Plea “Satisfaction” Clauses Require Defendant to Prove the Predicate Burglary; No Sua Sponte DVSJA Hearing Absent Request

Commentary on People v. Tenace, 2025 NY Slip Op 05552 (App Div 3d Dept Oct. 9, 2025)

Introduction

In People v. Tenace, the Appellate Division, Third Department, addressed two recurring issues at the intersection of plea practice and sentencing: (1) when a prior plea to criminal possession of stolen property, accompanied by a “satisfaction” clause covering any “underlying burglary,” bars a subsequent burglary indictment; and (2) whether a sentencing court must, on its own initiative, hold a hearing under the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA), Penal Law § 60.12, in the absence of a defense request.

The case arises from a January 2021 arrest and subsequent indictment charging David Tenace with burglary in the second degree and petit larceny for an August 21, 2020 dwelling burglary on Van Vranken Avenue in Schenectady and theft of property. Tenace moved to dismiss, claiming the indictment was precluded by an earlier plea under a superior court information (SCI) to two counts of fourth-degree criminal possession of stolen property—one of which the parties agreed would “satisfy” any underlying burglary for the procurement of the items referenced in the SCI.

With the SCI and plea minutes lacking case-dispositive specificity as to the stolen items, the County Court conducted an evidentiary hearing. It ultimately found that the items defendant possessed on August 26, 2020 (near Bedford Road) were not among the items stolen in the August 21 Van Vranken Avenue burglary. The County Court denied the motion to dismiss; Tenace thereafter pleaded guilty to the indictment with a negotiated sentence, and the court imposed an agreed-upon term, including a consecutive component. On appeal, Tenace challenged the denial of his dismissal motion, asserted error in the lack of a DVSJA hearing, and contested aspects of the sentencing determination.

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Department, in an opinion by Justice Mackey, affirmed the judgment. The court held:

• The defendant failed to meet his burden, established by stipulation as a preponderance of the evidence, to show that his earlier SCI plea to possession of stolen property was connected to and intended to satisfy the subsequently indicted August 21 burglary. The evidentiary hearing record—including testimony from the prior prosecutor and defense counsel and documentary comparisons—established the items did not match.
• The County Court neither denied the defendant the right to testify at the hearing nor compelled him to incriminate himself; his claims of being barred from testifying or forced to do so were rejected.
• The defendant’s claim that the court erred by not conducting a DVSJA hearing under Penal Law § 60.12 was unpreserved because no hearing was requested; the sentencing court had no sua sponte obligation to hold one simply because the presentence submissions referenced abusive experiences.
• The sentencing court did not misunderstand its discretion as constrained by the prosecutor’s plea offer; it exercised independent judgment consistent with People v Farrar and similar authorities.
• Consecutive sentencing was proper under Penal Law § 70.25(2-b) because the defendant committed a violent felony offense (burglary in the second degree) after arraignment on a separate felony, and no mitigating circumstances were shown to warrant concurrency. The negotiated sentence was not unduly harsh given the defendant’s extensive criminal history.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• CPL 470.05(2): Preservation requirement. The court relied on the familiar rule that appellate review is precluded where an argument was not raised below; here, no DVSJA hearing was requested.
• Penal Law § 60.12 (DVSJA): Authorizes reduced, alternative sentences upon findings that the defendant is a victim of relevant domestic abuse and that the abuse was a significant contributing factor to the offense. The court emphasized that a hearing is not mandatory absent a request, aligning with People v Smalls (3d Dept 2015) and People v Hudson (2d Dept 2024), with leave granted in Hudson (42 NY3d 1080 [2025]).
• People v Ava OO., 233 AD3d 1186 (3d Dept 2024): Confirms the procedural necessity of raising DVSJA relief in the trial court; where defendants request DVSJA proceedings, courts hold hearings and make findings. Tenace contrasts with Ava OO. because no such request was made.
• People v Smalls, 128 AD3d 1229 (3d Dept 2015), lv denied 27 NY3d 1006 (2016): Cited for preservation and the non-mandatory nature of DVSJA hearings absent a request.
• People v Hudson, 232 AD3d 200 (2d Dept 2024), lv granted 42 NY3d 1080 (2025): Quoted for the proposition that courts are not required to sua sponte conduct a DVSJA hearing in every case where there are allegations of domestic violence.
• People v Farrar, 52 NY2d 302 (1981); People v Schultz, 73 NY2d 757 (1988); People v Muhammad, 132 AD3d 1068 (3d Dept 2015): Reinforce that sentencing remains the court’s prerogative; plea agreements are subject to court consent and do not strip the court of discretion up to sentencing, subject to the defendant’s right to withdraw a plea if the agreed sentence cannot be honored.
• Penal Law §§ 70.02(1)(b); 140.25(2): Classify burglary in the second degree (of a dwelling) as a violent felony offense, relevant to consecutive sentencing considerations under Penal Law § 70.25(2-b).
• Penal Law § 70.25(2-b): The opinion applies this provision to hold that, where a violent felony is committed after arraignment on a separate felony, the sentence is to run consecutively absent mitigating circumstances warranting concurrency.
• CPL 470.15(6)(b): Appellate “interest of justice” review of sentence severity; the court declined to exercise this power to reduce the sentence in light of defendant’s extensive record.

