Plausibility Pleading and Post‑Conviction Rule 41(g) Motions: Commentary on United States v. Reddick (2d Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Second Circuit’s summary order in United States v. Reddick, No. 23‑6946‑cr (2d Cir. Nov. 24, 2025), in which the court affirmed the denial—without prejudice—of a motion for return of property under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g).

Although issued as a non‑precedential “summary order,” the decision is instructive in several important respects:

It expressly applies the Iqbal/Twombly “plausibility” pleading standard to a post‑conviction Rule 41(g) motion treated as a civil complaint for equitable relief.
It approves the district court’s summary denial of a factually conclusory pro se motion, while inviting refiling with adequate factual support.
It clarifies appellate finality where a “without prejudice” order is appealed after the movant disclaims any intent to amend.
It reinforces that Rule 41(g) motions must be filed in the district where the property was seized, not in the court of appeals.

The central dispute arose from defendant‑appellant Stanley Reddick’s claim that approximately $8,000 in U.S. currency was seized incident to his arrest and never returned. The government disputed that such an amount was ever seized, produced documentation showing a different amount ($1,000) that was later returned, and reported a complete absence of any record of an $8,000 seizure.

The district court (Meyer, J.) denied the motion without prejudice and invited Reddick to refile with a factual predicate. Reddick instead chose to appeal and, on appeal, expressly disclaimed any intent to amend. The Second Circuit (Wesley, Merriam, and Kahn, JJ.) affirmed.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Procedural Background

On May 3, 2017, federal agents executed a search warrant at Reddick’s home and a warrant for his arrest. The inventory listed an “undetermined amount [of] US Currency,” among other items (cell phone, personal documents).
Reddick was convicted at trial and sentenced in July 2019 to 120 months’ imprisonment. He did not appeal the conviction or sentence.
On July 24, 2023, proceeding pro se, Reddick filed a Rule 41(g) motion in the district court seeking “approximately $8,000 dollars in U.S. Currency seized incident to arrest.”
The government opposed, stating:
- No contemporaneous report or case‑agent recollection supported the claim that $8,000 had been seized.
The district court denied the motion “without prejudice to the re‑filing of a motion that shows a factual predicate for the claim that $8,000 was seized and that explains why no claim for these monies was raised at an earlier time.”
Reddick did not refile or supplement the motion. Instead, he appealed and, in his appellate briefing, expressly stated he did not intend to amend.
He also filed a renewed Rule 41(g) motion directly in the Second Circuit, which the panel denied as improperly filed in the first instance in an appellate court.

B. Holding

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the Rule 41(g) motion. The key holdings were:

A post‑conviction Rule 41(g) motion is treated as a civil complaint for equitable relief under Rufu v. United States, 20 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 1994).
When so treated, the motion must plausibly allege that the government seized and is unlawfully retaining the property. Mere conclusory assertion that “approximately $8,000 dollars in U.S. currency” was seized is insufficient under Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
Because Reddick’s motion “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility,” and contains only “threadbare recitals” supported by conclusory statements, it fails to state a plausible claim for equitable relief and may be summarily denied without prejudice.
The district court’s invitation to refile with factual allegations was appropriate; Reddick’s decision not to amend, and instead to appeal, made the otherwise non‑final “without prejudice” order final and appealable under Slayton v. American Express Co., 460 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2006).
The Rule 41(g) motion filed directly in the Second Circuit is improper because Rule 41(g) requires such motions to be filed in the district where the property was seized.

III. Analysis

A. Governing Legal Framework

1. Rule 41(g) and Its Post‑Conviction Character

Rule 41(g) (formerly 41(e)) provides in relevant part:

A person aggrieved by ... the deprivation of property may move for the property's return. The motion must be filed in the district where the property was seized. The court must receive evidence on any factual issue necessary to decide the motion.

In Rufu v. United States, 20 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 1994), the Second Circuit established that when a Rule 41 motion is made after the termination of criminal proceedings, it must be treated as “a civil complaint for equitable relief.” The Reddick panel quotes and applies that rule:

A “defendant's post-trial motion for return of seized property,” if “made after the termination of criminal proceedings against the defendant, ... should be treated as a civil complaint for equitable relief.” Rufu, 20 F.3d at 65.

