Pleading Conclusory Conspiracies Won’t Do: Good-Faith Reliance on a Facially Valid Warrant and Video-Verified Decorum Enforcement Defeat First and Fourth Amendment Claims — Story v. Gravell (5th Cir. 2025)

Introduction

In Story v. Gravell, No. 24-50646 (5th Cir. Sept. 9, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished), the Fifth Circuit affirmed dismissal, at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, of a civil-rights suit brought by a local activist against county officials arising out of an arrest on a school-district warrant and his removal from a county commissioners court meeting. The panel held that:

Conclusory allegations of a conspiracy between school-district officials and county officials cannot plausibly attribute one entity’s purported animus to another under Twombly/Iqbal.
Deputies executing a facially valid arrest warrant issued by a magistrate are protected by good-faith reliance unless the complaint plausibly alleges reasons to doubt the warrant’s validity or a Franks-type defect attributable to them.
When incorporated video evidence shows enforcement of neutral decorum rules in a limited public forum, a viewpoint-discrimination claim fails absent plausible allegations of differential treatment of similarly situated speakers.
Because probable cause supported the arrest, a retaliatory-arrest claim fails unless the plaintiff fits within the narrow Lozman or Nieves exceptions—neither of which was pleaded.

The decision underscores how, at the pleading stage, courts may consider documents and videos incorporated by reference and dismiss constitutional claims where objective evidence defeats speculative theories. Although unpublished and non-precedential under 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the opinion offers a clear, practical roadmap for litigants on both sides of Section 1983 disputes involving arrests on warrants and speech at government meetings.

Case Background and Parties

Plaintiff–appellant Jeremy Story is a politically active local pastor and critic of Williamson County and Round Rock Independent School District (RRISD) leadership. His complaint centers on two sets of events in 2021:

RRISD board meetings (Aug.–Sept. 2021): RRISD police removed Story from two meetings. Three days after the second, an RRISD police officer swore an affidavit for an arrest warrant charging Story with “Hindering Proceedings by Disorderly Conduct,” a misdemeanor. A magistrate found probable cause and issued the warrant, bearing the county sheriff’s seal. Williamson County Deputies Brien Casey and Jason Briggs arrested Story on the warrant, and he was held overnight.
Williamson County Commissioners Court (Dec. 21, 2021): Story spoke during the public-comment period on a school-funding agenda item. After the court approved the measure, audience applause and a verbal exchange ensued. Following warnings about decorum rules (no applause, outbursts, or speaking out of turn), Judge Bill Gravell directed Story to stop a continuing colloquy and ultimately expelled him from the meeting. The event was recorded and cited in the complaint.

Story sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting: (1) false arrest (Fourth Amendment) against Sheriff Mike Gleason and Deputies Casey and Briggs; (2) retaliatory arrest (First Amendment) connected to his speech; and (3) viewpoint discrimination (First Amendment) based on his removal from the commissioners court meeting (against Judge Gravell). He also raised a parallel claim under the Texas Open Meetings Act (TOMA). The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

Summary of the Opinion

Conspiracy/Attribution: The complaint’s assertion that county officials “worked in conjunction” with RRISD to target “political enemies” was “threadbare” and lacked facts establishing an agreement. Without a plausible conspiracy, any animus on the part of RRISD cannot be attributed to county defendants (citing Iqbal and Twombly).
Fourth Amendment false arrest: Deputies reasonably relied, in good faith, on a facially valid warrant issued by a magistrate. The complaint did not allege that the deputies signed the affidavit, nor that Sheriff Gleason made material misstatements or omissions in the warrant process. Absent facts calling the warrant’s validity into question, no Fourth Amendment claim lies (citing Leon and Franks).
Retaliatory arrest: Because the arrest was supported by probable cause, Story could not state a First Amendment retaliatory-arrest claim unless he satisfied the Lozman or Nieves exceptions. He did not.
Viewpoint discrimination at a public meeting: The First Amendment forbids viewpoint discrimination in a limited public forum. But the incorporated video shows Story engaged in an extended colloquy after warnings, violating neutral decorum rules. He did not plausibly allege that others who committed sustained violations were treated differently. The claim therefore fails (citing Lamb’s Chapel and Good News Club).
TOMA claim: Story did not develop an argument that TOMA provides broader protections than the First Amendment; dismissal was proper.
Qualified immunity: Because no constitutional violation was plausibly alleged, the panel did not reach qualified immunity.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Roles

