Plea in Satisfaction Bars §1983 Fabricated‑Evidence and Malicious Prosecution Claims; CPLR 4401 Judgment After Mistrial Permitted — Dawoodi v. City of New York

Introduction

This commentary examines the Appellate Division, Second Department’s decision in Dawoodi v. City of New York, 2025 NY Slip Op 05498 (Oct. 8, 2025). The case arises from a 2012 burglary investigation that culminated in the plaintiff’s arrest based on a victim’s identification from surveillance footage and a subsequent indictment on multiple counts. In 2013, the plaintiff pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of marijuana in full satisfaction of the indictment. He later brought civil claims in 2014 against the City of New York, a detective (Thomas Varghese), and the Kings County District Attorney’s Office, alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution, and deprivation of a fair trial under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 premised on fabricated evidence.

A jury trial in 2022 ended in a mistrial after the jury deadlocked. The defendants renewed their motion for judgment as a matter of law under CPLR 4401, which the Supreme Court, Kings County granted as to the three core claims. On appeal, the Second Department affirmed, articulating and reinforcing several important doctrines: (1) a court may grant CPLR 4401 judgment as a matter of law even after a mistrial; (2) a § 1983 fabricated‑evidence “fair trial” claim requires a favorable termination of the criminal proceedings, which is negated by a plea in satisfaction of an indictment; (3) a state-law false arrest claim against municipal defendants is subject to a one‑year‑and‑90‑day statute of limitations that accrues upon release from confinement; (4) probable cause defeats § 1983 false arrest and malicious prosecution claims; and (5) qualified immunity shields an arrest predicated on a victim’s positive identification, absent clearly established law to the contrary.

Summary of the Opinion

CPLR 4401 after mistrial: The court held the trial court properly entertained and granted a post‑mistrial CPLR 4401 motion for judgment as a matter of law (citing Matter of James and Gullian).
§ 1983 fabricated‑evidence fair trial claim: The claim fails absent a favorable termination of the criminal prosecution. A plea to unlawful possession of marijuana “in full satisfaction” of the indictment is not a favorable termination (citing McDonough, Barnes, and Black).
State false arrest (common law): Time‑barred. The claim accrued upon the plaintiff’s release from confinement on September 14, 2012, and a December 2014 filing exceeded the one‑year‑and‑90‑day limitations period (citing Williams and Bellissimo).
Malicious prosecution: No favorable termination because dismissal of charges as part of a plea “compromise” is not favorable (citing Cantalino and Rush); thus the claim fails.
Probable cause and qualified immunity: A victim’s positive identification supplied probable cause, defeating § 1983 false arrest and malicious prosecution claims. Detective Varghese is also protected by qualified immunity because his conduct was objectively reasonable and did not violate clearly established law (citing Jones, Williams, Boyd, and Davila).
2019 CPL 160.50 amendments: The court rejected reliance on the 2019 amendments because they could not have been encompassed in a 2014 complaint (citing Melchner). The court did not reach any substantive effect of those amendments on malicious prosecution or favorable termination doctrine.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Significance