Both parties agreed on this characterization; the government’s brief and Reddick’s pro se appellate submissions described a Rule 41(g) motion in this context as an “independent civil action for equitable relief.”

2. Standard of Review: Equitable Relief under Rule 41(g)

The Second Circuit relied on United States v. Zaleski, 686 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2012), to articulate the standard of review:

"We review a district court's grant or denial of equitable relief [under Rule 41(g)] for abuse of discretion, but we review de novo any legal conclusion underlying such a decision." Zaleski, 686 F.3d at 92.

Thus, two layers of review are present:

Abuse of discretion – to evaluate the district court’s ultimate decision to deny equitable relief.
De novo review of legal conclusions – including application of the Iqbal/Twombly pleading standard to determine whether the motion, treated as a complaint, states a plausible claim.

In Reddick, the panel effectively resolved the appeal by focusing on the legal question whether the Rule 41(g) motion “plausibly” alleged an unlawful seizure and retention of $8,000. They held that it did not.

B. The Pleading Standard: Importing Iqbal/Twombly into Rule 41(g)

1. The Iqbal Framework Applied

The key analytical move in Reddick is explicit: the court applies the Ashcroft v. Iqbal plausibility standard to a post‑conviction Rule 41(g) motion treated as a civil complaint. The court quotes the Supreme Court:

"A claim has facial plausibility when the [movant] pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the [respondent] is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation modified).

Reddick's motion "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." Id. (citation modified). It makes the purely conclusory assertion that "approximately $8,000 dollars in U.S. currency" was seized incident to Reddick's arrest. ... That "[t]hreadbare recital[] of the elements of a" claim for the return of seized property, "supported by mere conclusory statements," is insufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

The court thus:

Identifies what Reddick must plausibly allege: that the government seized and retained the specific property ($8,000) and did not return it.
Examines the content of the motion and finds only a bare assertion that “approximately $8,000” was seized incident to arrest, with no supporting factual detail.
Concludes that such a bare assertion is the sort of “threadbare recital” of an element, supported only by a conclusion, that Iqbal holds is insufficient.

2. Why the Motion Failed Under This Standard

The panel’s reasoning is simple but strict. The motion alleged only:

“approximately $8,000 dollars in U.S. Currency seized incident to arrest pertaining to the aforementioned case.”

Missing from the motion were factual allegations that might make the claim plausible, such as:

Details of when and how the money was in Reddick’s possession.
(e.g., “I had $8,000 in a brown envelope in my living room when agents entered.”)
Specifics about the seizure itself.
(e.g., agent statements, descriptions of items removed, contemporaneous receipts or lack thereof.)
Information about what happened to the money afterward.
(e.g., whether he ever signed any receipt, received any notice of forfeiture, or made prior inquiries specifically about the money.)
Any corroborating documentation or witnesses.

By contrast, the government presented:

Agent reports that did not mention an $8,000 seizure.
No record in the DOJ’s Consolidated Asset Tracking System of any $8,000 seizure from Reddick.
Documentation showing that exactly $1,000 in currency had been seized and later released to Reddick in 2022.
An argument that Reddick’s earlier requests for return of other items (cell phone, documents) never mentioned $8,000.

While the panel’s formal decision rests on pleading insufficiency, the background government submissions illustrate the type of documentary trail courts expect to see in actual property‑return disputes. The absence of any such detail in Reddick’s motion underscored its conclusory nature.

3. Interaction with Rule 41(g)’s Evidence Requirement

Rule 41(g) states: “The court must receive evidence on any factual issue necessary to decide the motion.” One might argue that whenever the government disputes the existence of a seizure, there is a “factual issue” requiring the court to receive evidence.

Reddick implicitly rejects an automatic‑hearing approach. By applying Iqbal first, the Second Circuit indicates that:

Only if the motion pleads enough facts to create a plausible claim—and thereby generate a genuinely material factual dispute—does Rule 41(g)’s evidentiary requirement come into play.
Where the motion is entirely conclusory, there is no “factual issue necessary to decide the motion” in the sense contemplated by the rule, because the motion can be dismissed at the pleading stage.

In effect, the court imports ordinary civil‑pleading gatekeeping into the Rule 41(g) framework: evidentiary hearings are reserved for disputes generated by plausibly alleged facts, not bare conclusions.

