Introduction

In The Gulfstream Café, Inc. v. Georgetown County, Opinion No. 28303 (S.C. Oct. 29, 2025), the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed a high-stakes clash between a longstanding restaurant’s nonexclusive parking easement and a county’s approval of a new restaurant within a planned development district (PD). Gulfstream Café argued that Georgetown County’s enactment of Ordinance 2018-40—which approved “Plan 3.0” for a replacement restaurant on the Marlin Quay Marina site—violated substantive and procedural due process, effected a taking and inverse condemnation, and was tainted by a council member’s conflict of interest during an earlier iteration of the project.

The case tested foundational land-use doctrines: the extent of flexibility PDs enjoy under S.C. Code Ann. § 6-29-740; the limits of nonexclusive easement rights in shared parking; and the burdens of proof for constitutional and takings claims when a landowner alleges severe economic impact from a neighboring redevelopment.

After a bench trial, the circuit court entered judgment for the County and related respondents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the County’s PD decision had a rational basis, Gulfstream’s nonexclusive easement was not “deprived,” and no taking occurred under either per se or Penn Central frameworks. The Court also found no procedural due process violation and declined to invalidate the ordinance over a recused council member’s prior ethical breach. A concurrence would have found the County’s action arbitrary and capricious but concurred in result based on Gulfstream’s failure to prove damages.

Summary of the Opinion

• Substantive due process: No violation. Gulfstream had a property interest (a nonexclusive parking easement), but the County did not deprive it of that interest, and Ordinance 2018-40 had a rational basis. PDs may deviate from general zoning rules (including parking metrics), and here the County permissibly treated Article XI parking standards as a guide rather than a mandate under § 6-29-740.
• Takings and inverse condemnation: No per se taking (Gulfstream retained economically beneficial use of its property and easement). No regulatory taking under Penn Central (character of action, economic impact, and investment-backed expectations weighed against Gulfstream). Inverse condemnation fails because no taking occurred; trial court’s use of a pre-Byrd test was harmless error.
• Conflict/taint: Despite an ethics violation by Councilman Goggans during “Plan 1.0,” his recusal from “Plans 2.0 and 3.0” and multiple public readings cured any taint. The ordinance remains valid.
• Procedural due process: Satisfied. Gulfstream received notice and meaningful opportunities to be heard; it lacked standing to attack notices to others; it also enjoyed judicial review.
• Costs/fees: Attorney’s fees to Gulfstream properly denied; costs of $9,065.54 to Respondents affirmed.

Concurrence in result (Chief Justice Kittredge, joined by Justice Hill): Gulfstream failed to prove damages—its valuation rested on an “extraordinary assumption” of total parking loss unsupported by the record. Absent that defect, the concurrence would have found the County’s decision arbitrary and capricious due to preferential treatment (e.g., using only heated square footage and fixed seating as parking proxies uniquely for this project).

Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

• S.C. Code Ann. § 6-29-740 (PD flexibility): The linchpin of the Court’s zoning analysis. PDs are legislative zoning amendments designed to allow “innovative site planning” and may “provide for variations from other ordinances” concerning “use, setbacks, lot size, density, bulk, and other requirements.” The Court reads this broadly to include parking regulations, empowering the County to use Article XI only as a guidance tool rather than a binding mandate in a PD.
• Sunrise Corp. v. City of Myrtle Beach, 420 F.3d 322 (4th Cir. 2005), and Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County: Adopted as the building blocks of the substantive due process framework—requiring a property interest, a deprivation, and government action so arbitrary that no process could cure it.
• Dunes West Golf Club, LLC v. Town of Mount Pleasant, 401 S.C. 280, 737 S.E.2d 601 (2013): A cornerstone South Carolina case for both due process rational-basis analysis and regulatory takings. It underscores (i) the presumption of constitutionality, (ii) judicial reluctance to substitute planning judgments, and (iii) the Penn Central approach when all economically beneficial use is not eliminated.
• McMaster v. Columbia Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 395 S.C. 499, 719 S.E.2d 660 (2011) and Knowles v. City of Aiken, 305 S.C. 219, 407 S.E.2d 639 (1991): Emphasize rational basis and the “courts are not city planners” admonition.
• Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992): Set the per se taking rule when all economically beneficial use is eliminated. The Court here finds Lucas inapplicable because Gulfstream retains use of its property and its nonexclusive easement.
• Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005): Provide the federal framework for regulatory takings analysis—character of government action, economic impact, and interference with distinct investment-backed expectations. The Court applies these factors and finds no taking.
• Byrd v. City of Hartsville, 365 S.C. 650, 620 S.E.2d 76 (2005): Clarifies that a regulatory inverse condemnation has two elements: (1) affirmative government conduct and (2) a taking. The Court notes the circuit court mistakenly applied pre-Byrd elements but deems the error harmless because Penn Central analysis shows no taking.
• Harbit v. City of Charleston, 382 S.C. 383, 675 S.E.2d 776 (Ct. App. 2009); Rush v. City of Greenville, 246 S.C. 268, 143 S.E.2d 527 (1965); Rushing v. City of Greenville, 265 S.C. 285, 217 S.E.2d 797 (1975); Ani Creation, Inc. v. City of Myrtle Beach Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 440 S.C. 266, 890 S.E.2d 748 (2023): Reinforce the presumption of validity for zoning enactments and the “fairly debatable” deference to local legislative judgments.
• Carolina Chloride, Inc. v. Richland County, 394 S.C. 154, 714 S.E.2d 869 (2011): Guides the “distinct investment-backed expectations” inquiry, highlighting that an owner’s primary expectation is continuation of existing use.
• Stono River Env’t Prot. Ass’n v. DHEC, 305 S.C. 90, 406 S.E.2d 340 (1991) and S.C. Const. art. I, § 22: Frame procedural due process—notice, opportunity to be heard, and judicial review.
• Standards of review: Temple v. Tec-Fab, Inc. (bench trials at law: errors of law), SCDOT v. Horry County (defer to supported fact findings), and Owens v. Stirling (de novo on legal/constitutional conclusions).