Twombly/Iqbal (Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)): Establish the plausibility standard and bar threadbare, conclusory allegations. The court used these to dismiss Story’s conclusory conspiracy theory and to emphasize that each official is liable only for his own misconduct (Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677).
Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496 (5th Cir. 2000): Allows courts to consider documents referenced in the complaint and central to the claims at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Here, that included the arrest-warrant affidavit and the warrant.
Harmon v. City of Arlington, 16 F.4th 1159 (5th Cir. 2021); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007): A court may consider video incorporated into the pleadings and credit it when it blatantly contradicts the complaint’s allegations. The commissioners court video undermined the viewpoint-discrimination claim.
Hughes v. Garcia, 100 F.4th 611 (5th Cir. 2024): A false-arrest claim requires an arrest without probable cause. The magistrate-issued warrant supplied probable cause unless undermined by pleaded facts.
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984): The good-faith exception: officers may rely on a facially valid warrant unless it is so deficient that reliance is unreasonable. The deputies’ reliance was reasonable here.
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978): A Fourth Amendment violation occurs if the affiant deliberately or recklessly makes material misstatements or omissions that support probable cause. Story did not allege a Franks defect by these defendants.
Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391 (2019); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011): Probable cause generally defeats retaliatory-arrest claims. Nieves recognizes a narrow exception for offenses where arrests are rarely made and evidence shows differential treatment. Not met here.
Lozman v. Riviera Beach, 585 U.S. 87 (2018): A separate narrow exception allows a claim despite probable cause if the plaintiff shows an official municipal policy of retaliation targeted at him. Not pleaded here.
Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001): The government may not regulate speech based on viewpoint in a limited public forum. The panel invoked these to frame Story’s First Amendment challenge and to conclude the enforcement was viewpoint-neutral.

Legal Reasoning, Step by Step

No plausible conspiracy; no vicarious attribution of animus.
Story’s central connective tissue—that county defendants “worked in conjunction” with RRISD to punish “political enemies”—was conclusory. Without facts that plausibly establish an agreement, the court declined to attribute RRISD’s purported animus to county officials. Under Iqbal, Section 1983 liability requires each official’s personal misconduct; group allegations or labels are insufficient.
False arrest fails: good-faith reliance on a facially valid warrant.
The affidavits and warrant—incorporated by reference—showed a magistrate’s probable-cause determination. Under Leon, officers may rely on such a warrant in good faith unless it is so facially deficient that reliance is unreasonable. Story pleaded no facts suggesting that Deputies Casey and Briggs should have doubted the warrant’s validity. Nor did he allege that they were the affiants or that Sheriff Gleason made any material misstatement or omission that would trigger Franks. Absent a plausible defect attributable to the defendants, the arrest was objectively reasonable and the Fourth Amendment claim fails.
Retaliatory arrest fails: probable cause defeats the claim; no exception pleaded.
Nieves generally bars retaliatory-arrest claims where probable cause exists. The two narrow workarounds—Lozman’s municipal-policy-of-retaliation path and Nieves’s “rarely enforced offense with clear differential treatment” path—do not apply. Story pleaded neither a targeted municipal policy nor facts showing that people similarly situated for the same offense were not arrested. The existence of a magistrate-issued warrant further undermines any inference of retaliatory animus by the executing deputies.
Viewpoint discrimination claim fails: video confirms neutral decorum enforcement.
The commissioners court meeting is a limited public forum in which the government may impose reasonable, viewpoint-neutral rules of decorum. The complaint incorporated the meeting video, which shows that after warnings, Story continued an extended colloquy out of turn, violating the rules. He alleged a comparator—a woman who yelled—yet the video showed he engaged in a sustained violation unlike a momentary outburst. Without plausible allegations that others who engaged in comparable, sustained violations were spared because of their viewpoints, Story cannot nudge a viewpoint-discrimination theory across the plausibility line.
TOMA claim undeveloped; falls with the federal claim.
Story did not argue that the Texas Open Meetings Act offers broader protections than the First Amendment in this context. The court affirmed dismissal on that basis.
No need to reach qualified immunity.
Because the complaint failed to plausibly allege any constitutional violation, the panel did not reach the second-order question of qualified immunity. This reinforces that pleading defects can dispose of Section 1983 suits before immunity analysis.