C. Treatment of the Motion as a Civil Complaint for Equitable Relief

The opinion reiterates and builds on Rufu’s rule that a post‑conviction Rule 41(g) motion is to be treated as a civil action for equitable relief. Several consequences flow from this characterization, all implicated by the Reddick decision:

Pleading standard – the motion must meet the civil pleading standard under Iqbal/Twombly.
Standard of review – the appellate court reviews the district court’s denial of equitable relief for abuse of discretion, but reviews legal questions (like sufficiency of the pleadings) de novo.
Relief sought – the remedy is equitable (return of property or similar relief) rather than damages (though some circuits allow certain monetary remedies where property cannot be returned).
Procedural posture – these motions are effectively independent civil cases, even if docketed in the original criminal case.

Reddick underscores that litigants should draft Rule 41(g) motions with the same care as a civil complaint: they must set forth facts, not merely conclusions.

D. Finality and Appealable Orders: Application of Slayton

Typically, an order denying a motion “without prejudice” is not final and thus not appealable. However, the Second Circuit relies on Slayton v. American Express Co., 460 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2006), to handle this procedural wrinkle:

Although the Rule 41(g) Motion was denied without prejudice, "an appellant can render such a non-final order 'final' and appealable by disclaiming any intent to amend." Slayton, 460 F.3d at 224 (collecting cases). On appeal, Reddick has expressly disclaimed any intent to amend. See Reddick Br. at 3 ("Mr. Reddick does not intend to amend his motion.").

This clarification matters for appellate practice:

If the movant indicates a desire to amend or refile in the district court, the “without prejudice” order likely remains non‑final and unappealable.
If the movant chooses to stand on the existing motion (as Reddick did), explicitly disclaiming amendment, the order is treated as final and appealable.

The trade‑off is clear: by appealing rather than amending, a litigant gains immediate appellate review but loses the opportunity to cure pleading defects in the district court.

E. Proper Forum for Rule 41(g) Motions

The panel also addressed, briefly but decisively, Reddick’s attempt to file a renewed Rule 41(g) motion directly with the Second Circuit:

Reddick also filed a renewed motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) before this Court. That motion is DENIED as not properly filed in the first instance in the Court of Appeals. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g) ("The motion must be filed in the district where the property was seized.").

This serves as a clear reminder:

Rule 41(g) motions must be initiated in the district court where the property was seized.
The court of appeals has appellate jurisdiction only; it cannot act as the court of first instance for such motions.

Practically, parties seeking return of property must always begin in the appropriate district court, even if the underlying criminal conviction is on appeal or has already been reviewed.

F. The Role of the Government’s Documentation and Asset Tracking

While the court’s decision turns on pleading insufficiency rather than a merits finding that no $8,000 was seized, the government’s response illustrates the expected evidentiary framework in these disputes:

Contemporaneous reports – agents’ reports and seizure documents should describe any currency taken.
DOJ Consolidated Asset Tracking System (CATS) – a database used to track seized and forfeited assets. The government reported that a check of CATS revealed no seizure of $8,000 from Reddick.
Property release forms – here, a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives “Release and Receipt of Property” form documented the release of $1,000 to Reddick in July 2022.

For future litigants:

Defendants should, where possible, cite or attach any property receipts, inventory returns, or correspondence to support their Rule 41(g) claims.
The government should ensure accurate and timely completion and filing of search‑warrant returns and property inventories—an issue highlighted by the footnote that the warrant return was only filed on the district court docket in October 2025, after this case raised questions about it.

G. Pro Se Status and Access to Equitable Relief

Reddick was pro se before the district court. The Second Circuit nonetheless applied the standard Iqbal pleading framework. While the opinion does not explicitly discuss liberal construction of pro se pleadings, Second Circuit practice generally construes pro se filings liberally, but does not excuse fundamental pleading deficiencies or allow conclusory allegations to survive.

The panel’s endorsement of the district court’s “without prejudice” denial is significant. The district court:

Identified the deficiencies in the motion (lack of factual predicate; unexplained delay in raising the money claim).
Gave Reddick an opportunity to correct them by refiling.

The appellate court therefore emphasizes that the process was fair: any hardship suffered by Reddick flows from his own decision not to amend, not from an unreasonably strict or inflexible application of Rule 41(g).