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Substantive Due Process

• Property interest exists but is limited. Gulfstream’s 1986 easement confers a nonexclusive right of ingress/egress and shared use of 62 spaces owned by the marina owner, plus Gulfstream’s own 17 spaces. The easement’s language anticipating daytime use by the grantor and evening use by Gulfstream is descriptive, not conferring exclusivity. Thus, Gulfstream’s interest is real but limited.
• No deprivation of the property interest. The ordinance did not eliminate or materially alter Gulfstream’s nonexclusive rights: it still may use the lot and spaces on a shared basis. The mere fact that parking scarcity increased due to a new restaurant does not convert a nonexclusive easement into an exclusive one or amount to a deprivation of the easement itself.
• Rational basis satisfied; PD flexibility controls. The County permissibly exercised PD flexibility under § 6-29-740. Article XI’s parking metrics apply generally but are not binding within a PD; PDs can vary to achieve innovative site planning. The County used Article XI as guidance, counted only heated square footage for parking, and limited seating to the prior establishment’s capacity. The Court emphasizes long-standing parking noncompliance in the PD under Article XI even before the new restaurant—bolstering the conclusion that strict Article XI compliance has never governed this PD. Under rational basis review, the ordinance bears a reasonable relation to legitimate goals—modern code compliance, orderly redevelopment, and serving tourism demand—so the claim fails.

2. Takings and Inverse Condemnation

• No per se (Lucas) taking. Gulfstream did not lose all economically beneficial use of its property. It still operates a restaurant and retains both its 17 owned spaces and nonexclusive access to 62 additional spaces. The valuation opinion claiming a reduction to $89,900 relied on an “extraordinary assumption” that Gulfstream would lose all parking—an assumption the record does not support.
• No regulatory (Penn Central) taking.
  • Character of government action: The ordinance reflects a typical land-use adjustment for the public good (safer, code-compliant building; tourism-serving use), with no exploitation or appropriation by the County. This weighs against a taking.
  • Economic impact: Diminution in value alone does not establish a taking, and Gulfstream’s expert’s premise of total parking loss undermines the probative value of the asserted $1.76 million diminution. Impact evidence was too speculative.
  • Investment-backed expectations: Gulfstream could expect to continue operating a restaurant, but could not reasonably expect exclusive evening use of a shared lot where the easement is expressly nonexclusive. This factor weighs against a taking.
• Inverse condemnation: Under Byrd, only two elements apply to regulatory inverse condemnation—affirmative government conduct and a taking. The enactment of the ordinance satisfies the first element, but no taking occurred under Penn Central. The trial court’s use of a pre-Byrd formulation was harmless error.

3. Ethical Conflict and Alleged Taint

Although Councilman Goggans was sanctioned by the Ethics Commission for his involvement in “Plan 1.0,” he recused from “Plans 2.0 and 3.0.” Both subsequent versions received three readings at the Planning Commission and three at Council, with public comment (including Gulfstream’s objections). The Court applied the strong presumption of validity for municipal zoning and found no “clear abuse” or illegality. The ordinance therefore stood.

4. Procedural Due Process

Procedural due process requires notice, opportunity to be heard, and judicial review. Gulfstream had notice of the 3.0 application, spoke at Planning Commission and Council proceedings, and received “exhaustive judicial review.” It lacked standing to challenge notice given to other property owners. No violation occurred.

5. Concurrence: A Cautionary Note on Arbitrary Treatment and Damages Proof

Chief Justice Kittredge concurred in the result only, emphasizing that Gulfstream’s failure to quantify damages (and its expert’s reliance on a baseless total-parking-loss assumption) doomed its monetary claims. Substantively, however, the concurrence criticized the County’s preferential treatment in calculating parking (heated square footage only; fixed seating caps), and suggested that, but for the damages defect, the County’s action would be arbitrary and capricious. The concurrence thus signals judicial discomfort with bespoke zoning metrics untethered to general standards, even within PDs, when they create singular advantages.