Legal Reasoning

1) Scope of the “Satisfaction” Clause and the Defendant’s Burden. A core dispute was whether the prior SCI plea—accompanied by a representation on the record that it would satisfy any “underlying burglary” for the procurement of the stolen property—barred the later burglary indictment. The SCI (count 2) alleged possession of stolen property on August 26, 2020 near Bedford Road but did not identify which items. The contemporaneous plea minutes (before Judge Sypniewski) memorialized the People’s statement that there had been no arrest for any underlying burglary and the People’s agreement that the SCI plea would satisfy any such underlying burglary if one existed.

Because neither the SCI nor the plea colloquy specified the property, the County Court conducted an evidentiary hearing, and—pursuant to the parties’ stipulation—the burden was on the defendant, by a preponderance of the evidence, to establish that the indicted burglary was the “underlying burglary” for the SCI possession count. The court credited the testimony of the prior assistant public defender and the prior prosecutor and examined documentary exhibits: the items defendant possessed on August 26 (violin, laptop, Kindle, prescription medication) and the items taken during the August 21 Van Vranken Avenue burglary (credit/debit cards, driver’s license, purse/diaper bag, currency, keys, checks, identification and gift cards). The items did not overlap. On this record, the Third Department agreed that defendant failed to prove the requisite connection, and therefore the People did not breach the earlier plea agreement by prosecuting the August 21 burglary.

The court also rejected defendant’s procedural objections: he was not denied the opportunity to testify at the hearing (with cross-examination), nor was he compelled to incriminate himself. The hearing mechanism thus permissibly resolved the ambiguity in the SCI/plea minutes through extrinsic proof without infringing constitutional protections.

2) DVSJA Hearing Claim — Preservation and No Sua Sponte Duty. The defense did not request a Penal Law § 60.12 hearing at or before sentencing. Although the sentencing memorandum referenced instances of childhood abuse, neither counsel nor defendant asked the court to conduct a DVSJA hearing or to make the statutory findings. Under CPL 470.05(2), this omission rendered the claim unpreserved. Substantively, the court held there is no affirmative obligation to conduct a DVSJA hearing sua sponte merely because abuse is referenced in the record, quoting People v Hudson for the proposition that a hearing is not required “in every case containing allegations that the defendant is a victim of domestic violence, regardless of whether a hearing was requested.” The Third Department’s approach is consistent with its own precedent (Smalls, Ava OO.) and with the Second Department’s Hudson, signaling cross-departmental alignment on the predicate necessity of a request.

3) Sentencing Discretion and Consecutive Terms. The panel found no basis for the claim that the County Court believed itself bound by the prosecutor’s reduced offer. To the contrary, the record reflected an independent exercise of discretion consistent with People v Farrar and kindred cases: the court consented to the negotiated disposition but retained sentencing discretion up to imposition, and nothing in its remarks suggested any abdication of that role.

On the consecutive/concurrent question, the plea contemplated a sentence for burglary in the second degree to run consecutive to the sentence defendant was then serving. At sentencing, the People argued that Penal Law § 70.25(2-b) required consecutive sentencing because the violent felony (burglary second) occurred after arraignment on a separate felony in Saratoga County and no mitigating circumstances were present to warrant concurrency. The defendant urged concurrency but did not contest the applicability of § 70.25(2-b). The appellate record offered no basis to find the statute inapplicable, and thus the consecutive term was neither erroneous nor an abuse of discretion. Finally, the Third Department rejected the claim that the negotiated 8½-year term (plus five years’ PRS) was unduly harsh given defendant’s “lengthy and serious criminal record” dating back to 1984 and reflecting a “lifetime of serial burglaries and theft.”