Matter of James, 17 AD3d 366, 367; Gullian v Newcombe & Co., 27 AD2d 479, 480. These cases support the procedural proposition that trial courts may consider and grant CPLR 4401 judgments as a matter of law following a mistrial. Dawoodi reaffirms that a deadlocked jury does not bar the court from entering JMOL where the plaintiff’s proof is legally insufficient.
Szczerbiak v Pilat, 90 NY2d 553, 556; Sargiss v Magarelli, 115 AD3d 842. These authorities set the CPLR 4401 standard: a defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and granting all reasonable inferences, there is no rational path by which a jury could find for the plaintiff. The Second Department applied this exacting standard in affirming dismissal.
Ricciuti v New York City Tr. Auth., 124 F3d 123, 130 (2d Cir); Garnett v Undercover Officer C0039, 838 F3d 265, 279 (2d Cir); Ashley v City of New York, 992 F3d 128, 139 (2d Cir). These cases articulate the elements of a § 1983 fabricated‑evidence fair trial claim: an investigating official fabricated information likely to influence a jury, forwarded it to prosecutors, and the plaintiff suffered deprivation as a result. These set the baseline doctrinal framework that Dawoodi then constrains with a favorable‑termination requirement.
McDonough v Smith, 588 US 109, 117 (2019); Barnes v City of New York, 68 F4th 123, 128–33 (2d Cir); Black v Petitinato, 761 Fed Appx 18, 23 (2d Cir). McDonough held that fabricated‑evidence claims accrue upon favorable termination of the criminal proceedings. Barnes clarified in the Second Circuit that favorable termination is not just about accrual; it is an element of the claim. Black confirms that dismissals tied to plea bargains do not qualify as favorable terminations. Dawoodi adopts this line for state court application, foreclosing fabricated‑evidence claims where the plaintiff pleads to an offense “in full satisfaction” of an indictment.
Williams v City of New York, 153 AD3d 1301, 1305; Bellissimo v Mitchell, 122 AD3d 560, 560. These cases fix the accrual of state false arrest at release from confinement and apply the one‑year‑and‑90‑day statute of limitations for actions against municipalities. Dawoodi reiterates that timing rule and applies it strictly.
De Lourdes Torres v Jones, 26 NY3d 742, 760; Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 457. These seminal cases define malicious prosecution’s elements: initiation, favorable termination, lack of probable cause, and malice. Dawoodi turns on the second element (favorable termination) and also buttresses the probable cause finding.
Baker v City of New York, 44 AD3d 977, 979; Rush v County of Nassau, 51 AD3d 762, 763. These underscore that failure to establish any one element of malicious prosecution defeats the claim. Dawoodi uses this to dispose of the claim at the favorable‑termination step.
Cantalino v Danner, 96 NY2d 391, 395. The Court of Appeals’ touchstone for “favorable termination,” which excludes outcomes that are compromises with the accused. Dawoodi relies on Cantalino to hold a plea in satisfaction is not favorable.
Melchner v Town of Carmel, 195 AD3d 803, 806. Cited to reject an attempt to retrofit the case with 2019 CPL 160.50 amendments; a 2014 complaint cannot be read to encompass post‑pleading statutory changes without proper amendment. Dawoodi uses Melchner procedurally, not to opine on the substantive reach of CPL 160.50 amendments.
Jones v City of New York, 206 AD3d 635, 639; Williams v City of New York, 153 AD3d at 1302. These authorities confirm that probable cause defeats § 1983 false arrest and malicious prosecution claims. A victim’s positive identification can furnish probable cause.
Boyd v City of New York, 149 AD3d 683, 686; Davila v City of New York, 139 AD3d 890, 893. These are relied upon for qualified immunity: officers are shielded where their conduct is objectively reasonable and not violative of clearly established rights. Dawoodi applies this to Detective Varghese’s reliance on a positive identification.

Legal Reasoning

Post‑mistrial CPLR 4401 judgment is proper.
Even though the jury deadlocked and a mistrial was declared, the trial court retained authority to grant judgment as a matter of law under CPLR 4401. The Second Department endorsed the court’s consideration of the defendants’ renewed 4401 motion, citing Matter of James and Gullian. This confirms that a mistrial does not reset the sufficiency inquiry where the plaintiff’s proof, taken as true with all favorable inferences, cannot support a verdict as a matter of law.
Fabricated‑evidence (§ 1983 fair trial) claims require favorable termination, and a plea in satisfaction is not favorable.
Drawing from McDonough and Barnes, the court required the plaintiff to show that his criminal prosecution ended in a manner indicative of innocence. The plaintiff’s 2013 plea to unlawful possession of marijuana “in full satisfaction” of a six‑count indictment is a textbook example of a compromise disposition. Under Black and Cantalino, such a plea cannot be a favorable termination. Without favorable termination, the fabricated‑evidence claim fails as a matter of law, regardless of the other elements (Ricciuti, Garnett, Ashley).
State‑law false arrest is time‑barred; accrual at release.
Consistent with Williams and Bellissimo, the court held that the common‑law false arrest claim accrued at the plaintiff’s release from confinement on September 14, 2012. Because suit was filed in December 2014, the one‑year‑and‑90‑day statute of limitations applicable to municipal defendants had run, warranting dismissal.
Malicious prosecution fails for lack of favorable termination and, independently, because probable cause existed.
Malicious prosecution requires favorable termination (De Lourdes Torres, Broughton). The plea in satisfaction is not favorable (Cantalino; Rush). Separately, probable cause is a complete defense (Jones), and the court found probable cause based on the victim’s identification of the plaintiff as the person exiting the apartment in surveillance video. That identification also undermines the “absence of probable cause” element.
Probable cause and qualified immunity defeat the federal false arrest claim.
A victim’s positive identification is sufficient to establish probable cause absent red flags about reliability. That defeats § 1983 false arrest claims. Even if probable cause were debatable, qualified immunity would attach where there is “arguable probable cause.” Citing Boyd and Davila, the court held Detective Varghese’s actions were objectively reasonable and did not violate clearly established rights, given the positive identification and the circumstances of the investigation.
No late reliance on 2019 CPL 160.50 legislative changes.
The plaintiff could not rely on post‑2014 legislative amendments to CPL 160.50 to reshape the case theory at the conclusion of trial. Invoking Melchner, the court clarified that the 2019 amendments were not encompassed in the 2014 complaint. Notably, the opinion does not decide the substantive question of whether the 2019 amendments alter favorable termination for malicious prosecution; it resolves only the procedural non‑applicability in this case.