IV. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Rufu v. United States, 20 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 1994)

Rufu is the foundation for treating post‑conviction Rule 41(g) motions as civil complaints for equitable relief. In that case, the Second Circuit:

Held that once criminal proceedings are over, a Rule 41 motion is no longer a purely criminal procedural matter but functions as an independent civil action.
Placed such motions within the framework of general civil equitable jurisdiction.

Reddick faithfully applies Rufu, and by doing so, confirms that:

The age of Iqbal/Twombly applies to these civil‑equitable Rule 41(g) matters.
Post‑conviction property‑return disputes are not exempt from modern pleading standards.

B. United States v. Zaleski, 686 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2012)

In Zaleski, the Second Circuit addressed the standard of review for Rule 41(g) orders and confirmed:

The district court’s decision to grant or deny Rule 41(g) relief is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
However, any underlying legal determinations (for example, whether property was subject to forfeiture or whether sovereign immunity bars certain relief) are reviewed de novo.

Reddick relies on this framework but channels its analysis to a single legal question: whether Reddick’s motion states a plausible claim. That underscores that sufficiency of pleading under Iqbal is a purely legal question, suitable for de novo review.

C. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)

Iqbal, building on Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), holds that:

Legal conclusions must be disregarded when determining if a complaint states a claim.
Only the well‑pleaded factual allegations are assumed true.
Those facts must support a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable.
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”

Reddick’s motion was exactly the sort of “threadbare” pleading Iqbal condemns: it simply asserted that $8,000 was seized, without any supporting detail explaining how, when, or by whom, or why the money had not been returned.

D. Slayton v. American Express Co., 460 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2006)

Slayton governs when a “without prejudice” dismissal is final and appealable. It holds that a plaintiff may render an otherwise non‑final order final by unequivocally disavowing any intent to amend. Reddick applied this principle:

The district court denied the motion without prejudice.
Reddick, on appeal, stated that he did not intend to amend.
Thus, the order became final and appealable for purposes of appellate jurisdiction.

This precedent is important whenever litigants must choose between:

Refining their pleadings in the district court (potentially strengthening the record), or
Going directly to appeal, at the cost of forgoing amendment.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. What Is a Rule 41(g) Motion?

Rule 41(g) allows someone whose property has been seized by the government to ask a court to order that the property be returned. Key features:

It can be filed during a criminal case (e.g., to get property back if it is no longer needed as evidence) or after the criminal case has ended.
When filed after the case ends, it functions like a civil lawsuit in equity—asking the court, sitting in fairness, to order return of property still in government hands.
It must be filed in the district where the property was seized.
If factual issues matter (e.g., did the seizure occur, who owns the property), the court “must receive evidence”—which may mean hearings, documents, or affidavits.

B. “Plausibility” Pleading Explained

“Plausibility” is a middle ground between:

Pure possibility (something could have happened) and
Probability (something is more likely than not).

A claim is “plausible” if, based on the facts alleged, a reasonable judge could infer liability—not certainty, but a sensible inference. To reach that level:

The complaint must contain specific, concrete facts, not just conclusions or legal buzzwords.
Courts ignore bare conclusions and test whether the remaining factual allegations, taken as true, show a viable claim.

In Reddick’s case, just saying “$8,000 was seized” was too thin. He needed some factual narrative from which the court could infer that agents took that amount and kept it.

C. Abuse of Discretion vs. De Novo Review

On appeal, courts use different lenses to review a lower court’s decision:

De novo review: the appellate court looks at the legal issue fresh, without deference. It is as if the appellate court were deciding the legal question for the first time.
Abuse of discretion review: the appellate court gives deference to the lower court’s decision, overturning it only if the decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or based on a misunderstanding of the law.

For Rule 41(g):

Whether the complaint states a plausible claim is a legal question reviewed de novo.
Whether to grant or deny equitable relief (for example, after an evidentiary hearing) is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

D. Summary Orders and Non‑Precedential Status

The opinion begins with a notice:

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER ... IS PERMITTED ...

This means:

The decision is not binding precedent on future panels of the Second Circuit or district courts within the circuit.
However, parties may cite it as persuasive authority—evidence of how the court has handled similar issues.
When citing it, parties must comply with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and local rules, including serving a copy on any pro se party.