Impact and Significance

Tenace offers several important clarifications for practitioners:

• Plea “satisfaction” clauses are enforceable but factual: When a plea purports to satisfy an “underlying burglary,” the burden may fall on the defendant to establish that a later indictment targets the very burglary that underlies the possession offense. Where the SCI and plea minutes lack specificity, courts may hold an evidentiary hearing and consider extrinsic evidence—testimony and documentary comparisons of stolen items—to resolve scope.
• Record specificity matters: For both prosecutors and defense counsel, this decision incentivizes more careful creation of the record when a satisfaction clause is intended to reach specific uncharged conduct. Identifying affected dates, incidents, locations, or even item descriptions at the colloquy stage can mitigate later disputes.
• DVSJA procedure is request-driven: Tenace reinforces a uniform message emerging across departments—DVSJA relief must be invoked. Absent a request, a court does not have an automatic duty to convene a § 60.12 hearing simply because abuse is mentioned in sentencing submissions.
• Consecutive sentencing under § 70.25(2-b): The court’s acceptance of a mandatory-consecutive framework where a violent felony is committed after arraignment on a separate felony underscores the importance of the defendant’s procedural posture in the earlier case. Counsel should be prepared to address both applicability and any mitigating circumstances that could justify concurrency.

In broader terms, Tenace harmonizes plea-agreement enforcement with practical factfinding and aligns Third Department DVSJA procedure with Second Department authority, signaling stability in two frequently litigated domains.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Superior Court Information (SCI): An accusatory instrument used to prosecute a felony when a defendant waives indictment and consents to be prosecuted on the SCI. Here, the defendant pled to two counts of criminal possession of stolen property under an SCI.
• “Satisfaction” Clause: A plea provision stating that the plea will satisfy other specified, often uncharged, offenses (e.g., “any underlying burglary” related to the possessed property). Such clauses operate like contractual commitments but apply only to the incidents contemplated by the parties; the defendant must show the later charge is the one covered.
• Preponderance of the Evidence: A standard requiring proof that a fact is more likely than not (greater than 50%). At the hearing, the parties stipulated that the defendant bore this burden to link the SCI plea to the later-indicted burglary.
• Preservation (CPL 470.05[2]): To raise an issue on appeal, a party must have raised it in the trial court. Failing to request a DVSJA hearing in the trial court means the claim is generally unreviewable on appeal.
• DVSJA Hearing (Penal Law § 60.12): A proceeding where the court may impose a reduced, alternative sentence if the defendant proves qualifying domestic abuse and that it significantly contributed to the offense. Courts are not required to hold such a hearing unless asked.
• Violent Felony Offense: Certain felonies designated by statute as “violent,” including burglary in the second degree of a dwelling (Penal Law §§ 70.02[1][b]; 140.25[2]), which can carry special sentencing consequences.
• Consecutive vs. Concurrent Sentences: Consecutive sentences run one after another; concurrent sentences run at the same time. Under Penal Law § 70.25(2-b), when specific conditions are met—such as a violent felony committed after arraignment on a separate felony—consecutive sentencing may be mandated absent mitigating circumstances.
• Postrelease Supervision (PRS): A period of supervision served after release from prison. Here, the negotiated sentence included five years of PRS.
• Felony Complaint: A preliminary accusatory instrument that can specify items or conduct underlying an SCI. In Tenace, the felony complaint listed the specific items possessed on August 26, which did not match the burglary’s stolen items.

Conclusion

People v. Tenace clarifies how New York courts will enforce plea “satisfaction” clauses when the parties dispute whether a later indictment targets the same conduct covered by an earlier plea. The decision establishes that, where the plea and SCI are ambiguous, courts may hold an evidentiary hearing; the defendant bears the burden (here, by stipulation, preponderance) to prove that the later charge is, in fact, the “underlying” offense contemplated. Absent that showing, the prosecution is not barred.

The opinion also reinforces procedural discipline in sentencing: a DVSJA hearing must be requested to preserve the issue, and courts have no sua sponte duty to convene one merely because abuse is referenced. On sentencing discretion, the court affirmed that judges retain authority independent of prosecutorial offers, and it endorsed the application of Penal Law § 70.25(2-b) to require consecutive sentencing in the circumstances presented, rejecting claims of harshness given the defendant’s extensive criminal history.

The key takeaways: precision at the plea colloquy is invaluable; defendants seeking to invoke satisfaction clauses must marshal specific proof linking incidents; DVSJA relief should be expressly requested with supporting submissions; and counsel should be prepared to address the applicability of mandatory-consecutive sentencing statutes and any mitigating circumstances. Tenace thus provides a practical, evidence-centered roadmap for resolving the scope of plea bargains and clarifies procedural expectations at sentencing.