Impact

Consolidation of favorable‑termination doctrine for § 1983 fabricated‑evidence claims in New York courts: By expressly invoking Barnes and McDonough, the Second Department cements that favorable termination is not merely an accrual trigger but an element of the claim. Plaintiffs who plead to any charge in satisfaction of an indictment generally cannot maintain fabricated‑evidence fair trial claims or malicious prosecution claims.
Plea decisions carry civil‑rights consequences: The decision underscores a strategic reality: a plea that resolves a criminal case will usually foreclose civil claims that require favorable termination. Counsel must weigh civil‑litigation goals before advising plea dispositions “in full satisfaction.”
Probable cause from victim identification remains robust: A positive identification—here, linked to surveillance footage—continues to suffice for probable cause, absent evidence of unreliability. This strengthens defenses to false arrest and malicious prosecution and supports qualified immunity.
Trial practice after mistrial: Defendants can and should renew CPLR 4401 motions post‑mistrial. Where the plaintiff’s proof is legally insufficient, courts may avoid retrial and enter judgment as a matter of law.
Statutes of limitation enforced strictly: The one‑year‑and‑90‑day period for municipal false arrest claims, accruing at release from confinement, is unforgiving. Practitioners must docket accrual dates early.
Limits on retrofitting claims with later statutory changes: Without amendment, parties cannot rely on post‑pleading statutory reforms (such as the 2019 CPL 160.50 amendments) to save claims at trial or on appeal.

Complex Concepts Simplified

CPLR 4401 (Judgment as a Matter of Law): A request made during or after trial asking the judge to rule that, even taking the opponent’s evidence as true and giving them every reasonable inference, no reasonable jury could find for them. It is akin to a directed verdict.
Favorable Termination: A criminal case ends in a way that is consistent with the accused’s innocence (e.g., acquittal, certain dismissals). A plea “in full satisfaction” of charges is a compromise, not a favorable termination.
Fabricated‑Evidence Fair Trial Claim (§ 1983): A claim that police fabricated evidence that could mislead a jury and forwarded it to prosecutors, causing a deprivation (e.g., prosecution, detention). Under McDonough/Barnes, the prosecution must also have ended favorably for the plaintiff.
Probable Cause: Facts and circumstances known to officers that would lead a reasonable person to believe a crime was committed by the suspect. A victim’s trustworthy identification often suffices.
Qualified Immunity: Protects government officials from damages liability unless they violated a clearly established right that a reasonable officer should have known. If officers had at least “arguable probable cause,” they are typically immune.
Plea “in Full Satisfaction”: The defendant pleads guilty to one offense and the prosecution dismisses remaining charges. This is a negotiated compromise and not a termination indicative of innocence.
Accrual of False Arrest (State Law): The clock starts when the plaintiff is released from custody. Claims against municipalities must be brought within one year and 90 days.
CPL 160.50 (Sealing upon Favorable Termination): A New York statute governing sealing records after certain terminations. Dawoodi holds only that 2019 amendments could not retroactively be relied upon in a 2014 complaint without amendment; it does not resolve their substantive effect on tort elements like favorable termination.

Conclusion

Dawoodi v. City of New York delivers a clear, multi‑faceted message for civil rights and tort litigation in New York:

A plea in satisfaction of an indictment is not a favorable termination and thus defeats both malicious prosecution and § 1983 fabricated‑evidence fair trial claims.
Probable cause—here, grounded in a victim’s positive identification—defeats § 1983 false arrest and malicious prosecution and supports qualified immunity.
State false arrest claims against municipalities accrue at release and are strictly time‑barred after one year and 90 days.
Trial courts may grant CPLR 4401 judgments as a matter of law even after a mistrial.
Parties cannot retrofit cases with post‑pleading statutory changes, such as the 2019 CPL 160.50 amendments, without proper procedural steps.

In reinforcing these doctrines, the Second Department aligns state practice with federal jurisprudence on fabricated‑evidence claims and clarifies several recurring procedural and substantive issues. The decision is thus a valuable roadmap for litigants navigating the intersection of criminal dispositions and subsequent civil liability.

Note: The opinion references that the “defendant pleaded guilty” where the context indicates it was the plaintiff who entered the plea. As a slip opinion, minor clerical errors can appear prior to final publication.