C. Impact and Practical Implications

• PD flexibility reaffirmed—now explicitly extended to parking metrics. Local governments in South Carolina may depart from countywide parking ordinances within PDs, using those rules as guides rather than mandates. The decision gives planners room to align parking with site- and PD-specific constraints.
• Nonexclusive easements remain nonexclusive—even if conditions worsen. Where an easement provides joint, nonexclusive use, courts will not imply temporal exclusivity (e.g., “evening exclusivity”) from aspirational language. Increased competition for shared parking does not itself constitute a deprivation or taking.
• Takings claims require rigorous, reality-grounded valuation. Expert opinions premised on assumptions contrary to the record—such as total loss of an easement’s benefits—will carry little weight. Plaintiffs should quantify actual impacts (e.g., profit/loss data, customer counts, parking studies) and relate them to the property’s value and permitted uses.
• Inverse condemnation remains anchored in Penn Central. Even though the Court corrects the trial court’s outdated element test, the decisive question remains whether the regulation effects a taking under Penn Central—not simply whether the government acted affirmatively.
• Ethics violations do not automatically void later legislative acts. Where a conflicted official is removed from the process and the ordinance undergoes regular procedural safeguards (multiple readings, public input), courts are reluctant to invalidate the final action absent proof of continuing taint.
• Concurrence’s warning shot for local governments. While the majority upholds PD flexibility, the concurrence suggests courts may scrutinize one-off departures from general metrics that appear tailor-made for a project, especially where the government’s rationale is thin and the record shows self-dealing. Expect litigants to cite the concurrence to argue arbitrariness in future PD disputes.

Complex Concepts, Simplified

• Planned Development (PD): A zoning district tailored to a specific area. PDs function as amendments to the zoning ordinance and can deviate from general rules to allow innovative site planning, as authorized by § 6-29-740.
• Nonexclusive Easement: A right to use someone else’s property (here, a parking lot) along with others. “Nonexclusive” means you cannot demand other lawful users stay out—even at peak hours—unless your easement expressly grants exclusivity.
• Substantive Due Process (land-use context): A constitutional check ensuring that government land-use decisions are not arbitrary or capricious. If the decision has a legitimate purpose and a rational basis, courts generally uphold it.
• Per Se Taking (Lucas): When a regulation denies all economically beneficial use of land. Rare; requires near-total wipeout of value/use.
• Penn Central Test: The balancing test for most regulatory takings claims. Courts weigh (1) the character of the regulation, (2) its economic impact, and (3) interference with investment-backed expectations.
• Inverse Condemnation: A lawsuit claiming the government has effectively taken property without formally exercising eminent domain. In South Carolina, a regulatory inverse condemnation requires (1) affirmative government action and (2) a taking under Penn Central.
• Heated vs. Gross Square Footage (parking): Some codes base parking on “gross” (total) area. Here, the County, exercising PD flexibility, used “heated” (enclosed/climate-controlled) area as the parking metric for the new restaurant—one of the features criticized in the concurrence as preferential.
• “Fairly Debatable”/Presumption of Validity: Zoning decisions are legislative and presumed valid. If reasonable minds can differ (i.e., the issue is fairly debatable), courts generally defer to the local government’s judgment.
• “Extraordinary Assumption” in Appraisal: An assumption that is necessary for an opinion but is unsupported by known facts. Appraisals built on such assumptions (e.g., “all parking will be lost”) are vulnerable to being discounted or rejected.

Conclusion

Gulfstream Café cements a consequential proposition in South Carolina land-use law: within a planned development district, local governments may depart from countywide parking ordinances and craft context-specific standards, so long as their choices bear a rational relationship to legitimate planning objectives. A nonexclusive parking easement remains just that; intensified competition for shared spaces does not morph into a deprivation or a compensable taking.

On the constitutional front, the opinion faithfully applies rational basis review for substantive due process challenges and Penn Central for regulatory takings, underscoring the evidentiary burden on plaintiffs to produce grounded, non-speculative proof of economic impact. The Court also confirms—again—that under Byrd, regulatory inverse condemnation turns on whether a taking occurred under Penn Central.

The concurrence’s pointed critique is simultaneously a caution to local governments and a roadmap for future challengers: when a PD approval appears tailored through bespoke metrics conferring singular advantages—especially against a backdrop of self-dealing—courts may be receptive to arbitrariness arguments if damages are soundly proven. Ultimately, however, absent a deprivation of a cognizable property right or a proven taking, and where procedural regularity is observed, the judiciary will not “become city planners.”

Key takeaways:

• PDs in South Carolina can lawfully deviate from general parking codes; Article XI is not binding within PDs unless made so in the PD plan.
• Nonexclusive easements do not confer priority use windows absent express language; increased congestion is not a deprivation.
• Takings claims must rest on credible, record-based valuations and concrete economic data; speculative “extraordinary assumptions” will not suffice.
• Ethical missteps do not automatically void later, procedurally proper legislative actions following recusal and public process.

The decision provides municipalities with clearer latitude in PD administration while signaling that tailored departures from general rules warrant transparent, well-documented rationales—especially when neighboring property interests are at stake.