Impact and Practical Implications

For plaintiffs bringing Section 1983 claims

Conspiracy must be factually grounded. Identify who agreed with whom, when, and how; supply objective facts (communications, coordinated actions) rather than labels (“worked in conjunction”).
Target the right defendants for warrant defects. If the arrest is on a warrant, focus on the affiant and articulate a Franks theory (specific, material falsehoods or omissions made knowingly or recklessly) instead of blaming executing officers or supervisors with no pleaded role.
Confront probable cause head-on in retaliatory-arrest claims. Unless you can plead Lozman’s policy-based exception or Nieves’s narrow differential-enforcement exception, probable cause is fatal.
Use video carefully. If your complaint incorporates a recording, the court may credit it over contrary allegations. Ensure that the video supports, not undermines, your narrative.
Comparator specificity matters. For viewpoint discrimination tied to decorum enforcement, plausibly allege that similarly disruptive speakers expressing different views were permitted to continue.

For local governments and law enforcement

Maintain and enforce clear decorum rules. Post them, announce them, and apply them evenly. Provide warnings before removal when feasible, and record proceedings—objective evidence can be decisive at Rule 12.
Train officers on warrant execution. Emphasize good-faith reliance on magistrate-issued warrants and documentation of the warrant’s facial validity.
Document basis for removals. When removing speakers for disruptions, create a record (warnings, description of conduct) that reflects viewpoint-neutral enforcement of time, place, and manner restrictions.

For courts and practitioners

Robust use of incorporation-by-reference. Collins, Harmon, and Scott support early consideration of key documents and videos to test plausibility.
Sequencing matters. If no constitutional violation is plausibly alleged, there is no need to decide qualified immunity or municipal liability. Although not discussed here, such derivative claims would fail absent an underlying violation.
Non precedential but persuasive. While unpublished, this opinion reflects the Fifth Circuit’s continued insistence on specific facts and objective evidence at the pleading stage in speech-and-arrest cases.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Limited public forum: A government-created forum limited to certain subjects or speakers (e.g., agenda-bound public-comment periods). The government may impose reasonable, viewpoint-neutral rules (decorum, time limits) but may not favor one viewpoint over another.
Viewpoint discrimination vs. content regulation: Viewpoint discrimination targets the perspective or stance (pro/anti) and is almost always forbidden. Content regulation addresses subject matter and may be permissible in limited forums if reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.
Probable cause: Facts that would lead a reasonable officer to believe a crime has been committed. A magistrate’s issuance of a warrant ordinarily signals probable cause; executing officers may rely on it in good faith.
Good-faith reliance (Leon): Officers are generally protected when they act on a magistrate-issued warrant, unless the warrant is so deficient that reliance is unreasonable or the officers know it is invalid.
Franks v. Delaware defect: A warrant is constitutionally tainted if the affiant included deliberate or reckless, material falsehoods or omitted critical facts. Typically requires targeting the affiant and showing materiality.
Retaliatory arrest (Nieves/Lozman): Normally fails if probable cause exists. Two narrow exceptions: (1) a municipal policy specifically targeting the plaintiff (Lozman); or (2) offenses for which arrests are rarely made, coupled with evidence of selective enforcement (Nieves).
Incorporation by reference/central to the claim: Documents and recordings referenced in the complaint and integral to the claims can be considered on a motion to dismiss without converting to summary judgment. If a video clearly contradicts the complaint’s version of events, courts may credit the video.
Qualified immunity sequencing: Courts can dismiss at the threshold for failure to allege a constitutional violation, without deciding whether the right was clearly established.

Conclusion

Story v. Gravell reaffirms three practical rules for civil-rights litigation in the Fifth Circuit: (1) conclusory conspiracies do not satisfy Twombly/Iqbal’s plausibility standard, and animus cannot be bootstrapped from one set of actors to another; (2) executing officers are generally shielded by good-faith reliance on facially valid warrants absent well-pleaded Franks-type defects attributable to them; and (3) video evidence of viewpoint-neutral decorum enforcement in a limited public forum can defeat a First Amendment claim at the pleading stage unless the plaintiff alleges facts showing comparable speakers were treated differently because of their viewpoints.

The panel’s refusal to reach qualified immunity after finding no plausible constitutional violation underscores a broader theme: objective materials incorporated into the complaint—affidavits, warrants, and recordings—can and will be used to test plausibility early, often proving dispositive. While unpublished, the opinion offers clear guidance to advocates: plead concrete facts tied to the specific defendants, confront probable cause directly (and exceptions carefully), and ensure that incorporated video supports, rather than undermines, your theory of the case.