc., 16 F.4th 192, 197 (6th Cir. 2021) confirms that failure to attach a proposed amended complaint or to identify new facts supports denial.
  • Standards of review: Savel v. MetroHealth Systems, 96 F.4th 932 (6th Cir. 2024) (de novo on Rule 12(b)(6)); Evans (abuse of discretion for leave to amend). Gavitt v. Born, 835 F.3d 623, 639–40 (6th Cir. 2016) (assume well-pleaded facts true at the 12(b)(6) stage).

Legal Reasoning

1) Discrimination Claims (Title VII and ELCRA)

The court accepted as true that Washington is African American and that he experienced multiple workplace challenges: assignment to an allegedly unqualified supervisor, fewer tools and support on second shift, criticism for incomplete tasks outside his job description, and disrespectful interactions with co-workers. But the complaint never tied any of these events to race.

The panel emphasized that the complaint:

  • Did not allege that similarly situated employees of other races were treated better;
  • Did not identify the race of supervisors, co-workers, or comparators;
  • Did not allege discriminatory statements, policies, or patterns connected to race; and
  • Relied on conclusory claims that he was subjected to offensive communications “on the basis of” race, without factual detail.

Under Iqbal and Twombly, such “naked assertions” of race-based motive are insufficient. Although Swierkiewicz relieves plaintiffs of pleading a prima facie case, they must still provide facts that allow a plausible inference that the adverse action was “because of” race. The complaint here failed that threshold.

2) Retaliation Claims (Title VII, ELCRA, and § 1981)

To plausibly plead retaliation, the complaint had to allege facts supporting a reasonable inference that Sodecia took an adverse action because Washington opposed race discrimination. The court found the complaint did not allege that Washington ever complained about race or racial harassment. His requests for a meeting to discuss tools/support and his report of Paulo’s disrespect did not mention race, and the complaint did not allege that anyone at Sodecia was put on notice that he was asserting unlawful race discrimination.

The panel acknowledged that complaints of discrimination need not be “lodged with absolute formality, clarity, or precision,” but they must be more than a “vague charge of discrimination.” Here, the only allegation that he “informed management of the discriminatory harassment” was itself conclusory and unsupported by factual content; under Iqbal, courts cannot accept such conclusory statements as true.

3) Denial of Leave to Amend

Washington’s opposition brief included a single-sentence, fallback request for leave to amend if the court found his complaint deficient. He did not file a separate motion, did not attach a proposed amended complaint, and—critically—stated that “the only facts available at this time were presented” in the complaint. Under Sixth Circuit practice, a one-line request “is not a motion to amend,” and Rule 15(a)’s liberal policy does not require courts to grant leave where the plaintiff offers no particulars about how amendment would cure deficiencies. Given the absence of any proffered additional facts, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although designated “not recommended for publication,” this decision crisply restates and applies settled pleading principles in employment litigation within the Sixth Circuit. Its practical implications are significant:

  • For plaintiffs: Identify concrete facts linking adverse actions to race. Examples include comparator allegations (how similarly situated employees of different races were treated), race-related comments, patterns of disparate enforcement, or other circumstances suggesting racial motive. For retaliation, plead facts showing you actually complained about race discrimination, or that the employer reasonably understood your complaint as opposing race-based conduct.
  • For employers: Early motions to dismiss remain viable where complaints recite only labels and conclusions. Maintain clear documentation of performance rationales and ensure complaint-handling records reflect whether allegations were framed as discrimination or as general workplace grievances.
  • On retaliation theory: The opinion reinforces a recurring Sixth Circuit theme: “protected activity” requires that the employer be on notice that the employee is opposing unlawful discrimination (here, race). General protests about workload, tools, or disrespect are not enough unless they are linked to protected-class bias.
  • Pleading vs. proof: Plaintiffs need not plead a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, but Twombly/Iqbal still demand factual content that suggests discriminatory or retaliatory motive. This decision harmonizes Swierkiewicz with modern plausibility pleading.
  • Leave-to-amend practice: To preserve amendment rights, file a proper motion, attach a proposed amended complaint, and identify new facts that will cure pleading defects. A contingent, non-specific request in an opposition brief will not obligate the court to grant leave.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Plausibility pleading (Twombly/Iqbal): A complaint must do more than assert legal conclusions; it must allege specific facts that, if true, make it reasonable to infer unlawful conduct. Courts ignore conclusory labels and focus on factual content.
  • McDonnell Douglas vs. pleading: McDonnell Douglas sets an evidentiary framework for proving discrimination (often at summary judgment), not a pleading requirement. At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the question is whether the complaint’s facts plausibly suggest discrimination or retaliation.
  • Protected activity: In retaliation law, “protected activity” means opposing conduct made unlawful by the statute (e.g., race discrimination). The employer must be able to understand that the employee is complaining about illegal discrimination—not just workplace friction or resource allocation.
  • Adverse employment action: A materially negative change in employment (e.g., termination, demotion, significant pay cut). Washington alleged termination, which qualifies; the deficiency was motive and protected activity, not adversity.
  • “Not recommended for publication”: In the Sixth Circuit, unpublished opinions are not binding precedent but can be persuasive. They still reflect how panels are applying established law.
  • Standards of review: De novo review means the appellate court decides the legal issue anew, without deference. Abuse of discretion is deferential; reversal occurs only if the lower court’s decision was unreasonable or based on an error of law.

Key Passages from the Opinion

“[Washington] tenders only ‘naked assertion[s]’ that Sodecia engaged in race discrimination. … [H]e … does not tie any of these events to race.” (citing Iqbal/Twombly)
“There are no factual allegations that Washington complained to anyone at Sodecia about racial discrimination or harassment. While [such] complaint need not be ‘lodged with absolute formality, clarity, or precision,’ he ‘must allege more than a vague charge of discrimination.’” (quoting Jackson and Yazdian)
“A request for leave to amend almost as an aside … in a memorandum in opposition to the defendant’s motion to dismiss is … not a motion to amend.” (citing La. Sch. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Ernst & Young)

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Washington v. Sodecia Automotive reinforces three bedrock principles in employment discrimination pleading within the circuit:

  • Discrimination claims must include factual allegations that plausibly link adverse actions to race; identifying one’s race and reciting workplace grievances without connecting them to racial bias will not survive Rule 12(b)(6).
  • Retaliation claims require allegations that the plaintiff actually engaged in protected activity—i.e., complained about race discrimination in a way that would put the employer on notice; generalized complaints about tools, duties, or disrespect are not enough.
  • Requests for leave to amend must be made by proper motion, with particularity and (ideally) an attached proposed amended complaint; passing, contingent requests in briefing do not trigger Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment policy.

Although unpublished, the opinion offers clear guidance to practitioners: plead facts, not labels; make explicit the race-based nature of any opposed conduct when alleging retaliation; and, if needed, seek amendment properly and with specificity. The ruling thus contributes to a consistent, disciplined application of Twombly/Iqbal in Title VII, ELCRA, and § 1981 litigation across the Sixth Circuit.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Comments