So, while Reddick does not formally “make law,” it is an important data point in predicting how the Second Circuit will treat similar Rule 41(g) motions.

E. Equitable Relief

“Equitable relief” refers to remedies based on fairness, rather than monetary damages, such as:

Orders directing someone to act (e.g., return property, perform a contract);
Orders prohibiting conduct (injunctions);
Other non‑monetary commands designed to prevent unjust enrichment or unfair outcomes.

A Rule 41(g) motion seeks equitable relief: the return of property. The court’s decision to grant or withhold that relief is guided by principles of fairness, respect for property rights, and the government’s legitimate need to retain evidence or enforce forfeiture laws.

VI. Impact and Practical Implications

A. For Defendants and Defense Counsel

Detail is essential. A Rule 41(g) motion must:
- Describe the property precisely (amounts, denominations, serial numbers if known, or other identifying details).
- Explain the circumstances of possession and seizure (where it was, who took it, what was said).
- Address what happened after the seizure (any receipts, notices, prior requests for return).
Document everything. Defense counsel should:
- Preserve seizure receipts and warrant inventories.
- Keep correspondence with the government about property.
- Attach these materials or refer to them with specificity in the motion.
Time matters. Reddick’s motion came years after sentencing, even though he had long sought other property items. District courts may reasonably require:
- An explanation for any long delay.
- Evidence countering possible forfeiture, destruction, or return of currency.
Strategic choice about amendment vs. appeal. Once a motion is denied without prejudice:
- Amending with more facts gives a better chance of success on the merits.
- Appealing immediately (and disclaiming amendment) may lock in a loss if the pleading is weak, as in Reddick.

B. For Prosecutors and Law Enforcement

Comprehensive documentation. Agencies should:
- Ensure that all seized items—especially currency—are accurately recorded on property receipts and warrant returns.
- Promptly file returns with the court, as highlighted by the delayed filing in Reddick’s case.
Use of asset tracking systems. Reliance on CATS or similar databases is critical:
- To verify what was seized and whether items were forfeited or returned.
- To rebut unsupported assertions of large, undocumented seizures.
Clarity in opposition filings. Government responses should:
- Identify any and all amounts seized.
- Document any returns or forfeitures (with dates and forms).

C. For District Courts

Reddick offers a template for handling conclusory Rule 41(g) motions:

Initial screening – apply the Iqbal standard to determine if the motion plausibly alleges a seizure and wrongful retention.
Option to deny without prejudice – where the pleading is deficient but potentially curable, deny the motion while explicitly inviting a more factually detailed refiling.
Hearing requirement – reserve evidentiary hearings and receipt of evidence for cases where plausible factual allegations establish a genuine dispute about seizure or retention.

D. Doctrinal Impact in the Second Circuit

Even as a summary order, Reddick:

Confirms that Iqbal applies squarely to Rule 41(g) motions treated as civil complaints.
Signals the court’s willingness to approve summary denials where motions lack specific factual content.
Clarifies practical aspects of appellate jurisdiction in this context (finality via disavowal of amendment; improper direct filing in the court of appeals).

Future litigants and courts within the Second Circuit are likely to treat Reddick as persuasive authority on these points.

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Reddick is formally a non‑precedential summary order, but it delivers several clear messages about post‑conviction Rule 41(g) practice in the Second Circuit:

Post‑conviction Rule 41(g) motions are civil complaints for equitable relief and must satisfy the Iqbal/Twombly plausibility standard.
Bare, conclusory assertions that property was seized and not returned are insufficient; specific factual allegations are required.
District courts may summarily deny factually deficient motions without prejudice, while inviting refiling with a factual predicate and explanation for delay.
Orders denying such motions without prejudice become appealable when the movant disclaims any intent to amend, under Slayton.
Rule 41(g) motions must be filed in the district court where the property was seized, not directly in the court of appeals.

In the broader legal context, Reddick underscores the continuing reach of modern pleading standards across procedural contexts, including equitable property‑return actions embedded in criminal cases. It also highlights the interplay between careful recordkeeping by law enforcement, diligent motion practice by defendants, and the judiciary’s role in managing post‑conviction property disputes efficiently yet fairly.